THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE SUDAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: November 13, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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13 November 1959
STAFF MEMORANDUM NO. )7-59 (Revised)
1. In The Outlook for the Sudan (SNIE 72.1-59, 6 January
1959), we estimated that, for the short-run at least, General
Abboud's regime could probably maintain its authority through
its control of the army and its support from conservative
political and religious leaders. The estimate also emphasized
the long-range difficulties of satisfying both the traditional
politico-.religious factions, on the one hand, and nationalist-
minded junior officer elements on the other. The short-run is
now showing some signs of running out.
2. On '17 Norembir 1958, Abboud and other senior army
officers staged a bloodless coup with the apparent knowledge
and consent of the then Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil (it
appears that Khalil expected to remain the dominant force in
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the government -- an expectation which was not fulfilled).
The coup was motivated by a desire to rid the country of
"degeneration, chaos and instability." Political parties
were dissolved, the constitution was suspended, and press
and other freedoms severely limited. The move was welcomed
by the public and the army, who looked upon it as a deliver-
ance from the corruption and venality of Sudanese politicians,
businessmen and newspapers., and who disliked the Khalil gov-
ernment's overt pro Westernism. The major political and re-
l-AIgious leaders went along, probably hoping that their in-
fluence would soon be restored under more stable conditions.
3. The Abboud government has, in fact, accomplished
much of what was expected of it. The economic situation has
improved largely as a result of the sale of the Sudan's
cotton in western markets. Corruption has been reduced and
the press controlled. Relations with the UAR have been im-
proved to the extent that a Nile Waters agreement has been
announced. While the Sudan has continued to accept American
and British aid and refused aid from the Soviets, it has
recognized Communist China and otherwise made gestures toward
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410m" Imny
neutralism. At the samt: time, the Communist Party has been
kept under tight control and subversive activities of both
the Soviets and the tJAR have been reduced.
1i.. Abboud, however, has shown three major weaknesses;
(a) he has not been able to develop a ;Lair for dramatizing
his accomplishments; (b) he has been unable to maintain the
discipline and loyalty of the junior officers of the army;
and (c) he has been unable to suppress effectively the
activities of the political and religious leaders. These
deficiencies have gradually eroded the prestige of his gov-
ernment.
5. The most recent threat has come from the junior of-
ficer element. For years., junior officers have been restive
under the Sudanese politicians. As early as June 1957, a
number of junior officers were sentenced to long prison terms
for plotting against the government, and military conspiracies
have continued under Abboudts regime. The most notable up-
rising occurred in March 1959, when Brig. Gen. Shannan of the
Northern Command and Brig. Gen. Abdullah of the Eastern Com-
mand led troops on Khartoum demanding a voice in the government,
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removal of unpopular members from the Supreme Council, and
the release of the imprisoned officers. The display of
force was only partly successful... Sharman and Abdullah
received posts in the cabinet, several Council members
were removed, and imprisoned officers released, Subsequently.,
however, Shannan proved unable to establish his dominance on
the council, and in May, Shannan and Abdullah, with an assist
from Council member Maj. Gen. Ahmad Abdullah Hamid, attempted
to repeat their March coup de force. The action aborted,)
however, and Shannan and Abdullah were arrested, tried, and
imprisoned. Hamid was cashiered from the army,
6e If Abboud had acted with dispatch during the coup at-
tempt in March, he could probably have arrested its leaders,,
restored discipline in the army and guaranteed his position
for some time to come. Abboud vacillated, however, and missed
his opportunity. In May, Abboud showed uncharacteristic re-
solve in arresting Shannan and Abdullah, Nevertheless his
subsequent purge of the army did not reach far enough, with
the result that plotting among the pro-Shannan Junior
officers has increased, spurred by the additional motive of
vengeance for their fallen leaders*
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7. On 10 November after many postponements, a group
of pro-Shannan ,unior officers again attempted to overthrow
the Abboud regime. Details of the attempt are still sketchy
but it appears the latest coup was pcorly organized and was
almost certainly penetrated by the governments In any event,
the necessary support did not develop., a number of the lead-
ers were quickly arrested., and the movement was easily sup-
pressed. It remains to be seen whether Abboud this time will
follow up his initial success with a wholesale cleanup of
dissident elements in the army. Based on past performance
it seems unlikely that he will. In the absence of prompt
and decisive action on Abboudts part) it must be presumed
that a M;+.,able number of antigovernment officers remain.,
especially in the outlying provinces* While these elements
certainly need better organization and more courage than they
have shown heretofore) their potential for causing trouble
for the regime cannot be discounted.
8. The exact makeup of the junior officers rather
amorphous M+ rsbership is not fully known., but it includes
many of the more radical junior officers who have been
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plotting since the early days of independence. It hopes to over-
throw Abboud and establish a Revolutionary Command Council composed
of junior officers and an Advisory Council of "elder statesmen" --
Shannan, Abdullah, and Hamid. Their program is still obscure,
though they claim to be neutralist and Arab nationalist,, and to
favor restoration of the freedoms denied by Abboud. The group
has been variously reported as being pro-Western and pro-Communist,
and probably includes elements of each. Many of the officers are
believed to be distrustful of Nasser. (Perhaps significantly, of
those arrested since the 10 November effort, a disproportionate
number appear to have been Communists. At least two were implicated
in an earlier pro-Nasser plot, although they claim they have since
become disillusioned with Nasser.) If the group eventually succeeds
in seizing power, it is likely that an internal struggle for power
will ensue. If such a struggle were to take place concurrently
with an abrupt restoration of political freedom, a degree of chaos
not unlike that in Iraq may result.
9. Abboud's strength has also waned with conservative
political and religious leaders. Initially Abboud was bolstered
by a pledge of support from Sayyid Abd-al-Rahman al Mahdi, leader
of the Ansar sect which, in turn, comprises the great bulk of the
powerful Umma party. When the Mahdi died last March his son and
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succesor., Sadiq al Mahdi, honored his father's pledge. Sadiq,
however, has been repeatedly offended by slights on Abboud's part,
and now appears to feel he is no longer bound by his pledge.
Leaders of the other major Sudanese party, the National Union Party
(NUP), have also been angered by Abboud's failure to broaden the
base of his government. Once cowed by the appearance of army
solidarity., leaders of both the Umma and the NTJP have become in-
creasingly emboldened by Abboud's troubles with the junior officers.
It is not clear whether the Umma or the NUP are actively conspir-
ing against the government, but leaders of both parties have
expressed the view that the army has demonstrated its incapacity
to govern and are obviously awaiting Abboud's downfall with con-
siderable anticipation.
10. There is home evidence that the junior officers and
members of Umma may have established contact. It is highly un-
likely, however, that the conservative Umma and the radical junior
officers have anything in common other than their desire for power.
Any cooperation between the two would probably be short-lived.. A
more likely possibility is that the Umma and the NIP may gang up
on the regime and indeed there is recent evidence that they are
already acting in concert. In view of the lack of discipline in
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the army and the fact that both parties have army adherrents, this
possibility poses a continuing threat to Abboud.
11. Abboudas position, however., is not hopeless. He is
obviously aware that plotting is going on., and may still possess
the strength and resolve to cope with it. The recent successful
conclusion of the Nile Water talks could do much to restore public
confidence in the regime if presented properly -- though both the
politicians and the junior officers have already begiza to charge
that he sold out Sudanese interests. If Abboud should., in the near
future., take measures leading toward the addition of prominent
civilians into the cabinet and the resumption of constitutional
life., he might be able to recoup much of his position with the
disgruntled politicians especially if he concurrently plays up the
leftist aspects of the recent coup attempt. Having parried the
threat from this quarter., Abboud would have much greater freedom to
cope with the situation in the army. The loyalty of the Ur,na
Party in particular would be a great asset during a period of army
reform since a large portion of the army is made up of members of
the Ansar sect. The first anniversary of the Abboud coup is approach-
ing and provides him with a ready made opportunity for taking the
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necessary steps to restore a measure of political life. Unless
he acts quickly and dramatically, however, increased instability
in the Sudan is nearly certain and the downfall of the Abboud
regime may be not far off.
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