THE KURDISH PROBLEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010091-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2006
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: April 8, 1959
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/10/31: CIA-RDP79R00904AO00500010091-8
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIM1TES
8 April 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Kurdish Problem
1. In view of recent increased interest in the Kurds as a
potentially troublesome element in the Middle East, 0/NE on 2 April
convened a meeting of Kurdish specialists from OCI, DDP, State, and
the services to discuss the problem. Although no attempt was made
to reach formal conclusions, there appeared to be general agreement
on most key issues*
2. Tho principal substantive points made at the meeting are
summarized below for your information:
a. There is little likelihood of the establishment of an
independent Kurdistan. Despite continuing efforts by exile groups
t h e ` cards are the predominant element of the population in an
area embracing southeast Turkey, northwest Iran, and northeast
Iraq. Some Kurds are also found in northeast Syria and in the
USSR. Although reliable population estimates are lacking., the
Kurds of the area are estimated to number over 3 million,
divided roughly as follows: Turkey: ll million; Iran: 500,000;
Iraq: 800,x.000; Syria: 2509000; USSR: 100,000 (Soviet Armenia).
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and some of the younger urbanized elements in Iraq to stir up
Kurdish nationalist feeling} the Kurds have never been politically
united and they lack any real sense of nationhood, Such ethnic.,
linguistic., and religious cohesiveness as does distinguish them
will probably continue to be outweighed by inherent inhibiting
factors - narrow and often divisive tribal and sub-tribal loyal-
ties' varying degrees of identification with the states in which
they live., and widespread indifference as to who controls the
political machinery so long as the individualts tribe is left
alones Over time., the Kurdish martial tradition and the cause
of Kurdish separatism are likely to be further weakened by
detribalization: settlement., and related social changee
b. Nevertheless., the Kurds will continue to have consid-
erable iruisance value as rebels - or potential rebels - at least
for some years to come. As a traditionally warlike and still
largely nomadic or semi-nomadic people who occupy relatively remote
areas and have a long history of bad blood with the authorities of
their host countries' the Kurds could fairly readily be aroused if
.WWWT
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given arms and funds from outside. Even in the absence
of an acknowledged over-all leader, enough tribes might
be stirred up to make considerable trouble for a weak host
country, especially if it had other security problems
to contend with at the same timee
c. The security problem posed by the Kurds is minimal
in Turke .9 where the government and array have long exercised
firm control and have had some success in encouraging
assimilation. In Syria the relatively small Kurdish
minority has been settled for years and offers little
trouble to the government. It thus has little special
potential as a vehicle for Iraqi subversion against the
d. However,, the situation is different in Iran, where
the government's policy is one of general neglect punctuated
by fine promises on the one hand and efforts to repress
the Kurds and put them in their place on the other. At
the same times the government in Tehran exercises only
limited effective authority over its Kurdish areas.
Although there is p esently widespread acceptance of the
-3-
T
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status quo and even some genuine loyalty to the crown among
Iranian Kurds, My might cause a serious diversion of Iran-
ian internal security resources if sufficiently arousedo
e e is currently the most active scene of develop-
monts affecting the Kurds', who comprise soe 2~% of the pop-
ulation, The Qassim government has sought to play down
traditional Arab-Kurdish animosities by well.-publicised
appointments of Kurds to high government posts, by welcoming
the return of Mulla Mustapha and his followers from exile in
the US5R#., by proclaiming Iraq a republic of Arats and Kurds,
and by broadcasting extensively in Kurdish. Especially if
the Communists continue their effective drive toward power
in Iraq, the Iraqi Kurds will give them a significant weapon
against Iran. At the same time, however, Kurdish Arab
animosities will continue to present problems of control
to any Iraqi government*
f. The SR has maintained its agitation and propaganda
among the Kurds at a relatively low key. It was felt that
25X1# indicates that urds
Suez Canal on
reported by the press transiting
route to Basra are followers of Mulla Mustapba.
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d ~r
the USSR, while not neglecting to build up its assets among
the Kurds, would view them primarily as a means of harassing
and undermining Iran, probably in conjunction with or follow-
ing other moves to create trouble for the Shah. In any
event, the USSR would probably not want to exploit the Kurds
in any manner inconsistent with its efforts first to secure
control of Iraq, When and if the Soviets should decide to
make use of the Kurds, whether to establish a "land bridge"
across Iran or more generally to create disturbances within
that country, it would probably be done primarily through
the Kurds of Iraq rather than directly from the USSR.
g. It was generally agreed that Turkey and Iran would
be unwilling to use Kurdish nationalism as a weapon against
the Arabs for fear of stirring up trouble at home and that
Nasserts identification with Arab nationalism would make
it extremely difficult for him to woo the Iraqi Kurds.
3? We do not believe, on the basis of our discussion, that
there is need for a formal estimate on the Kurds at this time.
However, there was general agreement thaThe Kurdish problem
would receive continuing close scrutiny by ally s represent-
ed at the meeting, with particular emphasis on getting fuller re-
porting on conditions and attitudes.
SFOMN KENT
Assistant Director
National. Estimates
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