MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010121-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 121
• Publication Date: February 11, 1959
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA?P79R00904A000500010121-4
1 i February 1959
MEMORANDUM FOR ?HL 13lk.LCTQR
SUBJ: C.T
1. This mernorandu represents the crancensus of the board
and Staff opinion an the moroing's telegram frOn Teheran.
L. we thinit it sxtrernely unlikely that the Soviets will use
armed force againstIran.
ink it highly probable that the Soviets will con rnence
a public and private war of hszveu afrainst Iran, inc lading :yarn e or
all of the following elements:
pressures not to sign bilateral with the US;
(b) protests aginsi present US and British militar
presence in Iran (MARG. installatio
(c) strong threats against any increase of US or Western
military presence in Iran;
(d) breaking off of diplo-vatic relations -- or a threat
to break off diplomatic relations it the bilateral is signed;
economic preugures
(I) possible troop to avereat }, designed to intimidate.
Approved For Release 2006/DP79R00904A000500010121-4
 Approved For Release 2006/11/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010121-4
Kurds, but
doubt that such r asures would be fruitful in the near
future. The same holds true for subversion axsrtar the Arabs ot
a
..
bbsliev, the F dish Party is virtual
useless to the Seaviests in the near future,
o rating against Iran, the Soviets will probably have
a care for the entitle? in Iraq, where the course of events I'v
currently favorable to then-' and might be distrub,ed by heavy ,dad
eduros in Iran.
of thine: the Soviets can in the inns diate
future substantially Increase pressures on Iran fro
.Y+ i.- I-- ..- s
The Soviets will probably increase their operations among the
'. - ____ 'mm, is sue zeovlet favor as it can.
6.
effect all Ate'i* this nay have On Iran will depend greatly
o what the US does. The Shah will certainly ask for na, it and
Political and material aseistaece. We think that, with son- US backing,
Iran can .survive a substantial Soviet political warfare Campaign.
It s
hostility of
given us by
. On the other hand, we believe that the
Soviets were no doubt injured in pride, and that they have a real concern
about the extension of US and W ter._z ,==ilitarypressure on their
borders. Approved For Release 2006/1 t/13 ? CIA-RDP79R00904A000500010121-4
, F4VJxUnR further information, that the
Soviets was surely not Minimized in the account