KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020003-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 10, 1960
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INT.dLLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF rI kTIONTAL ESTIM'RTES
10 May 1960
SUBJECT: Khrushchev At the Summit
la This memorandum examines Soviet policy and probable
intentions on the eve of the Summit meeting scheduled to open on
16 May. It does not attempt to forecast Soviet moves or positions
at the conference except in the broadest terms. Instead it discusses
the motives and general strategy of current Soviet foreign policy,
and the power base and political situation in the USSR and the Bloc
from which this policy proceeds. NIE's done over the last year or
so on various aspects of Soviet developments have been drawn upon
as background, and more recent indications have been evaluated in
the light of these basic estimates,
Khrushchev's Motives in Promoting Summit Di J.omacy
; -?L-
2. The Summit meeting of the Four Powers represents the
achievement by Soviet policy of a tactical aim pursued more or less
consistently for well over two years. Agitation for a new Summit
began immediately on the heels of Soviet claims of an ICBM in the
I/CDF yes 1 try
DOCUMENT NO. _ V 1
AUY1 is i& 1u.2
DATE: JUN 1980
REVIEWER:
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CLASS. 141".I'3K D TO: TS S C
.~'E),'+' i aA'rz.
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latter part of 1957. It was pressed during the Iraq-Lebanon crisis
of mid-summer 1958, but then abandoned on that occasion because
the Security Council forum, which the Western Powers insisted upon,
probably seemed too confining for the kind of Summit Khrushchev
had in mind. The current agreement to hold a Summit finally grew
out of Soviet instigation of a crisis over West Berlin beginning
in November, 19580
3o This persistent Soviet interest in Summit diplomacy seems
to reflect particularly Khrushchev's own tactical ideas. The move
for a Summit in 1955y the first since the wartime meetings, came
soon after his rise to predominant influence in the course of the
post-Stalin struggle for power, We have remarked in other papers
that Khrushchev's motives in this probably included a desire to
magnify his on and Soviet prestige; he evidently derives personal
satisfaction and, he thinks, political profit at home and abroad
from the opportunity to comport himself as the peer of Western
statesmen.
L More fundamentally, however, this interest in Summit
diplomacy probably reflects one aspect of a conscious reappraisal,
by Khrushchev and his supporters after Stalin's death, of the
tactics appropriate to Soviet policy -- "in the current historical
period," as the Communists sayo Although their published criticism
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MW
of Stalin has carefully skirted his derelictions in foreign
policy, it is altogether likely that they were determined to
change his methods in this field, too, They probably believed
that these had produced unnecessary tensions without compensating
gains, and had stimulated the '.lest to adopt a stronger, more united
and uncompromising posture, thus closing out opportunities which
might have been open to Soviet policy, Their own idea was that
Stalin's consistently hard-line confrontation of a united Western
camp should be replaced by a flexible policy and positive
negotiating approaches which would convey to the West a diminution
of Soviet aggressive intentions. Such a policy of mane ver, they
believed, instead of merely hardening the positions of the two
camps, would open up opportunities for actions directed at
splitting the western all ies,
5? Some such new general line of forwarding Soviet objectives
in an atmosphere of relaxed tensions was probably in Khrushchev's
mind from the moment of his rise to power. The visit to Belgrade
and the 1955 Summit were conceived as the initial steps of such a
campaign. The unforeseen consequences of de-Stalinization in 1956
were so unsettling within the Bloc, however, that it was necessary
to draw back to a more rigorous posture. Relaxation of tensions
and negotiations with the very Western Powers who had to be blamed
SM
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for instigating the Hungarian "counter-revolution" seemed
inappropriate for a time. But a year or so later thecall for a
Summit could be resumed, and by that time, with an improved
"position of strength" thanks to the ICBM and Sputniks, such
tactics could even be sold to hard-line Stalinists like the
Chinese.
6. Probably by 1958-1959 Khrushchev himself had a somewhat
more aggressive view of the objectives which could be pursued through
Summit diplomacy. By then he probably believed that, instead of
merely relaxing tensions in order to open up new lines of action
for more subtle Soviet policies, it would be possible to include
a larger element of pressure on the tiniest and by this means to make
immediate gains on some issues. At least, his opening up of the
Berlin question and seeking to have it resolved at the Summit
suggests this. Nevertheless, his original objectives
remained. These were, first, to consolidate the Soviet Bloc by
finally winning some form of viestern recognition for the post-war
status quo and the Communist expansion it incorporated? and second,
to open up a new phase for Soviet policy in which there could be
"peaceful competition" for influence and converts, without excessive
tension, everywhere outside the Soviet Bloc, but especially in
underdeveloped countries emerging from colonialism.
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7. The foregoing statement of the broad rationale underlying
Soviet policy in recent years, in which the Summit idea figured
purely as a tactical device, reduces to a secondary role another
set of motives which some opinion has assigned to Khrushchev. It
has been suggested that he needed a relaxation of tensions because
he feared the growing danger of nuclear war, or because continuation
of the burdensome arms race was too much for the USSR., or because
achievement of economic goals of the Seven-Year Plan required
a shift of resources from the military sector, or because internal
political pressures demanded an atmosphere of peace and more
consumer goods. In our view, none of these considerations was
compelling for Khrushchev's policy. Insofar as considerations of
thiss kind were present, they reflected what were conceived as
secondary objectives of the whole shift of policy in the post-
Stalin period. The changes introduced by Khrushchev and his anti.
Stalinist group of party leaders were primarily directed toward
developing the new strategy and tactics for Soviet external policy
suggested in Paragraphs 4 and 6 above.
80 We think it important to make this distinction between the
fundamental and the secondary, the compelling and the merely
desirable aims of current Soviet policy. We have estimated (in
NIE 11-I.-59), and continue to believe, that Soviet policy will not
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necessarily continue to stress the relaxation of tensions theme.
It may turn, if it believes that important objectives can be won,
to an attitude of sharp pressure on the ':lest, The case of Berlin
already sugc;ests this, and should the Soviets come to believe that
their total power position justifies it, there may be pressures
in other areas as well when opportunity arises0 In this event,
the Soviets would probably be willing to forego the secondary
advantages of relaxed tensions suggested in the preceding paragraph.
Khrushchev's Assets &t the Suit
9, There does not seem to be much doubt that, in Khrrushchev's
own mind, the cards he is holding as he sits doom at the Summit
table are strong ones. For two years or more Soviet attitudes have
had all the earmarks of a new and genuine confidence. This has
been manifested not only in manner and pronouncements, but more
convincingly in a willingness to relax somewhat the rules for
contact and competition with the outside world. On balance, this
more confident state of mind is probably a wholesome development
from the point of view of Western negotiators. Even a slight
relaxation of the morbidly hostile suspicion of Stalin's time
opens chinks which make the Soviet leadership more accessible to
tioestern views and influence. On the other hand, an excess of
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confidence is always dangerous in the leadership of a totalitarian
state. In our view, it is not likely that the Soviets are yet
suffering from an overconfidence that would lead them into
arrogant and aggressive behavior through misapprehension of the
real relations of powero
10. By all odds the most important single factor in the
Soviet mind in the general strengthening of the USSRss position
is the acquisition in growing number of weapons capable of striking
the US effectively, The Soviets naturally regard it as a very
great gain that the posing of a serious strategic threat is no
longer a US monopoly. The belief that they can also in some
undetermined degree impose deterrence on the West, or if necessary
retaliate with great destructive effect, Gives tremendous impetus
to their policy. It means to them that they can really, for the
first time in their history, face their enemies with a Genuine
conviction of having gained equality at the bargaining table.
11. It goes without saying, of course, that the Soviets try
to maximize, by gross exaggeration when they can get away with it,
the world's impression of their gains in relative military power.
They seem to be fully aware that the first dividend from the
possession of modern terror weapons is political, that the old
principle that power is in the eye of the beholder applies doubly
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to these weaponso Nevertheless, it seems likely that the Soviet
military leadership, and Khrushchev himself, continue to make
privately a sober appraisal of the current relations of power
between East and West. They recognize that they are not in a
position to impose their will by military forced They also
recognize the great peril in any reckless use of threats to employ
force. Thus, despite their satisfaction with what they consider to
be real shifts to their advantage in the power balance, Soviet
policy is likely to continue to act on the belief, as Khrushchev
pit it in Peking last October, that it should not "test the stability
of the capitalist system by force."
12. another card Khrushchev values highly is the growing
magnitude of Soviet physical resources. In his view the USSR and
the Bloc are rapidly narrowing; the ;gist's lead in the less
specifically military forms of power as well as in weapons. He
confidently expects the Soviet and Bloc economies to continue
to grow at rates higher than the economies of the West and thus
to insure within the foreseeable future a more equal contest insofar
as basic physical resources are a factor. This source of confidence
seems to be well founded. Even if particular programs and plans
should encounter strains from time to time and some planned goals
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fail to be met fully, there cannot be much doubt that the Bloc will,
relative to the adest, dispose of continuously growing resources.
This may be especially true in the scientific field, in which
the Soviets take particular pride in their achievements, and which
is of growing significance for the world power struggle.
13a Khrushchev probably also thinks that among his assets
at Paris, thanks largely to his on exertions, will be a
considerably improved attitude on the part of world opinion
toward Soviet policies and purposes. He is a practitioner par
excellence of the style of totalitarian diplomacy, which attempts
to make the force of mass opinion an ally at the bargaining table.
It does appear to be true that Soviet policy, Soviet power, and
even Soviet institutions have gained in world respect under the
influence of Khrushchev's remaking of the image of the USSR,
greatly aided of course by Soviet space achievements and by the
significant changes in internal policy since Stalin.
Consequently, Khrushchev can be counted on for a performance at
Paris boldly played to the galleries of world opinion, and thus
designed to maximize support for Soviet positions and to increase
pressure on the vesti_:rn statesmen for concessions, While "peace"
and "relaxation of tensions" will be his main themes, the desire
to win popular acclaim will not necessarily cause him to moderate
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the substance of Soviet positions, He will act on the assumption
that the world will be as much impressed by the USSR's firmness
and power as by its reasonableness and flexibility,
lL One audience Khrushchev will have particularly in mind
is that in Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, He
probably considers that Soviet policy must now accept the at
least temporary stabilization of the political-social system prevailing
in the states of the ddestern alliance, but believes that these
other areas offer excellent prospects for forward movement. It
is the political trend in underdeveloped and ex-'colonial countries
which, almost more than anything else., gives the Soviets a sense
that their policy is moving with the tide of history, They
believe that political independence and industrialization will
sharpen the contradictions between these countries and the older
capitalist states. This will give the USSR opportunities to
displace destern influence., they believe, and ultimately to
galvanize the revolutionary process in these societies to the
point where the Communists can achieve power.
15. This is currently one of the fundamental calculations
of Soviet policy and figures strongly in Khrushchev's tactics at
all times, even when negotiations with the Western Powers occupy
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the center of the diplomatic stage, Despite some signs in the
last year or so that the rosy prospects for Communist influence
in underdeveloped areas have begun to cloud over, Khrushchev is
very likely to persist in his policy of cultivating non-Communist
nationalist movements and states with political support and
economic aid. In his mind,, this is probably a long-term policy
in which he does not need to reckon on early results, but the
eventual benefits of which are nevertheless certain. He is
deeply committed to it politically and ideologically. Thus he
will have in mind other prospects and other battles beyond the
Summit itself, To him everything will not hang on the outcome of
this single encounter, dramatic as it may be. He will be as much
concerned with the record he makes and the subsequent repercussions
for Soviet policy everywhere as with the victories won on this
occasion.
16. It is in this field of the prospects for a growing Soviet
influence in underdeveloped countries that Khrushchev may be re;arding
as assets alra c.y banke~, are in fact only - o.ssible future gains.
Doctrinaire Marxist-Leninist ideas probably exaggerate the revolu-
tionary opportunities for Communism and greatly underestimate the
force of the drive for national independence -- from East as well
as U1est. As indicated., Khrushchev himself probably has a slow-moving
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strategy in view, is prepared to play a waiting game, and even to
accept some setbacks, It is a question whether his party
colleagues will be equally patient. In Communist tradition, any
policy of working with "bourgeois" movements is vulnerable to
"leftist" attack, especially when the "bourgeois" partners prove
faithless and turn on their local Communist alliesc The Chinese,
remembering how Chiang Kai-Shek did this in 1927 when the Chinese
party was following Soviet advice in cooperating with him, are
already calling for a purer revolutionary line in the underdeveloped
countries. Khrushchev's large personal and ideological stake in
his policy on this subject may, though probably not at any early
date, prove to have been a hazardous investment,
17. It has been suggested that Khrushchevss personal position
as supreme Soviet leader may depend on his success at the Summit,
Faint rumblings of opo:sition have been detected by some, and have
been taken to forecast extreme peril to his personal power unless
he returns from Paris like a conquering hero bearing rich gifts
extorted from the cowed 1"estern leaders, We are not much taken
with this image. The indications which could signify a weakening
of his position, chiefly certain personnel shifts in the Soviv'"j
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heirarchy, are fragmentary in the extreme and permit of other and
more pl urn ble cor~struc ions. His whole external conduct of power
over the last two years and more indicates an impregnable position.
He is after all the vanquisher of all the most form3_dabl.e figures
who survived Stalin. It is hard to imagine that the lesser men
who surround him could find a leader or form a faction, and then
convince themselves that the risks of opposition were not too high.
It even seems extremely doubtful that, as the Soviet system operates,
a man who has reached such a pinnacle of success and has already
craated his own legend of irresistible power can be touched at all.
18. Having said all this we should admit that . are have never
predicted a major turning point in the power struggles of the
Soviet leaders, in part because the evidence available is wholly
inadequate to clo this, in part because such events are in the _r
nature almost unpredictable. Khrushchev himself was for long an
unknown quantity; we failed to appreciate his stature until his
power had been virtually consolidated. One other reason for
caution in crediting Khrushchev with political invulnerability is
that the rules of the game have changed since Stalin's time and
observers of the Soviet, scene are too prone to draw parallels
from that period, Certainly the hazards of political opposition
are not as violent or as sudden as under Stalin. Political banishment
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is a powerful deterrent to professional party men of rank who might
consider opposition, but not quite so powerful as Stalin's
"Genickschuss" in the cellars of Lubianka prisons Thus if the
wise money must still ride with Khrushchev, cautious gamblers
(and estimators) will hedge their bets a little,,
l9d The one continrl.cncy a;;ainst .,which Khrushchev's position
might not be secure would. be a conspicuous failure of some major
aspect of his policies. Given the reduced hazards of intra-party
opposition, and possibly some adherence still to at least the
forms of collective leadership it is possible thzt such a failu re
could diminish his commanding role if it did not actually result
in his replacement,, Some of his policies do involve risk of
failure and his political style 3U,-'rests that he may be a gambler
who would cover his risks with n.w risks at even higher odds.
Currently the almost open attacks on his policies by the Chinese
indicate that he is gambling in a very dangerous area, that of
intra-Bloc solidarity It would probably be a severe test fcr any
Soviet leader if his enemies could charge him with responsibility
for ideological confusion and political disruption within the
Communist movement, The very fact that they Chinese attack his
policies so brazenly may indicate that they think his power position
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is already vulnerable on this or other ;rounds. On balance, howeer,
we do not think there is any solid ground for believing th t
concern for his personal position will impose constraints on
Khrushchevls behavior at Parise,
20, Even if the present Chinese surliness toward KhrKshchev
does not threaten his personal positions their attacks on his
policies do seem likely to have some constraining effect on his
attitude at Parise The Chinese have indicated that his attempt
to reach a basis for "peaceful_ n
"peaceful coexistence" ~nc~, by "mutual concessions"*
has gone dangerously too faro They argue that he is overestimating
the peaceful intentions of the imperialists, undermining the will
of the masses to engage in revolutionary struggle, and subverting
doctrines on the nature of the world struggle enshrined in the
incontrovertible formulations of Lenin himself, Preservation of
the Sino-Soviet alliance and of solidarity in the Communist movemnn+,
generally must necessarily be vital interests for any Soviet leader*
Therefore the Chinese attitude cannot be entirely ignored by
Khrushchev and it seems likely that he will try in some way to take
account of it in his negotiations with the hest0
This phrase was used in his important speech of Octe, 31, 1959
which contained the fullest theoretical justification for his
policies and at the same time the most far-reaching suggestion
of the limits to which he might be willing to go to reach agreements
with the rWeste It was almost certainly the formulations in this
speech against which the recent Chinese articles in Red. Flag
were directed, ... ,_
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21. How he might do this is more difficult to predict. He
will probably feel under greater necessity to demonstrate that his
policy is getting results; either in winning concessions or in
dividing the ~jest. This might cause him to increase the prep sure
behind Soviet demands, or conceivably to move in with concessions
of his own if necessary to wrap up more speedily some issue which
would otherwise have been allowed to drag out beyond the Summit.
This latter might apply especially to nuclear tests or to the
impasse on procedure in the disarmament negotiations. He might not
alter the substance of his positions at all, but try simply to
appease the Chinese by ro ort to somewhat shriller language?
This he may have tried to do already in his recent speech at Baku
and in the Supreme Soviet speech of 5 May, although these cases are
unclear since on both occasions he was reacting to what he took to
be strong US provocations.
224 What he almost certainly will not do is to alter the
main direction of his policy in response to the Chinese pressure.
This would be an abdication of the USSR's "leading role" and, he
would imagine, would lead him down a road which would cost him
dearly in the end. On principle, moreover, he probably regards the
Chinese as Stalinists and therefore as representing the doctrines
and methods which it has been his whole political mission in recent
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years to combot. Thus he will persist, whatever the Chinese say,,
in following a "general line" which permits flexible tactics both
in relations with the Jest and in promoting Soviet purposes in
the underdeveloped ccuntries. On this he will be very a.or~v.
indeed, because he almost c:rtainly thinks that Chinese views are
"adventuristic," the Conmun:Lst jargon for too risky, and that only
his own line can advance the Communist cause. All this would not
exclude that he rmi;ht try to appease the Chinese in the area of
Sino-Soviet relations proper.
Probable Positions cn Sunnit ',:end! Issues
23. The more recent Soviet statements and other
indications suggest that, although Khrushchev will make a pro-forma
argument for a peace treaty with. the two German states and for a
"free city" arrangement for 'West Berlin, the Soviets consider an
interim agreement on Berlin to be the serious bargaining areao
The elements they would like to see in such an agreement would
include reduction in Western troops, control on "subversive
activities" and propagL+nda3 restrictions on Bonn's role in !.jest
Berlin, and perhaps a supervisory commission, if possible with
East German representation in some form. it a minimum, they want
a Western admission that the situation is "abnormal" in their terms
and that the "occupation regime" must be terminated in a reasonable
period, which they would probably set at about two years. The
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essential thing from the Soviet point of view is that the
impression should be conyyed, especially to the West Berliners
themselves, throt the vJast has responded to Soviet demands to the
extent at least of taking the first steps toward altering the
status of the city.
24. Disarmament - The Soviets probably believe that the Ten
Power talks to date have exhausted the possibility of attaching
opprobrium to the oest for refusing to accept Soviet principles
for "general and complete disarmament," Khrushchev may varj
well therefore make a grand gesture of "concession" in agreeing
to terms of reference for the discussion of partial measures, He
may also outline partial measures the Soviets would like to
negotiate., and these are likely to focus on Centrrl European zone
proposals for troop withdrawals and li_:e-tations on weapons. The
proposals would be drawn primarily with a view to forwarding Soviet
political objectives in Germany.
25? Thc]rear Tes+,s - Khrushchev probably recognizes that
this subject is still too deeply mired in technical issues to permit
of any final agreement being reached at the Summit levels, Bu? he
probably does intend to et credit for taking an initiative which
will put the Geneva conference, or seem to put it, on the road to
early completion of an agreement. Therefore he is likely to take
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up the problem of a quota for on-site inspections and also the
terms of a moratorium on underground shots below the threshold
of the inspection system. On these and other aspects of the
test issue his position is likely to move toward the ?Iestls,
but only enough to insure that western opinion will still be
divided on whether to meet his terms, He probably still does
want a test agreement, however, and will try to impel the
negotiations forward consistent with the Soviet objective to
minimize the control system.
Khrushchev's Tactical Alternatives at the Summit and After
26, The outcome of the Summit which Khrushchev would almost
certainly prefer would. be one which showed some movement toward his
position on. Berlin and Germany, which kept disarmament negotiations
alive with apparent credit for this belonging to Soviet initiative,
and which in addition maintained an atmosphere of promise for
further relaxation of tensions and fruitful negotiation. This
would be the optimum result consistent with the broad rationale
of his foreign policy strategy described earlier in this paper,,
This means that he does not want a showdown crisis which would
heighten tensions or even a standoff which would leave an irmprosaion
of the futility of last ;pest negotiations
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27v On the other hand, he cannot afford to buy a "positive."
outcome, one providing for further easing of tensions, at the price
of seeming to withdraw all the demands which brought about the
meeting in the first place. Such a march downhill from the Summit
after having marched up with so much fanfare would be ludicrous
and damaging to his prestige, both in the West and among possible
doubters inside the Bloc. Moreover, on the Berlin question, except
for having removed the time limit for his demands, he has continued
out even further on
in his recent speeches to crawl / the very long limb on which he
is perched. There is a dangerous dilemma in his policy of combining
pressure on the West with appeals for peaceful negotiations. If
the concessions demanded,
the opponent does not deliver through negotiations at lest part of/
Khrushchev must either be exposed as a bluffer or he must increase
the pressure and accept risks and tensions which are in themselves
at least undesirable and which it was his purpose in the first place
to reduce. If this dilemma emerges clearly, his mistake will have
been to imagine that he could conduct an offensive action on so
sensitive a matter as Berlin an:U still expect the West to accept
that his real aim was to relax tensions,
28. Probably he does not yet think that the dilemma referred
to above has become too painful or obvious. If so, he will accept
the very minimum at the Summit as evidence that progress is being
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made. He will reason th ..t the vest will not yet conclude that he
is bluffing about Berlin and that his threat to take uni.lati rat
action will contin-ac to han-g over subsequent negotiations. He may
calculate that there will sooner or later be an attempt to buy him
off with concessions in come other area., most probably disarmament
or nuclear tests. He will probably advocate agreement in
principle to another Summit., this time in Moscow., not insisting
upon a final date but arguing that it not be too long delayedo
29, At the same time, he has laid the groundwork in his last
two speeches., notably th..t of May 5., for charging; that "certain
circles" in the Jest, in particular the US, sabotaged the chances
for Summit progress. He has interpreted the recent, Herter and
Dillon speeches in this sense, and also seized upon the plane
incident of May 1 to make the same point. Thus if he wishes to
do so he is in a position to mount a propaganda campaign blaming
certain persons or states in the iwdest for failure of the Summit.
and thereby to try to maximize divisions in tiestern opinion over
responsibility for the failure., It will be recalled that a prime
object of his strategy is to divide the tIestern Powers, and if a
wedge can be driven deep enough, he would regard this as also a
satisfactory outcome of the present phase. An enemy in disarray
may ultimately yield more ground than one who retreats in good order,,
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304 In any case, however he may play the Summit itself,
Khrushchev will still have to decide, assuming thth there is
insufficient promise of progress on Berlin to meet his minimum
requirements and no offsetting "positive" result on any other
subject, whether to execute his threat to sign a separate peace
treaty with East Germany He is probably still reluctant to do
so, and this is one reason for believing that he will make every
effort to insure that the Summit outcome can be taken as positive.
In our last estimate on the Berlin problem (SNIE 100-5-60 of
22 March 1960) we said that should a complete standoff result
from the Summit, Khrushchev would probably be driven to take this
step., though we left the timing and the manner somewhat open.
This is probably still the best estimate that can be made, and if
correct could mean that a serious crisis is in prospect, The
policy attributed to Khrushchev in this memorandum, although it
has the relaxation of tensions as one of its objects, remains a
dangerous one -- dangerous to .estern interests if it succeeds
in the forward aims to which it is also directed, and dangerous
to peace if it fails,
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 Approved For Release 2006/09/06: CIA-RDP79R00904AO00500020003-4
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR
This memo will be discussed at Princeton.
A copy of it has been sent to Ambassador
Bohlen, and Sherman Kent has copies with
FORM
MAYE OEM 10.101
AUGN 54 'V' WHICH REPLACES
BE USED.
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