SHORT-TERM OUTLOOK IN CEYLON*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020020-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: June 28, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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CENTR.FLL IPJTELLI GENCE l~ GENCY
2 8 Juno 1960
SUBJECT: Short-Term Outlook in Geyiorr'~
lp The last 1'IE on Ceylon (1!~ July 1959} bras focus ed
primarily on the precarious }position of the Bandaranaike
government, t~rith only minor references to what might follow
the fall of that ~overrunent. The ra~~. ic1 succession of events
since Bandaranaike4s a~~sassinGtion in September 1859 htzs, of course,
thoroughly paltered the outlook. The conflicts inh.erc;nt in the
Ceylonese political scene are a~ ain becon~.ng sharp as the 20
July general elections dratr near4
2. The prospects for Bandaranaike~s Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SEEP) follewint, his death appearod very tloomy. The
party--a heterorenous ort~~anization elected because of Bandara-
naike~s o~rir-inal ~.c~~~~zlarity and held toy:ether chiefly by a
The NIE on Ceylon scheduled fcr November will deal with the
outlook for Ceylon over the next few years (a,ft~r th+. July
elections) . This zier~orandur~ foc~.ses on the
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desire for the spoils of office~hacl declined stec;dily in ap:,ea1
since late 1957, chiefly because of interminable 1.~olitical
infi-:htin,n and failure to make l:n o ~.ress towurcl solvin; pressing;
social and economic problemso Some of the party~s rac~~.cal
elements resi;;ned shortly bcfare Bandaranaikets c?eath when
Philip Gunawardenats small Trotskyite party U~as expelled from
the ?overnment coalition as a result of ri{.~ht win. l:ressure.
Follatrint; Bandaranaikc~ t s ~1e~~.th, i'actianal disputes anti. personal
rivalries became so ~~cute; that Daha.nayake--Banc?ar~~naike~s
successcr as prime mi3~zister--requested the Governar General
to dissolve parliament and belt' netir electians in l~iarch.
Dahanayake and many conservatives then Zeft the SLFP to form
their own party. In view of the SLF]:~~s poor reccr~' and the
defection of its raclica.l ant? conservative win;fs9 most observers
thought the party woulcl make a very l:~cor showing in the elec-
tions. 2'he relatively con~erv~?tive Unitad .National Party (UVP) ~
t~hich had provided stable {pvernment a:nd considerable economic
progress from 19~.$ to 19569 ryas expected to V~i.n at le~:st a
stran~.r plurality.
3. Such early forec~ sts, however, underestimatc~:l the i ot~rer
of ljirs. Bandaranaike, who be flan campaigning vi z;orausly throu~ bout
tha island, She sheet ;neat quantities of te~.~rs for her dead
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husband before lame audiences, and appealed to the ~.eople to
su~~~.art the SLFP in sympathy for the ideals X~roclaimed by her
husband--who regained in death much of the popularity $e lost
in has last years. Ntrs. BandaranaikeTs style of campais~inC
had a powerful emotional impact--particularly on Ceylonese
women--and enablec'. th a SLFP to win 4b of the 151 seats at stake
compared to the 50 won by the UNP. Althau~,h the Gavernar general
Nava UNi' leader Dudley Senar~ayake the task of formin{ the new
~overnment~ he was unable to do so and new elections are
scheduled for 20 July.
~.. The outlook for the comin elections is coml~licatod
by several diverse trends. The SLFP has arranCed an electoral
a~recment with the Trotskyite LSSP the lard~est of Ceylonts
three Marxist parties, and t~.th the orthodox Ceylon Communa.st
Party. This a~~reement y_.oses a real threat to the UNi', for in
many constituencies Iron by the UNP last I~Iarch the total a~~;_ osi-
Lion vote exceeded that of the UNP. Tn addition, the Soviet
ambassador met with top LSSP leaders recently, a,o.d
while the subjects discussed are not known, it seem iikeiy
that the USSR is attemi~?tint.; to improve the prospects for the
coalition by ofi'ering Soviet assistance to the LSSP despite
its Trotskyite nature. ~Jhile the LSSP has-been op~;,osed to
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cooperation frith the USSR in the pasty it has recently Glter,. d
same of its lon -held 1_~olicies in order to iml;rave its electoral
pasiticn~ ~~nd so may now be tiTillin~; to acce~~t Soviet assistance.
,~o The impact of the electoral agreement may }~~; partially
offset, hoz~aever~ by the fact that mt~ny ine~.epenc~ent conservative
candidates have witYic?raVm from the forthcoming; electians9 t-rY:ich
should benefit the UNP. In o.clc'ition, the UNP appears tc~ l:e
takinU tl~e lead. in exploitin; the 1?otentially explosive cor~anunal
issue with charges that the coalition will not ~~rotect SinYralese
interests as re~arc?s the Tamils. The key factar~ hosrever~ is
once a.%ain likely to Ue the response to I~lrs. B~?n:~aranaikeis
canal .ai;;nin~.
6a In view of these diverse trends no ~~rediction about
tho elccti~.n outcome can tie mode zrith eonfiaenee. !st tlic
inomenti indications are that neither the UNP or the SLFP wil3
gain a clear-cut majority. In such an events a coali tion
;~;overntnent--probatsly unstable--is likely. In any event, the
outlook for political stability is not bright.
7. Continuec' f~~ilure to achieve sta~~ility unc'er the
parliamentary system might cause ri_;htist groups to resume
their efforts to or~ anize a coup-~ ~;ossibly Ur.Lth the cooperation
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of the Governor Goner. al. A successful cou7-, would rec,uirc the
sup. ort of Ceylon~s 17j~OC man defense and ,>alice forces, zrii~ch
have been non-political in the 1-~a3t, Hoti~aever, there have been
indicatot:ns that samf; leadinf~ officers hove become discrntEnted
with the lr~.ck of effective -government and. leftward trenr'. of the
country c?urin~, recent years, but lit~:le is known ai~cut the
attituce of the forces as a whole. G.~Yii1e the clefanse aid police forces
probably could seize control of the ;_~overnrient~ their small
size and relatively limited capal_,ilities would make it difficult,
of net imY~ossible9 for them to rl