THE OUTLOOK FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020068-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: April 12, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
12 April 1;60
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: THE OUTLOOK FOR THE DCMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Trujillo Regime
1. In our last estimate dealing with the Dominican Republic
(SNIE 30/1-59, 29 December 1959, paragraphs 7, 53-60) we stated
that the 30-year Trujillo dictatorship was in trouble, but con-
cluded that it probably would remain in power through 1960.
Since then the anti-Trujillo tide has gathered momentum, and we
now regard the condition of his regime as precarious. We cannot
predict the time or the circumstances in which the regime would
be likely to be overthrown.
2. A notable change in the country's political atmosphere
has developed since the wholesale arrests in January, in which
members of almost every prominent Dominican family were seized,
in many cases with great brutality, and subjected to heavy fines
and jail sentences. Drastic action may in fact have been neces-
sary to break what appears to have been an extensive revolutionary
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conspiracy; precise information as to how far plotting to over-
throw Trujillo had proceeded is still lacking. However, the magni-
tude and severity of the government's crackdown revealed the regime's
nervousness, made it more intolerable to leading elements in
Dominican society, and alienated the Catholic Church. The latter
is now Trujillo's most outspoken opponent inside the country.
3. Recent arrests of university students and new trials of
alleged plotters suggest that public unrest is spreading. Within
the armed services, which remain the mainstay of the regime, a few
new signs of rivalry and dissension have appeared; six army officers
have been imprisoned and an air force officer is the latest in a
series of defectors. The arrest of close relatives of high
ranking officers, a reduction in the perquisites of the armed
forces, and some terrorist activities directed against individuals
in these forces are probably also having an adverse effect on
their loyalty.
4. The economic situation has deteriorated further. Busi-
ness is stagnant, and an increasing number of people are suffering
economic hardship. In addition to some flight of private capital,
nembers of the Trujillo family are reported to have made sub-
stantial withdrawals from the national reserve bank -- a development
NEW
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which might seriously weaken the government's financial position.
Even if these reports prove unfounded.. or exaggerated, the spread
of rumors that such withdrawals were taking place would obviously
contribute to a decline in public confidence in the regime.
5. On the other hand, Trujillo himself shows no signs of
relinque,shing control, and there is no information to indicate that
discontent in the military is widespread. The plans of the in-
ternal opposition probably have been set back by the regime's re-
pressive measures. The numerous exile groups lack cohesion and
effectiveness, despite the encouragement and support given them
not only by Castro but also by Moderate leaders such as Venezuelan
President Detancourt. There are deep dividings between pro-
Communist and anti-Communist elements within these groups.
6. However, the outcome in the Dominican situation is likely
to depend less on the strength of opposition forces than on psycho-
logical factors. We believe that the fall of the regime will be
increasingly anticipated as time goes on. When there comes to be
a general sense that the regime's days are numbered -- or if
Trujillo himself becomes convinced that he is through -- the regime
will probably collapse quite suddenly.
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MN
7. The character of the regime which will eventually succeed
Trujillo will depend upon the time and circumstances of Trujillo`s
departure. In present circumstances, we think it unlikely that
Trujillo will be overthrown by a Castro-type invasion or revolu-
tion. It is more likely that Trujillo will eventually be forced
to leave by a military junta acting with the support of the upper
and middle classes and the Church. The longer his departure is
delayed, the more explosive the situation is likely to become.
u. Castro has already failed in an attempt to overthrow the
Trujillo regime through an invasion by Dominican exiles with Cuban
support. His agrarian reform program apparently still has little
appeal for the Dominican peasantry, who generally still regard
Trujillo as the Benefactor. The upper and middle classes, though
disaffected toward Trujillo, are repelled by the excesses of the
Castro regime in Cuba. The military remain loyal to Trujillo and
are additionally antagonized by what they have seen happening in
Cuba. Thus there is now in the Dominican Republic no important
element of Dominican society motivated to support a Castro-type
invasion or revolution.
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00" wff
Opp- -
9. Nevertheless, tension is rising in the Dominican Republic
and the eventual fall of the regime will be increasingly anticipated.
In such circumstances, persons of property and military officers,
apart from Trujillo`s personal associates, will become increasingly
anxious to effect a change of regime before uncontrollable dis-
order develops. At the psychological moment in this progression, it
would be in accord with Latin American custom for a military junta
to call upon the dictator to depart before the situation got out of
hand. In such matters, however, timing is of the essence. A pre-
mature move could be fatal. On the other hand, to hesitate too long
would permit an uncontrollable situation to develop.
10. If its timing were right, a military junta with upper and
middle class support could probably take over the Dominican Republic
without serious resistance. However, such a regime would immediately
face serious difficulties. Spontaneous jubilation over the fall of a
repressive dictatorship would entail a considerable amount of disorder:
destruction of the property of conspicuous beneficiaries of the fallen
regime, attacks on the lives of any of its active supporters who had
failed to escape in time. The efforts of the new government to main-
tain or restore order would be resented as further repression of the
people. Although the fall of Trujillo would mean liberation to the
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upper and middle classes, the urban proletariat and the peasants
would not regard with enthusiasm a military-upper class regime.
Returning exiles would feel that they, rather than the stay-at-
homes, were entitled by their sacrifices to lead the new regime.
The generally more radical exiles would probably incite the masses
against a moderate government. Within the government itself, there
might be a struggle for power between military and civilian ele-
ments. Finally, the Trujillo family has so dominated the Dominican
economy that the confusion attendant upon their sudden departure
would probably worsen an already bad economic situation.
11. Although Castro is probably incapable of overthrowing the
Trujillo dictatorship, the political turmoil which would follow the
fall of that dictatorship would afford him manifest opportunities
for political intervention in the Dominican Republic. Castro would
certainly do all in his power to incite the masses against a moder-
ate regime and to cal]. for a radical revolution on the Cuban model.
Paradoxically, the intense loyalty which Trujillo has developed
among the peasantry might provide Castro supporters with an opportun-
ity to arouse peasant bitterness against a successor government.
Unless a moderate Dominican government received prompt support
from sympathetic governments of an undoubtedly liberal character
(Venezuela, for instance), Castro might emerge as the ultimate victor.
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12. Although US relations with the Trujillo regime have not
been consistently good, his fall would almost certainly lead to
a decline in US influence in the Dominican Republic. Even among
moderate elements, there is considerable resentment of past US
support for and failure to intervene against the Trujillo dictator-
ship. Furthermore, almost any new regime would feel a need to
demonstrate to the Dominican people and to other Caribbean peoples
that it was not under US domination. However, a moderate govern-
ment would also be in desperate need of US assistance. If the US
were to render essential aid discreetly, while tolerating occasional
demonstrations of Dominican sovereignty, such a government would
probably cooperate in fundamental matters. If, on the other hand,
a government sympathetic with Fidel Castro were eventually to
come to power, US-Dominican relations would inevitably follow
the course of US-Cuban relations.
SflERMAN KENT
Chairman
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