KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 89
• Publication Date: March 11, 1960
• Content Type: MF

Approved For PARJease 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A$00500020089-0
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
11 March 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR TEE UNTIED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Visit to France
Pursuant to the discussion of the sensitive situation
item at the USIB meeting of 8 March, the Board of National
Estimates has studied possible implications of Khrushchev's
forthcoming visit to France and forwards the attached for
your information and as a basis for discussion at the USIB
meeting of 15 March.
DISTRIBUTION "A"
25X1
STMEMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11 March 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Khrushchev's Visit to France
1. Although Premier Khrushchev's visit to France beginning
15 March calls for numerous conferences with President de Gaulle
extending over a two week period, we consider it unlikely that
there will be any startling results. Nevertheless, the mere fact
of the Khrushchev visit will be regarded by de Gaulle as increas-
ing French stature in the Western Alliance; he may hope to capita-
lize on the visit in future dealings with his allies. The Soviet
Union's circumspect attitude towards de Gaulle in recent months
suggests that Khrushchev regards the visit as a promising oppor-
tunity to widen the differences between France and its allies.
Be Gaulle, however, is probably well aware that the Soviets have
little to offer him in return for upsetting or weakening allied
unity. Hence, the talks are likely to be limited to each leader's
eilmmommt assessing the attitude of the other on a variety
of subjects, including likely positions at subsequent high level
meetings.
SECIET
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
Approved For Re4aase 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A900500020089-0
SECRET
2. Khrushchev may attempt to persuade de Gaulle that a
more forthcoming attitude towards East Germany would permanently
divide the German people and hence resolve a traditional French
security problem. However, de Gaulle is apparently dedicated to
the concept of French security through the solidarity of Western
Europe, including the maintenance of the Franco-German rapprochement.
Be Gaulle has been Adenauerts stoutest defender in support of a hard
policy vis-a-vis the Soviets on the Berlin issue. He is almost
certainly aware that any move towards an accommodation with East
Germany would seriously jeopardize his cordial relationship with
Adenauer, something he would be most reluctant to do.
3. Khrushchev may try to get de Gaulle to agree to a limita-
tion on West German rearmament: particularly the independent
acquisition of nuclear weapons. While de Gaulle might be sympa-
thetic to such a limitation: he is unlikely to commit himself on
any agreement related to West Germany alone. He would believe
that such action would seriously strain the Franco-German rela-
tionship. It cannot be excluded however: that de Gaulle would
privately tell Khrushchev that he would oppose a lifting of the
WEU restrictions on German nuclear weapons development.
- 2 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
Approved For Rob; lase 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A800500020089-0
SvCRET
4. Khrushchev will almost certainly raise the general sub-
ject of disarmament. De Gaulle, who has stated he is not seeking
nuclear armament but rather nuclear equality, might be willing
to subscribe to a general statement giving top international
priority to control and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons,
although we believe he will attempt to avoid making specific
commitments on disarmament while the Geneva talks are in process.
Although it is conceivable that Khrushchev might offer some form
of technical aid to France in its nuclear development program
we think this is highly unlikely, As far as Khrushchev is concerned,
this would raise extremely difficult problems with the Communist
Chinese. As far as de Gaulle is concerned, it would be compotely
unacceptable to his allies, and he, himsolf? would almost cer-
tainly be unwilling to have the Soviets participate in Francers
program.
5. For his part, de Gaulle may attempt to secure from
Khrushchev some recognition of France's special position in Africa,
especially in Algeria -- either in a joint public statement or
perhaps by some act, such as a visit to the Sahara oil fields.
We do not believe, however, that to obtain this, he would be
willing to make concessions which would seriously antagonize his
Western allies.
-3
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : C1aiE9R00904A000500020089-0
Approved For Rejoase 2006/01/17: CIA-RDP79R00904A800500020089-0
SECRET
6. In general, de Gaulle can be expected to avoid making
commitments unacceptable to his allies. Although he wishes to
revise the organization of the Atlantic Alliance, he knows full
well that it is the best protection France has at the moment.
As yet his country does not have a nuclear capability that could
enable it to risk doing without the alliance. He is still far
from ending the Algerian War, and until this is done, he cannot
seriously entertain -- even if he desired to -- a revision of
France's basic security policies.
7. General de Gaulle's well known confidence that he is
admirably fitted to negotiate with the Soviets, his belief that
the USSR has more in common with the West than with Communist China,
and his insistence that the most desirable course of long range
policy is to exploit common East-West interests as a means of
disrupting the Sino-Soviet Alliance cannot be ignored. However,
the Gaullist perspective is long, and the General has shown him-
self capable of patience. He has always guarded against the
undertaking of premature initiatives, no natter how convinced he
may have been of the ultimate correctness of his assessment of a
situation.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/17: CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
Approved For Raisase 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A660500020089-0
SECRET
a. Khrushchev and de Gaulle will each be striving to impress
the other with the strength of his country and the vigor of his
policies. In so doing both parties will probably initially be on
their best behavior, but it is possible that the confrontation of
two such different personalities will result in serious clashes
either open or concealed.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25X1
MERMAN KENT
Chairman
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0
MEMORANDUM FOR:
0/nay)
/
ert-A,
'
The attached supersedes the text of
10 March. This text is the one that has
been sent to the USE members. There have
been a few verbal corrections but no change
in substance.
SHERMAN KENT
11 Mar 6o
(DATE)
FORM NO. 10 REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
Approved For Release 2006/01/17 : CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020089-0