KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO FRANCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020091-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: March 10, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
10 March 1960
1. Although Premier Khrushchev's visit to France beginning
15 March calls for numerous conferences with President de Gaulle
extending over a two week. period, we consider it unlikely that
there will be any startling results. Nevertheless, the mere fact
of the Khrushchev visit will be regarded by de Gaulle as an evi-
dence of French stature in the Western Alliance. Doth he and
Khrushchev, though in different ways, will seek to capitalize on
the visit in future dealings with the Western Powers. The Soviet
Union's circumspect attitude towards de Gaulle in recent months
suggests that Khrushchev regards the visit as a promising opportunity
to widen the differences between France and its allies. De Gaulle,
however, is probably well aware that the Soviets have little to
offer him in return for upsetting or weakening allied unity. The
talks are likely to be used by each leader as a means of assessing
the attitude of the other on a variety of subjects, including
likely positions at subsequent meetings.
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2. Khrushchev may attempt to persuade de Gaulle that a more
forthcoming attitude towards East Germany would permanently divide
the German people and hence resolve a traditional French security
problem. However, de Gaulle, who has followed and even strengthened
the pro-German policies of his immediate predecessors, is apparently
dedicated to the concept of French security through the solidarity
of Western Europe, including the maintenance of the Franco-German
rapprochement. De Gaulle has been Adenauer's stoutest defender in
support of a hard policy vis-a-vis the Soviets on the Berlin issue.
He is almost certainly aware that any move towards an accommodation
with East Germany would seriously jeopardize his cordial relation-
ship with Adenauer, something he would be most reluctant to do.
3. Khrushchev may try to get de Gaulle to agree to a limita-
tion on West German rearmament, particularly the independent
acquisition of nuclear weapons. While de Gaulle might be sympa-
thetic to such a limitation, he is unlikely to commit himself on
any agreement related to West Germany alone. He would believe
that such action would seriously strain the Franca-German relay
tionship. It cannot be excluded that de Gaulle would privately
tell Khrushchev that he would oppose a lifting of the WEU re-
strictions on German nuclear development.
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4. Khrushchev will almost certainly raise the general subject
of disarmament. De Gaulle, who has stated he is not seeking nuclear
armament but rather nuclear equality, might be willing to subscribe
to a strong statement giving top international priority to control
and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Although it is con-
ceivable that Khrushchev night offer some form of technical aid to
France in its nuclear development program we think this is highly
unlikely. As far as Khrushchev is concerned this would raise ex-
tremely difficult problems with the Communist Chinese. As far as
de Gaulle is concerned it would be completely unacceptable to his
allies, and he himself would almost certainly be unwilling to have
the Soviets participate in France's program.
5. For his part, de Gaulle may attempt to secure from
Khrushchev some recognition of France's special position in Africa,
especially in Algeria -- either in a joint public statement or
perhaps by some act, such as a visit to the Sahara oil fields.
We do not believe, however, he would be willing to make conces-
sions to obtain this which would seriously antagonize his Western
allies.
6. In general, de Gaulle can be expected to avoid making
commitments unacceptable to his allies. Although he wishes to
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revise the organization of the Atlantic Alliance, he knows full
well that it is the best protection France has at the moment.
As yet his country does not have a nuclear capability that could
enable it to risk outright independence. He is still far from
ending the Algerian War, and until this is done, he cannot seri-
ously entertain -- even if he desired to -- the revision of France's
basic security policies.
7. General de Gaulle's well known confidence that he is
admirably fitted to negotiate with the Soviets, his belief that
the USSR has more in cormon with the West than with Communist China,
and his insistence that the most desirable course of long range
policy is accordingly to exploit common East-West interests as a
means of disrupting the Sino-Soviet Alliance cannot be ignored.
However, the Gaullist perspective is long, and the General has
shown himself capable of patience. He has always guarded against
the undertaking of premature initiatives, no matter how convinced
he may have been of the ultimate correctness of his assessment of
a situation.
8. Khrushchev and de Gaulle will each be striving to impress
the other with the strength of his country and the vigor of his
policies. In so doing both parties will probably initially be on
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their best behavior, but it is possible that the confrontation
of two such different personalities will result in serious
clashes either open or concealed.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
SIERMAN KENT
Chairman.
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