RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE CONTINUATION OF THE NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020115-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 115
• Publication Date: January 28, 1960
• Content Type: MF

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grA.
ANDUM F
TS 0142023
4A'.3
enmity 1960
TH E. 01 C TOR
SUB .T: Recoutniendatlone Regarding the Continuatior
of the Net Eva on Subcommittee
1. In my last report to you (30 October 59) I in-
dicated that the 1959 net evaluation would not be presented
to the President until the late flaring and that the President
had indicated that this was the last such report he desired
during his term of office. About the same tiros General
Twining wrote to you informing you at the President's wishes
and advising you that plans for a ?960 evaluation bad been
cancelled.
2. Zince I last reported. the Subcommittee Staff has
completed its special target study and presented its finding",
orally to the Secretary of .!3efense. the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
and the service Secretariat. It has also completed its
secret study and presented the results to General Twining.
Both briefings are tentatively scheduled for presentation to
the President in February. Neither of these is a Sub-
committee project, and voiL have no direct responsibility
Los the contents.
3. The Staff is now cornaleting its written report of
the 1959 evaluation and preparing the oral briefing. Once
this has been presented in Anvil or May the Staff will have
no studies on its docket.
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4. In these direlynsttncoi it is appropriate to consider
e de.lra?hty of conthtid* the ,'Subcommittee and the Hall.
There are three alternativea:
a. 'I continuo tat; ?Abcontraittee and the Staff
indefinitely without any visible object except to keep
the orgesdastion together and to edecate the Staff
for any future taste set for it by the new administra-
ion. this *corns to me to be an unnecessary waste
of manpower.
b. To reduce t tM1 to a minimal aamber,
which old prepare whatever history nsightbe os.-
andepos* of existing records and *seamiest*.
(I believe this is what Gordon Gray proposed to
Cieneral Twining and tioneral Hickey some months
*gm at that time the Staff was heavily occupied. arid
Gray withdrew Ina proposal after Overeat
'Twining interposed ehtection.)
011113COgi Li141 directive ..t*blishtng the
uhcomrnittee and the .*teff end to discontinue studies.
variation woald be simply to abolish the Stall but
to maintain the Subcommittee in being on an inactive
basis. This last coarse is the one I recommend and
one which would probably meet with some support IA
theubcorniniftee.
5. When the net evatuotios proc.d&re was 1nitIato it
was believed quite rightly, that the OtiteetV31 of a
sr would he determined very largely by the outcorge
battles over the (X) and the USSR. As a mute-
ce. elaborate means were developed in the Subcommittce
Staff for determining the e4troine of these air baffles, for
if p-
termintog the placement of weapons, and for estimating the
*fleet* upon the two countries. hi recent years as newer
weapon* system. were developed or estimated for either
these were incorporated. het the principal 0311102.1 of deliver
in both cases has retrained the bomber up through the 1935
evaluation (i. 416 * for the period through isid-1962). Theee
studies have probably been as realistic as possible and gall-
orally accurate as to orders is magnitude.
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6. W have new reached a stage in the developne
*upon, systems where many -- if not moat ot tlic
zicepte will not be applicable in the period of 1943 and
The bomber is rapidly phoebe& out of the Soviet
y a* the principal dedivery weapon; its post. i 961rot
ly be limited to such special argations i.e recon-
r attack upon target* with no fixed address. lixtt
will be true of the ;Jetted biotin. Both the jb.
remaining the importance of an invulnerable re-
apability, are moving from the vutaerable aircraft
oat invulnerable missile either in a bard site, or
mobile launching vehicle.
T. Thu., the air battle will be no tasger of dertlive
rn line many and eeenplicated factors which must go
ciliation of the outcome at thee* battle* will still
but only to peripheral aspect* el a general war sites
be importance of eurpriee arcl timing will be greatly
reduced. Litber side vrill be able to launch a surprise at-
tack of devastating proportions. but this will not have a
decisive impact; the reply couid be equally devastating.
breashollev himself admitted this in his recent speech to
the Snorerne Soviet.
S. A general war ct1cnisUon wader the conditions et
i963 and beyond MU be relatively simple compared with
calculations applying to 19$54.0. Until an effective anti-
missile system is developed. the amount of physical damage
will simply be a Inaction at the autether of missile*, the ef-
ficiency of the missiles, and the targets selected. When
effective anti-missile system is developed, then eirriosaly
new situation will arise end a different and wholly new set
of calculations will be introduced. At that time a new .wat
game procedure will probably be needed.
9. I believe that, i7emw of the foregoing, no n. etul
purpose would be served 4y keepsag the present Staff itt bin zg.
It may be desirable to keep the bubcommittee itself in
simply to maintain the prenclple of interdepartmental co
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problem and to nsiaintain th* basic nachiriery
ttn new studies sheald they be deemed aeceesary.
aver. I 4e* no merit is initiating additional studies anti]
there is a major change in the strategic situation, or in
autintairting a standby Staff *eating such changes.
10. 1 therefore recoin mend the following:
be t4.ke4i to terminate the NSC
vs establishing the ore:seat staff mission
urs as of 34 Jure 1960. at the same
retaining the tfubcoRnmittee on a standby
b. U such rovse WI! slid. to suggest
Mr., Gray that the itaff be reduced to a standbl
S as soon ae the ittS9 evaluation hits Wien
rnpleted.
c. in any case, to neetit Mr. Grays approval
for withdrawal of die 1A memnhar a* regular *Stiff
atember and his transfer to advisory status at an
early date. Advisory states vrould insure whatever
is required in regard to assuming an adequate and
pert), utilised intelliasaca input without tying up
*Mar CIA officer fail time with activities of
txtarginal
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