POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF A US PROGRAM FOR COOPERATION WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THE PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000500020132-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 132
• Publication Date: August 9, 1951
• Content Type: MF

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RRMORI NDT FOR TIN, O:I;Rt C )i OF CE "''RAL Ii MM1,1C : ICS;
aatJE>JE;CT: Politic l ,=,a P` t: c io o i~;a] E':: 'c U j of a U3 Frogrs i
for Coca; ution i t h Oths-`Pr t. sr i. t3? i?ea~1'~
Uses of At'azwic 1 FSergG*
t
That the ps o1-,z a .. wro?uld be as outii nai in ti)e rJlr-jf
the MSC on "CoopwaiAon It . of per Vationo in the P+aace.
:/ 3 of Atomic ihw:rg,T'R.. fig. ~Ax ~ a;t i. 054.
La `ho initial r w onti f t tm i s Wo :.d cc %wt ies to
the proposed program. would a: s)e~:;t zerIcaira'y l; i geryawa y I' tve :.
able tiaa))i;h the pro. ; i WG :I? . G cruse r cars a. proz ;1e ort~
from some elements in L . ;a?; a Vdor o irtr :)
2 O For the most . art tit?. proposed progr wi7a : t
,pause, participating cotantr'.ea -4o h r to co t nts to the
. ~.~._ &a s r ar m-j -.gas p , a .d joint with and, is cancui
ir, by the- Office of in.t+fl t )n*de Research of the i p t -w
of State.
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~ ;t9 in other f: eL ., arid, the t eh the US i.r, i.i i :~,'~
to receive from tray= pYotrra r:r be in form of toed wi.U.e
aoreov .r, the general }aou t .c:F,.L and pyc :i1ogica'. vdv& to ,
wrought the US by the prorm~m r;u_Ld tend to fall off over tLe
anger term., a].t .on gh thia t toeli_xa + iTouk b,: m1 tiL a.tcad to thc:r>ram could be maintain ,
3. in some case ,, int pe ?ior .1 fears and ent c. is
could to Rh aorta if cart- _ ~ cr uaantz. .oa? ea s A 'Wast n :j
Japan, Israel., were ei.eot . to ),,a;, ci p tr in the program W--d
n- i hbcr?i ng covart iea were a ?x t Such eo*r.'?1 acts ;out ?a Jai, L{
3 .iea .erred in im 3 ~t such Li' E f t::? US o geam se hlithec .
ion2l r?eeearfio L R ::n r~a . ri c he aatt?ilahle &fl u
tz)
..i.ed scient-13ts -in t~az ire yi(.-r
1 The Bloc .!cuia 1-s-40t r;a rti. spat?. wart in th
g',~,~,gra n and t4or.,ldi. r'.o ,`a -liter ].c'1r e l?Y
ka:; opaganda maw e p,v-r, tikagr cla would roba ]v :c't
rai !icar:tly aff ec-b the x.11 ta.f,z e;p-5; c~s' Free 1.16--le,
~o a: tat Fie tf
s r tic3 pate in the r!i gr a.Fr _
la General os? nse . ]
3 initial r?-- rpo Asa of the the
Wyrld countries ` t.a. n; ocram acjt,,Jd a st cartair:i
l gene a.1ly fav r? blr art; ;rd, bah yr :ring political ar~.ci
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psychological benefits to the US. Many nations particularly
those which are more advanced scientifically, would regard
the program as a longoverdue relaxation of US policies of
secrecy and exclusiveness in the atomic energy field and an a
practical implementation of the President's speech of 8
December 1953. The underdeveloped nations would probably re-
gard the opportunity to participate in the program as enhancing
their prestige.
2. However, some cri icisass will probably be made:
that the proposed program to too m dest and is not commensurate
with the resources of the JS and the scientifi capabilities of
the more advanced countries or the needs of underdeveloped
countries; (b) that it should provide for installation of power
rather than research reactors (countries which already hale
research reactors may argue that they are ready for the next
stop, in their atomic eserg;r development programs, and many back,
ward countries will argue ';hat thex.r need is for a source of
cheap energy quickly). Thy may be sane instances in which
the fact that the US does not propose to finance the entire
program will cause disappo ntnentn
3o It is also likely that some elements in some countries
will voice fears that any association with the US in the w-..
ploitation of atomic enerj will increase the chances that their
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will themselves become involved in atonic war. These fears will
be played upon by Conmnist propaganda,, but are not likely to have
ary decisive effect on ar r non-cone nist government.
It. However, the program could probably be presented in such
a way as to mitigate some of the above criticisms and fears if
effective publicity were given to the uses of research reactors and
the fact that the proposed program would not advance the military
utilization of atomic energy except in an indirect and theoretical
war. Informed foreign opinion would also probably recognise that
work on the peacetime uses of atomic energy is still in the experi-
mental stages and that the program would give participating countries
an opportunity to train personnel who would be able to utilize the
products of this research as they became available. The general
reaction in underdeveloped areas may be more favorable to the United
States if the offer is construed as a first step in a program to
assist underdeveloped countrie;:r to obtain power reactors. Such an
interpretation would,, howevr, carry with it the expectation that
the US or the international agency to be established would assist
in solving the economic and fancial aspects of programs involving
power reactors.
5. Low Term Reactions. There is some danger that over the
longer term some countries participating in the program would become
disillusioned as experience taught them the cost of maintaining an
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atomic research program and that they would endeavor to persuade
the US to make additional financial contributions; similar problems
have been encountered in present technical aid programs. There
might be some popular dissatisfaction due to the lack of tangible
and spectacular benefits produced by the program, but this can be
lessened by avoiding the build-up of excessive expectations.
Nevertheless, the general political and psychological advantages
brought the US by the proposed program would tend to fall off over
the longer term, although this decline would be mitigated to the
extent that the momentum of the program could be maintained.
6. Reciprocal Commitments. Most participating countries
would probably expect that no political commitments would be
attached to participation in the programs because of the President's
emphasis in his "atomic pool" speech upon the fact that his proposal
was being made for the general benefit of mankind. These expecta-
tions would be reinforced by the modest character of the program
presently proposed. Moreover, those countries which supply the
US with atomic materials would probably regard the US offers under
the proposed program as no more than their due. In some cases the
US might be able to get a modest Mid Lro ut~o by bilateral negotia-
tions, particularly from countries which do not supply the US with
atomic materials. For the most part, however, countries will not
be willing to make commitments to the US in other fields and the
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advantages which the US is likely to receive from the proposed
'program will be in the font of good wills
7. Multilateral vs. B3iiateraljreements. While the aims
of the US program could probably be achieved, at least in part,
through bilateral arrangements alone, a concrete US proposal for
creation of an International Atomic Energy Agency affiliated with
the UN would evoke a more favorable Free World reaction. Among
other things, it would encourage those countries not receiving
immediate benefits from the US to expect that they would benefit
later through a multilateral spreading out of these benefits.
Many countries would also anticipate that in an international
agency they would have more leverage upon the US and be less di-
rectly committed to the US. At the same time a US proposal for
eventual creation of an international agency would ease the way xor
prior bilateral agreements. Some Asian countries might prefer
assistance via a UN agency to direct US assistance, but we belie ;
it unlikely that any Free World country would on this account
forego the benefits of aid. direct from the US o
$. Individual 0ountry Problects. Those countries which
supply nuclear materials to the IS will, like Belgium, almeost
certainly denand special consideration. They will expect US
assistance under the proposed program as a gold Ero coo for their
continued supplying of such materials 0
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9. In addition to the UK, France, Nora , the Netherlands,
Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland, and Canada, all have fairly advanced
atomic research programs of their own; some already have researen
reactors, and the others are building or planning to build one or
more; some are working on power reactors. Most of them would
probably be highly interested in, benefiting from US technologicat
assistance and in obtaining supplies of refined fissionable mate`-ials.
West Germany could probably rapidly develop an atomic research pro-
gram if present restrictions upon its activities in the atomic energy
field were modified.
10. A second group of Free World countries which have less
advanced atomic research programs, includes: Italy, India.,
Argentina, Brazil, Australia, the Union of South Africa, and Japan.
11. A third group of countries have demonstrated active interest
in the development of atomic energy for peacetime uses, but have no
programs of their own or are engaging in research of a peripheral
nature only. These countries ward require a greater degree of US
assistance and support than those in the second group. They includes
Israel, Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Mexico
y
Most remaining Free World countries are either not actively con
cerned with atomic research or completely lack the necessary ca;a-
bilities.
4"
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I-OW, loop,
12. Regional Problems. However carefully the proposed
program is handled, there is likely to be dissatisfaction and die-
content in some countries which do not immediately participate,
either because they feel that the US has underestimated their
scientific capabilities, or because they feel that there are spe-
cial circumstances which Justify their inclusion in the program
at an early stage. In some areas, intraregional antagonisms may
be sharpened if certain countries are declared eligible to the ex-
clusion of others. This factor will be particularly important if
it proves difficult to dez ns orate the complete dissociation of a
program for the use of atomic research reactors from any i cease
in military potential. The establishment of an international
organization under UN auspices for the administration of research
clone under the proposed program mould tend to allay the fears and
suspicions that may be created by the construction of an atomic
research reactor in one country in regions where thee is great
sensitivity to any changes, real or surmised, in the balance of
power. Such regional problems i ight also be overcome if regional
research cecters were set up to utilise the research reactors con -
structed under the proposed program t.
13. If Argentina and Brazil were the only countries declared
i' ately eligible in Latin America for participation in a
reactor presgr, their neighbors' fears would probably be aroused
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ANWOM --me
and if a reactor were constructed in only one of those two countries,
the other would probably react unfavorably. However, the creation
of regional tensions could probably be minimized if facilities
could be provided for qualified scientists from all the Latin Ameri-
can countries to work with a research reactor constructed in some
enitable location o
ll.. Israel and Turkey are the only states in the Middle East
erhioh have the scientific capability to participate in a reactor
program. Construction of a research reactor in Israel, however,
would arouse strong adverse reactions in the Arab statee, and it
would not be feasible to set up a regional research center in Israel.
9[he establishment of a regional research center in Turkey would prom
duee a mildly favorable response in the Arab states and would pc rit
some form of participation by all states in the area, save possibly
Israel.
l$o In South Asia, India's response to the offer of a research
Imactor would be enthusiastic because of that country's great nser,
for scientific and technological progress. The political and psycho'
logical benefits to the US would, therefore, be considerable, but
they would not be a determining factor in India's general political
orientation. India would be unlikely to agree to aray direct coxes
cessions to the US in exchange for the opportunity to participate.
W
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Moreover, while the reaction of most other South and Southeast
Asian states would be favorable, Pakistan, rich has established
close ties with the US, would react adversely if India alone re-
ceived US assistance. Pakistan's reaction would be leas adverse
if a regional research center (perhaps for all the Colombo powers)
were established, even if this were located in India.
16. In the Far East, Japanese participation to the exclusion
of countries like Indonesia,, the FPhilippines, and South Korea
would create misgivings in the excluded countries. Creation of
a regional center, however, would tend to mitigate this reaction.
Despite the high cost of power in Japan there has been only limited
interest in atomic energy, development in that country, and more-
over,* memories of Hiroshima and the recent thermonuclear experiments
in the Pacific have produced a wary public attitude toward atomic
energy matters. There would be divided counsels in Japan on the
benefits of the proposed program, but the net reaction would prob-
ably be favorable.
17. An important regional problen would be created in Europe
tr the uneasiness of other countries if the US decided to support
an atomic energy program in West oerraapy. There already exists in
Eirope an international organization formed for the purpose of
cooperative action in the atomic energy development field. Some
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European states would probably prefer to see US assistance under
the proposed program go to this organization, rather than to
individual states.
18. Soviet Reaction. The USSR, for reasons of both prestige
and security, would probably reject participation in the proposed
program. It is also unlikely that the USSR would seek to counter
the US offer by indicating that it too was willing to help supply
atomic reactors and technicians to underdeveloped countries. At
nest, Moscow might report with considerable fanfare the establish-
rent of atomic reactors in the Satellite states or Communist China,
citing the conditions of their establishment as exemplifying correct
relations among sovereign states.
19. The Soviet Union would probably rely primarily on propae
Banda to counter or "expose" the US program. Moscow would stress
above all else that the US was seeking to divert public attention
from the major international problem of banning the use of nuclear
weapons. It would minimize the significance of the US proposal,,,
arguing that only with agreement to prohibit nuclear weapons w04l6-
xuufficient nuclear fuel be diverted to the peaceful use of atomic
energy to be of substantial econovdc benefit to other nations.
would point out that the US planned to continue the full scale
production of atomic weapons. The proposal, it would be charged,
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is a direct descendant of the Baruch Plan and, as such, is designed
to secure US control over atomic research and production throughout
the world. Nevertheless, we be