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December 19, 2016
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October 12, 2005
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August 2, 1961
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Approved = Release 200/1Q1~2~,:S~Q$,p4A0007000~0022~9 ~ "#;' I TS ~1~+2368-a Copy 1 2 August 1961 MEMpRAI~DUM FOR THE. DIRECTOR SUBJECT ; The Soviet Air Show -- As Treated in the McNamara Report to the President, the Briefing of the Stennis Subcommittee, and the JCS cable to Major Commands. RIiF'ERENCES; 1. Letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense to DCI, dated 2~ July 1961 (Report to .President of 1~- July, attached) . 2. Report of Hearing before the Preparedness Investigation Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 18 July 1961. General 3. JCS Message 99963, 26 July 1961 (DA IN 129730) 1. Many differences in these three accounts of the Soviet Air Show of 9 July stem from two basic factors; (a) the pur- pose for which they were prepared, and (b) timing. The .JCS. report is lengthier and far more detailed, reflecting the requirements of its military recipients. .The McNamara report to the President and the Stennis briefing, both. tailored for civilian policymakers, concentrate upon highlights of the show. The JCS report also benefits from the fact that it was prepared some 8 to 12 days later than the other accounts, by which time r,~'~ ~r~snF.;~E tra c:.x. S, i ~ ~7 ~ :,EC!_AS~IF~ED ~~~ m ~ ~.. Ci.ASS. CWANGt'C TO: 25X1 ~j ~~~~~~~~DaTE: ~,~ REVIEWER: Approv~# For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79#~i0904A000700040022-9 code-names had been selected for the aircraft., some addi- tional facts were available, and intelligence evaluations had firmed up somewhat. 2. However these factors do not explain the difference in tone between the McNamara report to the President and .the other two accounts. The McNamara report is couched in terms of surprise; this is mitigated, however, by the cover- ing letter to the President, which does not convey an, impres- sion of alarm. The other reports indicate that despite the display of a number of new or modified aircraft, there were few surprises. Succeeding portions of this memorandum will note major differences in the reporting on the more important combat aircraft and in the conclusions of the three reports. Strategic Bombers 3. All three. reports are in general agreement as to the range and speed charaeteristi~s of the supersonic "dash" medium bomber, BLINDER, and note that one of these was carrying an air-to-surface missile (.ASM). Thin is identified. Approved For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 Approved~+$r Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R(~Q904A000700040022-9 as a new A,SM in the JCS report and the Stennis briefing, and the existence of such a missile is suggested by a sentence on modification of BADGER in the McNamara report. The new A.SM, not previously estimated, is larger than the 100 n.m. A.S-2 and. smaller than the 350 n.m. AS-3; this is the first evidence of its development. The statement in the McNamara report that the display of 10 BLzNDERs "indi- cates a buildup in operational units greater than currently estimated" is contradicted by NIE 11-8_61 (7 June 1961) which estimates that "about 30 have been produced to date" (Para. 86) and. that a few "probably have now entered service" (par's. 85). These estimates were included in the. Stennis. briefing. ~+? ~'he equipment of BADGERS and BEARS with A.SMs is noted in all three reports. The Stennis briefing and the JCS report indicate that these are the previously estimated AS-2 (100 n.m.) and A.S-3 (350 n.m.) missiles. Modifications to the BEAR to accommodate these missiles are noted in all three reports, and JCS suggests that the aircraft so modified Approved For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 ApproJs~d` For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP791~0904A000700040022-9 possibly do not have an alternate bombing capability. The McNamara report concludes on the basis. off' the extensive modification of REAR- and BADGER that "the Soviet emphasis on air-to-surface missiles was not entirely antici- pated " and in an opening paragraph expresses the ,judgment that "there are . indications of developments beyond. present estimates in the coupling of air-to-surface missiles with aircraft." Similarly the JCS report states that the increased use of air-to-surface missiles was forecast. "though not to the extent indicated." Whatever these statements may mean' the subject of air-to-surface missiles is covered extensively in national estimates. For examples NIE 11-5-61 (25 April 1961) describes the development and characteris- tics of AS-1~ AS-2~ and AS-3 (pares. 69-7'9 and Table II). NIE 11-~+-60 (1 December 1960) notes the deployment of ,ABMs to Naval Aviation (para. 89) and to Zong Range Aviation (para.35). NIE 11-8-61 (7 June 1961) estimates actual numbers of ABMs now operational (pares. g6-97). 5. The three reports identify BOUNDER as a prototype. However,, the Stennis briefing and the JCS. report describe the shortcomings of this design in some detail. The McNamara Approved For Relea~'me92~05111/29 ~ IA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 Approveor Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R~04A000700040022-9 report refers only to its development potential, a matter concerning which there is no agreed estimate within the intelligence community Attack Aircraft 6. All three reports note the display of the super- sonic FIREBAR, described as an "attack type" aircraft (McNamara), a "fighter-bomber" (.JCS), and a "tactical fighter bomber or light jet bomber" (Stennis briefing). Z`he statement in the McNamara report that aircraft in this category had not been specifically estimated, is correct. We: can. find no support in the recent national estimates for -the JCS. statement that "we had expected such aircraft but had no reliable evidence on which to base a forecast." The display of nine FIREHARs was cited as evidence in the Stennis briefing that this aircraft is operational. Fi ters 7? Both the JCS report and the Stennis briefing identify ~'IDDI,ER as an all-weather, long-range interceptor, reflecting Approved For Rele~a~e' 20U~l1~1~29 ~: CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 Approved~r Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP79R04A000700040022-9 ~~~ the current views of the intelligence community. Aevelop- went of an interceptor aircraft of this type had not been previously-estimated. The description of this aircraft as a light bomber in the McNamara report apparently reflects an earlier view.' The JCS report and the Stennis briefing note that FIDDLER is armed with a new, large air-to-air missile, but estimate that this aircraft. could be adapted to tactical use. 8. The three reports note the display of another all- weather interceptor prototype, FLIPPER. The-,JCS report states that "our estimates included an all-weather inter- ceptor of this type," However, the McNamara report states that "performance indicated is considerably above that estitt~.ted for future Soviet fighters." Actually, estimated characteristics of this aircraft are quite similar to-those estimated for the next generation of Soviet interceptors in NIE 11-3-CQ and NIE 11-3-61. (Soviet aircraft which have been estimated. but not actually observed are not given nick- names by Western intelligence.) Approved For Release 201 ,t~ ~/ ? ~~F"F~P79R00904A000700040022-9 ~ ~d ~..? Approv~ed'~For Release 2005/11/29: CIA-RDP791~904A000700040022-9 Conclusions 9. The threo reports are in general agreement on the propaganda motivations involved in. the air show. They also agree that it provided evidence of continued. Soviet development of manned aircraft systems. However, there is some disagreement as to the extent of Soviet pro- gress in this field. The McNamara report holds that "certain qualitative progress was beyond that estimated by the US" and that "intelligence estimates had not anti- cipated this continued improvement to the extent shown." The JCS report asserts that the air show "confirmed the estimated continued comprehensive Soviet research and development program in aircraft and aircraft armament" and that "these aircraft do not represent any advance in state-- of-the-art," but rather "the result of continued steady development." This was also the tone of the Stennis brief- ing, which. characterized the air show as a "pretty tangible demonstration of abroad spectrum of development in manned systems" and 'apart of a mixed force the Soviets seem to be pursuing." The views in the Stennis briefing and the JCS ~~ ~~w ~ iu. ~e Approved For Release 2005/'11/29: CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 Appro For Releasef2~05/11/29: CIA-RDP7''~00904A000700040022-9 report more correctly reflect the current national estimates. Although one or two aircraft types represent unexpected directions in Soviet research and development, we would caution that aircraft displayed in previous air shows have not always been selected for production and operational use. 25X1 ~~ ~~ Assistant Director National Estimates Approved For Relea~;a5,2~p5/1 ~ CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 Approv?~MFor Release 2005/11/29 :.,CIA-RDP79I~6904A000700040022-9 3 ~ ,-:~ INTELLIGENCE STATUS pF SELECTED EQUIPMENT DISPLAYE77 IN SOVIET AIR.SHbW In The McNamara Report BEAR (Equipped with AS-3} Extent of ASM.equip- ment not foreseen. BADGER: (Equipped with. AS-2) New.ASM (Carried by BLINDER) FIDDLER (Long-range interceptor) New .AAN! (Carried by FIDDLER Extent of ASM equip- ment not foreseen. Display of 10 indicates buildup greater than estimated. Not noted -- suggested by modified BADGER. D:eseribed as "light bomber". FLIPPER Says not estimated. (A].1,-weather interceptor} FIREBAR (Supersonic fighter- bomber} Says not estimated. In The National Estimates Known (NLE 11-5-61, NIE 11-~+-60} loo AS-3=.~ estimated operational (NIE 11-8-61}. Known. (NIE 11-5-61, NIE 11-~+-60) 50o AS-1 and AS-2 estimated operational (NIE 11-8-61). A few estimated opera- tianal and about 30 produced (NIE 11-$-61). Not known -- future ASM of longer range estimated (NIE 11-5-61}. Development not estimated. Tot specifically estimated -- development of new AAM6 foreseen (NIE 11-5-61}. Development estimated (NIE 11-3-60 and NIE 11-3-61). Approved For Releas~;2~0~111/2~~ CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 Approve~ifor Rele ~~~e904A000700040022-9 In The McNamara In The National Rep?rt Estimates FLASHLIGHT B Not specifically noted. Known-since 1956 but not estimated opera- tional. MAIL Not specifically noted. Known -- characteristics (Turboprop flyin.~ boat included in NIE 11-~+-60. Approved For Release 2005/11/29 :_CIA-RDP79R00904A000700040022-9 ._, ,.r ,~ ,.. ~. ~~ ~ ~~ ~~