THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800010013-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: November 3, 1961
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
CFFICE CF N..TIONA.L FSTIM .TES
3 November 1561
MEM0W NDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Situation and -Prospects in Cuba
Summaly
1. The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and
repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely
to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces
serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The
contrast between its roseate promises and the grim actuality is
producing disillusionment and apathy. Some specially motivated
elements have recently dared to demonstrate their disapproval.
The bulk of the population, however still accepts the Castro
regime, or is at least resigned to it, and substantial numbers
still support it with enthusiasm. At the same tir., the regime's
capabilities for repression are increasing more rapidly than are
the potentialities for active resistance.
DOCUMENT NO. ~--
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I ; EVIEW DATE:
"a"i"Wap ?;U ; t HR 70-2
RCIIIVAL RECORD 1aJUN 1980
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCI-IIVES, 25X1
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The Economic Situation and Prospects
2. The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of three
revolutionary changes: (a) the loss of most of its experienced
middle and upper level managerial talent; (b) the imposition of
elaborate state controls; and (c) a drastic shift in the trading
pattern, from primary dependence on the US to pr3.ttary dependence
on the Soviet Bloc. The US embargo has produced some economic
difficulties through the denial of spare parts for previously
acquired equipment, almost all of which was of US origin. Never-
theless, the production of sugar, the principal export crop, has
been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit,
the other leading exports, has been maintained. Although Cubats
free world trade and foreign exchange reserves have declined
sharply, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough
consumer goods and machinery to keep the economy going.
3. The domestic production of foodstuffs and other consumer
goods, and the imports obtained from the Bloc and elsewhere, are
together not sufficient to compensate for the loss of former im-
ports from the US. Porsonal consumption has declined, especially
in the cities, and most drastically in the case of the upper and
middle classes. In sor:c rural areas, however, especially in
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centers of sugar production., l v l ng coni itt'ions have h eon sub-
stantially improved, particularly in terr..s of housing and oani-
tat:i_on. These examples of the tangible benefits received by some
keep alive the hopes of many others.
In addition to trade, the Bloc has extended to Cuba some
$357 pillion in credits for industrial development. However., only
a few of these development projects are yet undenray, nor is much
likely to be accomplished for another year or more.
5. In general, the Cuban economy is characterized by major
shortages and a high degree of disorganization. This state of
affairs will continue for sore tine to corn, and r_;,zy indeed. get
somewhat worse. In view of the availability of Bloc assistance,
however, we do not believe that the cc-ono,,-.,y will deteriorate so
far as to bring about Castrots overthrow, or force hin to rake
basic changes in his policy. On the contrary, the situttiori will
probably begin to improve within a year or so, as the new
Communist--type organization takes hold, managerial experience
increases, and foreign trade is adjusted to new channels.
Popular llccelitance of the Regime
6.
Initially,, almost all Cubans hailed the triumph of the
Revolution with enthusiem. Disillusionment, however, cane quickly
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to the urban middle class, urban organized labor, and the landed
Gentry. It has since spread to small peasant proprietors and.
even to humbler folk, who are beginning to appear in sigraficart
nurbers in the flow of refugees from Cuba,
7? The severe internal repression which acconpariod the de-
feat of the April invasion stilled, for a tire, all manifestations
of opposition within the country. By September, however, this effect
had worn off sufficiently for Catholic crowds in Havana and other
cities to dare to defy the regime's prohibition of certain public
religious observances. This. was the first occasion on which the
regime had been forced to use gunfire to disperse hostile public
der.;onstrations. It was therefore indicative of a significant
chaog;e in the psychological situation,
8. There have also been some increase in small-scale guerrilla
and sabotage activity and a considerable increase in such passive
forms of resistance as absenteeism. However, most disaffected
Cubans new think primarily in terms of escape. In mid-September,
some 15,000 had completed legal arrangements to leave the country
which were then cancelled by the government, and some 500 were in
asylum in the several Latin American embassies in Havana. Illegal
departures occur almost daily.
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9. Do,; pi-t;e t,hi sc: r:;czi'iilest i,Ioc:o of cl:is