THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00904A000800010013-1
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
11
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 1, 2006
Sequence Number: 
13
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
November 3, 1961
Content Type: 
MF
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00904A000800010013-1.pdf447.44 KB
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t #. s Approved For (elease 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R009O4A000800010013-1 C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y CFFICE CF N..TIONA.L FSTIM .TES 3 November 1561 MEM0W NDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR SUBJECT: The Situation and -Prospects in Cuba Summaly 1. The Castro regime has sufficient popular support and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat likely to develop within the foreseeable future. The regime faces serious, but not insurmountable, economic difficulties. The contrast between its roseate promises and the grim actuality is producing disillusionment and apathy. Some specially motivated elements have recently dared to demonstrate their disapproval. The bulk of the population, however still accepts the Castro regime, or is at least resigned to it, and substantial numbers still support it with enthusiasm. At the same tir., the regime's capabilities for repression are increasing more rapidly than are the potentialities for active resistance. DOCUMENT NO. ~-- 1F NOCH : CLASS. ^ CLASSIFIED 3S. CHANGED TO: TS S C I ; EVIEW DATE: "a"i"Wap ?;U ; t HR 70-2 RCIIIVAL RECORD 1aJUN 1980 PLEASE RETURN TO AGENCY ARCI-IIVES, 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDPP~RE)8984AA --- 00010013-1 ri ,',' //,/ 7 Approved For l .elease 2006/11/01 : CIA-l DF'79R00904Ae000800010013-1 The Economic Situation and Prospects 2. The Cuban economy is now feeling the impact of three revolutionary changes: (a) the loss of most of its experienced middle and upper level managerial talent; (b) the imposition of elaborate state controls; and (c) a drastic shift in the trading pattern, from primary dependence on the US to pr3.ttary dependence on the Soviet Bloc. The US embargo has produced some economic difficulties through the denial of spare parts for previously acquired equipment, almost all of which was of US origin. Never- theless, the production of sugar, the principal export crop, has been increased, and the production of tobacco and tropical fruit, the other leading exports, has been maintained. Although Cubats free world trade and foreign exchange reserves have declined sharply, the Bloc is taking enough exports and returning enough consumer goods and machinery to keep the economy going. 3. The domestic production of foodstuffs and other consumer goods, and the imports obtained from the Bloc and elsewhere, are together not sufficient to compensate for the loss of former im- ports from the US. Porsonal consumption has declined, especially in the cities, and most drastically in the case of the upper and middle classes. In sor:c rural areas, however, especially in Approved For Release 2006111/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO00800010013-1 c c. Approved For Release 2006/11/g DP79R00904A000800010013-1 centers of sugar production., l v l ng coni itt'ions have h eon sub- stantially improved, particularly in terr..s of housing and oani- tat:i_on. These examples of the tangible benefits received by some keep alive the hopes of many others. In addition to trade, the Bloc has extended to Cuba some $357 pillion in credits for industrial development. However., only a few of these development projects are yet undenray, nor is much likely to be accomplished for another year or more. 5. In general, the Cuban economy is characterized by major shortages and a high degree of disorganization. This state of affairs will continue for sore tine to corn, and r_;,zy indeed. get somewhat worse. In view of the availability of Bloc assistance, however, we do not believe that the cc-ono,,-.,y will deteriorate so far as to bring about Castrots overthrow, or force hin to rake basic changes in his policy. On the contrary, the situttiori will probably begin to improve within a year or so, as the new Communist--type organization takes hold, managerial experience increases, and foreign trade is adjusted to new channels. Popular llccelitance of the Regime 6. Initially,, almost all Cubans hailed the triumph of the Revolution with enthusiem. Disillusionment, however, cane quickly Approved For Release 2006/11/01 CIA-RDP79R00904AO00800010013-1 Approved For Release 2006/11/0 &[TR DP79R00904A600800010013-1 to the urban middle class, urban organized labor, and the landed Gentry. It has since spread to small peasant proprietors and. even to humbler folk, who are beginning to appear in sigraficart nurbers in the flow of refugees from Cuba, 7? The severe internal repression which acconpariod the de- feat of the April invasion stilled, for a tire, all manifestations of opposition within the country. By September, however, this effect had worn off sufficiently for Catholic crowds in Havana and other cities to dare to defy the regime's prohibition of certain public religious observances. This. was the first occasion on which the regime had been forced to use gunfire to disperse hostile public der.;onstrations. It was therefore indicative of a significant chaog;e in the psychological situation, 8. There have also been some increase in small-scale guerrilla and sabotage activity and a considerable increase in such passive forms of resistance as absenteeism. However, most disaffected Cubans new think primarily in terms of escape. In mid-September, some 15,000 had completed legal arrangements to leave the country which were then cancelled by the government, and some 500 were in asylum in the several Latin American embassies in Havana. Illegal departures occur almost daily. Approved For Release 2006/11/01 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO00800010013-1 Approved For Release 2006/11/01 CIA-RDP79RO0904AO00800010013-1 9. Do,; pi-t;e t,hi sc: r:;czi'iilest i,Ioc:o of cl:is