LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SINO-INDIAN BORDER DISPUTE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020012-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: May 7, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Likely Developments in the
Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Attached is the memorandum on the Sino-Indian border
dispute requested by the White House. This memorandum has
been prepared with the assistance and concurrence of
representatives of State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research and, we are informed, has been reviewed by Mr.
Hilsman in draft. The memorandum has also been reviewed
by a DIA representative.
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
11"M-CLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: - REVIEWE
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7 May 1962
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Likely Developments in the Sino-Indian Border Dispute
Since there are important limitations on the will and ability
of both India and Communist China to pursue their border dispute,
the odds are strongly against a major military escalation. Never-
theless, the extent to which both sides have committed their
prestige makes small-scale clashes likely, and the political and
psychological stakes involved may progressively increase, making
it harder for either side to back down.
If the dispute worsens, India will probably seek additional
military equipment from both the USSR and the West, looking also
to the latter for help in keeping Pakistan off its back and for
additional economic aid. Intensification of the border dispute will
Ish-WAiMANOW
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pose a particular dilemma for the USSR, which must balance the
risks of further splitting the Bloc against the dangers of
alienating India. However, it will also pose problems for the
US, which cannot give major military aid to India without risking
adverse reactions from Pakistan and possibly other allies.
India's troubles with Communist China are unlikely to improve the
chances of a Koshtlir settlement.
1. The current flare-up in the Sino-Indian dispute was
touched off by recent Indian forward movements into the disputed
border area of Ladakh. Indian troops reportedly have already
occupied one outpost and have orders to take a larger one several
miles beyond. Peiping has protested the Indian moves strongly, de-
manding immediate withdrawal and stating that it will forcefully
defend the positions it now holds. Nehru has announced in
Parliament that India must continue to protect its interests in
the Himalayan border area, preparing for the contingency of war
with China.
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TILE INDIAN POSITION
2. Preservation of Indian territorial and political inter-
ests in the Himalayan area has long been a fundamental aspect of
Nehru's policy. Originally, he pinned his hopes on amicable rela-
tions with Peiping under the "Panch Shila" ("Five Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence") umbrella. However, since 1954 there have
been continued Chinese incursions into Indian-claimed territory.
In 1959 Peiping brutally suppressed the Tibetan revolt and there-
after increased its efforts to extend its influence in the
border states of Bhutan, Sikkim,and Nepal. India's belief in
1960 that there was a tacit understanding to maintain the status
quo was shattered by further Chinese encroachments in 1961. All
these events convinced Nehru and most informed Indians that their
interests cannot be protected without a demonstrated willingness
to use force in their defense.
3. India probably does not really expect to make good its
claims to all the territory in Ladakh which it asserts it in-
herited from the British, The Aksai Chin plateau area in eastern
Ladakh is much more useful and accessible to China than to India,
and. Peiping as long ago as 1957 completed a road across it con-
necting Tibet and Sinkiang. What the Indians are interested in
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is establishing a posture of military strength and a pattern
of occupation which will enable the;_1 to prevent further Chinese
expansion and leave them in a favorable negotiating position
for a settlement of a wide range of border questions. To this
end, they are trying to push back Chinese incursions which they
feel tend to expand the limits of the disputed area.
4. Nevertheless, the border question is a deadly serious
one in India today. New Delhi is convinced that failure to main-
tain actively Indian claims to any of the disputed areas would
endanger the country's security by calling into question the validity
of the entire border inherited from the British. Public opinion is
aroused. Nehru's prestige has been committed, and a long-tern
military buildup for defense of the border is underway. From
the Indian viewpoint, the present is an unusually favorable time
to assert its interests: Communist China is undergoing severe
internal difficulties; Chinese-Soviet relations are strained;
and the USSR has refused to support Peiping in the border quarrel
and has proved willing to provide New Delhi with military equip-
merit. In addition, New Delhi probably believes that the West
can be counted upon to approve Indian actions, and if it becories
necessary, to provide direct support.
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5. The dispute with India is also of great importance to
Cor_ulunist China. Peiping maintains that India's claims in the
Himalayan areas are based on unequal treaties forced upon a
helpless China in the colonialist past. Its control of the
Aksai Chin area is important to secure its position in Western
Tibet. In its view withdrawal would jeopardize this objective
and be damaging to its prestige.
6. The Tibetan revolt and subsequent border clashes with
India severely damaged the image that Peiping has tried to
create of a powerful but basically benevolent leader of Asia.
To repair the damage -- without endangering its strategic
interests -- Peiping demonstrated considerable cooperativeness
in reaching border agreements with Burma (1960) and Nepal (1961)
and continued to urge negotiations on India. In the face of
India's uncompromising stance, this tactic made little progress.
7. Recent Indian moves in Ladakh have clearly stiffened
Peiping's determination to defend its position. In its 30 April
note to New Delhi, Peiping stated that Chinese troops had been
ordered to resume border patrols in the Ladakh area (which it
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claimed haw been halted two years ago) and threatened to resume
patrolling along the entire frontier. On 3 May, China and
Pakistan jointly announced agreenent to negotiate a provisional
delimitation of the frontier between Sinkiang and Pakistan, in-
eluding Pakistani-occupied Kashmir -- a move which will almost
certainly further embitter Sino-Indian as well as Indo-Pakistan,,
relations.
THE MILITARY SITUATION
8. The Sino-Indian border region is difficult of access
and poorly suited for large or prolonged operations. Through-
out the year, but especially in the winter, the maintenance of
even small Outposts, many at an elevation of over 16,000 feet,
is extremely difficult for both sides. Although it has longer
supply lines, Communist china in general has easier ground access
to the disputed area than does India.. In the past few years the
Chinese have also improved their capacity for shifting troops
from one point to another by developing a route usable by trucks
which parallels most of the border, while the approaches from the
Indian side, over even rougher terrain, are for the most part
still mere trails which approach the border at right angles.
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Especially in the Aksai Chin area, Indian supplies rust nave
through a few high passes. Both sides depend heavily on pack
animals for supply. The Indians have also used airdrop.
9. Major Indian troop concentrations along the border are
in three widely separated areas: (a) the Ladakh region of
Kashmir; (b) Sikkim,; and (c) the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).
India has 13 infantry brigades in Kahomir but 11 are deployed
westward to defend and police the cease-fire line with Pakistan.
Indian forces in Ladakh -- operating in units of ctcnpany size
or less -- are supplied as far as Leh via an overland route which
is open most of the year, but aircraft and animals must supple-
ment notor transport. The one understrength infantry division
and several local rifle battalions located in IVEFA must be sup-
plied the same way. India's road net is much more adequate to
support its reinforced brigade group in Sikkim.
10. There are about 110,000 Chinese Corxiunist troops in
Tibet, approximately double the number stationed there before the
1959 rebellion. We know their disposition only in general terms;
probably about 40,000 in eastern Tibet, about 48,000 in and
around Lhasa, and about 20,000 along the Nepalese border. There
are also an estimated 34,000 troops in Sinkiang, most of which are
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in the northern and eastern parts of the province. The Indians
estivate that there are about 2,800 in the Aksai Chin area of
Ladakh, with an additional 7,000 reserves within 180 Hiles.
There are two main access roads: Yarkand-Gartok, and Galmo-
Lhasa. The latter apparently carries most; of the supplies for
the military units in Tibet. East-West roads within Tibet and
connecting roads with Nepal are also under construction.
11. Communist China's pressing economic problems sharply
limit its resupply and reinforcement capabilities in the Indian
border area. Maintaining its present forces in Tibet severely
taxes its logistic capabilities. It has neither the rotor
transport nor POL for any sizable expansion of its present ef-
fort. Lack of developed air facilities in the area and the
extreme length of Chinese supply lines limit Peiping's air
capability, particularly for combat operations.
PRODABLE DEVELOPMENTS
12. Despite the important national interests involved and
the vigor with which both China and India are now pushing their
positions, there are a number of major factors which will Hake
both sides cautious in escalating the tempo of their quarrel.
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The Indians are not confident that they have the resources to
cope with Chinese military power if any significant escalation
takes place. The Chinese are aware that the dispute has earned
them widespread criticism within the Bloc, and they probably
are reluctant to intensify the conflict, particularly in Ladakh
where they already occupy the contested territory. Furthermore,
the nature of the terrain involved in the dispute means that
the support of even relatively small military operations would
involve a considerable burden on economies already under heavy
strain. In addition, intensification of the border dispute
could limit the ability of both Peiping and New Delhi to deal
with other problems of more immediate importance.
13. Nevertheless, further clashes are likely, particularly
in the Aksai Chin area. Both sides have already committed their
prestige, and India has ordered 1,800 additional troops into
the Ladakh area; Peiping will probably feel compelled to reply
in kind. Clashes could also occur elsewhere along the border.
We believe that patrol actions and relatively small-scale en-
counters -- possibly accompanied by occasional minor air clashes are more likely than pitched battles above, say, the company
level. Nevertheless, as increasing numbers of troops come into contact
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the chances of miscalculation or overzealous action by local
commanders will grow. Although the odds are strongly against
major escalation of the military conflict, the political and
psychological stakes involved in even relatively small-scale
actions may progressively increase, making it harder for
either side to back down.
14. In the political field, both India and Communist
China are likely to step up their efforts to expand their in-
fluence in the Himalayan border states. Since Indian dominance
is already established in Sikkim, there is probably little that
Peiping can do there. India's position in Bhutan is less well
established, but China will have to move cautiously lest its
efforts cause Bhutan to increase its reliance on India as it
did after Peiping's suppression of the Tibetan revolt. Although
India also retains an important influence in Nepal, its un-
willingness to suppress the activities of Nepali opposition
leaders in India has caused King Mahendra to welcome closer
relations with Peiping. As long as his problems with India
remain unresolved, he will remain susceptible to a wide range
of Chinese overtures.
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15. While both New Delhi and Peiping feel coupelled
to make a show of strength, both would prefer to achieve
their aius without lark-scale resort to force. In tire,
the, euphasis in the dispute u:u.ay shift to negotiations,
p:articul:.zrly if a period of quiet on the border allows Indian
public opinion to cool off. Peiping has already indicated
that it would abandon its clai.s to NEFA in return for Indian
recognition of Chinese clai:::s in Ladakh -- a cu pro:::ise which
Nehru has spurned to date. Nehru, in turn, at one til.e sug-
gest :d that India night be willing to allow Cou nu.nist China
continued use of the road it had built across the Aksai Chin
plateau if residual Indian sovereignty there were recognized.
While he later withdrew this suggestion, he al;-aost certainly
rei.nains aware that Peiping, barring a cor plete domestic
c.]1 pse, will not agree to abandon its position in Ladakh.
II: owever, it is unlikely that any real settlement would co:_ie
out of such negotiations -- at least for the next several
years.
BROADER IMPLICATIONS
16. As long as Communist Chinese military pressures on
the frontier continues, India will seek military items on a
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selective basis from both East and West, seeking to maintain
its nonaligned position. On the long held Indian theory that
the USSR is in a better position to restrain Peiping than is
the West, India initially at least may tend to look for sup-
part more to Moscow than to Washington, looking to the latter rather
for help in keeping Pakistan off its back and for increased
economic support to make up for local resources diverted to
military purposes.
Implications for the USSR
17. The Sino-Indian border clashes pose a particular
dilen:--ia for the Soviet Union. If it goes too far in supporting
India, it will seriously exacerbate the Sino-Soviet dispute,
possibly to the point of an open split; if it refuses India's
requests for aid (e.g., MIG-21's and other military equipment)
it risks turning the leading neutralist power against it, de-
stroying the influence it has spent hundreds of millions of
aid dollars to establish, and weakening its influence in the
entire Afro-Asian "neutralist" world. The Indians, by pub-
licizing their current efforts to get military equipment from
the USSR, have spotlighted Moscow's embarrassing situation.
In the past Moscow has privately pressured Peiping to come to
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an amicable settlement of the border issue, while furnishing
aid to India, including military equipment which has been
used by the border forces. It has refused to take sides
publicly in the Sino-Indian dispute, and it will make every
effort to maintain this position.
Implications for the US
18. Continuation or intensification of the Sino-Indian
border dispute would probably pose less of a problem for the
US than for the USSR but would still involve some potential
difficulties. The Indian defense budget has already been
increased from $561'000.,000 to $730,000,000 since develop-
rient of the dispute in 1959 and further increases are likely.
Such diversions of Indian resources to defense purposes will
tend to inhibit progress in the development of the Indian
economy and might lead to pressing Indian requests for cor.i-
pensating US economic support. With respect to military aid,
the US cannot allow the USSR to assume the principal burden
of helping India without giving the Soviets important advantages;
on the other hand, the US cannot provide major assistance to
India without risking strong protests from Pakistan and perhaps
other allies.
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19. Pakistan will seek to exploit India's troubles
with Communist China by propaganda and diplomatic efforts
and perhaps by increased subversive activities in Kasllrlir.
It is unlikely to undertake military action. It will almost
certainly resist any restraining US efforts, and will be
unwilling, except on conditions unacceptable to India, to
undertake military redeployments or other actions which would
make it easier for India to concentrate military forces
against China., India's troubles with China are unlikely to
make either India or Pakistan significantly more amenable to
a compromise solution of the Kashmir issue, at least for
some time to come.
20. Over the longer run, heavy Chinese Communist pres-
sures against India's borders might conceivably make India
somewhat less resistant to an accommodation with Pakistan and
less firmly committed to a nonaligned position, particularly
if the USSR felt constrained to limit its support for India's
position. In the event of major military reverses, New
Delhi would almost certainly seek US military support, per-
haps within a UN context. On the whole, however, we consider
it unlikely that the border dispute will bring about any
major shift from India's policy of nonalignment.
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70
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NOTES FOR FILE COPY:
5 copies to McG Bundy w/5 maps
additional maps attached to DCI, DDCI, CES,
and AD/NE file copies.
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