CONSEQUENCES OF A BLOCKADE OF CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000800020016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 23, 1962
• Content Type: MF

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CONFIDENTIAL ~`
TS No. 1'+2519-c
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM FOR TIT DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Consequences of a Blockade of Cuba
TIIE PROBLEM
23 April 1962
To estimate the consequences of and general reactions to a
blockade of Cuba and the likelihood that it would bring about
the downfall of the Castro/Communist regd.:-.e.
A blockade could be imposed upon Cuba by a variety of means,
ranging from the use of all necessary US air and naval forces to
a token blockade consisting largely of announcements and warnings
issued by a Cuban government in exile. To be effective, however,
any kind of blockade would require such a degree of support from
the US as to make it virtually indistinguishable from an openly
announced and acknowledged US Government action.
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Reactions in the Non-Communist World
1. The general attitude of world opinion toward the US-Cuba
dispute is that the Castro regime does not pose a substantial
threat to US security, or indeed to any important US interest.
A blockade of Cuba by US forces would be regarded as an act of
war. Hence, the reactions to a determined US effort to overthrow
Castro would range from lack of sympathy or support to expressions
and acts of opposition.
2. In Latin America in particular public opinion would be
strongly opposed to a US blockade of Cuba. Attitudes toward the
US would be sharpened by the belief that its action in trying to
bring down the Castro regime would also impose suffering upon the
Cuban people as a whole. Many leaders of Latin American countries
would like to see Castro disposed of, but would be moved by the
pressure of public opinion to withhold any approval, let alone
support, of the US action. Moreover, some of these leaders would
genuinely fear a recrudescence o#"Zankee imperialism." There is
virtually no chance that the OAS would approve the blockade.
3. Outside Latin America, popular feeling would range from
distaste to revulsion. Some people and governments would consider
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that the methods adopted by the US were out of all proportion
to the stature and importance of the intended victim. Among
these elements, US Judgment and sense of balance would be called
in question. Moreover, the action would undermine the US posture
as a sincere advocate of decolonialization.
4. In the underdeveloped countries, opinion would be es-
pecially unfavorable, and the blockade would be looked upon as
bullying, at best. Misgivings would be reinforced about US
good will and the genuineness of US claims to support the
principle of self-determination. The US would be rendered less
able to influence these countries on a wide range of issues;
e.g., Palestine, Kashmir, West New Guinea.
5. Many countries, particularly in Latin America and in
Africa and Asia, would vigorously support UN action to put a
stop to the US blockade -- a situation which the Soviets would
find easy to exploit.
Soviet Reaction
6. The Soviet leaders would regard a US blockade of Cuba
with great seriousness. They would do all in their power,
short of assuming grave risk of general war, to save the Castro
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egime and to defe CONFiDE i/A L
r
at the US Purpose in Cuba and huElfore the iliate it be
world, We do not believehowever
, that they would re_
sort to military action themselves.
They are likely to believe
that they could obtain their objectives more effectively by means
entailing less risk,
7? In addition to the usual, outcry against US "Ix1pe ,iali
and suggestions that US actions had evoked the danger of sra
war, there would general
Probably be worldwide drives to raise money and
Organize measures of relief for the starving Cuban people e _
haPs under UN auspices. Soviet actions would ' P r
probably be pri_
marily Political and focused in the UN. They would seek a
lotion condemni reso-
the US, and they might sponsor a UN
of inquiry and conciliation,. They COission
would probably seek to impose
legal and other sanctions upon the US through the UN
national Court of Justice ,the Inter_
and other international bodies. In
all these efforts they would be likely to find widerPrea
d support.
8' One of the most
promising lines of activity from the
Soviet point of view
would be attempts to send car
the blockade goes through
< The value of such efforts would
that if lie in the fact
they succeeded the Problems of the Castro regime would
be in some degree alleviated, and if they failed would
create
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incidents which could be exploited against the US. Ships,
including some flying non-Bloc flags and manned by nonBloc
crews, would probably be sent to run the blockade carrying food-
stuffs and medicines paid for by popular subscription contri-
buted to by individuals from many parts of the world.
Chartered non-Bloc aircraft carrying relief supplies could
probably be sent to Cuba with crews which would be willing to
accept the risks involved in defying the efforts of US military
aircraft to turn then back. To contend with these maneuvers,
the US would be obliged to interfere with the ships and aircraft
of many countries and risk taking the lives of their nationals.
Effect of the Blockade in Cuba
9. A total blockade of Cuba -- which the US could impose
if it were willing to accept the heavy cost to its standing,
prestige, and alliances
would present the Castro government
with formidable problems. The more than $500 million worth of
equipment, supplies, and food now coming into the country an-
nually would be cut off and Cuba would be thrown back on its own
resources. A blockade would quickly bring the economy to a
virtual standstill. Food shortages are already marked. Petroleum
supplies could be stretched out to meet priority needs for only a
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few rionths. Many rlanuf ctt~ed items., like most medicines, would
quickly become unavailable. Most industrial and rlanufacturing
activities would have to be sharply curtailed or stopped. A
total blockade would cut off food imports which now account for
about one-third of present caloric intake, though sugar, citrus
fruits, and other foodstuffs presently exported would make up
part of the loss. Strict rationing and careful reallocation of
available nutrition would be necessary, but the country probably
would not starve. The regime would count on worldwide opinion and
the actions in the UN and elsewhere described above to force the
US to abandon its blockade before the internal situation became
desperate.
10. Within Cuba the political consequences of a blockade
would be mixed. The proportion of pro-and anti-Castro reaction
in the mixture would depend upon a wide variety of factors.
Anti-Castro Cubans would take heart from the blockade because they
would conclude that it meant the US was about to dispose of him
and the Communists. Unrest and resistance might increase, but
if a blockade were not soon followed by intervention, most of these
hopes would be dashed and disillusionment would grow with deprivation.
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11. The nur, er "af Castro's
supporters would probably not
for some time be decreased by the fact of a US blockade or its
consequences. Their numbers would probably be aug ented by
persons antagonized by the blockade. Castro's security forces
would probably be able to contain efforts at rebellion froi:a
inside, even if the rebels were to be supplied by the US. We
believe it likely that the Castro regime could maintain itself
in power for some time even in the face of an effective block-
ade. However, if such a blockade did bring about the downfall
of the Castro regime, this would occur in circumstances in which
it would be difficult to establish a successor regime genuinely
friendly to the US.
12. Another possibility is a blockade which would permit
ample quantities of foodstuffs to enter Cuba but prevent all
other goods from entering or leaving. Such a blockade would
not significantly reduce the emotional content and intensity of
the world public reaction.. Most Cubans would probably blane
the US rather than Castro for the many inconveniences and
deprivations consequent on the blockade. We believe that in
these circumstances also it is unlikely that enough Cubans would
take the risks involved in rebellion to overthrow Castro, except
in the presence of an invading force deemed likely to defeat him.
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13. In General, we conclude that reactions outside of Cuba
to a blockade would be as adverse as those to an actual iiili-
tart' intervention. Inside Cuba, a blockade would be less likely
than intervention to result in replacement of the Castro reCirne
by one friendly to the US.
FOR TITS I30ARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES;
25X1
y SITERMAN KENT
'may Chairrzai
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