MOTIVES IN CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY BUILD-UP

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00904A000800030021-0
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 21, 2006
Sequence Number: 
21
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 20, 1962
Content Type: 
IM
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PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00904A000800030021-0.pdf77.02 KB
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Approved For Relea 2006/04/21 :CIA-RDP79 _ ,QD904AO00800030021 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 20 June 1962 6C I No. 1Copy No. SUBJECT: Motives in Chinese Communist Military Build-up it ~al/ 1. We think it very, nlikely that the Soviets and the Chinese Communists have /planned a coordinated action--or even coordinated pressures--on Berlin and on Quemoy. The relations between the two countries are not, in our opinion, close enough at present to make this at all probable. Neither do we think that the Soviets wish at this time to run the risks involved in such an operation; indeed we believe that they would be opposed to the Chinese independently under- taking an attack on Quemoy. If the Chinese Communists launched such an attack or created a situation of sharp crisis in the area, we believe the Soviets would consider that any drastic increase of pressures in Berlin would involve an undesirable heightening of risks. 2. If the Chinese Communists attack Quemoy, or openly threaten to attack it, and conduct an appropriate propaganda campaign at home and abroad, we believe that one of their motives would be to divert their people and to secure a meas- ure of patriotic support for the government. Such a diver- sion would be unprofitable, however, unless the enterprise were successful, and (because of Chinese Communist economic weaknesses) successful fairly quickly. We do not believe that the Chinese can be confident of such a quick success. Accordingly, we believe that some other motivation is more likely to be primary 4 erhaps a desire to pre-empt an antic- ipated Chinese Nationalist attack by means of a spoiling operation against the offshore islands DOCUMENT NO.,. NO C H IN CLASS. ^ CLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: AUTH: HR 70.2 e, pATE REVIEWER. _ 2 6 JUN 1980 Approved For Release 2006104/21: CIA-RDP79R00904AO00800030021-0