SOUTH VIETNAM'S LEADERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 3, 1963
• Content Type: MF

S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Rele,e 2006/03/17: CIA-RDP79R00904A00001000
Executive Regiolty
3 September 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: South Vietnam's Leaders
1. It has been doubtful for a long time whether the
Ngo family could provide the kind of unifying national leader-
ship necessary to win the counterinsurgency struggle, reduce
the Viet Cong threat to the level of local police action, and
restore a modicum of tranquillity to the countryside. This
has been doubtful largely because the regime has failed to win
the popular support and loyalty necessary to such an effort and
because it has alienated a large proportion of the competent
Vietnamese politicians and administrators whose support and
assistance would be an invaluable aid in governing the
country and combatting the Viet Cong.
2. The Ngo family's handling of the Buddhist crisis and
particularly its actions during a past few weeks now lead us
to conclude that this family cannot lead the country to
victory. Its actions have intensified the disaffection of most
politically articulate Vietnamese with the regime and its
methods and further reduced its chances of ever winning the
AIN
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S-E-C-R-E-T and declassification
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S EL ET
popular support and loyalty necessary to victory over the
Viet Cong. Moreover, the regime has further deepened its
distrust of the US, which will further reduce the US-
Vietnamese cooperation at all levels which is probably
essential to victory.
3. In addition, we observe that several of the other
non-Communist governments of Asia strongly disapprove the
conduct of the Diem regime, and the US, because of its
close connection with Diem, has received some share of this
disapproval.
5. No one can guarantee that a new regime would be
more successful than the present one in achieving US objectives.
The accomplishments of a successor government would depend upon
the character and competence of the individuals who composed
it, the appeal it could make to the people at large and, above
all, the degree to which it could command united support from
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E I.
the army. It appears to us possible, though far from certain,
that new ruiners could be found who would satisfactorily fill
the requirements.
25X1
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
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ROOM NO.
7D60
ROOM NO.
7E48
DATE
3 Sel..zmber 1963
Hq.
J. &at
Acting DD/I
" O/NE
BUILDING EXTENSION
Hq.
1 FEB 55.24 I REPLACES FORM 36-8
T WHICH MAY BE USED.
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