IRAQ: A GLOOMY PROSPECT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000010008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: August 1, 1963
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
1 August 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Iraq: A Gloomy Prospect
The five years since the overthrow of the monarchy have
witnessed c, etrastic slowdown of economic progress in Iraq. More
impor'tautly, there has been a growth of a spirit of violence and
extremism, expressing itself in street killings and summary
executions. Finally, Baghdad is facing the longest and biggest
tribal, revolt since World War I. The Baathist regime is unpopular
and will probably become more so as the Kurdish stalemate continues
and casualties mount. Sooner or later the present regime will
probably be displaced by a military group whose leaders would be
likely to employ the same harsh tactics as the Baathists have done.
It may be that a successor government, with capable and confident
leadership, could turn Iraq's efforts and resources into constructive
channels. The danger is that a cycle of violence is being started
and that a series of military coups will produce a shifting, un-
stable, and increasingly violent political atmosphere in Iraq for
years to come. Such conditions would seriously set back the once
promising economic development of Iraq, provide tempting opportunities
for the Soviets, for other Arabs, for Iran, and for Turkey to meddle
in various ways, and generally set back chances for the stability
which is a cardinal aim of US policy toward Iraq.
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1. Five years ago a military coup d'etat overthrew the
Nashimite mom urciy amid nationwide rejoicing that full independence
from foreign influence had at last been obtained. Western influence
declined shorply and the Soviets roved rapidly to establish a
commanding presence through sizeable military and economic aid.
The leaders of the coup soon fell out over questions of personal
leadership and the degree of closeness the new Iraq should have with
Nasser. After several plots in the first several months and one
abortive rebellion, Abdul Karim Qasim confirced his position as
"the Sole, the Faithful Leader," who would, by his unique talent,
create a modern state in Iraq.
2. Qasim governed Iraq by adroitly balancing political forces
off against one another, now favoring the nationalists, now the
Communists. He personally dominated the administration and arrogated
to himself the decision-making power in virtually all important
matters. Most of his army colleagues, happy with the prominent
role they played in the government and with the new equipment and
perquisites they received, found it in their interest to support him.
The "Sole Leader" made a strong and rather successful play for
support from the masses, especially the two to three hundred thousand
peasants who flocked from the country during the fifties to seek work
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in Baghdad, living in vast settlements of mud and reed huts on
the fringes of the city. However, he progressively alienated the
bulk of politically conscious elements in the country by his
inept and heavyhanded administration.
3. Despite Qasim's erratic leadership, the country managed
to stagger along economically. A quarter of a billion dollars a
year in oil revenues enabled the regime to carry out some develop-
ment schemes and to import enough grain to make up for the errors
of the land reform program. Show projects such as street paving,,
lighting and housing, particularly in the Baghdad area, were put in
hand; some major efforts started under the old regime were finished;
a number of industrial and communications projects were begun under
Bloc supervision. Generally, however, business stagnated due to
lack of confidence in the regime and overall progress in develop-
ment was not very great. Finally, careless fiscal management and
lavish spending on prestige items wasted a great deal of money and
left the government with budget deficits and, toward the end, actual
shortages of cash.
4. The most serious damages to Iraq from the Qasim regime
are not the foreign debts and domestic business stagnation, which,
in the light of continued oil revenues, can be dealt with in a few
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years by employing sound fiscal and economic policies, envisaged in
the Beath program. The tr't~,ty ha:mful result is the growth of a
spirit of violence and extremism which has occurred in the last five
years. During the high point -of Communist influence in 1959, the
"street" took to executing justice in its own fashion by brutal
murders and dragging of bodies through the streets. Further, the
regime itself turned to the practice of executing some of its
convicted enemies -- four from the old regime, thirteen from the
unsuccessful Mosul revolt of 1959.* Probably most disastrous of all,
Qasim's tactics of trying to control the Kurds by letting loyal
tribes fight rebellious ones resulted in a major revolt which has
seen large portions of Kt^distcn out of government control for two
years now.
5. Regrettably, the trend toward extremism has continued under
the Baathist government. Believing itself capable of subduing the
Kurds, the new regime refused to negotiate seriously the promised
special status for the Kurdish areas and is conducting a harsh,
repressive campaign, including summery execution of persons suspected
Customarily in the Arab Near East, the unsuccessful plotter or
the leader deposed by a coup has been jailed or exiled, not shot
or hanged. There have been exceptions, of course, but generally
the policy of leniency has been reciprocal and has been, so to
speak, a "rule of the game."
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of aiding the Kurds, which it hopes will bring the rebels to sub-
mission. The bitterness, deriving from indiscriminate bombing of
villages and similar measures, will bedevil attempts at Kurdish-
.Arab cooperation for a long time to come. The regime has tried and
executed over .60 people already for terrorist actions caimmitted in
Mosul and Kirkuk in 1959 and 1960 and, apparently, shot out of hand
a goodly number of the participants in the unsuccessful July 1963
Communist uprising at Rashid Camp in Baghdad. In a less violent
vein, it is alienating most of the politically conscious elements of
the population, choosing to run Iraq as an all.-Baeth state rather
than seeking the broader cooperation which it badly needs to get
Iraq on its feet, administratively and economically.
6. These developments present Iraq 'with two separate but
related problems. In the first place, the determination of the
Baath Party leaders to totally dominate the government is likely to
backfire. The Baath does not have broad popular support, and dis-
like of its attempts to monopolize all important government posts
is growing. Continued casualties and lack of progress in Kurdish
operations are likely to cause increased dissension among army and
civilians. In time, forces opposed to the Beath are almost certain
to move against it. Although opposition to the Baath is at present
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disorganized and leaderless, sooner or later the present regime is
likely to be displaced by a military group. Unless an outstanding
leader is thrown up by such a coup, the chances are that it will
be only one of a continuing series of transitory governments,
bringing Iraq along the sae path that Syria has trod since 1948.
7. Since no such group is presently discernible on the
horizon, it is impossible to do more than speculate about the
nature of its leadership. From the military, a leader of stature
and ability might emerge; on the other hand, the opposition might
have nothing better than the "strong man" so common in recent
Syrian politics. Unless an outstanding leader emerges, the chances
are for a continuing series of transitory governments, each under
recurrent pressure from other ambitious military men.
8. The Baathist regime is also sowing the seeds of future
trouble by encouraging the growth of violence and extremism and
by the indiscriminate imposing of the death penalty. A successor
regime will be strongly tempted to indulge in the same practices out
of a spirit of vengeance, perpetuating the cycle -- the group in
power rules harshly to forestall opposition, for it knows the
opposition, once in power,, will show little mercy. And so on and
on as the employment of harsh tactics by the government results in
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increased use of violence and terrorism by those seeking to oust
it. Further, personal feuds and private vengeance will have new
opportunities to flourish in such an atmosphere. (In the last
year or so of Qas3m's rule, upwards of 50 murders in Mosul were
attributed by the authorities to reprisal or counter-reprisal for the
Communist excesses of 1959.)
9. Iraq has never been a model of peace and stability; it has
had its share of coups d'etat, assassinations, tribal revolts, and
street rioting.. However, the scope of these activities has increased
greatly in the past few years. The present Kurdish revolt exceeds
in duration, munbers of insurgents, and area affected anything
since the turbulent days immediately after World War I. Again,
executions for political crimes far exceed the total of pre-Qasim
days,* and are increasingly being carried out summarily, without
the delays which permit traditional leniency to be shown. In sum,
the none-too-sturdy structure of legal process and orderly govern-
mmnt, in the broad sense, put together by the British, which managed
An Iraqi nationalist, who was strongly anti-Hari, recently
summed it up this way: "We used to talk about and publish
things that irritated Nuri and the palace, knowing that we
might ;o too for and lose our jobs, have our paper closed, or
the like. But t;e .'??x Nuri -t ouldn't hang ua for this. These
pc.eplc (the Baathists) will. "
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to survive through Nuri's authoritarian era, is showing dangerous
signs of collapse.
10. Aside from a handful of old politicians with tiny
personal followings, only two political groups, the Beath and the
Communist, now operate in Iraq -- and the latter are proscribed and
repressed. There is widespread feeling that more organized political
activity is desirable, but there are neither leaders nor parties to
translate this feeling into action. The Communists will certainly
strive to build their strength clandestinely, especially among
those elements most likely to be out of phase with the Baathists,
such as peasants, workers, and military personnel. The Iraqi
Communists are already supporting the Kurds and will strive to
achieve a dominant role in the Kurdish Democratic Party, the political
arm of the present rebellion. The Soviets are giving political and
propaganda support to the Kurdish rebels, probably hoping to profit
from the turbulence of the rebellion, since their former favorable
position in Baghdad has been largely destroyed.
U. What does this mean for the future of Iraq? It would be
incorrect to say that Iraq is reverting to the level of insecurity
which prevailed in ottoman times, but certainly present conditions
are more dist:cubed than during the army coups of the thirties,
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indeed, since the establishment of the state in 1921. If the
Baathist government does not contrive a settlement of the Kurdish
insurrection, enlist the meaningful cooperation and participation
in governing of at least some political elements other than itself,
and take steps to eliminate or drastically reduce legal and extra-
legal bloodletting, then the steady trend away from orderly govern-
ment is likely to bring Iraq into a political, social, and economic
quagmire. Such conditions would endanger the once promising economic
development of Iraq, provide tempting opportunities to the Soviets,
to other Arabs, to Iran and Turkey to meddle in various ways, and
generally set back chances for the stability which is a cradinal
aim of US policy toward Iraq.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL EST[MATES:
SHERMN MUr
Chairman
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