MEMO: 'POSSIBLE SOVIET REACDTIONS TO US DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000010028-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2006
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: June 15, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. TO
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UNITED STATES GO INIMENT
Memorandum
DATE: 15 J'6& 1963
SUBJECT: Haw; 'Possihie Swiet petits to US Disarmament, Propm-1t#"
This mmr~mao~ is in. resptxnse to your request for comments related to
reparatioa or nev dia t pr ats as directed by 1 239. We
Included la the fix-st several paragraphs some general ec nts on the
B;wy i.r tnr Intelligence
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CENTRAL I N T E L L I G ENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
14+ June 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Reactions to US Disarmament Proposals
1. Because an agreement to cease nuclear testing has acquired
major importance as a symbolic political act, it would be difficult
in the present context to move on to further significant advances
in the field of disarmament and arms control without first having
concluded a test ban agreement. The outcome of the July talks in
Moscow on this narrower subject will both provide evidence on
Soviet intentions in the disarmament field as a whole and determine
what further movement is possible on broader measures. New pro-
posals after agreement on a test ban treaty would presumably be
made in a significantly improved international atmosphere and
Soviet receptivity would probably be increased. If the test ban
negotiations fail, however, the Soviets would almost certainly charge
the West with the full responsibility and for some time would not
give serious consideration to further US proposals on arms control
or disarmament that did not include important concessions to
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Soviet positions. Such concessions, however, might encourage the
Soviets to believe that they could adopt an even harder stand not
only in relation to disarmament but on other contentious political
issues as well.
2. The Sino-Soviet negotiations which begin before the test
ban talks, but are likely to be protracted, could be an important
factor in Khrushcliev's view of the conversations with the US and UK.
Chinese opposition to any agreements which impose restrictions on
their acquisition of nuclear weapons is clear, and the Soviet
position on disw nament is bound to be an issue. Conversely, the
American attitude in the talks could affect the course of the
Sino-Soviet discussions. Khrushchev'a choice of a mid-July date
for the three power negotiations might even be intended to warn
the Chinese that he has the option of serious dealing with the
West. Because these two sets of talks may be interrelated,
Khrushchev is likely to remain flexible until he is in a position
to judge the probable outcome of both negotiations. In addition
to the Sino-Soviet quarrel, a complicating factor may be differences
within the Soviet leadership on the question of whether it is
possible to reach any important agreement with the West and whether
the USSR would not be better advised to proceed w th new weapons teats.
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General Considerations
3. In general, we do not believe the USSR regards the
present period as a favorable one for reaching arms control agree-
ments which would advance Soviet interests. Although it is
conceivable that economic pressures will force the USSR to consider
political ways of reducing the arms burden, current signs do not
point in this direction. Moreover, the underlying assumption of
a broad agreement on disarmament or arms control is that the USSR
can accept the political status quo as the basis for a detente
with the US. Since the Vienna meeting with President Kennedy,
Khrushchev has adamantly refused to make such a commitment to
detente, and until he does so will be wary of encouraging expecta-
tions that major issues can be resolved through agreement with
the US.
i+. Unless their attitude undergoes a basic change we believe
the Soviets will continue to view disarmament primarily as a
subject for political agitation to appeal to aspirations for peace
and mobilize pressure against Western military measures. This is
not to say that the Soviets have no interest in disarmament. They
probably still see advantages in certain measures of arms control.
They would doubtless count it a significant advance, for example,
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if they could find a means of preventing the proliferation of
nuclear weapons or reducing the chances of accidental war. In
this respect their Interests coincide with those of the US.
Their approach to such measures, however, is focused on Europe,
and Germany in particular. Thus the Soviets are the most receptive
to US disarmament proposals which are heavily overlaid with
political issues,, especially those affecting the future of NATO
armaments. And at any rate, they view the mere discussion of
this issue as potentially divisive for the Western Alliance.
5. In the recent past the Soviets have probably not
expected the US to offer important concessions to Soviet views;
on the contrary, they have been somewhat apprehensive that they
were on the defensive and in a weak position in negotiations
generally, because of the outcome of the Cuban crisis. They
might, however, interpret the recent Western initiatives as re-
flecting an inordinate need for negotiations with the USSR and as
foreshadowing new concessions, particularly since Moscow has dis-
played little interest in resolving important issues on mutually
acceptable terms. Such an interpretation could lead than to con-
clude that on a number of other issues they could press harder than
they have previously calculated.
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each side could choose among various systems for greater or lesser
reduction within the overall percentage, there would be an appeal
to the Soviets from both a military and economic standpoint.
Nevertheless, no such separable first stage plan is likely to be
negotiable with the Soviets without some provision for the reduction
of US bases and troops abroad, and the Soviets would still oppose
the kind of inspection which the West has hitherto thought nocersory.
T. The Soviets would probably insist that such an agreement
be concluded between NATO and the Warsaw pact rather then bilaterally,
in order to prevent a buildup of strategic power by Western Europe.
They would be more Likely to take such a poet ova ill try Thad
decided to opt for relatively greater reductions in their striking
forces directed primarily at Europe, so as to achieve a more
favorable intercontinental strategic balance between the US and
the USSR.
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b. Gradual Approach: The US would make proposals
for a gradual approach to disarmament, beginning with token
disarmament plus confidence-building measures to demonstrate good
faith. The initial steps would also be intended to prepare for
subsequent steps involving more comprehensive reductions and in-
tensive Inspections of more significant hardware.
8. Objectively, this approach should appeal to the Soviet
leaders more than the comprehensive, multistage plans of both sides.
It offers, for example, a relatively simple way to begin a reduction
in armaments and create a general political atmosphere conducive to
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gradually expanding the scope of further reductions. It is a
flexible arrangement which could be slowed down or speeded up,
and either side need only go as far as it wished since there would
be no commitments to proceed to any ultimate goal or even through
steps. r'inally, it has more political significance in the
early stages and more military significance in the later stages; it
is, therefore., closer to Soviet interests as opposed to their
propaganda position, since it does not infringe on Soviet security
at the outset.
9. Ne7ertheless, an approach of this kind has always been
available to the Soviets if they were seriously interested in
demonstrating their acceptance of disarmament as a way to relieve
tensions. They have consistently refused to move ahead on such a
basis because it presumes a political commitment to normalizing
relations with the US., without any progress on related political-
military questions, such as the German question. Moreover, a
gradual approach would leave untouched for some time the important
issues which agitate Soviet policy; particularly US plans for making
nuclear weapons available to the Western Alliance. In addition, it
would involve a repudiation of their extensive propaganda investment
in a set plan for complete and general disarmament. In general., we
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think that for these reasons the Soviets would rebuff such a plan
at this time, unless the associated political agreement covered an
important issue. One or more elements of the plan might also have
a greater appeal if it were offered as a quick follow-up to take
advantage of the political atmosphere after a test ban agreement.
C. European - ecurit;L: The US makes proposals on
European security arrangements involving substantial arms control
and disarmament as a major element, particularly in relation to
reductions in nonventional and tactical nuclear weapons.
10. The Soviet response to almost any European security plan
will depend on how it relates to the problem of Germany and the
continued American military presence in Europe. Soviet interest
will vary with the degree to which a European security plan confirms
the division of Germany, deprives Western Germany of any access to
nuclear arms, and provides for a reduction in American troops and
weaponry in Europe. Since almost any security arrangement is bound
to touch at least indirectly on these issues, the Soviets will have
a great interest in pursuing such negotiations, if only to raise
suspicion and apprehension in the Western Alliance.
11. The present time is probably more propitious for testing
Soviet interest in European security arrangements than any other
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since late 1958, when Khrushchev provoked the Berlin crisis. The
Soviets apparently see little chance of gaining their objectives
by forcing a showdown over Berlin. Instead they have shifted to
possible European security arrangements. They recently tabled at
Geneva a proposal for a NATO-Warsaw pact nonaggression treaty
evidently as an indirect means of securing Western recognition of
the division of Germany and Soviet hegemony in East Europe.
Moreover, they probably feel that once the general question of
European security is opened up for negotiation it can be used as
a weapon against plans to strengthen the nuclear and conventional
capabilities of NATO.
12. It should be emphasized that in the field of Eutropean
security involving arms control and disarmament the USSR can
afford to go much further than the US because of the prevailing
military balance of forces in Europe. Regardless of the character
of US initiatives, the Soviets can be expected to respond by
proposing withdrawals of foreign troops, and restrictions on deploy-
ment of nuclear weapons. Almost any proposals acceptable to
Moscow would have to close any loopholes for German acquisition of
nuclear weapons. In return the Soviets would have little to offer,
except perhaps the assurance that some step toward European security
might greatly reduce the chances of a crisis over Berlin. Thus the
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issue might eventually be posed as to whether the US would make
important concessions on the larger question of Germany in ex-
change or a commitment to relax pressure on Berlin.
d. Nuclear Disarmament: The US would make proposals
related to the broad problem of halting the further proliferation
of nuclear weapons occurring either through acquisition by additional
countries or deployment to additional geographic areas and outer
space. Among the measures involved would be a test ban, a non-
dissemination agreement, a cut-off of fissionable material pro-
duction, a ban on placing nuclear weapons in space, and creation
of denuclearized zones.
13. If there is one aspect of Soviet disarmament policy
which is fairly certain, it is that Soviet national interests are
not served by the spread of nuclear weapons. The Soviets, however,
are caught in a painful dilemma: they seem to recognize that a
general test ban would be important in containing the spread of
nuclear capabilities; but their military doctrine and actual
military posture points to an increasing reliance on a substantial
long-range striking force with high yield nuclear warheads, which
means they wish to have a free hand to perfect their weaponry
through continued testing. This dilemma may account in great
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part for the ambivalent Soviet behavior in the long and dreary
test ban negotiations.
14. In our view, the Soviets do not regard the three-power
test ban as adequate in itself to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear capabilities. Not only can the Soviets not deliver China,
but it is most unlikely tl at, .canoe would join an . greenent. In the
Soviet view, any test ban would not reduce the chances of Germany
gaining access to nuclear weapons either from France or through
NATO. We think, therefore, that the Soviets have almost concluded
that the spread of nuclear weapons to Germany is inevitable unless
a test ban is followed or accompanied by a nondissemination agreement.
15. Thus, the Soviets probably now view the test ban primarily
as a tension easing device which could lead to other agreements of
interest to them. We think the Soviets are holding open the door
to tag -ccment on a test ban, until they are firmly convinced that US
policy precludes any further agreement affecting the buildup of
nuclear strength in NATO. Now far the US is willing to go in
nuclear arms control in all its various aspects could have a
decisive bearing not only on the Moscow talks but on the general
course of East-West relations. Denuclearization of Central Europe
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(e.g., the Rapacki plan), of course, would be of interest as a
separate measure and in this connection the Soviets may tie the
whole question of stopping the spread of nuclear weapons into
the German and Berlin questions.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL EST2MA.TES:
I
SE RMAN icJi T
Chairman
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