PRINCIPAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE USSR IN THE ARAB WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000010035-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: June 6, 1963
• Content Type: MEMO

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6 June 1963
SUBJECT: Principal Opportunities for the USSR in the Arab World
Although the USSR and the Communists are unlikely to make
any very substantial gains in the Arab world in the years im-
mediately ahead, there are a number of possible developments
that would, if they occurred, offer new opportunities to Moscow.
If Israel were to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or if re-
newed Arab-Israeli hostilities should occur, the USSR might be
able to acquire a privileged position or a significant degree
of influence as the price of assistance to the Arabs. The Soviets
might also profit, though on a lesser scale, from political up-
heavals within the Arab world. However, exploitation of vulnera-
bilities in the Arab world might also create disturbing dilemmas
for the Soviets, and in any event local leaders will probably
remain suspicious of Moscow.
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1. The USSR has suffered a number of setbacks in the Arab
world in recent months. Moreover, Arab nationalist leaders --
even those accepting Soviet aid -- have demonstrated considerable
ability and determination to maintain their independence of
action and to suppress local Communists. Indeed, we believe
that the UESSR and the Communists are unlikely to make any very
substantial gains in the area in the years immediately ahead.
Nevertheless, the Arab world is going through an era of intense
ferment, and there are a number of possible developments which
could, if they occurred, offer new opportunities to Moscow.
2. The UAR-Israeli Advanced Weapons Race. The advanced
weapons race between Israel and the UAR could provide one such
J
opportunity. Both Israel and the UAR are pressing the develop-
ment of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and this is already
having political and psychological repercussions. Even more
See NIE ll- - 3, The Soviet Role in the Arab World," dated
24 April 1963 for a discussion of trends in Soviet-Arab
r 3lations.
See SNIE 30-2-63, "The Advanced Weapons Program of the UAR
and Israel," dated 8 May 1963.
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disruptive would be the Israeli detonation of a nuclear device,
Arabs would hold the West responsible for this Israeli achieve-
ment and probably believe that the US could have prevented it if
it had wished to do so. Such a development would almost certainly
lead the UAR to appeal to the great powers for firm and categoric
guarantees of its integrity. If the US failed to provide such
guarantees or to take steps to prevent the Israeli acquisition
of a nuclear weapons capaT)il:1ty9 Arab hostility to iard the West
would rise.
3. In these circumstances, the chances for the Soviets to
make significant improvement in their relations with the Arabs,
and the UAR in particular, would be good. The UAR would be likely
to regard the USSR as its principal protector and, if it felt
sufficiently threatened, might even grant the USSR a privileged
position or a significant degree of influence as the price of
support. While we believe that the Soviets would not provide
nuclear weapons to the Arabs, they probably would supply addi-
tional modern weapons, possibly including SSMs, and might make
some rocket-rattling statement designed to intimidate Israel and
the West and to imply protection for the UAR. However, the
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Soviets would be wary of becoming involved in any situation that
4. Arab-Israeli Hostilities. Although we believe an
outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities is unlikely in the next few
years, there are several developments which could lead to such a
conflict. For example, Israel might seize the West Bank of the
Jordan River if a pro-Nasser nationalist regime were installed in
Jordan; Syrian-Israeli hostilities could result from Israeli
diversion of the Jordan waters; a Syrian-Israeli border incident
might flare into larger-scale fighting; or the UAR might launch
a preventive strike against the Israeli Dimona nuclear reactor
to cripple Israeli nuclear capability. While the course of each
encounter might be somewhat different, the Israelis have a clear
military superiority over their Arab opponents, and the Arabs
would be forced to rely on great power intervention to restrain
the Israelis.
5. In this situation, the Soviets would have a new vppor-
tunity to appear as the champion of the Arabs if they provided
diplomatic support and additional military aid. However, the
extent of Soviet gains would depend heavily on Western reactions.
If the Western Powers forced Israel to agree to an armistice and
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to withdraw to its present boundaries, the Soviets might not
find their position significantly improved among the Arabs.
On the other hand, if the West were not able to restrain the
Israelis, the Arabs would ascribe this to conscious US policy,
and Arab leaders would be likely to rely more heavily on the USSR.
6. A Kurdish Revolt in Iraq. The movement for Kurdish
autonomy in Iraq presents the Soviets with both opportunities
and problems. If fighting should break out again, the Kurds
in their search for allies may become more receptive to Soviet
b].andishmen?;ts and might even conclude a tactical alliance with
the Iraqi Communist Party, some of whose members have taken
refuge from government persecution in Kurdish areas. On the
other hand, despite their initial anguished attacks on the
Baathist regime, the Soviets now appear anxious to retain as
much influence and position in Baghdad as possible. They have,
for example, offered to continue their substantial military
aid to the Iraqi Government. While they almost certainly would
provide the Kurds with some form of assistance, they would be
unlikely to commit themselves so fully as to foreclose oppor-
tunities which might develop among the Iraqi Arabs.
7. A Revolt in Saudi Arabia. Opposition to the monarchy
in Saudi Arabia is growing, fed by the upsurge of pan-Arab
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reformist movements in neighboring countries. A successful
nationalist revolution would offer the USSR an opportunity to
establish diplomatic relations and to conclude assistance
agreements. Even if the plotters were only partially successful
and a civil war ensued, the Soviets in conjunction v:Lth the UAR
might find an opportunity to intervene on the Yemeni model. This
could further increase the willingness of the resulting Saudi
Government to establish close ties with the Soviet bloc. Even
should this occur, however, the Soviets would amost certainly
fail -- as they have elsewhere in the Arab irorld -- to exert a
dominating influence over the Saudis. In any event, the country's
reliance on the West for a market for its oil zrould be likely to
require a substantial US presence in Saudi Arabia for some years
to come.
8. The Overthrow of the Monarr-chy in Jordan. King Hussein's
position has been weakened in recent months, though the military
probably will remain loyal. If his internal opposition should be
able to subvert the military, the monarchy could not last, and its
overthrow would provide new opportunities for the Soviet Union.
The immediate threat of Israeli intervention, as well as the
desire of the nationalists to balance Jordan's relations with
the West, would probably lead a nationalist regime to establish
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diplomatic relations with the Soviet bloc and to seek bloc
aid. Althouf,h the Soviets would be likely to grant such
support in crder to gain a presence in Jordan, any successor
Jordanian government would almost certainly be strongly
nationalist.
9. Soviet Involvement in Yemen. The Soviets have some
prospects for further gains in Yemen. While they were content
to supply most of their aid indirectly through the UAR in the
early stages of the Yemeni republican regime, the Soviets are
now dealing directly with the Sallal government. Such a course
has its own dangers for Moscow, not the least of which is the
possibility of running into direct conflict of interests with
the UAR. We 'believe that the USSR would be loath to alienate
Nasser in this way and thus are unlikely to press vigorously
to replace the UAR as the dominant influence in Yemen. However,
if for any reason the UAR's ties with Yemen should loosen, the
Soviets could be in a position to develop a closer relationship
with the Yemeni Government. The Soviets may also hope to use
facilities In Yemen and transit rights to facilitate their
penetration of East Africa.
10. Instability in Algeria. The political and economic
situation in Algeria offers the Soviet Union some hopes of
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'low
eventually increasing its influence there. Although to
date Communist gains have been slight, the emergence of new
leaders or a rupture with France over any one of many issues
could radically alter the present anti-Communist trend and
lead to closer relations with the USSR and other bloc countries.
However, in view of the magnitude of the aid required just to
keep Algeria afloat and the uncertainty of future trends in the
country, we believe that the USSR would be reluctant to attempt
to replace France as the primary source of foreign influence --
and foreign aid -- in Algeria.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Cline
Mr. Kent
DCI approves recomme ttion to distribute
paper to USIB princ' als.
I have note om Chet Cooper's notes that
this an( milar papers are distributed in any
event
Ques ton-. Is this cricket?
W. Elder
17 June 63
U ATE)
FORM NO. IU I REPLACES FORM 10- 101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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