CASTRO AND COMMUNISM: THE ESTIMATIVE RECORD*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001000050011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 26, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 13, 1964
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 May 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Castro and Communism: The Estimative Record*
1. Was Castro a Communist when he came to power? We are
unable to prove or disprove it, but his 'political record as a whole
suggests that he probably was not. The estimates prior to Castro's
1 December 1961 statement that he was a."Marxist-Leninist" did not
label him a Communist. But there is clear warning that for most
practical purposes his regime should be regarded as Communist.
2. The four following selections from SNIE's and NIE's,
1958-1960, are worthy of note. (The first of these was published
six weeks before Castro came to power, and all of them preceded
Castro's "Marxist-Leninist" statement by at least a year.) A more
extensive selection of excerpts is attached as Annex B.
Two annexes are attached: Annex A, "A Chronology of Significant
Dates," and Annex B, "Relevant Judgments from Estimates and
Memoranda." Two broader studies entitled "The Estimative Record
on Cuba" and "Positions on Seven Major Aspects of the Cuban
Situation in NIE's and SNIE's since Castro's Takeover" (dated
15 November 1960 and 30 July 1962 respectively) were sent forward
earlier as memoranda to the Director.
GROUP 1
E}ccluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
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a. SNIE 85-58,, "The Situation in Cuba," 24 November 1958:
"While we have insufficient evidence to establish the
degree of Communist influence in the 26 of July Movement at
the present time, the situation lends itself to Communist
exploitation. Fidel Castro's control over his far-flung
guerrillas is not so firm that he can prevent Communist infil-
tration even if he should so desire." (Paragraph 10)
b. SNIE 85-60, "Communist Influence in Cuba 22 March 1960:
"We believe that Fidel Castro and his government are not
now demonstrably under the domination or control of the inter-
national Communist movement. Moreover, we believe that they
will not soon come under such demonstrable domination or
control . . . Yet, we believe that the Cuban regime is in
practice following the line set for Latin American Communist
parties at the time of the 21st Party Congress in Moscow in
February 1959 and that it will continue to pursue policies
advantageous to the Communists and; to accept Communist
assistance and advice in carrying them out. Cuba may give
increasing appearances of becoming. a Communist society."
(Paragraph 8)
co NIE 85-2-60, "The Situation in Cuba,' 14 June 1960:
"We are unable to answer the simplified question 'Is
Castro himself a Communist?' Communists are deeply involved
in the remodeling of Cuba -- more so than in Guatemala in 1954 --
and the country has become a base for communism in Latin
America. Clearly Castro regards the Communists as helpful
and reliable allies in achieving his objectives; Communists
and their supporters are in positions of importance throughout
the revolutionary government. Given the mutuality of interest
between the Castro regime and the Cuban Communists, it is
difficult, and in most respects academic, to try to distinguish
the policy and actions of the Castro regime from those which
would be expected of a government under actual Communist con-
trol in the present circumstances in Cuba. This situation will
almost certainly persist so long as Fidel Castro and his
associates remain in power. Indeed, the outlook is for Castro's
increased dependence on Communists and they will continue to be
able to make many decisions and take many actions without
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consulting him. If this trend continuem, the. Communists
will gain de facto control of the Castro regime, and are*
near this point, now." (Conclusion. 4)
d. SNIT; 85-3-6O "Prospects for the Castro R. me,
TDecembbe:; !=96C
"It is impossible to distinguish between the policies
and actions of the Castro regime and the program presently
advocated by the local Communists. The PSP is playing an
increasingly important role in the Castro regime. It is pro-
viding guidance to Castro through his chief aides. PSP
members fill key administrative, managerial, and military
positions. The Party's propaganda: apparatus is of inestimable
value to Castro. The party line laid down at the PSP congress
last summer called for continued strong support of Castro, who
was characterized as carrying out the essential first steps of
a 'revolution of national liberation.' PSP spokesmen indicated
that the regime would eventually evolve into a Communist state.
Virtually all institutions of Cuban life are being remolded in
the likeness of a typical Communist society. In short, for
most practical purposes, the present Cuban Government can be
regarded as Communist." (Paragraph 5)
3. One can, of course, pick and choose sentences and passages
from the estimates that mention Castro without linking him with
communism or that discuss the various indications that he was not a
disciplined Communist agent. NIE 85-62, "The Situation and Prospects
in Cuba," dated 21 March 1962, sums up this situation by noting that,
"Since his accession to power in 1959, Castro has collaborated in-
creasingly with the Communists. However, the limited evidence
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State, would substitute "may be" for "are."
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regarding the precise nature of his relations with the Communists
is confused, contradictory, and open to various interpretations . . .
While for all intents and purposes we can now consider Castro as
being fully wedded to the Communist cause, his passionate avowals
do not necessarily mean that he is considered by the Soviet and
hardcore Cuban Communists as being a completely indoctrinated,
disciplined, and reliable Communist." (Paragraph 19) And, "In sum,
the story of Castro's relations with the Communists leaves much
unclear. It seems established that he did not make his revolution
as a disciplined Communist." (Paragraph 30)
4. In retrospect it seems to us that the confusion about
Castro's political character and commitment arose from the fact that
he was and is a new kind of phenomenon in the Communist movement.
We had been accustomed to think of a Communist as a person firmly
committed by formed membership and the acceptance of party discipline,
meaning ultimately Moscow's discipline. This is in fact the way it
was under Stalin'ci iron control of the movement. But a looser organi-
zation of the Communist movement has developed over the last decade,
permitting the association with it of a variety of political types.
These are people who accept Communist political verbiage and ideas
in a general way and see political advantage in an alliance with the
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local Communist party and with Moscow, but who do not necessarily
submit themselves to the traditional discipline of the movement.
Many politicians of this type have been appearing in the conditions
of revolutionary turmoil which now obtain in newly independent and
underdeveloped countries. The Communists, eager to expand their
influence and following in these areas, have been willing to work
with such politicians pretty much on the latter's own terms. The
result has been a variety of shadings inkallegiance to Moscow and
a blurring of the lines that divide hardcore Communists from others
who call themselves Marxists, socialists,! radical nationalists,
5. Almost certainly Castro should be understood in terms of
this kind of development in the ranks of international communism.
His early career and the relations of his group to the Cuban Communists
before and after the seizure of power make it seem very unlikely that
he was a secret and disciplined Communist conducting a political
charade. Probably the critical turning point in his career arose
from his need, in developing a radical course for his revolution,
to adopt a strongly anti-American line. The usefulness of then
finding protection and support from the Soviets as the principal
opponent of the US was manifest. Ideological accommodation to a
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Soviet alliance was not difficult for one of his temperament.
Since establishing the connection with the USSR, Castro has never-
theless sought to remain more ally than puppet, a further indica-
tion that his career cannot be explained in simple terms.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Sfl N IWT
Chairman
25X1
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26 July 1953
December 1956
January 1959
April 1959
May 1959
October 1959
February 1960
March 1960
March 1960
7 May 1960
May 1960
July 1960
July 1960
August 1960
January 1961
February 1961
April 1961
ANNEX A
A CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT DATES
Abortive uprising by Castro
Castro invades Cuba and goes into the hills
Castro comes to power.
Castro visits the US
First Agrarian Reform Act announced
Huber Matos arrested for denouncing growing
Communist influence in regime
First USSR-Cuban economic agreement signed
The French ship La Coubre explodes in Havana
ha -bo.T; Cuba accuses US
President Eisenhower authorizes training of
Cuban exiles
Cuba renews diplomatic relations with the USSR
Castro orders US refineries to process Soviet crude;
they refuse and he nationalizes them in June.
US rescinds Cuban sugar quota
Guevara says Cuban revolution was "socialist"
Communist leader, Blas Roca, calls for fusion
US breaks diplomatic relations with Cuba
US imposes economic embargo against Cuba
The Bay of Pigs
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1 May 1961
July 1961
I December 1961
Mare 1962
October 1962
May 1963
October 1963
January 1964
February 1964
April 1964
Castro says Cuba is a "socialist" state
Announcement of PUBS; OBI formed as inter-
mediary step and Communists dominate it
Castro says he is a Marxist-Leninist
The Escalente affair
The missile crisis
Castro's first visitto the USSR
Second Agrarian Reform Act announced
Castrors second visit to the USSR
The fishing boats-Guantanamo water incidents
The U-2 overflight controversy
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RELEVANT JUDGEMENTS FROM ESTIMATES AND MEMORANDA
1. SNIE 85-58, "THE SITUATION IN CUBA," 21'November 1958:
"Castro's lack of clarity about his objectives, beyond the elira-
ina.tion of Batiste., has raised dotbts ab uv his lc -vance intentions
among many non-26 of July opposition leaders who at the moment
support him. Castro's infrequent pronouncements reflect no well-
developed program, although they indicate definite concern for
agrarian reform and the regulation of public utilities..."
(Para. 5)
"In its inception, the 26 of July Movement was not anti-
American. Until last summer, it sought to cultivate US good will.
Since then, however, rebel propaganda has stressed the supposed
US preference for dictatorship . . . Recently, however, Castro's
propaganda has again evidenced a desire for US understanding."
(Para. 8)
~~. the Cuban Communist Party (PSP), as such, has been
excluded from both the 26 of July Movement and the Frente Civico
Revolucionario (FCR), despite its recent strenuous efforts to
get in. In Caracas, the Venezuelan Communist Party has actually
hindered FCR activities, in order to compel the FCR to admit the
Cuban Communist Party." (Para. 9)
"while we have insufficient evidence to establish the degree
of Communist influence in the 26 of July Movement at the present
time, the situation lends itself to Communist exploitation. Fidel
Castro's control over his far-flung guerrillas is not so firm that
he can prevent Communist infiltration even if he should so desire.
A few alleged Communist sympathizers hold moderately important
positions in the movement, especially among the troops led by
Raul Castro." (Para. 10)
2. SSE 100-3-59 ""LHIREATS To THE STABILITY OF THE US MILITARY FACILITIES
POSITION TN THE CARIBBEAN AND BRAZIL, 10 March 1959:
"In Cuba, the newly installed nationalist regime of Fidel
Castro . . ." (Conclusion 2)
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"Moreover,, some of his top advisors are antagonistic toward
the US and these can count on support from extreme nationalists
as well as from the Cc=nunist Party whose over-all prospects have
measurably improved in the post-revolutionary confusion." (Para. 16)
3. SNIE 8O-59. "THE SITUATION IN THE CARIBBEAN TIiROUGH 1959,
30 June 1959:
"The Communists probably do not now control Castro, but they
are in a position to exert influence in his regime and to carry
on further organizational work. We believe that at least for the
period of this estimate the Communists will continue to support
Castro's program and will attempt to avoid giving Castro any cause
for believing that they are seeking to usurp his position as leader.
We, therefore, believe that Castro is unlikely to take the drastic
steps necessary to check their increasing power." (Conclusion 2)
"Castro's brother Raul, who is strongly sympathetic to com-
munism . . . Major Ernesto "Che" Guevara Serra, . . . , has
consistently furthered Communist interests . . ." (Para. 17)
"Castro and certain of his followers have recently made anti-
Communist statements which suggest that they have some concern
about the local Communists as a potential threat to the 26th of
July Movement's dominance. Thus far, however, Castro has taken
virtually no action to curb the Communists, and we believe that he
is unlikely to take drastic steps against them during the period
of this estimate." (Para. 25)
4. Memorandum for the Director., "The Situation in the Caribbean,"
17 November 1959:
"The adverse trends projected in SNIE 80-59 have become con-
siderably more p:ronQunced since June. Castro's radical advisors --
and the Communists -- have continued to consolidate their positions
at the expense of more moderate elements,, but ultimate power appar-
ently still rests with Fidel Castro himself." (Para. 2a)
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5. SNIE 80/1-59, "TEIE SITUATION fl THE CARbmpa THRouGH 196D.11
29 December 1959:
". . . Raul Castro and Che Guevara -- both staunch pro-Commu-
nists if not actual. Cori unists . ": (Conclusion 1)
"Communist influence will almost certainly continue to increase
in 1960 , largely as a result of the influence the Communists exert
through Raul Castro and Che Guevara and Communist success in placing
adherents in key position in the government. Nevertheless, we do
not believe that during this period the Communists will be able to
force Fidel Castro to adopt policies to which he is opposed."
(Conclusion 2)
"In fact he 'probably trill become increasingly dependent on
them ZC_ommunist2 and he may turn more to the Bloc for assistance."
(Conclusion 3)
6. SNIE 85-64, "COsMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN CUBA, " 22 March 196D:
"In the domestic field, Castro is pursuing an increasingly
radical program eiirploying techniques used by the Communists
themselves in other countries." (Para. 1)
"These developments obviously raise serious questions as to
the degree to which Cuba may now be or may become subject to in-
ternational Communist control . . . Prolongation of the present
situation will result in even greater Comtmmist influence in
Cuba . . ." (Pare . 5)
"His /'astro'J susceptibility to Communist influence and
suggestion and his willing adoption of Communist patterns of
action springs from the parallelism of his revolutionary views
with the current Communist line in Latin America, from his con-
viction that communism offers no threat to his regime, and from
his need for external support. He almost certainly has no in-
tentions of sharing his power or abandoning his announced objec-
tive of developing; a neutralist "third, force" position for Cuba . ."
(Para. 6)
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V e believe that Fidel Castro and his government are not now
demonstrably under the domination or control of the international
Communist mo:rer{lent. Moreover, we believe that they will not soon
cone under such demonstrable domination or control. We reach this
conclusion in part because we feel that under present circumstances
International Communism does not desire to see a situation arise in
which it could be clearly demonstrated that the regime In Cuba was
under its domination. Yeti ire believe that the Cuban regime is in
practice following the line set for Latin American Communist parties
at the time of the 21st Party Congress in Moscow in February 1959
and that it will continue to pursue policies advantageous to the
Communists and to accept Communist assistance and advice in carry-
ing them out. Cuba may give increasing appearances of becoming a
Communist society." (Para. 8)
7. NIB 85-2-60 "TTIIL^SI'].'LTATION IN CUBA," i4 June 196D:
"Fidel Castro has replaced Batistat:s military dictatorship
with a radical-nationalist one which is deeply and increasingly
influenced by Communists. There is no longper any prospect of
democratic government under his regime." (Conclusion 1)
"We are unable to answer the simplified question 'Is Castro
himself a Communist?' Communists are deeply involved in the re-
modeling of Cuba. -- more so than in Guatemala in 1954 -- and the
country has become a base for communism in Latin America. Clearly
Castro regards the Communists as helpful and reliable allies in
achieving his objectives; Communists and their supporters are in
positions of importance throughout the revolutionary government.
Given the mutuality of interest bett Teen the Castro regime and the
Cuban Communists, it is difficult, and in most repsects academic,
to try to distin.^uish the policy and actions of the Castro regime
from those which would be expected of a government under actual
Communist control in the present circumstances in Cuba. This
situation frill almost certainly persist so long as Fidel Castro
and his associates remain in power. Indeed, the outlook is for
Castro's increased dependence on Communists and they will con-
tinue to be able to mare many decisions and take many actions
without consulting him. If this trend continues, the Communists
will gain de facto control of the Castro regime, and are* near
this point now." (Conclusion 4)
The Director of Intelligence and. Research, Department of State would
substitute "tray be" for "are."
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ANNEX B
8. SNIE 82-2-60""PROSPECTS FOR THE CASTO.REGIME," 8 December 1960:
"These measures Lteiken by the Castro regime are closely paral-
lel to the traditional pattern of Connnunist takeover." (Para. 2)
"It is impossible to distinguish betz-reen the policies and actions
of the Castro regime and the program presently advocated by the local
Communists. The PSP is playing an increasingly important role in
the Castro regime. It is providing guidance to Castro through his
chief aids. PSP members fill key administrative, managerial, and
military positions. The party's propaganda apparatus is of inesti-
mable value to Castro. The party line laid down at the PSP congress
last summer called for continued strong, ` support of Castro, who was
characterized as carrying out the essential first steps of a
"revolution of national liberation." PSP spokesmen indicated that
the regime would eventually evolve into ` a. Communist state. Vir-
tually all institutions of Cuban life are being remolded in the
likeness of a typical Communist society, In short, for most prac-
tical purposes,, the present Cuban Government can be regarded as
Communist." (Para. 5)
9. MernorandUm for the Director, ' the Cuban Revolution of 1958
Led to Cuba's All.
cent with the USSR, " 21 February 1961:
"Prior to the overthrow of Batista, the 26th of July Movement
was not Communist; inspired or directed." (Para. 2)
"Fidel Castro, on his part, rejected Communist support when
it was finally proffered. Indeed, on craning to power, he acted
to break the control of organized labor which the Conmmunistshad
seized . . ." (Para. 3)
5s disillusionment set i7 "the Communists became the only
dedicated and effective organizers, operators, and supporters
upon whom Castro could rely, and Raul Castro and Che Guevara were
at hand to influence hiia toward increasing reliance on them."
(Para. 8)
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10. NM 80 T-~Z7., "I,ATIPr At'~tTc~,tt!N RFr1~':TSo 'TO D'VELOxr..:~~ _S IN AND
T731 RE az C-5-TOT CUBA 18 July tiy 19f~1.:
'fie ZPide1/ has pursued his objective /in L -- in close
alliance frith international communism . . . (Para. 19)
U. SNIE 85-61, "THE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA It
28 November 1961:
"The regime is nor in the process of completely reorganizing
the form of gove:rxment in Cuba, and is developing a new totali-
tarian political party to operate and control it. The Communist
model is apparent in both instances," (Para. 13)
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S-E-C-R-E-T ANNEX B
12. NIE 85-6?, "THE SITLtuION AND PPOSPECTS IN CUBA: It Pl March 1
2L
"The pattern of events in Cuba clearly reveals the historical
step by step Communist procedure for attaining complete control of
a country. Daring the past year Cuba has, in effect, gone behind
an iron curtain. The regime has thoroughly reorganized its
political, economic, police, and military-systems in the classic
Communist ideological fashion. It has also sought to identify
itself with the Soviet Bloc in teims that would obligate the USSR
to protect it. The Bloc, however, has avoided any explicit military
commitment to defend Cuba." (Conclusion 1)
"Since his accession to power in 1959, Castro has collaborated
increasingly with the Communists. However, the limited evidence
regarding the precise nature of his relations with the Communists
is confused, contradictory, and open to various interpretations.
On 1 December 1961, Castro said in effect that he was greatly
influenced by Marx and Lenin while a university student, but that
he was then prejudiced against the Communists -- that he held
essentially his present ideas in 195+, but that his understanding
of them was then doctrinally imprecise -- that he became a proper
Marxist-Leninist some time after his accession to power in 1959.
He intimated that he had kept the matter a secret because its
announcement would have cost him needed support. This probably
is an essentially true account of his present appreciation of
himself and his personal political development. While for all
intents and purposes we can now consider Castro as being fully
wedded to the Communist cause, his passionate avowals do not
necessarily mean that he is considered by the Soviet and hardcore
Cuban Communists as being a completely indoctrinated, disciplined,
and reliable Communist." (Para. 19)
"In sum, the story of Castro's relations with the Communists
leaves much unclear. It seems established that he did not make
his revolution as a disciplined Communist. From expediency, and
probably from conviction as well, he has identified himself with
the Communists and evidently now wishes to be regarded as fully
committed to their cause. It seems likely, however, that both
the Soviet and Cuban Communists, partly because he is a recent
and untutored convert and partly because of his impetuous personal
style, retain doubts about his complete reliability. In this
situation, some degree of friction is probable despite the identity
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S-E-C-R-E-T ANNEX B
of interests and mutual dependence that now bind Castro and the
Communists. Whether it ever becomes significant enough to disrupt
the present pattern of close collaboration will depend on Castro's
temperament and his understanding of his own interests as well as
upon the degree of flexibility which the Communists exercise in
dealing with him. On balance we ibhink that the development of an
open conflict between Castro and the Communists is highly
unlikely." (Para. 30)
13. NIE 85-2-62, "SHE SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA," 1 August 1962:
Not pertinent to issue
14. SNIE 85-3-62, "THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA," 19 September 1962:
Not on subject
15. SNIE 85-4-62 "CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA,"
9 November i
Not on subject
16. Memorandum for the Director, "Possible Soviet Courses of Action in
and with Respect to Cuba," 13 March 1963:
"The Soviets are having trouble controlling Cuba's Maximum
leader: Soviet percheron and Cuban mustang do not work well in
harness." (Para. 21)
IT. Memorandum for the Director, "Cuba A Year Hence" 22 April 1963:
"Castro's relations with the Moscow-oriented Communists are
still uncertain. Castro is probably still suspicious of their
relations with Moscow, ..." (Para. 13)
"Castro wants all the benefits of Soviet economic and military
commitments but insists on Can,J unique position in the Bloc outside
Communist discipline and control." (Para. 24)
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18. Memorandum for the Director, "implications of Castro's Visit,"
29 May 12
"Khrushchev has also removed any doubt that Castro is leader
of Communism in Cuba and its final arbiter." (Para. 5)
19. NIE 85-63, "SITUTION AND PROSPECT'S IN CUBA," 14 June 1963:
Nothing new or relevant on subject.
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