VIABILITY OF THE PRESENT REGIME IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010031-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2006
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: July 28, 1964
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010031-4
28 July 1964
SUBJECT: Viability of the Present Regime
in South Vietnam
1. General Khanh's regime is faced with two urgent and
related problems: Khanh's present state of mind constitutes
one; the other is the growing dissatisfaction on the part of
certain important associates with the effectiveness of his
leadership and even the main lines of his policies. Neither
difficulty presently has an "inevitable" outcome. The course
of both will be significantly influenced, perhaps determined,
by US actions and behavior.
2. General Khanh evidently feels that after two decades
of constant war, South Vietnam and its people cannot much longer
endure the grinding campaign which exclusive reliance on the
present US-sponsored internal pacification effort entails.
For the past two months, in private conversations with US
officials Khanh has repeatedly urged the need for at least
some form of attack on North Vietnam; in recent days this
theme has been publicly surfaced by the GVN, and Khanh has
openly associated himself with it. Khanh's views and actions
derive from many sources, including honestly held military
C _C
Extludsd tra,n aa4cmaf-,;
rinsrn? ;'in; a;:d
?~_deCtass!ltcatlun
Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010031-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010031-4
CAST i4of
judgments, an activist's desire for quick results, personal
frustration at the slow pace of governmental programs and
at the bickering within his regime, a buffeting from the
claims of contending military and civilian colleagues and
rivals, an awareness of restiveness among junior officers
over the lack of progress in the war, and manpower stringencies.
The themes of reunification and attacking the North have
political and psychological appeal to a number of influential
groups in South Vietnam. Also Khanh has doubts about US
support for him and ultimate US intentions. In any event, it
seems evident that Khanh is becoming convinced that the present
US/GVN strategy involves unacceptable hardship for South
Vietnam, with little hope of victory within a reasonable time.
If Khanh`s mood continues to deteriorate, he might either
undertake some desperate action or simply withdraw from office.
3. Many signs, including the recent frequency of Dalat
meetings, suggest that the present regime may be considerably
more of a military collegium than we have perhaps appreciated.
Khanh relies heavily on Defense Minister Khiem; General Minh
still seems to have a voice (usually directed against Khanh);
and even the formerly arrested quartet of generals whom Khanh
deposed apparently still have some say. There are indications
that the generals may be polarizing into a hard-line group
can
Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01100010031-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010031-4
around Khiem, advocating a move against the North, and another
group under Minh, opposed to Northern adventures and possibly
giving serious consideration to negotiation. Either might be
able to develop the capability of deposing Khanh, particularly
if joined by a sufficient number of junior officers. Khanh
appears presently to be very much in the middle, pulled from
both sides.
4. There are some grounds for thinking Khanh himself
may be examining negotiation as a way out of what he terms
South Vietnam's "agony." A GVN official (General Lam) may be f
F
currently engaged on some exploratory mission in this vein,
perhaps through French mediation. Should this be true, Khanh
might simply be playing politics, touching all bases to keep
all of his colleagues in line. Or he himself may not yet have
decided what to do. Or, and this cannot be ruled out, he may
be preparing to cover himself by urging the US to take escalating
action he knows the US will not agree to take, intending to
claim -- when his requests are denied -- that since the US will
not permit him to fight effectively, nor take the risks of
using its own power directly, he has no option but to negotiate.
5. In the labyrinth of Vietnamese politics, US actions
are minutely studied and often misread. What Washington regards
as necessary coordination can be seen -- or made to appear --
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010031-4
 Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A001100010031-4
tir
in Saigon as a sign of "puppet" status. Moves to enhance
the prestige of South Vietnam's Chief of State can be, and
have been, read as signs of US dissatisfaction with Khanh
and desire to boost Minh at his expense. Despite all
assurances to the contrary, Khanh and his principal colleagues
cannot shake off the suspicion that after the forthcoming
elections, the US may seek to disengage from Vietnam by a
negotiated settlement with Hanoi. By some, this is used as
an argument that the South Vietnamese government should itself
initiate negotiations with the DRV. The present GVN leader-
ship may be seeking to take advantage of pressures which it
believes will build up in the US during the presidential
campaign, or may be seeking to force the US into a situation
of active conflict with Hanoi, and possibly Communist China,
from which Washington could not disengage after November.
6. At the moment, it is impossible to give anything but
conditional estimates of the viability of the present GVN. On
balance, we believe Khanh still has a better than even chance
of keeping the leadership united under his aegis. With respect
to the war effort as a whole, the chances that Khanh and his
government will sustain it much longvare better than even if --
and only if -- Khanh can be brought out of his present
discouraged mood, convinced of US determination to support him
Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79ROO904AO011000100-31-4
 Approved For Release 2006/1 tv EIR DP79R00904A001100010031-4
and the war effort, and induced to hope that the future
contains something for South Vietnam other than more of
the same. Khanh presently seems to think such hope can
only be found in operations beyond South Vietnam's borders.
Militarily and in the context of international politics,
such operations may not be required or even desirable.
But some form of new look is probably necessary to cope
with the internal political and psychological stresses
that Khanh faces within South Vietnam.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
Approved For Release 2006/12/08: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01100010031-4