STATUS OF THE SOVIET ABM PROGRAM AND ESTIMATED SOVIET REACTIONS TO US DEPLOYMENT OF ABMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 14, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 30, 1965
• Content Type: MF

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30 November 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT . Statue of the Soviet AEM Program and Estimated
Soviet Reactions to US Deployment of ABMs
Summary
1. We have recently completed our annual National Intelligence
Estimate of Soviet strategic air and missile defences. The estimate
(NIE 11-3-65) was approved by the United States Intelligence Board on
18 November. In our review of developments in the Soviet ABM program,
we estimated that the USSR has begun to deploy ballistic missile
estimated that the Soviets could achieve an initial operational
capability at Moscow in 1967 or, more probably.1968, and that over the
next ten years the USSR will extend its ABM defenses to provide pro-
tection for other major urban-industrial areas.
2. Earlier this year we produced a Special National Intelligence
Estimate in which we estimated Soviet reactions to US deployment of ABMs.
The estimate (SNIE 11-12-65) was concurred in by the United States
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Intelligence Board on 22 September. In this estimate, we concluded
that a US decision to deploy ballistic missile defenses, by itself,
would not significantly worsen US-Soviet relations, although the Soviets
would feel compelled to respond in several ways, including efforts to
improve and expand their strategic strike capabilities and to intensify
work on their own ABM program. We rated as low the chances of a positive
Soviet reaction to a new offer on arms control made at the same time
that US ABM deployment was announced.
3. In another recent National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet
strategic attack capabilities (HIE 11-8-65), we also considered some
possible effects of US ABM deployment on Soviet military programs.
One effect, we believed, might be to incline the Soviets to higher numbers
of ICBMs; another might be to revive interest in the manned long-range
bomber. It seemed certain, however, that a US decision to deploy an
AM system would spur Soviet development of penetration aide.
4.. We estimate that the Soviets are now deploying an ABM system
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5. The Soviets are constructing very large radars (Hen Houses) in
the northwest, which probably are intended to function as part of a
ballistic missile defense.
d
ballistic missile early warning function, and they may provide some
tracking and prediction data for use by antimissile missile launch units.
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6. The Soviets are also constructing a huge radar (Dog House)
about 30 miles southwest of Moscow./
that this radar, which could be operational in 1967, is intended to
serve a long-range acquisition and early target tracking function for
ballistic missile defenses in the Moscow area.
7. In addition to the Dog House, the Soviets are working on a
series of "triads" located at some of the outer ring SA-]_ sites at Moscow.
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the triad facilities will provide final target tracking
and missile guidance for the Moscow ABM ayetem. 6/
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It should be noted,
however, that the Soviets will probably undertake some of these advanced
weapons programs even if the US implements no ballistic missile defense
pro, ,,,Tam.
17. It seems certain that a US decision to deploy an ABM system
would spur Soviet development of penetration aids.
the large payloads of so-,ie Soviet ICBM systems present an obvious opportunity
for trade-offs between nuclear yield and such devices. Relatively un-
sophisticated types of penetration aids such as fragmenting boosters and
balloons are within present Soviet technical capabilities and could be
developed without testing.
I Development of
other penetration aids such as shielding, decoys, and je risers would
require flight tests.
18. The Soviet assessment of a US decision to deploy ABM defenses
would go beyond military significance and consider political motivations
as well. The Soviets would first of all view the decision as evidence
that the US was intent upon maintainiiiG. its strategic position vis-a-vis
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the USSR. While they would recognize that their own ABM program had
contributed to the US decision, they would judge that the US in this
instance was willing to see, or at least saw no way to avert, a continuation
of the arms race. Further, it is conceivable that they would view the
decision as a move to force them to make military expenditures which
would keep their economy under strain. They might even interpret it as
a sign that the US considered nuclear war sonewhat more likely in the
longer tern, particularly if the announcement came at a time of crisis,
in, for example, Vietnam. Associated US expenditures for a shelter
program would probably strengthen the voice of those advocating this
interpretation. The Soviets would be likely to interpret the coupling
of the US announce,i ent with a disarmament proposal for, sa-, redr.cin;
strategic delivery vehicles as part and parcel of a scher,ie cues-,7neci
to restrict their strategic capabilities.
19. It is possible, however, that in view of internal Soviet
policy debates stemming from the resource demands of the military, the
US decision might increase pressures on the Soviet leaders to stabilize
some aspects of arras competition. In this context, a simultaneous new
offer on arms control might have sore prospects. We rate the chances
of a positive Soviet reaction, however, as low.
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20. In the propaganda field, the Soviets almost certainly would
charge the US with reducing the prospects for disarmament, and probably
would accuse the US of seeking to increase its capabilities for nuclear
war. Over the longer term, however, the Soviets probably would stress
two propaganda lines: one, that the concept of "Fortress America"
was again gaining ascendancy in the US; the other', that Soviet missile
defenses were superior to those of the US, and that the latter could
not cope with a Soviet strategic missile attack.
21. In any event, we believe that a US decision to deploy ballistic
missile defenses, by itself, would not significantly worsen US-Soviet
relations. Nor would it be likely to have any direct or basic effect
on Soviet policies in existing problem areas, i.e.., Vietnam or Berlin.
And we believe that such a US decision would. not change any of the key
determinants of Soviet policies toward Western Europe or Communist China.
SHERMAN KENT
Director/
National Estimates
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