THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR--A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010013-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 24, 2006
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 24, 1965
• Content Type: MF

Approved Foelease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R009f0012000100
21t September 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
G
The attached is an interim assessment of the Indian-
Pakistan crisis. It is necessarily incomplete, because all
returns are not yet in. Also, we have not dealt with all
aspects of the crisis, in particular, the role of Communist
China. So we will be writing more on the subject. If there
are particular aspects you would like to have dealt with,,
will you inform me .
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200g10013-6
 Approved Fo,&lease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904P01200010013-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
24 September 1965
SUBJECT: The Indo-Pakistan War - A Preliminary Assessment
The India - Pakistan crisis is by no means over; further
disputes are inevitable and the fighting could still resume,
though the struggle is likely to shift from the military to
the diplomatic sphere. Despite the unsettled situation, it
seems useful to attempt some analysis of recent events and
some assessment of their more enduring consequences. The
essential message of this memorandum is that India has won the
first round; this will make India more intransigent and put
President Ayub's government in a difficult position.
President Ayub clearly agreed to a cease fire only after
considerable hesitation and with considerable anguish. He did
so for two principal rea&ons; (1) he was aware that if the
fighting continued his forces would be worn down and then defeated
by India's larger ones, and (2) he saw that the only way to
offset India's military superiority was through a major Chinese
military attack on India. Even assuming that China was willing
to launch such an attack, which is unlikely, Ayub was clearly
unwilling to cast his lot completely with China. However, he
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010013-6
 Approved For.jlease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0090W01200010013-6
tried to limit the loss of face involved in agreeing to a cease
fire by declaring his unwillingness to pull Pakistan's military
forces back as called for by the UN until it was clear that India
would undertake serious discussion on Kashmir.
2. India also accepted the cease fire with reservations.
There will be constant disputes and delays over executing the
terms of the cease fire, and there are factors, e.g. activity
by such guerrillas as remain in Indian-held Kashmir, which could
threaten its continuance. On balance, we believe that neither
side will denounce the cease fire and resume the war.
3. India looks on the UN imposed settlement as a return
to the status quo; Pakistan regards it as requiring serious
negotiations leading to a settlement on Kashmir, and believes
that the US is committed to play an active role in bringing
about such a settlement. However, efforts in the UN to get
* The UN resolutions and the official acceptances of India
and Pakistan are attached as Annex A.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010013-6
 Approved Fors (ease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79RO090 001200010013-6
S-E-C-R-E-T
India to make concessions on the Kashmir issue are likely
to fail as they have in the past. This failure will engender
substantial bitterness and frustration in Pakistan, feelings
which will probably lead to public demands for further military
action against India. They will be particularly influenced
by the output of Pakistan's propaganda apparatus which is now
stating that their army won the war, forced the Indians to
plead for a cease fire, and "has convinced the Indian warlords
that the Pakistan army in invincible." These pressures will be
particularly dangerous in that much of the army and government,
and nearly all the general public, now believe that perseverance
in the military struggle would have forced India to give up
Kashmir.
4. The Pakistan government is faced with the same
difficult problems and choices as it was before the fighting
started; the need for military security against India, its
strong desire to acquire Kashmir, the continued need for foreign
economic and military aid, and the question of its international
orientation vis-a-vis the US, Communist China, and the Afro-
Asian world. Its difficulties have been increased, however,
by the failure of its military efforts and by the fact that
-g-
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved For lease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79RO090 A01200010013-6
S-E.C-R-E-T
popular expectations have been aroused while knowledge of
Pakistan's deteriorating military position is known to very
few. Ayub cannot admit Pakistan was -- or soon would have
been -- defeated by India, without raising the question why
Pakistan embarked on the course it did. Yet the people -- and
many civilian and military officials as well -- wonder why
Pakistan stopped fighting if it was doing as well militarily
as it claimed.
5. Indeed, the survival of Ayub's regime is by no means
certain. There are indications of military dissatisfaction
with Ayub and of talk to replace him. However, we doubt that
Ayub is presently in serious danger.
6. It seems likely that Ayub will give a high priority to
patching relations with the US. He has always recognized
his dependence on the I-feet in general and the US in particular,
and is aware that the USSR will not and Communist China cannot
supply the economic and military aid Pakistan needs. Recent
events have shown him that his China policy was largely a
failure: fear of China did not deter India from striking back
at Pakistan; and when India did strike back, it became apparent
to Ayub that Chinese intervention would create for Pakistan
S-E-C-R-H-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved Forlease 200/0/~7RC,grRDP79R009001200010013-6
more problems than it would solve. However, public opinion
still is in favor of working with China, and Ayub probably
will not make any move to break existing ties.
7. Public optnion against the US will continue to run
strong, and many demands will be made that Pakistan cut all ties
with the US because of the letter's neutrality in the conflict.
These attitudes will considerably limit Ayub's freedom of action,
and any attempt he manes to move closer to the US will be slow
and difficult. In these circumstances, much will depend on
how hard the US pushed for a Kashmir settlement, and on the kind
of arrangements, particularly regarding aid, the US is willing
to make with Pakistan. Ayub is probably aware that his bargaining
power with the US has declined, but is also convinced he must
continue to receive economic assistance from the US if he is
to resist public opinion, repair his relations with the US,
and permit US facilities to remain. In time, he will feel the
need for renewal of US arms aid as well.
8. If Ayub should be removed,: or if his freedom of action
became greatly reduced, Pakistan's relationship with the US
would be considerably altered. Pakistan's dependence on US aid
- 5-
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved For., lease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R00904001200010013-6
would be as great as ever, but there would be a substantial
chance of its succumbing to its emotions, lashing out at the US,
moving closer to China and Indonesia, and leaving the United
Nations. It might even seek to renew the war with India.
If major hostilities did break out, it might be impossible to
prevent the communal violence which thus far both countries
have been able to avoid.
9. India will face different roblems. Its propaganda
claims are nearer the truth, and Shastri's position, and that of
the Congress Party, will be greatly strengthened by a de facto
Kashmir victory. The hardships of the Indian people will be
attributed to Pakistani malevolence, and accepted, in the short
term, as patriotic necessities. Indians feel considerable
satisfaction with the results of their diplomatic efforts
and their ability to stand up under pressure. This will engender
increased national self confidence.
10. However, the Indian economy is not in good shape.
Food scarcities, increasing inflationary pressures, a foreign
exchange crisis and an unsatisfactory growth rate posed major
challenges before August 5. The war has made the situation
worse; in particular, the military's preemption of the nation's
transportation system has already created very serious food
-5-
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved For lease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79RO090 01200010013-6
shortages in certain areas. Even with a good harvest and massive
food imports, India's food situation will remain precarious
for some time. There may be pressures for increased military
spending in both countries. Further, India -- and Pakistan
as well -- will continue to rely very heavily on foreign aid for
economic development, though potential donors may be more
reluctant to assist them than previously.
11. India's domestic and foreign policies are likely to
change but little. New Delhi will almost certainly refuse any
compromise on the Kashmir issue. It will probably feel that
both the US and the USSR will continue to build up Indian strength
as a counterweight to the Chinese threat in Asia. The internal
debate on whether to acquire nuclear weapons will be renewed,
but we believe that Shastri will, for a time at least, continue
to hold a final decision in abeyance.
S- E- C-R- E- T
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved For lease 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R0090W01200010013-6
4 September 1965 Security Council
Resolution
The Security Council, noting the report of the Secretary
General dated 3 September 1965. Having heard the statements
of the representatives of India and Pakistan, concerning
the deteriorating situation along the cease fire line in
Kashmir.
1. Calls upon the Government of India and Pakistan
to take forthwith all steps for an immediate cease fire;
2. Calls upon the two governments to respect the
cease fire line and have all armed personnel of each
party withdrawn to its side of the line;
3. Calls upon the two governments to cooperate
fully with the United Nations Military Observer Group,
India=-Pakistan in its task of supervising the observance
of the cease fire and,
I+. Requests the Secretary General to report to
the Council within three days on the implementation of
this resolution.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010013-6
 Approved ForQolease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R009001200010013-6
6 September 1965 Security Council
Resolution
The Security Council, noting the report by the Secretary
General on developments in the situation in shmir since the
adoption of the Security Council cease-fire resolution on
4 September 1965 (S/Res/209) (1965) being document 5:6661
dated 6 September 1965.
Noting with deep concern the extension of the fighting
which adds inmeasureably to the seriousness of the situation
(1) Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities
in the entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly
withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held
by them after 5 AuCAust 1965.
(2) Requests the Secretary General to exert every
possible effort to give effect to this resolution and
the resolution of 4 September 1965, to take all measures
possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer
Group in India and Pakistan and to keep the Council promptly
informed on the implementation of the resolution and on the
situation in the area.
(3) Decides to keep this issue under urgent and
continuous review so that the Council may determine what
further steps may be necessary to secure peace and security
in the area.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved For,&lease 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP79R0090O01200010013-6
20 September 1965 Security Council
Resolution
The Security Council, having considered the reports
of the SYG on his consultations with the Government of
India and Pakistan, commending the SYG for his unrelenting
efforts in furtherance of the objectives of the SYG's
resolutions of 4 and 6 September, having heard the statements
of the representatives of India and Pakistan, noting the
differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease
fire as set out in the report of the SYG (5/6683), but
noting further with concern that no cease fire has yet come
into being, convinced that an early cessation of hostilities
is essential as a first step towards a peaceful settlement
of the outstanding differences between the two countries on
Kashmir and other related matters,
1. Demands that a cease fire should take effect
on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours GMT and
calls upon both Governments to issue orders for a cease
fire at that moment and a subsequent withdrawal of all
armed personnel back to the positions held by them before
5 August 1965;
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved For;,please 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904001200010013-6
2. Requests the SYG to provide the necessary
assistance to ensure supervision of the cease fire
and withdrawal of all armed personnel;
3. Calls on all states to refrain from any action
which might aggravate the situation in the area;
4+. Decides to consider as soon as operative paragraph
1 of the Council's Res 210 of 6 September has been
implemented. G-1hat steps could be taken to assist towards
a settlement of the political problem underlying the
present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two
governments to utilize all peaceful means, including
those listed in Article 33 of the charter, to this end;
5. Requests the SYG to exert every possible effort
to give effect to this resolution, to seek a peaceful
solution, and to report to the SC thereon.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6
 Approved For-lease087_bCAR9,Pj92(090 / p01200010013-6
ANNEX A
Shastrifs message to the Secretary General
"As already communicated to you in my letter of 15th Sept.
1965, I am willing to order simple cease fire and cessation of
hostilities on being informed of Pakistan's agreement to do
likewise. To carry into effect such cease fire from 7 a.m.
GMT on Wednesday, 22nd Sept, as provided in SC RES, it would be
necessary for me to arrange for issue of necessary orders to field
commanders by 12 noon GMT on 21st Sept. I would, therefore,
request you kindly to inform me of Pakistan's agreement to cease
fire before this hour."
Ayub's answer as read by Bhutto on September 22, 1965
Pakistan considers Security Council Resolution 211 of
20 September as unsatisfactory. However, in the interest of
international peace and in order to enable the Security Council
to evolve a self-executing procedure which will lead to an
honorable settlement of the root causes of the present conflict,
namely the Jnmmu and Kashmir dispute, I have issued the following
order to the Pakistan armed forces: You will stop fighting as of
3 a.m. on 23 September -- 2200 GMT 22 September, and from that
time you will not fire on enemy forces unless fired on.
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010013-6