COLOMBIA: THE NATURE OF THE POLITICAL DANGER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200010025-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2006
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: June 11, 1965
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Rise 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904A`W 200010025-3
S-E-C R-E-T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
11 June 1965
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Colombia: The Nature of the Political Danger
The National Front -- a system of coalition government that
has provided political stability in Colombia since its inception
in 1958 -- has all but broken down. Even if it manages to sur-
vive over the next year, it will probably be unable to relieve
the country's mounting economic and political tensions. At
present the Front is under extreme pressure from labor, business
and military leaders to undertake effective measures to deal with
the worsening economic situation, but it ir3 unlikely to move
either decisively or successfully.
An early disintegration or overthrow of the Front would
bring on a period of political confusion and possibily major
disorders, but we believe that the chances of a successful ex-
tremist revolution would be small. On the other hand., the indefi-
nite prolongation of the present ineffectual system would eventually
strengthen the hand of the advocates of violent revolution.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
S-E-C-R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010025-3
 Approved For Rekuse 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79R00904AO*M00010025-3
S-E-C.R-E-T
1. Colombia's political history has been dominated by
the intense and often violent rivalry between its traditional
parties -- the Conservatives and the Liberals. In 1957-1958,
following a decade of virtual civil war and military rule, the
leaders of the two parties devised a scheme known as the
"National Front" and wrote it into the country's constitution.
Their purpose was to compose their sectarian differences and re-
store both political peace and civilian oligarchical control.
The Front provides for the alternation of the presidency between
the two parties and equal division of all other elective and
appointive offices. The essential feature of the system is its
requirement for two-thirds majorities on all important legisla-
tive matters. This is intended to prevent any combination of
political forces from imposing its will on a sizeable section of
either party: in effect, it gives each major political faction
a virtual veto over policy.
2. The Front worked reasonably well at first, providing
not only political stability but also some useful initiatives
for stepping up economic development and social reform. These
led to the labelling of Colombia as the "showcase" of the Alliance
for Progress. But the system has rarely worked well in recent
years. Economic growth has slowed down and social reform programs
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010025-3
 Approved For Rase 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904A 1200010025-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
have dragged along in low gear: if anything, the poor in
Colombia are both more nm.:.merou3 and more dissatisfied today
than they were several years ago.
3. For the past year, moreover, the Front has been un-
able even to address it-.,elf on a sustained basis to the country's
problems, much less to alleviate them. Conservative Guillermo
Leon Valencia, President since.1962, has not exerted the leader-
ship required by so cumbersome a governmental system. Popular
dissatisfaction with living conditions led to a setback for the
Front in the 1964 elections which reduced it in the House of
Representatives to a thin margin over the two-thirds majority
needed to do business. Most important, ever since the election
the nominal supporters of the Front have been engaged in bitter
infighting for political position for the 1966 congressional
and presidential contests,
4. Popular discontent came to a head last January in a
call by democratic labor leaders for a general strike that was
averted only when Valencia promised to convene a special session
of Congress to do something about the worsening economic situation.
Congress has been in session since April; in the meantime, business
leaders, and even the usually apolitical military, have joined
labor in demanding that the government come up with an effective
-3-
S-E-C R -E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010025-3
 ? Approved For Relftse 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904A0i100010025-3
S-E-C-R-E-T
program. But the various elements of the National Front so far
have spent most of their time attacking each other rather than
the work at hand. The Front may yet come up with some kind of
economic program. The measures that are most needed, however,
are certain to be unpopular, at least initially. Thus growing
infitit .onarrr pressures can be relieved only by increased taxes
and by restraints on prices and wages. Intense pressures on
Colombia's balance of payments require either an adjustment of
the overvalued exchange rate or more stringent trade control.
Also, if poorly handled, a devaluation would greatly increase
inflationary pressures.
5. We believe that the National Front will probably fail
to take decisive corrective measures regarding the present eco-
nomic crisis. Indeed, in our view, the National Front has all
but broken down; as presently constituted, it probably is al-
ready beyond durable repair. The Front might be able to hold
on until the congressional elections next March, but it will
probably be unable to relieve the country's problems suffici-
ently to impress the electorate. Consequently, anti-Front
forces would probably gain at least the one-third margin in
Congress which would enable them on their own, to hamstring the
government for still another two-year period.
S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010025-3
 Approved For Re a 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79R00904AO 200010025-3
6. If the National Front were to disintegrate in the near
future, what would ensue? We believe it most likely that the
military would move either to establish a military junta or to
dictate the terms for an interim civilian alternative to the
National Front. skis political reaction to the military inter-
vent .o .i wowid probably dq?end on such factors as the extent of
antra-Front quarrelling at the time and on whether large-scale
public disorders were taking place or appeared imminent. We think
there is about an even chance that the great bulk of political
leaders would accept the intervention, welcoming the opportunity
to try to establish a more effective governmental system. Under
such circumstances, the period of confusion and uncertainty
surrounding the collapse of the Front would probably be rela-
tively short. But we believe it equally likely that a sufficient
number of politicians
perhaps including President Valencia
would try to resist any military intervention, thereby increasing
the prospects that the period of political confusion would be
prolonged.
7. The military probably would not move unless there had
been some degree of public disorder. The coup itself would raise
the possibility of major disorders, either provoked or prolonged
Approved For Release 2007/03/08: CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010025-3
 Approved For Rase 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R009041200010025-3
by extremist groups. We believe, nonetheless, that the chances
for a successful Communist revolution would be small. The
extreme left in Colombia is badly fractured, poorly led, and not
very popular. The orthodox Communist Party (PCC), the largest
leftist extremist group, has so far shown little interest in
violent tactics and would probably shy away from a direct con-
frontation with the military unless circumstances appeared
extremely favorable. Several extremist splinter groups have
engaged in largely ineffectual "armed struggle" against the
govertment (i.e., sporadic urban bombings and at least one
hit-and-run guerrilla raid against a small village), but these
tactics have apparently not evoked a favorable response from
the population.
8. Ex-dictator Rojas Pinilla, on the other hand, has been
drawing large, enthusiastic crowds to his demagogic rallies
against the National Front. Rojas, who is as hostile toward the
oligarchy as any leftist, is probably more interested in testing
his strength in elections than in street riots. If a military
coup did not exclude the possibility of elections in the near
term, he would probably not directly oppose it.
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010025-3
 Eappruveu ror rc + use cuuiiusiuo : %.im-rcuriyrcuuvu4Eavw cuuu iuuza-s
S-E-C-R-E-T
9. In the event of a military coup, the Colombian security
forces would almost certainly resist any extremist uprising and
would probably be able to maintain control of outbreaks of
violence in major cities. Their ability to keep order throughout
the rural areas would be more limited, but once order had been
established in urban areas they would probably be able in time
to pacify outstanding rural troublespots.
10. The replacement of one governmental system by another
would not in itself solve any of Colombia's problems. But the
indefinite prolongation of the present ineffectual system would
over time only add to the country's problems and would eventually
increase the appeal of the advocates of violent social revolution.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
-7-
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01200010025-3
 4
Mow 9c 01
UNCLASSIFIED FIDENTIAL SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO
NAME AND ADDRESS
DATE
INITIALS
D
2
f
7
3
4
5
6
ACTION
DIRECT REPLY
PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL
DISPATCH
RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT
FILE
RETURN
CONCURRENCE
_
NFORMATION
SIGNATURE
Remarks :
?t a?IJfC2"~ n givers our apgrreia-
tion of the basic eiements an the
Colc bian situation. It is sent to
you against the possibility that the
current crisis in that count27 MY
require your attention during the
next few days.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Ib A
E
O
FORM NO. n~-7 Use previous editions (40)
2-61 G I U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 0-587282