REVIEW OF ESTIMATE ON SOVIET MANNED LUNAR LANDING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 13, 1965
• Content Type: MF

Approved For Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
"~ T-O-P - - '`'~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
13 Septexaber 1965
MER'~ORANDUM FOR TSE .pIRECTOR
STJBJECT: Revie~r of Estimate on Soviet Manned Lunar Landing
REFERE,~iCE; NIE 11-1-65: "The Soviet Space Program" (SECRET
27 January 1965}
1. In our most xecent estimate on the Soviet space program,
xeferenced above, we specifically considered the possibility that
the USSR had undertray a ~aanned lunar landing program in competition
Frith Pra,~ect Apo1.].0. The paragraphs froia. the estivate in vrhich we
dealt with this possibility appear below.
59. Manned Lunar Landing. It seems certain that
the Soviets intend to land a rr-an on the moon soneti~.e in
the future, but there are at present no apecif is indications
of any such pro3ect aimed at 1968-1969, i.e., intended
to be competitive with the US Apollo pro3ect. 5or~e R&D
effort tosrsxd a manned lunar landing is almost certainly
in progress and ire note that considerable preparatory `rorl~
could have been going on without as yet providing firta
indications of its nature. Although uany of the critical
pxerequisites for a ~aanned lunar landing have not been
observed in Soviet space operations, ire would not necessarily
see them this early.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
T-0-P ~-~- -R-E-T downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
60. We have estimated that a very large booster
(about five miLl.ion pounds thrust) could become available
for manned space flight in 1968. We doubt that the thrust
of this booster would be sufficient for a manned lunar
landing mission without earth-orbit rendezvous or the U5
technique of lunar-orbit rendezvous. If the earth-orbit
rendezvous technique here used, some one to three rendezvous
probably would be required, depending on the actual thrust of
the booster and Soviet success in reducing the weights of
structures and components belo~r present levels. Thus a
Soviet attempt et a manned lunar landing in a period competi-
tive frith the present US Apollo schedule cannot be ruled
out.
61. To compete in this fashion, hotrever, the Soviets
would have had to mare an initial decision to this effect
several years ago and to have sustained a high priority
Por the pro3ect in the ensuing period. This would have
required them to undertalze a burdensome and rapid extension
o#' tta~ir space tec..hnology and to reconcile the heavy
demands of this pro,~ect with those of other important
space ventures and military programs, all with no clear
assurance that they t~rould triumph. The appearance and non-
appearance of various technical developments, economic con-
siderations, leadership statements, and continued commitments
to other mayor space missions all lead us to the conclusion
that a manned lunar landing ahead of the present Apollo
schedule probably is not a Soviet objective.
62. With a very high degree of success in all phases
of the pro,~ect, the first Soviet attempt at a manned
lunar landing might occur as early as 1969. In vietr
of the magnitude of the technological problex~ and the
level of resources trhich the Soviets are likely to
commit to this project, we believe a Mare probable date
for such an attempt to be a fear years later.
Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
~ T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Technical Factors
2. The evidence acquired since publication of the estimate
is consistent z~ith these judgments. They t~rere based primeriiy
upon the technics]. evidence concerning Soviet capabilities to
accomplish all the steps necessary to undertalte a manned lunar
landing. A crucial element uas the probable timing a:~ s Soviet
program to develop a suitably large booster (i.e., faith a thrust
o~ about dive million pounds).
T-O-
Approved Far Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
flight test of a vehicle could occur in late 1966 or e~a,::1y 1967
if it had been built end static tested elsetrhere. On the other
hand if the First flight vehicle is to be first assembled and
static tested at Complex J, the First flight test ~rould probably
occur sometime in 196$.
4. The evident Soviet interest in luna~M exploration was a
factor in our ~udgnent that the Soviets intend to undertake a
manned lunar landing sometime in the future. The pace of this
Soviet program, hotaever, has been uneven, and it has been generally
unsuccessful. From late 1958 to early 1960, the Soviet space
~ogrem concentrated heavily on the moon frith an estimated nine
firings, only three of trhich tirere successful. No more lunar
attempts zrere made until 1963, although ten probes `~rere launched
toward DRars and Venus. Three lunar probes ~rere launched in 1963,
and tyro in 19~}+; al3 of these ~rere unsuccessful. Since publica-
tion of NIE 11-1-65, four mare lunar probes have been launched,
which tirere also unsuccessful, and a fifth was cancelled in
September. These more recent shots appear to be attempts to soft
7.a[t~: aclentific payloads on the moon. The two launched in Ntay and
Approved Far Release 2006110/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
,~; T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
June demonstrated a Soviet caillingness to accept less favorable
launch candit:~.ons, and suggested an increased urgency in the program.
This could relate tv the iaanned lunar landing program, but it may
represent an attempt to counter the successes of the US Ranger program.
Political and. Economic Factors
~. Since the first of the year, we have acquired no evidence
that the new leadership in the USSR has tal~en any decisions tv
change the course or the scope of the Soviet space program.
Statements made by Soviet authorities since January continue to
affirm the existence of a manned lunar landing program, but
fail to specify a target date for the accomplishment of this
mission.
6. There has been no substantial ehan6e in the econ~nic
situation lil~.ely tv affect the space program.. In NIE 11-1-65
we called attention to the high cost of a manned lunar landing
program and to the competition bet~reen civilian and military
claimants for scarce high-quality resources in the Soviet
economy. This competition has not lessened and may have
intensified. The new leaders are pushing ahead with the
modernization of industry, and Brezhnev'$ agricultural proposals
appear even more ambitious than those of Xhrushchev. There are
-5-
Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
T-Q-P
also indications that military expenditures, trhich had substantially
leveled off in the past two years will begin to rise again. Public
statements by the neca leaders in the first few months after
Khrushchev's overthrotr gave no indication that issues of military
policy were under active debate. PRi].itary policy has notir come
bacl~ to the forefront of public commentary, and present indications
are that the claims of defense axe being given a sympathetic hearing
in the policy councils of the regime. A number of the top Sovi et
leaders have publicly declared their commitment to strengthening
the defenses of the country, and particular emphasis has been
given to military research and development, ~rhich is directly
competitive with the space pro~am.
7. We do not believe, of course, that economic considerations
are an overriding factor in Soviet thinlLing. The resources which
the Soviet leaders have already committed to the space effort
are indicative of the political. importance ~rhich they attach to it.
We consider still valid the ~udgnents of I3IE 11-1-C,5 as to the
impact of political considerations on future Soviet efforts:
3~. Far political reasons, hoti~rever, the Soviets
could :[11 afford to slacl~en in the space race and from
all indications they have no intention of doing so.
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E T
Approved Far Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
.,.-' ~'
T-aP -
The USSR's space program has become a lsey element in
Soviet world prestige. Space remains the ma~ar area
in tahich the Soviets can still propound a credible
claim to world primacy. We expect that the Soviet
space program will involve a range of undertal~ings
which in their overall impact will be strongly campeti-
tive with the US program during the next five to ten
years.
Future Prospects
$. Ii' the Soviets have not chosen to race to the moon,
we expect that they will endeavor to soften the impact of a
successful Apollo mission by the achievement aP other goals of
their awn choosing. They have openly questioned the scientific
significance and necessity of a manned lunar lending, and will
probably substitute goals to which they can attribute greater
meaning< Extensive earth orbital operations and the establish-
ment of a system of ma3or space stations in a period when the US
has no comparable program would enable the Soviets to dull the
effects of a successful US landing on the maan. A vigorous
Soviet pragram of instrumented lunar exploration is also indicated
by Saviet statements which emphasize the necessity for extensive
activity of this type prior to any attempts at a manned landing.
An early Soviet manned c ircumlunar flight is considered in the
T- 0-P - ~ -
Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
"'"~ T-CI-P - - ~
estimate as an additional mission aimed at offsetting the effects
of a successful Apollo mission a-nd reinforcing the association of
the Soviet Union with the early exploration of the moon.
9. Our estimate of Soviet capabilities to establish a
large space station and tv essay a manned circumlunar flight was
based on development of a new large booster of at least ttiro million
pounds throat, We estimate that the booster used in the launching
of Proton I had a th^?uet on the order of two and a half million
pounds. We had estimated that the first flight of this netir vehicle
would occur sometime in the first half of 1965;. the Proton I
launching took place on 16 July. We believe, therefore, that the
estimate of lii~e].y dates for orbiting a large apace station and
for manned circumlunar flight using this nets booster -- 3.e.,
in the 1968-1969 period -- remains genera7.ly valid.
10. The Soviets could place in orbit even laxger space
stations using the very large vehicle {i.e., of about five million
pounds which tics believe to be under development, The Soviets
might plan to use such stations in their manned lunar landing
program. In NIE 11-1-65, we discussed this possibility as
follows
Approved Far Release 2006110!13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
~' T-O-P ~-F_r._R_~_m
~3? If the Soviets choose to direct their space station
efforts t~rar~3 even more extensive manned exploration of space,
they may develop very large quasi-permanent stations for the
assembly and 'launching of spacecraft from near-earth orbit.
Indeed, a number of SQV3et statements suggest that they view
this as an attractive approach to subsequent manned flight into
deep space. 11 suitably large space station probably could be
created in the early 1974's by malting use of the same very
large booster we have discussed above. If so, a manned lunar
landing mission launched from a space station could occur in
the middle 1974'x.
11. The Soviets have additionally stated their intention to
establish a lunar base subsequent to manned lunar landing but no
significant details or meaningful timetables have been revealed.
If Soviet manned lunar landing is undertal~effi as a follot~r-on to
extensive earth orbital operations and instrumented exploration of
the moan, it is likely that they mill enjoy some advantages in the
establishment of a lunar base. Such an approach crould allow for the
concurrent development of the technology of lunar transporation and
that oP maintaining man in space for extended periods. It is
.passible that a late lunar landing may be folla~red fairly rapidly
by the establishment of a Soviet base on the moan.
12. In sum, we expect the Soviets to pursue a vigorous and
expanding space program generally competitive vrith that of the U8.
We do not believe that they are engaged in a manned lunar landing
Approved For Release 2006/10113: CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 Approved For Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
~,,~ T-0-P S-~-C-R-E-T
program competitive with Pro,~eat Apa17.o, but sae cannot rule this
possibility out. We continue to estimate that they could achieve
a manned lunar landing about mid-1969 at the earliest. IP they
detect slippage or stretchout in the US program, they might be
moved to acc4lerate thei:~r o~m.
FOR THE BOARD QF NATIONAL EST7~IATBS:
$$ERMAN KENT
Chairmen
T-U-P S-E-C-R-E-T
Approved Far Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
 25X1 Approved For Release 2006/10113 :CIA-RDP79R00904A001200030002-6
Approved Far Release 2006110/13 :CIA-R?P79R00904A001200030002-6