JOSEPH ALSOP'S COLUMN OF 28 FEBRUARY 1966: COMMENTS ON THE VALIDITY AND POSSIBLE ORIGIN OF THE INFILTRATION FIGURES APPEARING THEREIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200050018-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 1, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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1 March 1966
MEI ORANIIUM FOR TEE DEPUTY DIRECTOR
SUBT: Joseph Alsop's Column of 28 February 1966:
Comments on the Validity and Possible Origin
of the infiltration Figures Appearing Therein
Mr. Alsop's figures on net capability to increase Communist
military manpower in South Vietnam are about twice as high as
anything in Agency or USIB publications or in the MACV November
1965 briefing for Secretary McNamara, to which Mr. Alsop refers.
His figures on supply capabilities, on the other hand are law.
The language of the column implies, but does not state, that his
information was gathered in Vietnam on his recent trip out there.
This may be; at least his figures do not jibe with any figures
published by the Agency or used in USIB papers.
1. Alsop speaks of "recalculations made . . . at about the
end of October (1965) or the beginning of November" and says:
"These new estimates were presented to Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara when he visited Vietnam in late November." He
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states that the "new estimates" concerned enemy capabilities to
infiltrate men and supplies. According to Alsop the "Vietcong
and North Vietnamese were now credited With the capabilities of
increasing their strength by two regiments a month from November,
1965, through December 1966 . . which meant that the enemy could
well increase his strength by the equivalent of eight full
divisions more than had been previously thought likely."
2. The MACV briefing for Secretary McNamara had in effect
two sets of figures. First, it gave the DRV a gross capability
to train and infiltrate about 4,500 men a month -- equivalent to
three regiments as the regiments were at that time estimated (they
are now estimated at nearer 2,000 than 1,500 men each). This
figure is 50 percent higher than Alsop's. Second, the briefing
had, a net figure obtained by adding local VC recruitments but
subtracting estimated combat losses and defections. This figure
would presumably represent the amount by which the enemy could
actually "increase his strength." It was given as "45 battalion
equivalents" by the end of 1966, or an average of about one
regiment equivalent a month over 13 or 14 months -- this figure
is one-half Alsop's.
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3, The net figure does not appear in any National Estimates,
but the gross PAVN infiltration figure of nine battalion equiva-
lents a month appears in SNIE 10-12-65, Annex A, 10 December 1965.
it says:
"With a force of this size (about 12 regiments)
available to furnish instruction and training, about 36
new PAVN regiments or regimental equivalents of approxi-
mately 1500 men each could be trained and infiltrated
into South Vietnam during 1966. This would amount to an
average of 9 battalion equivalents a month."
This passage is also quoted in a footnote in SNIE 10-1-66,
4 February 1966. This figure also appears in an OCI Memorandum
of 11 January 1966,* which says:
"It has been estimated that the North Vietnamese
could maintain an average infiltration rate to South
Vietnam throughout 1966 of approximately 4,500 men per
month. It appears, on the basis of reports of captured
prisoners, that somewhere near this figure may have
been reached in the last two months of 1965."
The figure of 36 regiments or at least 50,000 men as an "apparent"
infiltration capability for 1966 also appears in a 21 February
1966 Directorate of Intelligence Memorandum, "Buildup of
Vietnamese Communist Forces Continues After Resumption of
Air Attacks.""
TheStatus of PAVN Infiltration into South Vietnam,"
- OCI SECRBT.
TOP SECBEP,,
_3-
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4. We Alsop's statement that in the recalculation the
North Vietnamese were . . . "credited with the capability of
bringing into the South between 140 and 175 tons of supplies
per day . . ." is also at variance with the McNamara briefing
and all Agency and USIB publications that we have seen. The
figures given to Secretary McNamara by MACV in November were
as follows, in tons per day:
Through LAOS
300 in dry season
50 in rainy season
195 average
Through CAMBODIA
25 minimum
By Sea
14
TOTAL AV ME CAPABILITY
?3
SNIE 10-12-65, Annex At says "The cumulative throughput
capability into South Vietnam by means of the Laos corridor is
estimated for the current dry season at 150-200 tons daily."
Recent studies of improvements on that route have led to raised
figures. The 21 February 1966 DD/I Memorandum estimates the
- 4-
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capability of the Laos route as ". . . at least 400 tons a day in
the dry season, and about 100 in the wet." This memorandum also
says that "from 7x90 tons per day has been moved into Laos in
January and February" and that some 50-70 tons of this probably
goes on to South Vietnam. Nowhere does Alsop's 1Z+0-175 tons per
day appear.
5. Since neither the studies published here nor the MACV
briefing contains any of the figures used in Mr. Alsop's column,
we are at a loss to know where he got them. A reasonable guess
would be that he got them third-hand and garbled in conversations
in Vietnam, or, perhaps, in Washington. There is nothing in his
column which indicates that he has had access to any of the Agency
or USIB publications.
NOTE: We understand that in the Honolulu briefing for Secretary
McNamara this February the projected number of Communist battalions
in the South by the end of 1966 was raised from 155 to 179? This
would be close to an average monthly increase of two regiments.
Alsop makes no reference to this briefing.
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Deputy Director
National. Estimates
AEBoT SMITH
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THE WHITE ..OUSE
WASHINGTON
March 7, 1966
TO DICK HELMS
Bill Moyers
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Matter of Fact . .
The Untold Story: Panic
. By Joseph Alsop
ANYONE wanting an ex- ment. His staff, however, then presented to Secretary
planation of the strange was then more worried of Defense Robert McNama-
course of events in these about the tactical difficul- ra when he visited Vietnam
last months must begin the ties of prolonged "penny in late November. The esti-
search in packet war," than about mates meant that the enemy
Vietnam, at further large-scale North could well increase his
about the Vietnamese invasion of the strength by the equivalent
end of Octo- ?;odnotbb.
wY AB A'' ptblitation or , i barwe not
it c c ogee be done it .eh.
mamh 1966
(DATE)
FORM
BEM 10-101
AUGN 54 lol WHICH RELACES
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