THE VIEW FROM HANOI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: November 30, 1966
• Content Type: MF

. iO C /
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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
30 November 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The View from Hanoi
1. What is the view from Hanoi? What is Hanoi's current
evaluation of: (a) the course of the war? (b) the political
situation in South Vietnam? (c) the international climate,
including US domestic opinion?
2. The Milit Situation. In the spring of 1965 Hanoi
made two fateful decisions, The first was to pass up an
opportunity for negotiations, provided by a private Soviet
proposal to reconvene the Geneva conference; this was soon
followed by the famous four points, a program patently designed
to discourage any negotiations. The second decision was to meet
the prospective American buildup of ground forces by continuing
the input of North Vietnamese regular units, and trying to maintain
offensive operations, decisions which apparently were questioned
by some "comrades," including perhaps General Giap.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S?-E-C-R-?E-T declassification
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3. Hanoi has had a good 12 months to evaluate the con-
sequences of this general policy. From the military viewpoint,
developments must be fairly discouraging. Since the inconclusive
battle of the Ia Drang Valley (November 1965), the regular NVN
regiments have not won any major engagement. Even if one accepts
the official NVN position that this is a protracted war of attrition,
the statistics cast doubt on the validity of Hanoi's previous
strategy. To the extent to which wars can be measured by statistics
the NVA/VC forces are losing.
4. The operation across the DMZ which began in June pro-
vided further evidence that their offensive strategy was faltering.
It is still not too clear what precise objectives this bold move
was intended to accomplish. But whatever its purpose the operation
was stalled. No important ground was gained, only a small American
force was diverted from another area, and no little Dienbienphus
were contrived before the US congressional elections.
5. Adding to the setback in the northern tip of South
Vietnam was the mauling of the NVA/VC in Binh Dinh (Operation
Irving) followed by the equally costly operation in Tay Ninh
(Operation Attleboro) which took a heavy toll of men and materiel
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in the long held base area of War Zone C. What must be impressive
to Hanoi is the ability of the US to move from one major battle
to other, while the NVA/VC have been incapable of mounting a
series of major offensive operations which would seem necessary
to the success of their strategy.
6. For example, there was apparently no effort made to
relieve the pressures in the DMZ by major action elsewhere, which
points up a simple fact about the war: the NVA/VC units can no
longer mount or prepare major operations without inviting highly
damaging US spoiling attacks. The proposition that the Communist
forces have lost the battlefield initiative has become a cliche,
but it is nevertheless one that must be disturbing to Hanoi.*
7. It can be argued, of course, that Hanoi does not take
such a short-term view, but sees the war as part of a long-term
revolutionary process which began 20 years ago. Moreover, the
North Vietnamese can point to some significant achievements: their
main forces are larger today than a year ago and the flow of men
For example, the present situation bears little resemblance
to General Giapts claim of last May, "In the military field,
the Southern people now have a strong regular force, capable
of fighting increasingly large battles."
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and materiel is at least adequate to maintain this level. The
intervention of the US has not yet shaken morale importantly.
-- the Delta -- has been relatively unaffected
by the US action, In short, the NVA/VC forces are still intact.
8. How important is the military factor? Over a year ago
General Giap asserted, "the essential problem, the decisive prob-
lem is who will be the final victor on the battlefields of South
Vietnam ..." If we are. in any significant measure correct in our
judgment of how the situation looks to them, the Communist mili-
tary strategists must already have had doubts over their future
strategy.
9. The Political Situation. On the political front, Ho Chi
Minh and his advisors are faced with a more ambiguous situation.
One hard fact confronting Hanoi, however, is the surprising
durability of the Ky government despite repeated crises. If the
NVN regime has been counting on a state of permanent upheaval in
Saigon, they should now revise their estimate. To be sure, there
will be more crises, squabbles, and infighting in Siagon, but even
some consistant critics are allowing a bit of optimism to creep into
their observations.*
For example, Denis Warner, "South Vietnam's Political Awakening,"
The Reporter, 17 November 1966.
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10. Hanoi could, of course, take refuge in the long view.
It might reason that a superficial stability cannot conceal
the fundamental problems of regional and religious conflicts
which inevitably come to the fore in South Vietnam. Hanoi
might postpone decisions about the war in the hope that, over the
next year, the work of the constituent assembly and natinnal
elections could produce a South Vietnamese government more favorable
to the Communists as a prospective negotiating partner. Or they
may believe that the process of developing a constitutional
government will prove so disruptive that recent progress will be
wiped out.
11. But it cannot be too comforting, if Hanoi's leaders com-
pare the current situation with their estimate in early 1965 that
the complete collapse of South Vietnam was not far off. And they
must be influenced by the fact that despite the successive turn-
overs in Saigon, no important political, military, or religious
figure has defected to the National Front since the death of Diem.
12. Of considerable concern to Hanoi, perhaps even more so
than the political developments in Saigon, is the effectiveness of
the Revolutionary Development program. This threatens the VC directly.
Hanoi's propaganda and military actions are strong indications that
destroying this program is a key cbJective. Hanoi probably views
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this program as relatively ineffective, thus far, it is probably
more apprehensive over the future. Of particular concern to
Hanoi would be the assignement of more ARVN units to security
roles, since this would require the VC to use larger, better
armed units to combat the Revolutionary Development program.
13. The Enemj -- the US. Some of these political develop-
ments in Saigon as well as the trends on the battleground have
been apparent for some time. Thus, in order to account for
Hanoi's persistent determination to fight on,, many Western
observers have increasingly focused on the state of US domestic
and international opinion as the main prop in Hanoi's calcula-
tions. It is difficult to see these matters from Hanoi's point
of view. How do the Communist leaders evaluate a student riot
at Berkeley or Harvard? How do they interpret the election of
Congressman X or the defeat of Senator Y? The standard estimate
has been that Hanoi believes that a combination of US and inter-
national opinion will eventually force the US to offer important
concessions to disengage from the war.
14. One wonders whether this is still a sound estimate
of Hanoi's view, It is characteristic of hoary Marxist-Leninist
analyses that "the people" will prevail on the capitalists to
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change their policies. But Communist leaders have become much
more sophisticated since the 1920's and 1930's, and Ho Chi Minh
has a well deserved reputation for political. acuity. Ho should
now recognize that the effect of US opinion on US policy is
diffic.LLt enough for Dr. Gallup and Lou Harris to measure, let
alone for the American section of the NVN foreign office. And
public opinion is a weak reed on which to base a political-
military strategy.
15. The trouble is that Ho has been through this before
with the French. Even General Giap concedes that French politics
were as important to his victory as the tide of battle. We do
not know whether Ho really believes, as he claims, that the US
will decide to give way, or whether he clings to this out of
growing desperation. Unfortunately, it makes quite a difference.
16. In any case, the North Vietnamese almost certainly
recognize that the presidential election of 1968 is an important
target date for planning purposes. If they do still believe that
American opinion and politics will in the long term prove decisive,
then there is a strong incentive to hang on until mid-1968. Never-
theless, they must worry whether frustration over the war will
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lead to a sharp escalation over the next 18 months. Thus, this
important factor can work in both ways on Hanoi.
17. As far as hard evidence is concerned, there is none.
The repeated statements of various Vietnamese are not a good
guide, since one could hardly expect them to engage in a frank
analysis either with the Premier of Rumania or an AFP corres-
pondent. But it My be indicative that Hanoi's reaction to the
results of US congressional elections has been to dismiss them
as unimpo:rtant. Hanoi could have chosen to read into the results
a growing opposition to the war, or at least emphasize this propa-
ganda line. That they did not mar mean they are backing off one
step, so as not to encourage illusion in their own country.
18. The International Climate. As to Hanoi's evaluation
of international opinion, the picture may be a ltttle clearer.
As the Economist pointed out recently, the vaunted "third force"
is not at present a very effective factor in international politics.
If Hanoi's leaders ecpected a year ago that a ground swell of
international opinion would eventually overwhelm the US, they
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must now be quite disappointed. Undoubtedly fate has dealt them
some unkind blows: some of the more strident voices, Nkrumah's,
Pen Bella's, Sukarno's are silent, and Hanoi pays some price,
for example in India, for its close alliance with China. Finally,
Hanoi's own intransigence has repeatedly denied potential
sua porters the opportunity and the means to bring real diplomatic
pressures on the US. It is perhaps indicative of the state of
affairs, that outside the Coma i.st world, Bertrand Russell is
currently Hanoi's loudest and most colorful champion.
19. China -- the uncertain Al 1,Y. A new factor. bearing on
Hanoi's position is the crisis in China. Hanoi cannot fail to
be seriously concerned about the disruption of a previously
stable political leadership in Peking. Hanoi is affected in
to ways. First, there is the growing tension between Moscow
and Peking. To be sure Hanoi has managed to steer clear of this
conflict and fairly skillfully, and has even profited materially
from Sino-Soviet competition. But given the uncertainties in China,
there is a growing chance that China might force Hanoi to take a
stand. against Russia. The attitude of the Chinese toward "fence
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sitting" has become progressively sharper. Hanoi is likely to
see little choice but to align with China. This must seem
highly unpalatable.
20. A second effect on Hanoi of China's situation may be
that China now looks less reliable as a deterrent. The North
Vietnamese cannot have failed to notice that China's role in and
its international, role as Hanoi's champion have been greatly
over-shadowed by Peking's domestic troubles. Of course, China's
military potential has not diminished, but there is a growing;
impression abroad, particularly in Japan, that the danger of
Chinese intervention is receding. Thus, Hanoi tends to be
deprived of a high card. The firing of China's nuclear missile
caused some international apprehension over the development of
a strategic capability, but Hanoi probably realizes that this is
still too far in the future to affect the current situation.
21. In sum, China is increasingly exposed as a rather
uncertain and unstable ally, and the net result may be a loss of
Chinese influence in Hanoi.
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22. The USSR. It has usually been considered that the
USSR was a counterweight to the Chinese in Hanoi, and that a
rise in Soviet influence meant a rise in the chance of a
negotiating situation. As far as the Soviet attitude was
concerned, this was probably more likely in the early days of
Soviet involvement in the war than now. The Soviets may see
certain byproducts from the war in terms of their own interests:
strains on American resources and aggravation of ITS problems in
Europe. At the same time, the Soviets must be aware of the
risk of escalation. And neither China nor Russia has the degree
of influence or control necessary to force political or military
decisions on Hanoi. Thus, the USSR has little choice but to
wait for the moment in which Hanoi seems susceptible to Soviet
advice. Such advice probably would be for Hanoi to move toward
political action, but the Soviets probably also realize that they
cannot provide the guarantee of an outcome that would satisfy Hanoi.
23. Hanoi'
Future Strategy. The foregoing presents a bleak.
picture for Hanoi and a probability that it will become worse.
Even so, Hanoi is not necessarily as impressed as an outside
observer with what the latter would see as adversity. The North
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Vietnamese are apt to view their overall situation as worse than
a year ago, but not yet critical. They almost certainly would
believe that their present situation is much better than the
Viet Minh's prospects in say 1951. But the question remains
whether they will conclude that their basic interests can be
better served by a new and different combination of military
and political tactics.
24. Hanoi could view its future strategy in terms of
three options. First, to change the character of the war by
e;3calation either through use of their own forces or by calling
in the Chinese. This seems highly unlikely and has seemed so for
some time. Escalation in this manner is probably not a serious
alternative at present, especially as long as the situation in
China is so unstable. This does not mean that Hanoi will not keep
the pressure on the US by the use of a select number of Communist
"volunteers" in NVN.
25. Hanoi could change the nature of the war in another way,
by reverting to "protracted war" in which guerilla operations are
primary. This alternative must seem attractive in the military
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sense. Operations in small units, terrorism, sabotage, etc.,
might hold the answer to the question of how to cope with
superior US mobility and fire power in large engagements. A
guerrilla strategy, moreover, would be consistent with a policy
of long term resistance, in which the war weariness of the enemy
becomes the main objective. Under this strategy, Hanoi would
have several options for disposing the EVA regiments. It could
break them down into smaller units, or it could retain them in
tact as a potential threat Vii. orderto tie down American forces
in certain areas. Hanoi might even withdraw certain units,
attempting to bargain for a US withdrawal.
26. The key question, however, is whether a reversion
from a supposedly higher stage of revolutionary warfare to a
lower one can be accomplished without serious damage to the
morale and the structure of the fighting force. According to
General Giap, "guerrilla war must multiply. To keep itself in
life and develop, guerrilla warfare has necessarily to develop
into mobile warfare. This is a general law." There is some
evidence that this issue of guerrilla versus mobile warfare has
been under debate in Hanoi, though it is expressed in a modified
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form, i.e., "offensive" versus "defensive" operations. It
may be that we are already witnessing an adjustment toward the
"defensive" option,
27, One consequence of a shift in military strategy
toward protracted, guerrilla operation might be a loosening
up of political tactics. Hanoi's handling of the four point
program and its relationship to negotiations might be modified.
They might hope to regain some international support by appearing
more flexible and in the process to create apprehension in Saigon
and uncertainties in the US. Thus Hanoi might seek to create
an ambiguous situation in which the US would find it politically
difficult to maintain or increase the military pressures,
particularly the bombing of North Vietnam.
23. An alternative to such a change in tactics would be a
more basic shift in political strategy. That is, the North
Vietnamese might attempt to obtain by negotiations or reciprocal
actions a US withdrawal or diminution of the war in the expecta-
tion of gaining their objectives by means other than those they
have been pursuing. This alternative too may be up for reappraisal
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in Hanoi, though there is no hard evidence that this is so.
The recent overtures to the US from the USSR and Eastern
Europeans for a pause in bombing operations could be an indi-
cation that Hanoi's resolve to reject any nave toward nego-
tiations is weakening. Some recent hints of changes in the
fortunes of top level leaders in Hanoi could. indicate that a
policy review is underway.
29. Hanoi's opposition to negotiations and the reasons
for it are well known and need not be discussed at length. The
North Vietnamese must still be deeply suspicious that any nego-
tiations will deny them the important gains they believe have been
won on the battlefield. The main question in their minds, however,
may be whether some negotiation is inevitable, and whether their
position will be stronger or weaker. A year ago they probably
estimated that it would be stronger, now they must have doubts.
30. Our best judgment is that faced with the defeat of its
present strategy and confronted with unpalatable options, Hanoi
is procrastinating. Next spring, after the dry season, is a more
likely time than now for modifications in strategy. But if Hanoi
is now reconsidering its fortunes, then the two live options
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are a modification of military tactics toward guerrilla operations
or a shift toward the political track, with all its hazards.
Our view is that the military option -- i.e., some new combination
of guerrilla and large unit operations -- is still likely to be
the preferred cc-=se; and given time to work out the consequences
and problems, Hanoi may move this way. But this is by no means
certain, and for the first time in the last two years, there is
a chance of a serious political move from the Communist side.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
25X1
SHEBMAAT KENT
Chairman
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DATE
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