ATTACHED ONE SPECIAL MEMORANDUM, 'IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH VIETNAM OF A COMPLETE BREAK IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060011-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: October 24, 1966
• Content Type: MF

SEC SET
Approved For Release 2005/06/23: CIA-RDP79R00~ 04A0011200060011-3
2! October 1966
SUBJECT: Attached ONE Special Memorandum, "Implications for
North Vietnam of a Complete Break in Sino-Soviet
Relations"
The attached ONE Special Memorandum assesses the conse-
quences for North Vietnam of a Sino-Soviet split. It was
done at the request of Chester Cooper, Special Assistant to
Governor Harriman. The Board considered it, with representa-
tives of OCI and SAVA, and it has been delivered to Mr. Cooper.
We are sending copies to a number of officers within this
building, but at present do not recommend any wider circulation.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES :
# Sri
.le
SHEflMAN KFNT
Chairman
EacIuded trcm autematic
downgrading and
deciassJ#Jea#doA
!387
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060011-3
 Approved For Release 2005/0
RE DP79R0 04A001200060011-3
9
C E N TRAL INTELLIGENCE A G E N CY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
24+ October 1966
SPECIAL MEMORANDUM NO. 17-66
SUBJECT: Implications for North Vietnam of a Complete
Break in Sino-Soviet Relations
1. A break in. Sino-Soviet relations would depress
North Vietnamese morale and somewhat intensify existing strains
within the countryts leadership. Hanoi's leaders would fear
that their interests would increasingly become a pawn in the
contest between Peking and Moscow. Hanoi would seek reas-
surances from each side that its aid to the DRV would continue
unhindered.
2. We believe that the Soviets would not cut off or
diminish their aid to North Vietnam. It is conceivable that
they would use the threat as leverage to force Hanoi to negotiate,
but we believe they would be most unlikely to do so.
3. We believe that China would probably restrict passage
of Soviet military aid to North Vietnam. It would probably not
close the route completely, because of criticism in the Communist
world that it would thereby be sabotaging the North Vietnamese
cause. However, Pekingts growing isolation in the world Communist
GROUP 9
EMCludon from acnmatlc
AawRg2Ging and
Approved For Release 2005/06/ P79R00904A001P'n~-.
 Approved For Release 20 t!ClARDP79R009O4A001 200060011-3
NW-11 suff iw
confident of its probable reaction than we are of Moscow's.
4. If Hanoi were forced to choose between China and
the USSR, it would probably cast its lot with the former.
Hanoi now regards the threat of Chinese intervention as the
principal deterrent to US invasion which it fears more than
it does Chinese occupation. Hanoi also shares with Peking
the concept of protracted war in Vietnam and feels it can
count on Chinese support in manpower and materiel for such
a war. Only if North Vietnam became prepared to accept
negotiations would it be likely to rely on the USSR to an
extent that would risk a break with China.
5?
Most Soviet aid to North Vietnam moves by sea. But
a very significant portion of military supplies move by rail
across China. If the China route were closed, Moscow would
probably turn almost entirely to ocean shipping, though some
small and essential cargoes might be air-lifted.
6. The Soviets have provided Hanoi with all its SAIL
equipment, most of its AAA and aircraft, and about half its
small arms and ammunition. China is Hanoi's principal supplier
of small naval craft and radar, and has provided nearly half
of Hanoi's jet fighters and perhaps ten per cent of its .,.
If Soviet military aid were cut off, the Chinese could supply
Approved For Release 2005/06/A_ : fF ? DP79R00904A001200060011-3
 Approved For Release 2005/06/2 IP79RQ04A001 200060011-3
more fighter aircraft and substantially more small arms and
ammunition. They could also supply Hanoi with some 57 mm
,, but not in quantities to make much of an impact. They
could provide additional fully-equipped Chinese AAA divisions.
Consequently, North Vietnam could almost certainly continue
the war for some time without further Soviet assistance.
China would not, however, be able to supply SAMs and much
of the related equipment; as North Vietnamese stocks were
exhausted, the country's air defense capabilities would be
seriously degraded.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHEERMAN KENT
Chairman
071 S,4, is
bQ?
Approved For Release 2005/06/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060011-3
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/06/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060011-3
I TRANSMITTAL SLIP
5.241
REPLACES FORM 36-B
WHICH MAY BE USED.
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/06/23 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060011-3