IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CABINET CRISIS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001200060012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: October 20, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
20 October 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Implications of the Current Cabinet Crisis
in South Vietnam
On the whole, we think the chances are better than even
that the crisis will be compromised in some fashion which will
limit the damage and leave Ky about where he is. However, there
is sufficient potential here for real trouble that it is worthwhile
assessing the more ominous possibilities.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
S-E-C-R-E-T declassification
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S-E-C -R-E-T
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
20 October 1966
SUBJECT: Implications of the Current Cabinet
Crisis in South Vietnam
1. Situation. The current cabinet crisis derives from
an unfortunate meshing of two of the major divisive factors
which have long complicated political life in South Vietnam --
regional rivalries and the issue of civilian versus military
control. It does not represent a new development, but merely
the first significant manifestation of these fundamental maladies
since the September elections. It will not be the last.
2. The seven cabinet ministers (out of 29) who have prof-
ferred their resignations are all of Southern (Cachinchinese)
A third major divisive influence is religion which is not
yet openly involved in the crisis; but should the crisis
drag on, religious animosities and political jockeying
among the various religious groups could readily come into
play.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and
Declassification
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origin and are civilians. They share the general Southern
antipathy toward the Northern "carpet-baggers" who dominate the
Ky government and the military establishment. They also suspect
that the military leadership will not fulfill its pledge for a
transition to a civilian government. The visits of various
GVN leaders (in particular those of Police Director, General
Nguyen Ngoc Loan) to military-dominated South Korea adds fuel
to Southern suspicions. With this backdrop of traditional mis-
trust, the heavy-handed action by Loan, a Northerner, in arresting
an acting cabinet minister provided a rallying-point for the
Southern ministers. They began to pressure Ky and to charge
that Loan was attempting to create a "police state." Moreover,
the imminence of the Manila Conference gave them an advantageous
moment to bring pressure on Ky. The ministers assumed that Ky
would be eager to avoid any political crisis before the Con-
ference, in particular one involving the issue of civilian-
military relations which the US considers crucial to the "other
war" in Vietnam.
The exact status of these ministers is unclear. Ky? has said
that they have agreed to remain at their posts until after
the Manila Conference (21_26 October). Nonetheless, the
resignation statements have appeared in the press after the
ministers supposedly agreed to stay on, and the statements
at least appear unequivocal.
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3. It is also likely that General Deng Van Quang (IV Corps
Commander) and perhaps General Nguyen Huu Co (Deputy Prime Minister
and Minister of War) are involved behind the scenes in the challenge
to Ky's regime. Both men are Southerners. More important, they
have strong personal reasons to oppose Ky: both men are prime
candidates to be removed from their posts for corruption.
4. In any event, Ky, a Northerner (Tonkinese) and a
military man, is almost certainly the ultimate target of the
Southerners although the ministers have scrupuously avoided
attacking Ky personally. Ineteexd they have aimed their attack
at those close to Ky, particularly Loan, head of the two
principal security organizations; but also at General Le Nguyen
Khang, III Corps and Marine Commander; Bui Diem, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs; and Dinh Trinh Chinh, Secretary of
State to the Prime Minister. These men are all Northerners.
Because they command the security forces in the Saigon area,
Loan and Khang provide much of the physical protection for the
Ky regime. Should Ky be obliged to remove these men, his power
base and prestige would be seriously weakened.
5. The crisis has already done some damage to Ky's image.
Regardless of the immediate outcome of the crisis, Ky will go to
Manila with his domestic house in a state of some public disarray.
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Nov, Soo
There has already been adverse foreign publicity on this score,
and the heavy press coverage of the proceedings in Manila will
engender more. In South Vietnam, the crisis has helped dim the
glow left by the successful September election. It also has
publicly raised the issue of civilian-military conflict. This
will have reverberations in the Constituent Assembly where there
is a sizeable and vocal bloc of Southern delegates, the most
potable and most vocal being Tran Van Van, who may be working
covertly with the dissidents.
6. Implications. The crisis can almost cettainly not be
resolved before the Manila Conference, and the best that can be
looked for is its deferral until after the Manila Conference.
Such a deferral would put the best face on an embarrassing
problem at Manila and might allow things to simmer down in
Saigon. On previous occasions, Ky has been adroit at fashioning
compromises which have at least temporarily tended to placate
the contending elements. If no compromise can be reached this
time, or if Ky is compelled to meet the problem head on, he has
two alternatives: 1) to accept the cabinet resignations, or
2) to sack or substantially curb Loan.
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T If Ky does accept the resignations, it would be a
blow to civilian-military relations and would further exacerbate
regional rivalries. There would be a chorus of unfavorable
publicity in the foreign press. To lessen the impact of such
a move, Ky would probably try to replace the ministers with other-
Southerners. He could probably do so, and this would help.
Nevertheless, there would be a new round of anti-GVN statements,
charges of "military dictatorship", and the like. Some of the
firebrand Southerners in the Assembly might resign in protest.
In these circumstances, there might be some street demonstrations
and the militant Buddhists might strike up a temporary alliance
with some Catholic Southern elements.
8. A move by Ky to drop Loan could cause more immediate
and serious problems. Ky realizes this and has said that he will
not fire Loan, though like all decisions in South Vietnam, this
is probably not irreversible. As director of the two major
security organizations, Loan is a power in his own right. More-
over, he is the foremost figure in the loose grouping of young,
hard-line officers collectively called the "Baby Turks." Loan's
removal would raise the spectre of renewed military factionalism
which has not seriously plagued the GVN since the removal of
General Thi last spring. Moreover, Ky has confidence in Loan,
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who played a major role in upholding the GVN in its recent victory
over the militant Buddhists. In considering a move against Loan,
Ky would be aware that this would only temporarily appease the
opposition elements and only whet the Southerners' appetite for
more concessions. Loan's removal under pressure would weaken
Ky in the eyes of all concerned.
9. On the whole, the best thing that could happen would
be that the crisis not come to a final head before Manila and
that after Manila it can be settled by a compromise or at least
by a not overly disruptive showdown. The worst that could
happen would be a shattering of the unity among the military.
At present and for a long time to come, military support, and
probably predominance as well, is essential for any regime in
South Vietnam.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
EO 12356 1.3(a)(4)
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