DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: CAN BALAGUER BELL THE CAT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300010003-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2007
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 24, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NAT20NAL ESTIMATES
24 August 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE D
SUBJECT: Dominican Republic: Can Balaguer Hell the Cat?
Balaguer is facing a particularly difficult dilemma.
He feels the need to bring his military mare under control;
he would like to do this before the departure of the Inter-
American Peace Force (TAPE), now scheduled for late September;
but to do it sa quickly risks a violent reaction by the
military. One possible way out would be to ask the TAPE
to stay longer, though this too would have some political
Co$t.
1. In our last estimate on the Dominican Republic, we noted
the likelihood of further tension and disorder, and painted out
that the IAPF had become the primary stabilizing factor in the
country. We also discussed the necessity, and at the same time
the delicacy, of reshaping the Dominican military establishment,
and we warned that if the new president moved clumsily in this, he
might provoke the very military intervention he was trying to rule out.
2. The Balaguer administration, after a brief honeymoon
period, is now faced with increasing suspicion, opposition and
N .2- , "Prospects far Stability in the Dominican Republic,"
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intrigue, Some elements on the extreme left have resumed acts
of violence; some on the extreme right are plotting once again.
One aspect of Balaguer's response has been the preparation of
a draft law to curtail political party activity; this is antag-
onizing part of the moderate opposition as well. His own
Reformist Party is not so we11-organized or united that it pro-
vides him with a really solid base, and a number of its members
are disenchanted because Ba.laguer has given them less patronage
and mare austerity than they expected.
3. But it is Bala:guer's relationship to the military
that poses the most serious short-run problem. He has appointed
as his awn military aide an ambitious officer whb is generally
considered a Tru~illoist and is regarded with suspicion by the
defense minister and the service chiefs, who have made their
views known to Balaguer. Bala.guer has replaced the chief of
police with a trusted associate -- but a man who seems heavier
handed and lighter headed than his predecessor. He has ordered --
though not yet implemented -- the transfer Of two key military
units to what seem to be more reliable comrr~nds.
This is a big establishment in a small country. Total number
of military personnel is nearly 19 000. In addition, there
is the National Police with about ,500. Though not the
throw-back, gorilla outfit it was in Tru~illo's time, the
Dominican military is still essentially a conservative force
and tends to align itself with the civilian elite.
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~. Balaguer has told the US Ambassador that he is deter-
mined to proceed with a reduction and thorough reorganization of
the Dominican military. Although he realizes that this involves
some risk, he may be underestimating how much. He has emphasized
his belief that certain specific changes must "Qe accomplished and
that the broad outline of the whole plan must be established while
he sti11 has the baclcing of the IAPF. (IAxF strength is now down
t4 about 5,000, and the last units are scheduled to leave in the
latter part of September.) He has 'been ,giving some thought to
the pros and cons of requesting s,n extension o#' the IAPF presence.
5. Many Dominican military figures are probably willing
to cooperate with Ds,la,guer in his reorganization efforts. Others
in the military are bowed to become restive as they see plans
developed to cut back not only their numbers, but also their
privileges and prerogatives. Officers already involved in con-
spiring with civilian rightists are likely to do mare of it.
Any upsurge in terrorism an the part of the extreme left or any
improvement in the political fortunes of the moderate left,
would probably cause more of the military to involve themselves
in coup plotting.
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6. Since its inception, the IAPF has been an effective
deterrent to insurgency from the left and to a coup from the
right. The likelihood of these contingencies will in any case
become greater when the last elements of the TAPF depart. And
if, before the presently scheduled departure date in late
September, Balaguer presses ahead to accomplish several of his
military reform measures -- and to advertise the rest -- the
chances of a military coup would be sharply increased.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
Acting Chairman
Ea 12356 1.3(x)(4)
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fi~IEMORANDUM FG, ,
This memo seat tc: ~9eam Rwk, Ga?rge Ball,
Thomas Hughes, Henri area, Eobt. Mc]!