THE CRISIS IN CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300010015-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2006
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: July 15, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
15 July 1966
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Crisis in China
1. After more than eight months of turmoil and confusion
the situation inside China seems to be settling down enough to
permit some tentative conclusions about the near future. Develop-
ments in the past few weeks have caused most observers to conclude
that Mao is now in effective control over the party and the policies
of the regime. Whatever explanation there may be for the troubles
this spring, a new equilibrium seems to have been established in
the top leadership.
2. There does remain, however, controversy over what happened
last winter and spring when Mao was absent from view for many months
and when major party journals took opposing positions. Although
most observers believe Peng Chen fell in a power struggle, perhaps
touched off by a sudden illness of Mao, some believe that Peng
was the victim of a purge organized and developed by Mao as part
of the intensification of the "cultural revolution." Mao's
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reappearance has made this debate less relevant to the current
situation than it was some time ago when his position seemed
uncertain.
3. Whether Mao faltered or not, in a broad sense all Chinese
politics must be regarded as heavily conditioned by the succession
question. Even if Mao has been in over-all command throughout the
period, his colleagues must conduct themselves with a sharp eye
cast toward their friends and enemies. Thus, it is plausible that
Mao intended some general purification of the party and that the
enemies and rivals of Peng Chen, notably Teng Hsiao-ping, turned
Mao's campaign against Peng.
The Top Leaders
24 The principal casualties in addition to Peng Chen are
Lo Jui-ching (armed forces chief of staff and probable head of the
secret police), Lu Ting-yi (party secretary and chief of the party's
propaganda department), Chou Yang (deputy director of propaganda),
as well as lesser figures in the party propaganda and control
apparatus and some military officials whose status is in doubt.
The four top leaders under Mao have emerged unscathed, though their
relative power position is open to speculation. Teng Hsiao-ping,
as general secretary, gains as the result of the removal of a strong
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rival, Peng Chen. Lin Piao gains because of the unusual publicity
associating his name with the cultural purge. Chou En-jai has not
been hurt, and may have stayed aloof from the troubles last spring.
Liu Shao-chi remains the nominal number two man, though he may
have suffered some loss because of the strengthening of Teng and
5. While one member of Mao's "brain trust," Chou Yang, was
purged, another member, Chen Po-ta, has been named to lead the
"cultural revolution." A newcomer to the party center is Tao Chu,
chairman of the Central-South Regional Bureau, and now replacing
Lu Ting-yi on the secretariat and as propaganda director.
Yeh Chien-lying also moves onto the secretariat, the first pro-
fessional military officer in that group since 1959. A new balance
of power under Mao thus appears to be taking shape, but its details
are not yet clear.
6. Out of all this comes one clear implication for the future.
The long-standing stability of the Chinese leadership has been
shaken, Whoever did what to whom, there must now exist deep sus-
picion and mistrust within the Chinese party fran top to bottom.
The chance of a peaceful and orderly succession to Lui Shao-chi or
to a Maoist "collective" appears greatly lessened. The party
leadership will live under the threat of an increasingly suspicious
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Mao, or in the tense expectation of a vicious contest for power
as he fades away. Thus, we are entering a period of much greater
uncertainty in discussing future developments in China.
Internal Policy
7. It is possible that current campaigns such as the "cultural
revolution" may fade away or even be abruptly reversed. They may
have been intended primarily to mask the collapse of Mao's control
last winter, and to justify the disgrace of important officials.
But in view of Mao's apparently revived vigor, his profoundly
revolutionary cast of mind, and indicators of at least temporary
stability in the leadership, current policy statements should be
given considerable credence, with allowance for the usual exaggera-
tion and ideological overtones always present in Chinese official
pronouncements.
8. Chinese society is probably in for continued massive doees
of political indoctrination, with emphasis on the cult of Mao and
"politics in command." The effect on a population already weary
of propaganda will be increased apathy and resentment. Support for
the regime will further weaken as the policy of substituting
exhortation for material incentives is pushed.
9. The intellectuals are almost certainly in for an even
heavier going over than they have had over recent years. The regime
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has already pinpointed colleges and universities as bourgeois
strongholds, and is probably moving toward a sweeping "reform"
of the educational system, an action of potential long-range
significance. More than any other group, intellectuals will resent
the ludicrous extremes of the campaign and the hypocritical role
they have to play in it. Already suffering from a chronic shortage
of technicians, China may now face declining productivity and
cooperation from its limited stable of trained specialists, Moreover,
the effect of putting "politics in command" is to subordinate
technicians and scientists to the politicians, one of the reasons
for the colossal failure of the Leap Forward.
10. Despite the apparent equilibrium in the top leadership,
the entire party and government apparatus is nevertheless probably
in a state of confusion and apprehension, and it is difficult to
see how effective political leadership or economic management can
develop in such an atmosphere. As for the military, the campaign
has eliminated at least the armed forces chief of staff and secret
police chief Lo Jui-thing. Others, military leaders not identified,
may have fallen. But the effect on the military is not clear. If
the disruptive "cultural revolution" is pushed hard, then it could
be that such notions as learning to fly better Ily studying Mao more
and flying less will take a toll on the morale and competence of
the professionals. On the other hand, Lo Jut-ching appears to have
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been replaced on the party secretariat by a professional military
officer, Yeh Chien-ying, which suggests that the military may
still be spared the worst excesses of Mao's new campaign.
11. It is also an open question how far the radicalization
in the cultural and educational spheres will extend into economic
policy. There have been recent high level statements about another
"leap forward." But these could be part of the polemics against the
anti-party group who allegedly attacked the last Great Leap. In
any case, while we would not expect a repetition of the extremes
of the original Leap Forward, any sharp step-up in the pace could
be disastrous for an economy still recovering from the excesses
of the first leap. Not only are food supplies more vulnerable now,
but diversion of scarce resources to the military programs has left
the economy with little resiliency for absorbing inept experimen-
tation. In the rural economy, for instance, abolition of the
private plots might be a logical outgrowth of the present political
campaign. If so, this would severely cripple food output.
Foreign Policy
12. It is possible, of course, that a radical turn of internal
affairs could spread to foreign policy. Most observers, however,
think the opposite is the more likely. With internal affairs in flux
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and demanding greater energies and attention, it might be prudent
for the regime to seek a certain equilibrium abroad, lest foreign
developments intrude on internal programs. Recent Chinese propa-
ganda -- e.g., that the main enemies are internal. ones
to point: in this direction.
13. The Vietnamese war is obviously the touchstone for testing
whether Chinese foreign policy has been affected by internal troubles.
There are no signs of change in the intransigent Chinese position.
Most observers agree, however, that in general the internal crisis
serves to reduce the chances of Chinese intervention in Vietnam.
Chinese reaction to US bombing of NVN's POL sites seems to bear out
this estimate. It is significant that in the wake of the new bombings
the Chinese have reiterated the old line that, while socialist
countries must support Hanoi, the main burden of the war must be
borne by the Vietnamese themselves. And this reaction came after
the time when the leadership situation seemed to have stabilized.
14. North Vietnamese-Chinese relations, however, have become
more complicated. Hanoi has moved, despite Peking's obvious opposi-
tion, toward a neutral position between Peking and Moscow. And the
NFLSV has followed suit. It may be significant that this "centrist"
course was first denounced by the very man, Teng Hsiao-ping, who
many think is one of the principal architects and beneficiaries .
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in the political crisis in Peking. A vehement anti-Soviet line
is a striking feature of current denzn+aciati.on of the Chinese
"anti-party" group. Ho Chi Minh probably visited Peking in secret,
at least once, to find out first-hand what the implications are
for Hanoi.
15. As for Sino-Soviet relations, it seems highly unlikely
that Peking will soften its anti-Soviet line. Indeed, there has
been an intensification of Chinese attacks on the USSR recently,
taking the particular form of charges of US-Soviet "collusion"
regarding Vietnam.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
10
L
ABBOT SMITH
Acting Chairman
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