PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO A PARTICULAR US COURSE OF ACTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300020010-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: December 19, 1966
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001300020010-7
TOP SECRET/
SUBJECT: Probable Communist Reactions to a Particular US
Course of Action
How would North Vietnam, Cca nunist China, and the USSR
react to reconnaissance over China and North Vietnam by OXCART
vehicles based in Okinawa?
1. Cam. We believe that the Chinese would quickly acquire
knowledge of the operation. Mission aircraft would almost
certainly be detected by Chinese radar, and, by virtue of speed
and altitude, be identified as a new type of reconnaissance
vehicle. The chances are good that Chinese. agents on Okinawa
would become aware of the operation and that Peiping would quickly
relate the new overflights to the base at Kadena,
2. The, Chinese would of course try to knock down the air-
craft. Assuming their failure to do' so, and- a i660essful flight,
we believe the chances of significantly adverse consequences to the
US are virtually negligible. For the reasons that they do not
acknowledge successful U-2 overflights, they would almost certainly
TOP SECRET)
GROUP l
eluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001300020010-7
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A0O1300020010-7
TOP SECRET)
not draw any special attention to this operation. Furthermore, in
this contingency the kind of pressure they might try to apply to
Japan or to any other country which might have afforded assistance
would be of the most general sort -- if any at all.
3. The situatL on would be quite different, of course, if an
CICCART aircraft came dawn on Chinese territory. Such an incident
would be the occasion for a major political and propaganda
campaign, particularly if a live American pilot fell into Chinese
hands. In dramatizing the affair, Peiping would hope to persuade
the world, including the American public, of Chinese strength and
of the riskiness of US policy. They would also use what reseurees
they had to mobilize public opinion in Japan and in Okinawa against
US control of the latter island and against the existence of US
bases in Japan itself.
4. In the past several years Communist China's air space has
been probed often -- a number of deep penetrations by U-2s and
drones, many shallow penetrations by other aircraft, and innumerable
snooper patrols offshore by aircraft collecting Elint and oblique
photography. The CIICCART would seem "more of the same," only executed
with superior equipment. The relative invulnerability of the craft
TOP SECRET)
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001300020010-7
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AQQ1300020010-7
TOP SECRET/
would be frustrating to the Chinese, but the advanced technology
which had made it possible would impress them and remind them of
the capabilities the US could bring to bear in a Sino-US war.
5. The Chinese leaders probably do not seriously expect a
US attack on China in the near future, i.e., as long as Chinese
participation is indirect and Chinese airfields and Air Force
units are not actively engaged in combat against US forces. Never-
theless, upon detecting the first CKCART intrusion they might worry
that some sort of sneak attack was aimed at one of their nuclear
installations, but they vivuld not have time for any reaction other
than to alert their air defenses to try to shoot it down. After
the first flight was completed it would be clear that the mission
was reconnaissance and that the CICART was, in effect, merely a
more advanced sort of U-2. We do not believe that the Chinese
leaders are so tense and jittery that this would lead them to
any drastic new action.
6. In a worst case situation -- one in which an CICART
vehicle a came to earth relatively intact, with the pilot alive
and talking -- the regime's exploitation of a "captured American
invader" would probably generate !t high feeling within the country.
-3-
Top SECRET/
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01300020010-7
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP79R00904AW1300020010-7
TOP s rJ
The occasion could be used to "Justify" some change in policy
toward the Vietnam war which had already been decided upon, but
we do not believe that even this worst case would, of itself,
generate a significant policy change.
To In short, we do not believe that CKCART missions, whether
or not any aircraft came down inside China, would significantly
affect Peiping's broader calculations governing its policy toward
the war in Vietnam,
8. North Vietnam. The DRV is already subjected to heavy US
air attack and reconnaissance. It would attach little extra
significance to the COCCXRT operation.
9. Thy. Through a variety of its own sources
the Soviets would quickly acquire a fairly caanplete picture of the
operation. They would probably take no action and make no
representations on the matter. Moscow would reinforce any Chinese
or North Vietnamese propaganda campaigns built around the shoot-
down of an aircraft. But almost certainly they would not make
- 4-
Too SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01300020010-7
 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AQD1300020010-7
TOP SECRET,l
overflights of China or the DRV a major issue in Soviet-US relations.
Their primary concern would be to forestall use of the aircraft
over their own territory. To this end they would probably issue
propaganda recalling the inglorious end of the U-2 program over
the USSR, and warning of the dangers of retribution against
cooperating countries. They might further make private camiunica-
tions to the US stressing the seriousness with which they would
view any intrusion into Soviet airspace.
-5-
TOP SECRE1J
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904A001300020010-7
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01300020010-7
Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01300020010-7