PROBABLE COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO USE OF THE OXCART FOR RECONNAISSANCE OVER CUBA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300030002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 8, 1966
• Content Type: MF

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8 September 1966
SUBJECT: Probable Comuniat Reactions to Use of the
OXCART for Reconnaissance over Cuba
Assumptions: (a) Four flights: two per month for two months
(b) The vehicle would be detected and identified
We think it most likely that there would be no attempt to
shoot down the aircraft, and that the Communists would either
make no public issue of the matter, or would keep public controversy
in a very low key. If they did make an issue at all, it would
more likely take the form of private warning to the US against
use of OXCART over the USSR. But there are other possibilities
which are included in the discussion below.
1. The Soviets know of the existence of a US aircraft such
as the OXCART: we believe that they do not know the details of
its capabilities. One virtually certain reaction to the flights
would be for the Soviets to take measures to gain more information
about the vehicle.
2. The Soviets might be puzzled as to why we were using
this vehicle at this time, for returns which would probably not
seem to them worth the cost of revealing more of the aircraft's
capabilities. They would wonder why we chose to introduce this
new factor into the Cuban situation, which is quiet and in which
T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
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they probably consider that we are getting all the intelligence
we need from mpiUieized and unmolested U-2 flights. We think
their most likely interpretations would be that the flights
represented either (a) a stage in the routine replacement of a
U-2 capability which was obsolescent, or (b) final trials before
use of the aircraft over North Vietnam, over China, or even over
the USSR.
3. We think it unlikely that the Soviets (or Cubans) would
attempt to shoot the OXCART down with an SA-2 missile. We see
no reason why the OXCART should be attacked when the U-2 is not.*
25X1
4. The real question is whether the Soviets would decide
to make an issue of the matter -- publicly or privately. They
might do so out of concern that the US was preparing to employ
the vehicle over the USSR, and out of a desire to get US
assurances -- public or private -- renouncing any such purpose.
(Any Soviet representations on this subject, public or private,
~
would make use of the public statement by President Kennedy in Cy
January 1961 that flights of American aircraft penetrating the ~o
airspace of the Soviet Union had been suspended since May 1960,
and that he had ordered that they not be resumed.) It is also
Pasible that they might use it as an occasion for raising the
* We are advised that any such attempt against the OXCART
would almost certainly be unsuccessful.
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whole question of overhead reconnaissance (including that by
satellites); or more generally for showing a harder line towards
the US with respect to Vietnam.
5. On the whole, we think it unlikely that the Soviets
would want to heat up the international situation over this issue
if only because it would involve embarrassment about past U-2
flights over Cuba, and uncertainties about how to deal with
OXCART in the future. Hence we doubt that they would create
a public furor, or reopen the whole question of overhead
reconnaissance. There is about an even chance that they would
make private representations to the US, warning against use of
the vehicle over the USSR.
6. Whatever the desires of the US and Soviet governments,
something about flights of this vehicle over Cuba might become
public, either by Cuban declaration or by leaks to the press. in
such case the Soviets would surely declare their ability to deal
with the aircraft over the USSR. If there were substantial
publicity, the Soviets might feel constrained to make a greater
issue of it; we think they would prefer not to do no.
7. If the vehicle came down in Cuba (which we are informed
is extremely unlikely) and especially if the pilot were alive,
there would certainly be a great deal of propaganda and publicity.
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The chances of Soviet actions along the lines mentioned above
would substantially increase; we still do not think the Soviets
would create an international crisis. If the aircraft came down
at sea and was not recovered by Cubans, Communist reactions would
probably be the same as if it had returned to its base.
8. There is one other slight possibility worth canvassing.
The Cubans may be sufficiently annoyed by U-2 reconnaissance, and
sufficiently eager to do something about it, to seize upon use of
the OXCART as evidence that the US itself had changed a static
situation. They might then consider that it gave them license
to use SA-2 missiles against U-2 aircraft subsequently overflying
their country. We believe that they would not think the risk
worth taking; it does not make much sense from their point of
view; moreover they would almost certainly be restrained by the
Soviets.
9. Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese reactions would
be limited at most to propaganda if the affair became public.
Both countries would doubtless expect the vehicle to be used over
them, but the North Vietnamese at least expect direct US recon-
naissance in any case. We do not believe that either country
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would take the event as evidence Of US intentions to escalate war
in the Far East, thought both might issue propaganda to this
effect.
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SHERMAN KENT
Chairman
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'I f( tq,
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES
John F. Kennedy
Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and
Statements of the President
JANUARY 20 TO DECEMBER 31, 1961
1961
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON I962-
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[8] Jan. 25 Public Papers of the Presidents
8 The President's News Conference of
f anuary 25, 1961
THE PRESIDENT. I have several announce-
ments to make first.
[i.] I have a statement about the Ge-
neva negotiations for an atomic test ban.
These negotiations, as you know, are schcd-
ulcd to begin early in February. They are
of great importance and we will need more
time to prepare a clear American position.
So we are consulting with other governments
and are asking to have it put off until late
March. As you know, Mr. John McCloy
is my principal adviser in this field, and he
has organized a distinguished panel of ex-
perts, headed by Dr. James Fisk of the Bell
Laboratories-and Mr. Salingcr will have a
list of the names at the end of the confer-
ence-who are going to study previous posi-
tions that we've taken in this field, and also
recommend to Mr. McCloy, for my guid-
ance, what our position will be in late March
when we hope the tests will resume.
[i.] Secondly, the United States Gov-
ernment has decided to increase substantially
its contribution towards relieving the fam-
ine in the Congo. This will be_ done by
increasing the supply of cornmeal and dry
milk, by adding contributions of rice, and by
airlifting a thousand tons of food supplies,
seeds, and hospital supplies from a number
of African nations to the Congo.
It is the intention of the United States
Government to meet fully the emergency
requirements of the Congo for rice, corn,
dry milk and other foodstuffs in our surplus
stocks. Assurances have been received from
the United Nations that with the help of
this program the flow of supplies will be
adequate to relieve the distress. The United
States Government will cooperate fully to
help the United Nations prevent famine in
the Congo.'
[3.] Third, I am happy to be able to
announce that Capt. Freeman B. Olmstead
and Capt. John R. McKone, members of the
crew of the United States Air Force RB-47
aircraft who have been detained by Soviet
authorities since July r, rg6o, have been re-
leased by the Soviet Government and are
now en route to the United States.
The United States Government is gratified
by this decision of the Soviet Union and
considers that this action of the Soviet Gov-
ernment removes a serious obstacle to im-
provement of Soviet-American relations.
Our deepest sympathy and understanding
go to the fa: ;;Jcs of the men of the RB-
47 who gave their lives in the service of their
country. At the same time, I am sure that
all Americans join me in rejoicing with the
Olmstead and McKone families. The fam-
ilies, as well as the men, comported them-
selves in these trying times in a way which
is truly in the best traditions of the military
services of the United States. Restraint in
these conditions is obviously not easy. But
they can be assured that they have con-
tributed in large measure to the final achieve-
ment of the objective which we all sought-
release of the men.
[4.] Q. Mr. President, this RB-47 case
was regarded by the Russians as an over-
flight although we took a different position.
In the light of this announcement, what will
be your general policy on overflights and on
such things as the U-z case, or the U-2
A White House release, dated January 25, de-
scribes more fully the Emergency Food Program
for the Congo. The release Is printed in the
Department of State Bulletin (vol. 44, p. 218).
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John F. Kennedy, 1961 Jan. 25 [8]
C to
toad
the
3-47
)Viet
t re-
arc
ified
and
3ov-
im-
ding
RB-
.heir
that
L the
fam-
icm-
hich
itary
it in
But
con-
icvc-
lit-
wcr-
tion.
will
d on
U-a
5, (10?
gran
the
8).
flights? Do you conceive of circumstances
which might warrant resumption of such
things as the U-2 flight?
TILE PRESIDENT. The Soviet Government
is fully aware of United States Government
views with respect to the distinction between
the question of the United States Air Force
RB-47 and the incident which occurred
over Soviet territory on May I, ig6o, involv-
ing an American U-a type aircraft. Flights
of American aircraft penetrating the air
space of the Soviet Union have been sus-
pended since May Ig6o. I have ordered
that they not be resumed.
[5.] Q. Mr. President there have been
reports that Mr. Khrushchev might come to
the United Nations General Assembly for
the resumption of the disarmament debates
sometime in March. If this were to hap-
pen, would you welcome a visit by him to
Washington for a get-acquainted meeting?
THE PRESIDENT. I've not heard officially of
any proposal by Mr. Khrushchev to come to
the United States. I've merely seen news-
paper reports and I feel that it would be
more appropriate to wait until we had some
indication of whether Mr. Khrushchev was
planning to come to the United Nations.
[6.] Q. Mr. President, can you tell us
something about what your role was, if you
had one, in the release of these fliers? Did
this come about as a consequence of some
action you took?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, this matter has been
under discussion by the American Ambas-
sador and Mr. Khrushchev on one occasion
and representatives of the Soviet foreign min-
istry since this weekend. The fliers were re-
leased as of a a.m. yesterday morning, but
in the plane taking off there was a tire that
was blown and therefore the plane did not
take off. Our last information is that it took
off at 5 o'clock our time this afternoon. It
will fly to Amsterdam and then we expect the
fliers to be brought to the United States to-
morrow afternoon.
17.] Q. Mr. President, one of your task
forces recommended that you resist any early
move toward general disarmament negotia-
tions until a firm and fixed U.S. policy could
be worked out. What is your reaction to
that report and how much time do you think
it might take to get a firm fixed U.S.
position?
THh' PRESIDENT. Well, Mr. McCloy has re-
sponsibility over the area of disarmament as
well as nuclear testing. He has, as I've said,
set up this committee-advisory committee-
on nuclear testing. We expect to also get
the American position clearer on general dis-
armament. There is not the same deadline
that we've been facing on the nuclear test-
ing where we were supposed to resume in
early February, but I can state that this
was a matter which was discussed early this
week by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State and Mr. McCloy and we
are preparing clarification of American posi-
tions on disarmament.
[8.] Q. Mr. President, what more can
you tell us about the long conversation that
Ambassador Thompson had with Mr.
Khrushchev, including whether the tone of
that conversation was anywhere near as
friendly as that of the messages that Khru-
shchev has sent you?
THE PRESIDENT. I would say the tone was
friendly. And as a result of the conversa-
tions, as I've said, the decision was made
to release the fliers. But the conversations
were conducted in an atmosphere of civility.
Q. Could you give us any indication at
all as to what other subjects were taken up
in addition to the release of the RB-47 fliers?
THE "RESIDENT. No. I think that I have
to stand on my previous statement.
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[81 Jan. 25 Public Papers of the Presidents
[9?] Q. Does your administration plan Thompson had with the Soviet officials and
to take any steps to solve the problem at therefore we were informed as to the date
Fayette County, Tenn., where tenant farm- that they would be released-the time-
ers have been evicted from their homes be- yesterday.
cause they voted last November and must [I2.] Q. Mr. President, there has been
now live in tents? some apprehension about the instantaneous
THE PRESIDENT. We are-the Congress, of broadcast of Presidential press conferences
course, enacted legislation which placed very such as this one, the contention being that
clear responsibility on the executive branch an inadvertent statement no longer correct-
to protect the right of voting. I supported ible, as in the old days, could possibly cause
that legislation. I am extremely interested some grave consequences. Do you feel
in making sure that every American is given there is any risk or could you give us some
the right to cast his vote without prejudice to thought on that subject?
his rights as a citizen. And therefore I can THE PRESIDENT. Well, it was my under-
state that this administration will pursue the standing that the statements made by the,
problem of providing that protection with by President Eisenhower, were on the record.
all vigor. There may have been a clarification that
[so.] Q. Sir, would you please tell us could have been issued afterwards but it
how it was possible for you to do by Execu- still would have demonstrated, it still would
tive order what Mr. Benson always told us have been on the record as a clarification, so
was impossible for him to do without more that I don't think that the interests of our
legislation? I refer to the order expanding country are-it seems to me they're as well
the distribution of food to the unemployed protected under this system as they were
and giving them more variety in the diet. under the system followed by President
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would not attempt Eisenhower. And this system has the ad-
to comment on Mr. Benson. I don't think vantage of providing more direct communi-
there's any question of our rights to issue cation. On the question at issue would
the Executive order under the authority [13?] Q. q
given to us by the Constitution and by leg- you consider reopening diplomatic relations
islative action. I think we're within our with Cuba and are you considering such a
rights. It is a judgment as to what is the step now?
best use to make of the funds that are avail- THE PRESIDENT. Well, at the-take the
able-the funds are quite limited. The diet last part first-we are not considering such
which is being provided for the people who a step at the present time. I may say
are unemployed is still inadequate. But that the United States is interested, and I
nevertheless we have used the funds that are think that this administration is extremely
available to the maximum. And I don't interested in movements in Latin America
think there's any question that we were and Central America, or the Caribbean
within our rights. which provide a better life for the people.
[ii.] Q. Mr. President, could you tell And if American interests may be damaged
us how and when you learned that these by those movements-or revolutions, or
fliers were going to be released? whatever term you want to use-we feel that
THE PRESIDENT. I learned as a result this should be a matter that should be nego-
of the conversations which Ambassador tiated. What we are of course concerned
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icials and
the date
ie time-
has been
tantaneous
onferenccs
being that
;cr correct-
;sibly cause
you feel
ve us some
my under-
adc by the,
i the record.
ieation that
'arils but it
t still would
rification, so
:rests of our
ey're as well
s they were
,y President
has the ad-
:ct communi-
;t issue would
hatic relations
Bering such a
the-take the
isidcring such
I may say
erestcd, and I
z is extremely
`.atin America
.he Caribbean
for the people.
ay be damaged
-evolutions, or
;c-we feel that
;hould be nego-
urse concerned
John F. Kennedy, 1961
about is when these movements are seized
by external forces and directed not to im-
proving the welfare of the people involved
but towards imposing an ideology which is
alien to this hemisphere. That is a matter of
concern particularly when that intervention
takes the form of military support which
threatens the security and the peace of the
Western Hemisphere.
Now, I'm hopeful that governments will
be established throughout all of Latin
America and governments which are estab-
lished will, and I think nearly all of them
do, share the same view that we have to pro-
vide in this hemisphere a better life for the
people involved, that we are interested in
that, that we are concerned about it, that
American policy will be directed towards
that end. But we are also concerned that
in the name of that peaceful revolution, when
it's seized by aliens for their purposes, it's
very difficult for the United States to carry
on happy relations with those countries.
So in answer to your question we have no
plan at present to resume diplomatic rela-
tions with Cuba, because of the factors which
are involy&d in that island.
[14.] Q. You said in the past, sir, that
the President should be in the thick of the
political battle, and I wondered, sir, if you
could tell us what part you're playing in the
effort to expand the Rules Committee and
whether you feel your domestic program-
whether the success of your domestic pro-
gram in part depends on expanding the
Rules Committee?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, the Constitution
states that each house shall be the judge of
its own rules, and therefore the Speaker of
the House, Mr. Rayburn, has been extremely
anxious that the House be permitted to
settle this matter in its own way.
But it's no secret that-I would strongly
believe that the Members of the House
Jan. 25 [8]
should have an opportunity to vote them-
selves on the programs which we will pre-
sent. That, I think, is the reason the people
selected them to go to the House of Repre-
sentatives and to the Senate and selected me
as President, so that we could present pro-
grams and consider programs and vote on
programs which are put forward for the
benefit of the country.
Now I feel that it would be-I'm hopeful
that whatever judgment is made by the
Members of the House, that it will permit
the Members to vote on these bills. This is
a very difficult time in the life of our coun-
try. Many controversial measures will be
presented which will be in controversy and
will be debated. But at the end the ma-
jority of the Members of the House, the
majority of the Members of the Senate, I
hope, will have a chance to exercise their
will, and that a small group of men will not
attempt to prevent the Members from finally
letting their judgments be known.
For example, we have the housing bill
which is going to come before the Congress
this year. We have an aid-to-education bill.
We have legislation which will affect the
income of farmers. Shouldn't the Members
of the House themselves and not merely the
members of the Rules Committee have a
chance to vote on those measures? But the
responsibility rests with the Members of the
House, and I would not attempt in any way
to infringe upon that responsibility. I
merely give my view as an interested citi-
zen. [Laughter]
[15.] Q. Are any plans being made to
implement the recommendations in the
Voorhees report on the Cuban refugee prob-
lem? Secondly, do you plan to appoint
somebody to continue Mr. Voorhees' work?
THE PRESIDENT. We are considering the
recommendations of Mr. Voorhees and the
whole problem of the Cuban refugees, but I
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[8] Jan. 25
Public Papers. of the Presidents
don't have any statement to make on it at
this time.
1i6.] Q. Mr. President, what is the offi-
cial Government position in regard to the
Portuguese-seized ship? Can the Navy
board it if and when it makes contact?
TIIE PRESIDENT. Well, I believe that the
location of the ship has been determined,
and-[aside to Mr. Salingerl -perhaps we
could give the location of it-at the present
time the instructions are for the Navy-to
continue its accompaniment of the ship.
The Santa Maria has been located by Navy
P2V aircraft, and the position is approxi-
mately boo miles north of the mouth of the
Amazon River. It is headed on a course
of 117, a speed of 15 knots, and the exact
position at ro minutes after 4 was 10-35
north, 45-42 west. It will be trailed by air-
craft and picked up by the destroyers of
our African task force.
Now, there are Americans involved; and
their lives are involved. But we have not
given any instructions to the Navy to carry
out any boarding operations. Though, of
course, we are concerned about the lives of
the Americans involved. And also we are
concerned because the ship belongs to a
country with which the United States has
friendly relations.
[17.] Q. Mr. President, in consequence
of Mr. Khrushchev's apparent indication last
weekend of willingness to release the Ameri-
can fliers, have you sent any communication
to him through Ambassador Thompson or
otherwise?
THE PRESIDENT. Wcll-havc I sent a mes-
sage since the release of the fliers?
Q. Since his communication to us through
Ambassador-
THE PRESIDENT. We have had several ex-
changes with the Soviet authorities. I do
not believe that one has taken place since the
release of the prisoners but that's partially
because there has been this delay about their
leaving Moscow.
[18.] Q. Mr. President, there is meet-
ing here now a nationwide group of labor,
agriculture, and industry which wants to
abolish all restraints of the Reciprocal Trade
Agreements Act. They say that it robs us
of gold, robs American workers of jobs.
What is your position on such a proposal?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I think that their
meeting here is well within their rights as
citizens of the United States and I think
that we should listen to their views. This
is a matter of great concern. I do think
we should be conscious of the fact, of course,
that the balance of trade has been substan-
tially in our favor in the last year. But
we are continually concerned about those
imports which adversely affect an entire
industry, or adversely affect the employment
of a substantial number of our citizens. The
present laws-peril-point and escape clause-
of course, all take those matters into con-
sideration. But I'm glad to have them here;
I'm glad to, have them express their views.
I think the Congress should consider their
views carefully, and I hope that in their
consideration they will consider the whole
problem of trade, and I do think we should
realize that the balance of trade has been
in our favor and the gold flow would have
been substantially worse if we had not had
this favorable balance of trade.
[ig.] Q. Mr. President, in relation to
the gold problem, the outgoing administra-
tion has ordered a cutback in the number
of American military and civilian depend-
ents stationed abroad in the so-called hard-
currency nations. The day before your
inaugural the outgoing Defense Secretary
advised your incoming Defense Secretary in
a manner urging that relief should be sought
as soon as possible because of what the
outgoing Defense Secretary termed the "ad-
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S/ meet-
if labor,
ants to
1 Trade
robs us
of jobs.
?oposal ?
at their
ights as
I think
This
o think
course,
substan-
ir. But
at those
i entire
loyment
M. The
clause-
ato con-
.m here;
it views.
Ter their
in their
e whole
c should
ias been
uld have
not had
ation to
ministra-
number
depend-
cd hard-
)re your
Secretary
:retary in
)e sought
vhat the
the "ad-
John F. Kennedy, 1961
verse affect of the order on the morale of
the military." I-lave you had a chance to
make up your mind on that position, sir?
THE PRESIDENT. Mr. McNamara and Mr.
Dillon have discussed the effect of this order
,.. military morale, military strength, the
rate of reenlistment. It's really a question
of determining what alternative steps can
be secured which would be less harmful but
which would protect the flow of gold. I
do expect to make some reference to this
matter of gold outflow in the State of the
Union Address. I will send within a 2-week
period after the State of the Union Address
a message to the Congress dealing with the
gold outflow and our recommendations for
nutting it and we will at that time come
to some judgment as to whether a more
satisfactory method of protecting our gold
could be secured than providing for the
return of the families of Americans serving
abroad in the military.
I will say that our study so far has con-
vinced us that the dollar must be protected,
that the dollar can be protected at its present
value, that exchange controls are not essen-
tial, but it is a most serious problem and it
will be the subject of a message to the
Congress.
[Eo.] Q. Mr. President, the State of New
York gave you one of your handsomest ma-
jorities in the 196o election campaign, but
now the Democrats of New York are rather
bitterly divided over leadership. As the
leader of the Democratic Party nationally, are
you going to take some steps to try and heal
the splits in New York?
. THE PRESIDENT. Well the people in New
York, the Democratic organizations in New
York, who are interested in the success of
the Democratic Party, they have to make
their judgments as to what kind of a party
they want to build there. I have asked Mr.
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Jan. 25 [8]
Bailey, the new chairman of the Democratic
Party, to lend a helping hand in attempting
to alleviate some of the distress. [Laughter]
[2I.] Q. Sir, do you have any plans for
quick Federal aid for the unemployed?
THE PRESIDENT. We are going to send a
message to the Congress right after the State
of the Union Address, on what steps we
think the Government could profitably take
to provide protection for the unemployed
and also to stimulate the economy. On the
immediate question, I will discuss that in
the State of the Union Address on Monday.
[22.] Q. Mr. President, now that the
Soviets have released the RB-47 fliers, will
you estimate for us the chances of you meet-
ing with Premier Khrushchev?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes. There is no rela-
tionship, nor has there been, in the discus-
sion between the two matters. And there-
fore I have no-there has been no change in
my previous statement that there are no
plans at the present time for meeting with
Mr. Khrushchev.
[23.] Q. Mr. President, will you tolerate
the continued abuse of Executive privilege to
suppress information which is needed by
Congress? For instance, now that you are
President, will you direct the USIA to give
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
those prestige polls which you urged the
previous administration to make available
during the campaign?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, let me say that I
would have no objection at all to the polls,
or at least the results of the polls, being made
available. And I'd be delighted to check in
and see what we can do about making it
available to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee or the House Foreign Relations
Committee, if they would like them.
Q. Mr. President, about the abuses regard-
ing the privilege to suppress all sorts of in-
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[8] Jan. 25
Public Papers of the Pr dents
formation. What is your position on that?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, that's a statement,
really, not completely a question, in-
Q. Sir, but you yourself agreed-.
THE PRESIDENT. That's why I stated that
I thought that it would be well to release
these polls and that's why I said I'd be glad
to release these polls. Now if other matters
come up, we'll have to make a judgment
whether it is an abuse or whether it is within
the constitutional protections given to the
Executive, and I would hope that we can
within the limits of national security make
available information to the press and to the
people, and I do think that it would be
helpful to release the polls which we dis-
cussed last fall.
Q. Mr. President, Press Secretary Salinger
said today, indicated today, there might be
a need for a tightening of information on
national security. Doesn't the policy of
deterrence require that the enemy have
knowledge of our strength and the ability
to carry them out and wouldn't there be a
risk of possible miscalculation by tightening
up information?
TILE PRESIDENT. Well, I think that the
enemy is informed of our strength. I think
Mr. Salinger in his statement today at
lunch indicated his judgment based on his
experience so far, that there had been very
ample information given so that the enemy
can make a determination as to our strength.
I am anxious that we have a maximum flow
of information but there quite obviously are
some matters which involve the security of
the United States, and it's a matter on which
the press and the Executive should attempt
to reach a responsible decision.
I could not make a prediction about what
those matters will be, but I think that all of
us here are aware that there are some mat-
ters which it would not be well to discuss
at particular times so that we just have to
wait and try to work together and see if we
can provide as much information as we can
within the limits of national security. I do
not believe that the stamp "National Se-
curity" should be put on mistakes of the
administration which do not involve the
national security, and this administration
would welcome any time that any member
of the press feels that we are artificially in-
voking that cover. But I must say that I
do not hold the view that all matters and all
information which is available to the Execu-
tive should be made available at all times,
and I don't think any member of the press
does. So it's a question of trying to work
out a solution to a sensitive matter.
[24.1 Q. Mr. President, in the past few
days the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, has
issued statements-one with your name on
it-to the effect that this country wants a
return to quiet private diplomacy. Could
you give us some idea of the meaning behind
this, Mr. President? Are you trying to
suggest to Khrushchev that you'd like to
resort to this for the time being without
offending him or making him go off the
cordial path he's on at the present time?
THE PRESIDENT. Would you-the last part
of that-
Q. Are you trying to suggest to Mr.
Khrushchev by the tone of these-by what
you're saying in these statements-that you
don't want a summit meeting now and
you'd like to go through private channels,
and trying to do this without offending him
or getting him off the cordial path he's on
now?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would just say-
without accepting the question completely
as a premise-I would say that the Secre-
tary of State is anxious to explore with inter-
ested countries what chance we have of
lessening world tension which is-in some
areas of the world-is quite high tonight.
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 see if we
s we c:ul
t}'. I do
ional Sc-
of the
olve the
nistration
member
icially in-
ay that I
rs and all
lc Execu-
all times,
the press
to work
past few
Rusk, has
name on
wants a
Could
rig behind
trying to
d like to
without
;o off the
-nt time?
last part
t to Mr.
-by what
-that you
now and
channels,
iding him
th he's on
just say-
:ompictcly
the Secre-
vith inter-
have of
-in some
h tonight.
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John F. Kennedy, 1961
And therefore there are occasions when
traditional exchanges between diplomats and
the countries involved are in the national
interest. And that, I think, is what Mr.
Rusk is directing his attention to. And
I'm hopeful that from those more traditional
exchanges we can perhaps find greater
common ground.
[25.] Q. Sir, do you favor Senator
I-Iumphrey's suggestion that we send surplus
food to Red China through the U.N. or
CARE, or some similar organization?
TIII? PRESIDENT. Well, I'd say two things:
firstly, Red China-the Chinese Commu-
nists-are exporting food at the present time,
some of it to Africa, some of it going, I
think, to Cuba, and therefore that is a factor
in their needs for food from abroad.
Secondly, we've had no indication from
the Chinese Communists that they would
welcome any offer of food. I'm not anxious
to offer food if it's regarded merely as a
propaganda effort by the United States. If
there is a desire for food and a need for
food, then the United States would be glad
to consider that need, regardless of the
source. If people's lives are involved-if
there is a desire for food-the United States
will consider it carefully. I do say that in
this case, however, there are these examples
of food being exported during this present
time or recent history and, secondly, there
has been a rather belligerent attitude ex-
pressed towards us in recent days by the
Chinese Communists and there is no indi-
cation, direct or indirect, private or public,
that they would respond favorably to any
acts by the United States.
[26.] Q. Mr. President, the task force
report on space has been criticized as par-
tisan opinion. There also has been criticism
that the report was made without any con-
tact with NASA officials, without any at-
tempt at liaison during the transition period.
Jan. 25 [8]
And there is concern that no one has so far
been named to head the agency. Could you
comment on these charges, sir?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I don't-the task
force was free to make the kind of report
that in their best judgment the events called
for. The task force was made up of nun
of broad experience in this field. I think it
was really a blue-ribbon panel. They pre-
seutcd their views. I don't think anyone
is suggesting that their views are necessarily
in every case the right views. I am hope-
ful-we have appointed an acting director-
and I'm hopeful that before the week is out
we will have a director of NASA.
[27.] Q. Mr. President, you have di-
rected your departmental heads to take a
new look at the Eisenhower budget. I
wonder-with indications that you may
have some partial revisions with this budg-
et-can you now say whether you hope or
expect to live within the $8o,9oo million
spending figure which your predecessor laid
down?
THE PRESIDENT. I would-that study of
the budget is now going on and I couldn't
give you an answer yet. We haven't fin-
ished our study.
[28.] Q. Mr. President, your Inaugural
Address was unusual in that you dealt only
with America's position in the world. Why,
Mr. President, did you limit yourself to this
global theme?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, because the issue of
war and peace is involved, and the survival
of l haps the planet, possibly our system.
And, therefore, this is a matter of primary
concern to the people of the United States
and the people of the world.
Secondly, I represent a new administra-
tion. I think the views of this administra-
tion are quite well known to the American
people, and will become better known in
the next month. I think that we are new,
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[8] Jan. 25
Public Papers of the Presidents
however, on the world scene, and therefore
I felt there would be some use in informing
countries around the world of our general
view on the questions which face the world
and divide the world.
[29.] Q. Mr. President, you have spoken
of the situation where there are crises in the
world now. One of these crises is Laos.
Do you have any hope that a political settle-
ment can be negotiated there?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, as you know, the
British Government has presented to the
Soviet Union-and to the best of my infor-
mation an answer has not been received
by the British-a proposal to reestablish
the International Control Commission. We
ought to know shortly whether there's any
hope that that commission can be reestab-
lished. As to the general view on Laos, this
matter is of great concern to us. The United
States is anxious that there be established in
Laos a peaceful country-an independent
country not dominated by either side but
concerned with the life of the people within
the country.
We are anxious that that situation come
forward. And the United States is using its
influence to see if that independent country,
peaceful country, uncommitted country, can
be established under the present very difli-
.cult circumstances.
[30.] Q. Mr. President, in discussing
with the Soviet Union the release of the
RB-47 fliers, did we also take up with Mr.
Khrushchev the fate of Francis Gary Powers,
a U-2 pilot, and the I1 fliers who are missing
from the C-13o which was shot down in-
side Armenia in 1958?
TIIE PRESIDENT. The matter of the ii fliers
was discussed and Mr. Khrushchev-the
.Russians rather-have stated that their pre-
vious public statements on these fliers repre-
sent their view on the matter: that the news-
paper-magazine story which was written
by an Eastern German does not represent
the facts. So that that would-on the mat-
ter of Mr. Powers, we have not discussed
him at this time because he is in a different
category than the fliers that were released.
One was an overflight and the other was a
flight of a different nature.
Q. Did the Russians ask any quid pro quo
or did we make any concessions to them
in exchange for the release of these fliers?
If not,-how do you account for this remark-
able turnabout in their relations with us?
TIIE PRESIDENT. They did not. The state-
ment which I have made is the statement
which the United States Government put
forward on this matter, which I read to you
earlier in regard to overflights. I would not
attempt to make a judgment as to why the
Soviet Union chose to release them at this
time. I did say in my statement that this
had removed a serious obstacle in the way
of peaceful relations between the Soviet
Union and the United States and I would
judge that they desired to remove that seri-
ous obstacle.
Q. Mr. President, did they accept a re-
assurance of no more overflights as an ex-
change?
THE PRESIDENT. It is a fact that I have
ordered that the flights not be resumed,
which is a continuation of the order given
by President Eisenhower in May of this
year.'
[31.] Q. Mr. President, your own elec-
tion has stimulated renewed proposals for
electoral reform. Do you have any objec-
tion to changing the present method of
electing Presidents or do you favor any of
the proposals?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, I do have some
thoughts on it. One, that in the first place,
having been through the experience in '56,
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 epresent
the mat-
liscusscd
different
released.
cr was a
1 pro quo
to them
se fliers?
remark-
With US?
t e state-
;tatement
,rent put
ad to you
vould not
Why the
m at this
that this
i the way
he Soviet
1 I would
that scri-
cept a re-
as an ex-
iat I have
resumed,
rder given
ay of this
own elec-
oposals for
any objcc-
method of
or any of
have some
first place,
once in '56,
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John F. Kennedy, x961
I think it was, of an attempt to substantially
change the electoral college, it's my judg-
ment that no such change can secure the
necessary support in the House, the Senate,
and in the States of the Union. The area
where I do think we perhaps could get some
improvement would be in providing that
the electors would be bound by the results
of the State elections. I think that that is
a-would be a useful step forward.
The electors-after all, when the people
vote they assume that the votes are going
to be cast in a way which reflects the judg-
ment of a majority of the people of the
State and therefore I think it would be
useful to have that automatic and not set
up this independent group who could vote
for the candidate who carried the State or
not, depending on their own personal views.
That would be the first thing.
Secondly, I'm hopeful that the Congress
would consider the suggestions made, I
think, first by President Theodore Roosevelt
and later by Senator Richard Neuberger, of
having the National Government participate
in the financing of national campaigns, be-
cause the present system is not satisfactory.
Jan. 27 [9]
Perhaps it would be useful to go into that
in more detail later because I do think it's
a most important subject. But I would say
for the present that this matter of the electors
would be an area where I think we could
usefully move.
[32.] Q. Mr. President, on a related
subject, without being morbid, have you
given any consideration to the problem
which President Eisenhower resolved with
his Vice President-that is, the problem of
the succession in case of injury, illness, or
some incapacitation-some agreement with
the Vice President such as your predecessor
had?
THE PRESIDENT. Yes. Well, I haven't de-
veloped that at this present time, though I
do think that President Eisenhower's deci-
sion was a good one, and I think it would
be a good precedent. Nothing's been done
on it as yet, but I think it would be a good
matter on which we could proceed.
Reporter: Thank you, Mr. President.
Norm President Kennedy's first news conference,
broadcast over radio and television, was held in the
State Department Auditorium at 6 o'clock on
Wednesday evening, January 25, 1961.
9 Letter to Secretary Ribicoff Requesting Him To Undertake
Direction of Cuban Refugee Activities. January 27, ig6r
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I want you to undertake responsibility,
effective February i, for directing the Cuban
refugee activities now being conducted by
the Executive branch of the Federal govern-
ment, and to make an on-the-scene investi-
gation of the problem within the next week
as my personal representative.
I want you to make concrete my concern
and sympathy for those who have been
forced from their homes in Cuba, and to
assure them that we shall seek to expedite
their voluntary return as soon as conditions
there facilitate that. I believe that the pres-
ent program can best be strengthened by
directly bringing to bear your personal
leadership and the vast welfare, health, and
other skills of your Department. I am
anxious that you make use of private serv-
ices available for the refugees to the greatest
extent possible.
Both here at home and abroad, I want to
re-emphasize most strongly the tradition of
the United States as a humanitarian sanc-
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