SOME IMPLICATIONS OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT TO CONTROL STRATEGIC WEAPONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001300040029-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2006
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: April 6, 1967
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
6 April 1967
SUBJECT: Some Implications of a Soviet-American Agreement
To Control Strategic Weapons
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates in response to a request from the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for International Security Affairs for an informal
paper on certain implications of an agreement between the US
and the USSR to limit their strategic forces. As specified in
the request, the following topics are considered: a) Western
European reactions; b) Chinese Communist reactions; c) effects
on Soviet policy toward China and Europe.
GROUP 1
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1. WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTIONS
1. The European allies regard US strategic forces as the
primary US contribution to their defense. They would therefore
expect to have their views heard on any arms agreement which affected
the US strategic posture. If they gained the impression that
the US regarded the negotiation simply as a bilateral Soviet-
American affair they would be greatly concerned, and serious
strains might arise in the alliance. To a great degree, then,
the European reaction would depend upon the manner in which
the arms control agreement was reached, and the extent of con-
sultations which the US held with its allies in the course of the
negotiations.
2. Reactions to the nonproliferation treaty have illustrated
this point, and demonstrated how sensitive European governments
are to the implications of Soviet-American arms control measures
for European security. Any treaty which allowed the USSR to
retain its force of many hundreds of MR-IRBM's targeted on Europe,
and allowed it to complete ABv1 sites under construction, while
at the same time barring any future US aid to Europe in offensive
and defensive missiles, would probably be seen as imposing a serious
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disadvantage on the European states. More generally, a treaty
which appeared to reduce the measure of strategic superiority
which Europeans feel the US possesses, would arouse concern
among some elements of European opinion. There would be a wide
variety of calculations and theorizing as to the effect upon the
balance of military power and upon the operation of deterrents
in the new situation. It is possible that confidence in the
credibility of the US deterrent would decline, and that the
treaty might be taken as further evidence of a US intention to
diminish its commitments to the defense of Europe.
3. Granted that there is due consultation, however, so that
these problems can be properly dealt with, European reaction to
the postulated agreement would be favorable. The prospect of
checking the spiral of competition in advanced weapons would be
welcomed, in part because it would tend to prevent a widening of
the immense gap in military power between the superpowers and
other states. But most important, it would be taken as a major
step toward ending the East-West tensions which have marked the
past two decades. Indeed it would probably be greeted as the
opening of a promising new phase in East-West relations of a kind
which the Europeans as well as most other peoples have greatly
desired to see.
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4+. Such initial reactions, mainly positive, might of course
give way to subsequent concern, depending upon the course of
developments in Soviet and American policy. As long as the USSR
pursued a policy of detente in Europe all would be well -- at
least all would be well providing the relaxation of tensions with
the East did not open the way for a reappearance of old international
rivalries within Western Europe itself. Should Soviet policy
again become threatening, however, new problems would arise. US
ability to convince Europeans of the firmness of US commitments
might be substantially reduced, especially if it was felt that the
US had in effect accepted parity with the USSR in strategic power.
All this, however, woul(' be a new situation; it might equally
well arise if there had been no arms control agreement at all.
5. The likelihood of unfavorable reactions would be greatest
in West Germany. For the present, Bonn would probably view the
postulated arms control agreement as compatible with its own
efforts to improve relations with the East. If these efforts show
little return, as seems likely over the long run, there might
be some danger that Germans would look back upon the agreement
as signifying a Soviet-American accord at the expense of German
interests. But, again, this would depend upon the whole international
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political atmosphere at the time, and upon the course of US
relations with Germany itself, apart from the matter of arms control,
II. CHINESE COMMUNIST REACTIONS
6. We do not foresee any significant change in Chinese
policies resulting from the proposed Soviet-American arms control
agreement. The Chinese would, of course, roundly denounce the
agreement as another example of US-Soviet collusion. They would
argue that, were it not for such collusion, the growth of Communist
strategic power would justify bolder challenges to the US in many
areas. They would probably not conclude, however, that uni-
lateral adventures of their own would be attended by less risk,
even if the agreement appeared to register a stabilized parity
between US and USSR strategic forces. They would recognize that
US power to deal with Chinese agression was unaffected.
7, Militarily, the Chinese probably would see some advantages
over the long term. Even though they are years away from even a
very modest intercontinental missile capability, they might see
a net gain in a prohibition on the further deployment of ARM's
which might eventually enhance their own crude missile capabilities.
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III. EFFECTS ON SOVIET POLICY TOWARD CHINA AND EUROPE
8. China. Possible concern about a long term Chinese
military threat might be one of the factors Moscow would consider
in weighing an arms limitation agreement with the US, but we
doubt that it woulr'figure very importantly if for other reasons
the Soviets wanted the agreement. Willingness to make the agree-
ment would presumably reflect a Soviet expectation that no funda-
mental improvement in relations with China was in prospect, and,
once made, the agreement might prove to be an obstacle to such an
improvement.
9. Europe. In Western Europe, the USSR would probably
expect to gain from its willingness to conclude an arms control
agreement with the US. Moscow would seek to use the agreement
to convince West Europeans that the Cold War was over, and tlm t
Europe could safely loosen its security ties with the US in the
interest of an all-European arrangement. Eventually, if the Soviets
judged that Atlantic defense ties had been weakened, they might
turn again to policies of pressure in Europe. They would recognize,
however, that any early or precipitate attempt to exploit the
agreement in this way would be self-defeating.
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10. In East European countries, the Soviets might stand
to lose a little from further demonstrations of their interest
in detente. The East Germans would be distrustful and fearful of
further isolation. The others would seek to take advantage of a
relaxed climate to further their own particular interests and to
expand their independence of the USSR. Again, these would be
effects whose ultimate significance would depend in large measure
on what was happening within the Western Alliance.
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