POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE KOREAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400010019-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: January 26, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 January 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR*
SUBJECT: Possible Developments in the Korean Situation
1. The US is confronted by two separate but directly
related problems in Korea. Of immediate importance is the
release of the Pueblo and its crew. Beyond this, however, the
US faces the question of how to cope with North Korea's generally
aggressive line. This policy, now more than a year in development,
is designed to shake popular confidence in the Seoul government,
strain US/ROK relations and undermine South Korean support for
the US in Vietnam. Thus, any course of action by the US needs
to be measured in terms of its impact on these two problems.
2. There are perhaps three broad courses of action which
the US might follow in the current crisis. It could continue
to combine diplomatic pressures with some military preparations.
This memorandum is offered by a working group in the Office
of National Estimates as a contribution to discussions; it
has not been approved by the Board of National Estimates nor
coordinated with other Offices of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
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Alternatively, the US could proceed soon to military retaliation.
Finally, the US could declare, jointly with the ROK, a new policy
for dealing with the North Korean regime, stating that we proposed
henceforth to retaliate selectively and in appropriate measure
should the warlike acts of that regime continue.
3. Before considering reactions to these options, it should
be emphasized that the situation in North Korea is not at all
clear. While the broad outlines and motives of Kim Il Sung's
policy have been apparent for well over a year, some recent
developments are worth noting. Last December, a major address by
Kim Il Sung seemed to be moving toward an even harder line; in
any event he forcefully reiterated North Korea's support for
revolutionary action in the South. This has been followed by
even greater emphasis on US aggressiveness, including warnings
over "spy ships," and more exhortation to the populace to be
vigilant, etc.
4. This line has been accompanied by further changes
within the North Korean leadership. It appears that the removal
of top level figures beginning in 1966 was related to policy
toward South Korea, indicating that this policy may have been
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opposed. Thus, the recent incidents, particularly the guerrilla
raid in Seoul, seems to reflect a further development of this
aggressive line, and may be related to the internal problems
of Kim I1 Sung.
5.. This could be significant in that North Korean reactions
might not necessarily follow the course which would seem dictated
by prudence and by what we believe to be their basic policy of
stopping short of a resumption of the Korean War.
Course I
The US continues diplomatic pressures at Panmunjon, in Moscow,
and in the United Nations for some time; preparations for
possible military action continue.
6. There is a fair chance that, if the US pursues this
general course, before long the North Koreans will release at
least part of the crew. After they have exploited the incident
and obtained technical intelligence from the ship and crew, the
North Koreans would probably see little to be gained from detain-
ing the entire crew. They might, however, keep the officers and
civilians, and perhaps even stage a trial. They would probably
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not release the ship. The North Koreans would be concerned at
the possibility of US military action, but they would probably
be more impressed that the US had not acted immediately and had
persisted in diplomatic pressures. They would be inclined to
conclude that the US was constrained by the requirements of the
Vietnam war from any kind of action in Korea which would seriously
open up the prospect of conflict on another front. They would
also believe that their possession of the crew enforced restraint
on the US.
7. In these general circumstances, neither the Soviets
nor Chinese are likely to be very influential in Pyongyang. One
of the principal features of Kim Il Sung's policy is a militant
independence of both Moscow and Peking; indeed he would want to
avoid any hint of yielding to Soviet overtures.
8. Even though the US might in time secure the release of
some of the crew and even the ship, the effect of this policy on
South Korea would probably be quite damaging. The South Koreans
have already criticized the US preoccupation with the Pueblo
affair, as opposed to the Seoul attack, which they regard as far
more serious. The ROK will almost certainly plan a retaliation;
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US attempts to discourage them will undermine their confidence
to some extent. They may in fact carry out some fairly forcible
retaliatory act across the DMZ, despite US urgings; this would
probably complicate efforts to effect release of the Pueblo and
its crew under this course of action.
Course II
If the Pueblo and its crew are not released promptly, retaliatory
US military actions commensurate with the seizure of the Pueblo
are carried out on a one-time basis (attack on North Korean
naval vessels at sea or in port), and some new actions by the ROK
along the DMZ are initiated.
9. There is little doubt that the North Koreans are con-
cerned over some US military retaliation. They have taken some
precautionary measures and the Soviets are obviously keeping a
close watch on the Enterprise task force. Both will prefer to
avoid any retaliation; if and when Pyongyang became convinced
that the US will in fact launch a retaliatory action, it would
probably move to moderate the crisis by releasing part of the
crew. But there is no certainty that they would become convinced
that the US would in fact carry through a retaliation.
10. If the US did strike Wonsan or some North Korean naval
vessel, the North Koreans would probably not release the crew or
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ship at once. They might still doubt US determination to go
further and they would probably wish to show their own mettle.
One thing they could do would be to proceed with the trial and
"Punishment" of the crew forthwith, as they have already threatened.
They might also counter by an air attack of their own against
South Korean airfields or even against the Enterprise. In our
view this latter seems unlikely since it would invite a rapid
escalation of the action and run high risks of an eventual
resumption of the ground war.
11. The attitude of the Soviets and Chinese in this situa-
tion would be of increasing importance to the North Koreans.
Currently, Chinese-Korean relations are so strained and the
situation in China so confused that the North Koreans would not
count on Chinese support. While the Chinese are likely to take
a hard propaganda line they would almost certainly refrain from
any action against the US.
12. The North Koreans cannot afford to proceed very far in
a confrontation with the US Without some assurance of Soviet
military support. We doubt any firm assurance would be given
at this stage, despite Soviet obligations under the 1961 Mutual
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Assistance Treaty. We think the initial Soviet response to a
US air strike in North Korea would be somewhat along the lines
of their first reaction to US air strikes against Vietnam. They
would of course be tough in public support of Pyongyang, but
probably they would go quite far in private pressures on the
North Koreans to end the crisis.
13? The resort to military action would please the South
Koreans, who are less concerned to effect release of the Pueblo
than to display a firm and tough posture toward the North. How-
ever, if an air strike left the North Koreans still defiant and
threatening, and the US showed no inclination to undertake further
military attacks, the ROK would feel that the US and South Korea
had lost considerable face. The net result could be damaging to
popular morale in the ROK and to US-ROK relations.
14. In sun, the threat of retaliation, if it were convincing,
could be effective in securing the early release of the crew and
possibly the ship, but the actual deed would not be likely to
accomplish this, at least immediately. Retaliation would evidently
bring the Soviets and Chinese more directly into the situation,
but the nature of their advice and the extent of their influence
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with the North Koreans cannot be reliably foreseen. Because of
the UN involvement, other countries would also make their voices
heard, and there would be a growing concern in the world over the
possibility of general war in the Far East.
Course III
Under this course, the US and the ROK would make a policy state-
ment emphasizing the generally aggressive nature of the actions
of North Korea and announcing a new policy of active self-
defense including selective retaliation as appropriate. No
specific action would be promised, but the ROK would in fact be
granted some latitude in retaliatory action along the DMZ, and
the US would make some open movements to strengthen the Eighth
Army and the Seventh Fleet. Direct retaliation for the Pueblo
incident would be withheld for the time being.
15. This line would not be likely to result in the immediate
release of the Puebla. The North Koreans would, however, have
some time to consider their own alternatives and to consult with
the USSR and the Chinese. They would see in this US stand a
partial accomplishment of their objective of tying down US and
ROK forces in South Korea and perhaps causing some diversion of
effort from South Vietnam. Nevertheless, the North Koreans and
the Soviets would probably be impressed by the evident willing-
ness of the US to adopt a strong stand in Korea, as well as in
Vietnam, especially if there were clear signs of a military
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buildup in the Far East. Pyongyang might decide to slow down
some of its own terrorist and guerrilla programs. In time the
crew of the Pueblo might be released, or perhaps exchanged for
North Koreans captured in the South.
16. Because of the broader implications of this course,
the Soviet Union would probably become more directly involved
in North Korean policy. Our view is that Moscow does not want
a reopening of the Korean War; as long as Kim I1 Sung's policy
seemed to be paying dividends in Seoul without high risks, the
Soviets supported him. In this new situation, Soviet counsel
almost certainly would be one of restraint. Nevertheless, the
Soviets would almost certainly have to increase their military
aid and to respond publicly to the US.
17. The Chinese might see in this situation a chance to
regain their lost influence in Pyongyang. Despite a formal
Defense treaty with North Korea, the Chinese would probably not
commit themselves to direct military support in response to this
US course of action. There would be increasing fears in Peking
that the US was moving to open a two front war, directed ultimately
against China. Such fears would almost certainly reinforce
Chinese caution in Korea and in Vietnam.
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vow
18. The South Koreans would welcome this course of action;
they would want to stage some action along the DMZ at an early
date and they would probably urge an air attack on North Korean
guerrilla training camps. They would also ask for greater US
military assistance, particularly aircraft. But their general
confidence in the US and its Asian policy would increase.
19. The US could expect some adverse international reaction
to a new policy pronouncement and any follow up actions. And
of course, the internal debate in the US would be a factor to be
considered. All Communists would keenly watch domestic US
developments for indications of how far they themselves could
go in confronting the US.
20. In sum, this option would not guarantee the release of
the Pueblo, but it would strengthen US solidarity with the ROK.
In time, if the US and especially the ROK did begin limited
retaliations, the North Koreans might decide that their own
policies were becoming too risky and potentially costly. But
there is a chance, as indicated above, that Kim 11 Sung may be
acting with less prudence than we estimate and may in fact be
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willing to absorb some US military retaliation in pursuit of
his present policies.
Director-
National Estimates
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