COMMUNIST REACTION TO CERTAIN US ACTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400010020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: January 26, 1968
• Content Type: MEMO

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
26 January 1968
SUBJECT: Communist Reaction to Certain US Actions
1. The North Koreans as well as the Soviets and Chinese
Communists must realize that tensions are building in the Far
East, and probably are aware that the chances of some US retalia-
tion for the Pueblo incident are increasing. All three of the
Communist powers appear to have undertaken certain precautionary
measures, but we do not know what advice has been proffered to
Pyongyang by Moscow or Peking. The North Koreans have apparently
acted independently thus far, and probably intend to keep the
affair in their own hands insofar as they can.
2. Both the Soviets and the Chinese have thus far refrained
from involving themselves directly. Peking has maintained a
stony silence, in keeping with its general coolness toward the
Pyongyang regime. The Soviets have mainly echoed the Korean
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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charges, but without trying to convey a sense of impending
crisis. In the main, we think that both would prefer an outcome
that would amount to a political-propaganda reverse for the US
rather than the opening of a second theater of hostilities in Asia.
It is possible that both Peking and Moscow, though we cannot say
this with high confidence, would believe that hostilities in
Korea would adversely affect the Communist effort in Vietnam at
this time.
3. Of various possible US retaliatory moves considered
below, all would cause high concern to the USSR and China because
of the potential risks to themselves, but in general the more
limited in duration and scale the U8 retaliation was the less l,kely
would be the direct involvement of Peking and Moscow. Moreover,
it would make some difference, especially to the USSR, if the
retaliation was preceded by a warning, which allowed some
opportunity to prevail upon the North Koreans to settle the
incident. Moscow might not choose to intercede in Pyongyang,
but there is a slight hint in the second Thompson-Kuznetsov
conversation that the USSR may yet encourage North Korea to seek
a peaceful conclusion to the Pueblo episode.
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US COURSES OF ACTIONS
Course I: The US attacks North Korean patrol boats
in North Korean waters, seizes or sinks a North Korean
merchant ship, conducts an air strike against a land-based
facility, e.g., a naval base, harbor installations, or
guerrilla training camps.
4. Something along this line is probably what the Communists
anticipate the US retaliation would be, should it come. They
would all hope to avoid it; some move to dampen the crisis and
inhibit US retaliation may be taken if they judge that the US is
approaching the point of action. This depends almost entirely on
the North Koreans and their judgments of the risks and costs of
further intransigence. They have already sought to head off any
US retaliation by threatening to try and punish the Pueblo crew.
5. We see no major difference in the possible reactions
whatever the precise target. Probably the Communists would
initially regard the action as a one-time shot, mainly to even
the score and assuage public opinion in the US, but they could
not be sure that other attacks would not follow. There would be,
of course, a stream of invective and verbal abuse. But beyond
this, neither the Soviets nor the Chinese would be likely to take
countermeasures that they believed would increase the chances of
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a confrontation with the US. The Chinese would probably make some
demonstrative defense preparations in North China and Manchuria,
and the Soviets too would begin marshalling some more naval and
air power in the Far East and the Sea of Japan. They would still
hope to avoid a direct clash with the US, but the chances of
dangerous incidents, particularly involving Soviet naval forces,
would increase.
Course II: As an alternative to the above measures,
the US could conduct an air strike against different
types of targets: industrial installations, power plants,
rail yards, or POL sites.
6. All of the Communists would view this turn of events as
more ominous. They would regard this type of action as looking
less like a single retaliation than as the beginning of at least
an air campaign against North Korea. They might be concerned that
the US was setting in motion a train of events which could lead
to a reopening of the Korean War.
7. The net effect of such a retaliatory strike would be to
reinforce both Soviet and Chinese concern to avoid a situation
that could expand into major hostilities. They would both make
further military preparations and demonstrations. The Soviets
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despite a tough public posture, would probably privately urge
the Koreans to limit their own reactions and move to end the
crisis. While the Chinese would seek for their own interest
in relation to Vietnam to maintain tensions in Korea at a fairly
high level, they would be increasingly concerned whether the US
intended in fact to reopen the Korean War and, ultimately, to
attack China. Thus, the Chinese would not retaliate.
8. However, the North Koreans might feel compelled to
react, either against the South Koreans or Americans along the
DMZ or by attacking airfields in South Korea. In these circum-
stances, it might become increasingly difficult for the USSR
and China to limit their own involvement. Both regard the area
as one involving important security interests, and both have
mutual assistance treaties with North Korea.
Course III: The US retaliate by blockading North
Korean harbors with mines.
9. North Korea has six major ports and 18 lesser ones,
mostly on the Sea of Japan. Almost all North Korea's seaborne
trade is carried in foreign ships (160 Free World and 132 Communist
calls in 1967). Among Communist countries having ships in the
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North Korean trade, the USSR has by far the largest role. Thus
a complete blockade of North Korea's harbors would pose a direct
challenge to the USSR.
10. Presumably, there would be no effective way of sweeping
the mines, without assembling a fairly large task force. It is
unlikely that the Soviets would want to risk clashes with the US
in the Sea of Japan or a major confrontation. Their first
resort would probably be at the UN, where they would seek a
condemnation of the US and the removal of the mines. They would
recognize that an obvious bargain would be the return of the
Pueblo and its crew for a lifting of the blockade. And they
would probably sound out the Koreans on such a deal. The economic
pressures on the North Koreans to remove the blockade, however,
would not be very great since most of their imports come overland.
11. A common concern of all the Communists would be that
failure to take effective action against the blockade might
encourage the US to take similar action against Haiphong in
North Vietnam. The Chinese, who have virtually no large shipping
to Korea, would not feel compelled or obligated to react with
force, and they might take some pleasure in taunting the USSR
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to do so. If all political efforts failed, however, the USSR
would probably decide to live with the blockade. Nevertheless,
harrassing actions against US naval forces would continue while
a political solution was sought.
12. A complete blockade would pose some potentially
dangerous problems. There are Korean ports near the border with
China and the USSR. To mine these areas could involve Soviet
and Chinese territorial waters. If so, then the risks of a
military reaction by both the USSR and China would be greatly
increased, especially since maintenance of the minefields would
require continued US operations in the area. In short, the
attempt to enforce a complete blockade could prove to be highly
risky, without much promise of putting real pressure on North
Korea.
13. The threat of US retaliation may bring about an early
release of the Pueblo and its crew. Once launched upon the
courses described in this paper, however, the US would be unlikely
to achieve this result. The risks of an enlargement of the
crisis and actual hostilities would be greatly increased.
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