CAMBODIAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION TO COMMUNIST FORCES IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 31, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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31 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Cambodian Involvement in the Supply of Arms and
Ammunition to Communist Forces in South Vietnam
REFERENCE: Memorandum, dated 31 October 1968, Cambodia as a
Source of VC/NVA Arms and Ammunition
1. Pursuant to a request by Assistant Secretary William P.
Bundy and with the approval of the DCI, the undersigned led a
team composed of members of CIA, DIA, and INR in visits to
CINCPAC and Saigon during the period 29 November - 17 December
to make a further study of the reference subject.
2. In Saigon, MACV's J-2 Staff presented the team with a
full series of briefings describing the available intelligence,
their collection efforts, and their conclusions with respect to
JCS review completed.
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Cambodian involvement in the supply of arms and ammunition to
Communist Forces in South Vietnam. The team also had some
opportunity to examine MACV's intelligence holdings, to review
methodology with respect to estimates of munitions imports into
Sihanoukville, and to discuss problems relating to the evalua-
tion of intelligence reports from various sources.
3. The team was provided excellent support and extended
full courtesies at every stop, and was particularly appreciative
of the efforts made at MACV and by US forces in the field (CG,
1st Air Cav Div, CG 25th Infantry Div, and the Senior Advisor,
IV Corps) to inform us of their views and of the situation as
seen in the field.
#. The conclusions, discussions, and recommendations in
the attached memorandum were prepared by the team after a
thorough review of the information available in Washington and
in the field. Individual members of the team were not bound by
the positions of their respective agencies, and there was no
requirement for the members of the group to reach agreed conclu-
sions among themselves.
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5. It should be noted that the conclusions of the team as
expressed in the attached paper represent a change from those
expressed in the earlier reference memorandum. In particular,
the involvement of elements of the Cambodian Army in something
more than "small-scale" smuggling of arms to the Communists is
accepted and it is suggested that Sihanouk himself is probably
aware of this arms traffic. But certain essential differences
remain between the position of this paper and that of J-2 MACV.
These involve the quantities of arms moving through Sihanoukville
to Vietnam, the relationship between arms deliveries to Sihanoukville
and Cambodian military requirements, and the extent to which
Communist Forces have been denied access to other routes of supply,
notably the overland route through Laos.
DISTRIBUTION:
Mr. Thomas Hughes (INR)
Maj. General Joseph McChristian (Army)
Rear Admiral Frederick Harlfinger, II (Navy)
Maj. General Jack E. Thomas (Air Force)
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31 December 1968
D"'MMORANDUM
"UBJECT; Cambodian Involvement in the Supply of Arms and
Ammunition to Communist Forces in South Vietnam
CONCLUSIONS
A. There is no significant body of intelligence data
available in the field that has not been disseminated to
Washington. To the extent that there are differences of view
as to the sources of arms and ammunition supplied to Communist
forces in II, III, and IV Corps, they arise in the process of
evaluation and analysis of commonly shared information.
B. There has been no question that Communist forces
make extensive use of Cambodian territory along the Vietnamese
border for the storage of arms and ammunition and other supplies, and
for sanctuary. The Communists move at will across and along much
of the Vietnamese-Cambodian border from the tri-border area
in the north southward to the Gulf of Siam. There is also
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no question that the Cambodian Army has been involved in the
shipment of Cambodian rice and other non-lethal supplies to Vietnamese
Communist forces along the border.
C. There is now little remaining doubt that elements of the
Cambodian Army are engaged, on an organized basis, in the shipment
to arms to the Communists in South Vietnam. The available evidence
does not, however, permit confident estimates on the quantities
involved in these arms shipments to the Communists.
D. The elements involved in this complicity include high-
ranking Cambodian Army officers
Their
activities are probably known to Sihanouk. The available evidence,
however, is inadequate to establish the existence of a high-
level agreement between Sihanouk and the Communists for the
delivery of arms to the Communists.
E. Positive information relating to the movement of arms
southward via the overland route from the tri-border area in
southern Laos to the border regions of III Corps is limited.
We cannot quantify on the basis of evidence currently available
the amount of arms and ammunition that moves south from the
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tri-border area. There is, however, a long established and
extensive trail network, which is being continuously improved,
extending southward along the border to III Corps. Communist
forces are present along the entire network. CIA/DIA analysis
shows that sufficient supplies to support southern II Corps and
III Corps reached the tri-border area from the north in both 1967
and 1968. We believe that all the evidence -- efforts to improve
roads and trails, shipments south to the tri-border area, a few
reports of logistic activity along the trails, and use of the trails
for personnel movements -- is sufficient to indicate continuing
reliance on the overland route for the movement of some
arms and ammunition.
F. In addition to the overland route and Cambodian Army
sources, the Communists appear to obtain some arms by smuggling
over the Cambodian coast east of Kampot and by occasional
penetrations of Market Time patrols in the coastal waters of
South Vietnam.
G. In sum, we believe that Communist forces in III and
IV Corps depend on a variety of routes for their arms supply.
None of them are ideal. The overland route is expensive in
terms of construction and maintenance efforts and losses of men
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and supplies due to bombing; the route through Sihanoukville is
controlled by the Cambodian authorities and thus subject to dis-
ruption; smuggling over the Cambodian beaches may depend on
bribing local Cambodian officials; penetrating Market Time is
not possible on a large scale.
H. The evidence available does not offer positive proof
that any one of these routes now carries the bulk of the required
arms and ammunition to IV, III, and southern II corps. All things
considered, however, we believe that the overland route is the
basic channel for the movement of arms and ammunition to Communist
forces, not only in I and II Corps, but also in III Corps.* The
Communists will almost certainly continue to make every effort
to maintain and increase its capacity.
Team member believes that the evidence available
does not justify the judgment that the overland route is now the
"basic" channel for the movement of arms and ammunition
to Communist forces in III corps.
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DISCUSSION
A. Cambodian involvement in the Supply of Arms and Ammunition
to Communist Forces in South Vietnam
1. Good evidence of Cambodian Army (PARK) complicity in the
shipment of food, other non-lethal supplies, and some arms to
the Communists in South Vietnam has long been available. Within
the past few months reports, particularly from CIA sources, have
built up a fairly clear and consistent picture of an organization
(involving identified FARK officers, Chinese businessmen and the
which controls
these activities. Recent reporting has clearly established
that arms and ammunition are included in the goods shipped to
South Vietnam, with the FARK depot at Kompong Speu apparently
being the major trans-shipment point. These reports do not
provide any firm basis, however) for estimating the quantities
involved, or, in many cases for differentiating between shipments
of arms and other types of supplies.
2. It seems probable that Sihanouk is aware of PARK's
activities; but it is not clear that shipments of arms and
ammunition to the Communists have Sihanouk's positive blessing,
represent official policy, or rest on an understanding between
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Sihanouk and Peking or Hanoi. Until more conclusive evidence
of an agreement is obtained we must reserve judgment on Sihanouk's
role.
3. In theory, it should be possible to estimate the tonnages
of arms and ammunition reaching the Communists through Sihanoukville
by establishing the amounts off-loaded at the port and sub-
tracting Cambodian military requirements. The residual would be
the portion ear-marked for the Communists and this figure could be
cross-checked with intelligence reports on truck movements of arms
and ammunition to the borders of South Vietnam.
4. J-2 MACV is convinced that it has sufficient intelligence,
to perform these
culatsons and to reach firm conclusions. MACV's most recent
compilation shows that the "probable" tonnage of "munitions"
delivered to Sihanoukville during the 12 month period ending
30 September 1968 totaled 10,668 tons. For the same period,
J-2 MACV shows 10,035 tons of "suspected" ordnance delivered by
track from Cambodia to the border areas in II, III, and IV
Corps.
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5. These figures would provide an average of 28 tons per
day for Communist forces in the areas concerned, an amount more
than double the estimated external requirements for arms and
ammunition. It is conceivable that Communist military planning
and the logistic system, which depends on stockpiles cached in
advance of military operations, produces requirements considerably
in excess of actual expenditures.
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7. Studies done in CIA suggest a minimum figure 9f 16-1700
tons of arms and ammunition for the same 21 month period for
which MACV previously cited imports of over 13,000 tons. The
CIA figure is almost certainly low; with "possible" tonnages
added, it might reach 7-8,000 tons. F
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10. MACV does not believe that sufficient supplies have
been moving overland from the north into southern Laos to meet
the requirements of Communist forces in IV, III or southern II
Corps. In addition, they tend to take the lack of positive
evidence of supply movements iiouthward from the tri-border area
as proof of the absence of any such movement on any scale.
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11. We differ substantially with MACV's estimate of the
tonnages moved into southern Laos over the past year even though
the basic intelligence inputs -- road watch and pilot sightings
of trucks -- appears to be basically the same. Our computations
result in tonnages moved to southern Laos over the past year
which are more than adequate to support Communist requirements
In III and southern II Corps for arms and ammunition.
13. There is, however, a long established trail network
extending southward along the border to III Corps. We have
evidence of continuing efforts to improve these trails and road
segments on both sides of the border.
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fact that supplies are known to move inside South Vietnam through
areas strongly invested by US/ARVN forces without detection, the
lack of more indications of supply movements along the Communist
controlled border area hardly seems conclusive.
14. The evidence available does not offer positive proof
that the overland route is the primary source of supply. But
a
we are quite certain that/functioning logistic system exists
south of the tri-border area and that it has the capacity, in
terms of manpower and trails, to move the tonnages necessary to
meet Communist requirements in III and southern II Corps.
C. Other Sources of Arms and Ammunition
15. In March 1963 the Cambodian Navy intercepted a junk
carrying members of the Viet Cong and loaded with arms and
ammunition. It seems almost certain that the ship intended to
off-load somewhere on the Cambodian coast east of Kep and that
Sts earvo would then have moved across the border into IV Corps.
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16. We also believe that some arms continue to enter South
Vietnam directly on small junks which evade Market Time patrols.
This conclusion runs counter to some claims for the near total
effectiveness of Market Time, but there are enough report
on instances of sea-borne
infiltration to convince us that it still goes on at some level.
D. Actions and Recommendations
17. As a result of the increased interest in the Cambodian
problem, the intelligence effort, on both the collection and
analytical sides, has been intensified. For example, MACV
has restructured and intensified its collection efforts against
Cambodia under a newly instituted program called BALCKBEARD (U).
This program will utilize all available resources including
photography, Special Forces assets, and third country nationals.
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19. Continuing attention to the subject of Cambodian
complicity and to the question of the volume of supplies moving
over particular routes is clearly indicated and necessary. We
urge that all USIB Agencies provide sufficient priority to the
problem to permit continuous attention to both the collection
and the analytical effort.
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