SPECULATION ON HANOI'S MOTIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400020027-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: April 8, 1968
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
8 April 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Speculation on Hanoi's Motives
46
1. Consistent with its past reactions, Hanoi might have been
expected to reject President Johnson's initiative or any other
move short of an "unconditional" cessation of bombing. Or it
could have stalled for a time, while testing various interna-
tional currents, and perhaps sounding out its Allies in Moscow and
Peking. Instead, Hanoi moved quickly and invented a new stage
called "contacts" with the US.
2. Assuming that such contacts are actually intended, several
different interpretations are possible for a move of this signifi-
cance. These rest on alternative appraisals of the total situation
which Hanoi may be making. The basic factors which would enter
into such appraisals would be the course and prospects of military
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action, the viability of the GVN/ARVN under continued pressure,
and the effects of election year political currents on the US
will to continue the struggle.
3. In theory, Hanoi's appraisal of the situation could
range from high confidence through uncertainty to near desperation.
In the following paragraphs we consider each of these cases in
turn.
CASE I. Hanoi's Appraisal is Highly Optimistic
I+. This hypothesis rests on a judgment by Hanoi that the
military-political results obtained since Tet and those in pros-
pect in the near future are turning the balance of the struggle in
its favor. Hanoi has always said that at such a stage it would be
correct to begin talking while still fighting. The fight-talk
tactic has been portrayed as a forward move to exploit major mili-
tary and political successes and leading to the final resolution
of the conflict on Communist terms. What could not be known by Hanoi
was when the most propitious moment would arise to employ this
tactical line; there is considerable evidence suggesting that it
believed 1968 would be the "decisive" year, and. that it expected
the Tet offensive to contribute greatly to this result.
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5. The North Vietnamese could read the President's statement
as confirming that a decisive stage had, indeed, arrived. They
could interpret his decision not to stand for re-election as an
admission of failure for his policy in Vietnam, just as they
claimed that General Westmoreland's departure indicated a "compre-
hensive defeat" for his military strategy. They could believe the
failure to send large reinforcements to South Vietnam vindicated
their predictions that US international commitments plus domestic
pressures would eventually limit the US buildup. And they could
view the bombing restriction as a concession forced by increasing
domestic pressures for peace in Vietnam.
6. The experience of the North Vietnamese leaders in 1953-54
would strongly incline them to such interpretations of American
political developments. Even if the Tet offensive fell well short
of its hopes, Hanoi would still regard its position as quite strong
and Saig,9n's position as significantly weakened. They would ex-
pect negotiations to accelerate the decline of the GVN and exacer-
bate US-GVN tensions. And they would believe that continued and
perhaps intensified military pressures would strengthen Hanoi's
bargaining position vis-a-vis the United States. Thus, the con-
fluence of events in South Vietnam and the United States could be
regarded as having created optimum conditions for beginning the
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"fight-talk" phase. Hanoi was able, with little time lost in delib-
eration, to move in the direction already anticipated by its basic
strategy.
CASE II -- Hanoi's Appraisal is Uncertain
7. An alternative explanation would be that Hanoi is not
entirely confident of its overall position and foresees a long and
increasingly costly struggle. While able to endure this, it would
prefer not to do so and the President's initiative offered an op-
portunity -- though not an ideal one -- to give greater emphasis
to the political aspects of the struggle. Even if Hanoi believed
the US position was weakened and Saigon shaky, it would also recog-
nize the risk of escalation if the President's move had been to-
tally rejected. Hanoi might calculate that by removing himself
as a candidate the President was in a better position to adopt
new military measures against North Vietnam if necessary. Added
to these risks, Hanoi might have seen a certain loss in failing
to respond when international reaction to the US move was gener-
ally favorable.
8. Under this hypothesis, Hanoi would still have some e,%pec-
tation of being able to combine the talks with fighting in such a
way as to force a favorable settlement. They would recognize that
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both sides would be under certain pressures not to allow a com-
plete breakdown in the discussions. They would also recognize
that some further concessions would probably have to be made to
gain a complete cessation of the bombing; and though their forces
would still be capable of further military successes, these would
not likely be decisive in bringing about the collapse of the
GVN/ ARVN.
9. Nevertheless, Hanoi would still see advantages to opening
discussions with the US. The bombing restrictions would be pro-
longed, at least for a while. Saigon would be more and more ap-
prehensive about a secret deal at its expense. In this atmosphere
even local military success might have a strong psychological im-
pact on the Allied side. The pressures for continuing the talks
would probably be greater on the US than Hanoi. And if, in the
end, the talks failed, Hanoi. would at least be no worse off.
CASE III - Hanoi's Appraisal is Pessimistic
10. A third alternative is that the North Vietnamese view
the overall balance of forces as distinctly unfavorable and are
more or less compelled to settle on whatever terms can be nego-
tiated. The results of the Tet offensive might have forced a
reappraisal of their military capabilities, leading to the
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conclusion that the strains of the war were too great and the
prospects of success too doubtful. Though physically capable of
further fighting, it is conceivable that they have concluded that
another round of attacks would almost surely fail, would be devas-
tating to morale and raw capabilities and might force them to end
the war on highly unfavorable terms or fade away, or call on the
Chinese to help. On the other hand, a failure to deliver the prom-
ised "second wave" would be encouraging to the GVN and the US.
The President's statement provided a way out. As long as Commu-
nist forces remained intact, negotiations might still hold some
prospect of salvaging the Front as a legitimate political instru-
ment and causing an eventual American withdrawal.
CASE IV -- Other Contingencies
11. A final e%Tlanation is that there has been some dramatic
change in Hanoi. For example, the North Vietnamese populace could
be far more restive than we can determine. This of course might
prompt concessions to end. the bombing, if not the war. Or it
could be that there has been a change in the top leadership it-
self. There has always been the chance of a struggle to succeed
Ho Chi Minh. Hanoi's quick move to establish contact with the US
could thus be a move in an internal contest or even the first act
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of a new and more flexible political leadership. While such a
change in command would not in itself have to lead to a change
in basic policy, it could explain a shift in tactics.
Conclusion
12. Among the alternative explanations suggested above,
our current evidence suggests that the truth lies somewhere
between Case I and Case II. This would mean that Hanoi considers
that it can register further military successes at costs it can
afford to bear even if it would prefer not to, that it believes
the will to persist is beginning to crumble on the US/GVN side,
and that hard bargaining combined with continued military
pressure can bring a favorable outcome eventually.
13. If our interpretation is generally correct, then it
is probable that Hanoi had for some time been preparing to make
a diplomatic initiative -- that the President's statement merely
offered an unexpectedly hopeful opportunity to get on with a
policy already substantially determined. This is not to say
that Hanoi's position in meetings will be conciliatory; on the
contrary its representative will probably take a hard line,
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demanding an unconditional halt to all bombing and reconnaissance
over North Vietnam. We do believe, however, that Hanoi probably
wants to talk, and that it will not seek pretexts to back away
from establishing contact with the US.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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Distribution forwarded on 1st run (unnumbered)
of 8 Apr 68 Memo to DCI, "Speculation on Hanoi's
Motives"
8 cys to DCI who
President
W. Rostow
Rusk
Clifford
Wheeler
Nitze
Katzenbach
Also, cys fwd to (1 each):
DDCI
DD/I
D/OCI
SAVA (2 cys)
5cys INR STATE
1 cy each to:
5cys ACSI
THOMAS H. HUGHES
5cys NAVY
LT.
GEN. J.F.
CARROLL
5cys AFNIN
LT.
GEN. M. S.
CARTER
5cys DIA
M.R.
HOWARD C.
BROWN JR.
2cys AEC
MR.
WM. SULLIVAN
icys FBI
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icy SDSG
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