THE SPANISH BASE ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A001400030033-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 7, 2006
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: February 25, 1969
• Content Type: MF

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
25 February 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Spanish Base Issue
1. The Franca regime probably would abide by a five-year
renewal of the US-Spanish defense agreement. This agreement
is especially valued by the powerful Spanish military estab-
lishment for the equipment, training, and international tie
it provides them. Moreover, the very visible link with
Washington still is psychologically important to the regime
as the best available substitute for acceptance by the other
West European powers. These attitudes are changing, for
reasons discussed below. But the change is not likely to pro-
duce a sharp reversal of government policy within five years.
2. Should Franco die or become incapacitated during this
period, the situation would of course become more complicated.
Initially, the factions which comprise the present regime --
the military, the Church hierarchy, business leaders --
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probably would cooperate to ensure an orderly transfer of
power, and the military would continue to be the strongest
single element of the government. Soon after the initial
transition was achieved, however, there would likely emerge
a struggle for power among groups and individuals who now are
united in support of Franco but have a long history of dis-
trust and even hatred of each other and who certainly would
fall out over the pace of change necessary or desirable in
post-Franco Spain.*
3. In the resulting atmosphere of government uncertainty
and weakness, groups which oppose the regime -- dissenting
workers and students, liberal Churchmen, and the illegal po-
litical parties -- would become bolder and more violent in
their attacks on the government. We do not think these at-
tacks would result in an overthrow of the government by more
liberal forces. It is more likely that widespread civil dis-
orders would be the one thing which could at least temporarily
unify the feuding "in" groups in support of a more authori-
tarian regime. It is possible that the leaders of such a
See NIE 27.1-68, dated 10 October 1968, for a fuller dis-
cussion of the groups and issues likely to be involved in
a post-Franco power struggle.
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regime, feeling weaker and less confident than Franco, would
react to criticism of their actions by the US and other demo-
cracies by kicking out the American military. But it is much
more likely that they would cling ever more closely to the
practical military benefits which the US defense link confers.
4. When and if, through evolution or revolution, more
progressive Spaniards should come to power, they are likely
to look to Western Europe for guidance and for material sup-
port. The illegal Socialist, Christian Democratic, and Com-
munist political groups -- and their various worker affiliates
-- already receive some training and support from their
brother organizations in Western Europe. A Spanish government
dominated by liberal groups would probably be bitter about
Washington's military and economic aid to the Franco regime.
But it probably would also want to be part of whatever alli-
ance then existed among the other West European governments
or between them and the US.
5. While the outlook for keeping the bases another five
years seems good, the general condition of US-Spanish rela-
tions probably will deteriorate. Growing economic prosperity
and increased contacts with Western Europe already have
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lessened the Spaniards' sense of isolation and thus of depen-
dence on the US. In this atmosphere, new expression is being
given to anti-American sentiments which go all the way back
to a long standing grudge against the Anglo-Saxon Protestants
who allegedly stole Spain's Empire and blackened her interna-
tional reputation.
6. In order to diversify its foreign associations,
Madrid recently has been more active in trying to improve re-
lations with and expand markets in the Arab world, Latin
America, and even Eastern Europe. Some Spanish officials may
hope that emulating de Gaulle's attitude toward the US would
increase Spain's appeal in these areas. Few would be willing
to carry this line of reasoning to the point of cutting ties
with the US. But the Spaniards will want to be seen as guard-
ing against any possible contribution US bases on Spanish soil
might make to policies not approved by Spain -- e.g., US sup-
port of Israel against the Arabs or Britain's "occupation" of
Gibraltar.
7. A continued US military presence in Spain would make
it almost certain that contending political groups would try
to draw the US into a post-Franco power struggle. A renewed
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base agreement would increase the bitterness of opposition
groups and even some within the regime over Washington's ap-
parent support of the Spanish military. If Washington tried
to inhibit the Spanish military from using US-provided equip-
ment against its domestic opponents, then the US would be
accused by the military of being soft on their "Communist"
challengers. In this way, internal turmoil could pose polit-
ical problems as well as a threat to the effective operation
of US base facilities.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
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