Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 29, 2005
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 28, 1970
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00904A001500020012-3.pdf329.57 KB
Approved Fos.Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R0090CA001500020012-3 SENSITIVE CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTUATES 28 May 1970 MEMO tANDC}M FOR ME DIRECTOR SUWECT: Communist Reactions to the Entry into Cambodia of Troops from Non-Communist Asian States or non-Communist states of East Asia show increasing concern over developftefte in Indochina. The Djakarta meeting is one sign of this concern but not the only one, and the meeting further revealed how uncertain these states are about what to do. One bility is that several of them might decide to take some kind of active (or more active) military role not only in South Vietnam but also in Cambodia. The foiling memorandum assesses (1) the availability of forces for some such role`, (2) how a develo!ment of this kind g'o'ld be viewed by the Communist states -- North Vietnam, China,. North Korea and the USSR; and (3) what the Communist response might be. GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic dow adin and declassification S-E--C-R-E-T SENSITIVE Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01500020012-3 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01500020012-3 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01500020012-3 Approved ForwRelease 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904"AO01500020012-3 ver the extent o m south free, Indonesia C nnist ii y ers as ro) -- to substitute Asis their invo.v for rican ground forces ese .ce ,ould be e prospect of oue east Asia. against Communist azplratiors of South Korean forces alone, however, obably t ady heav d be seen as hadn such broad st iificancc. ted. in Swth Vjetngm and their a y Fist but eaeentiaa exten:ai.. of the Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01500020012-3 Approved For Release 2005/07/13: CIA-RDP79ROO904A 3@1500020012-3 S-E-C-R- .T of Chinese Nationalist troops would be viewed with extreme seriousness and seen as confirmation of United States Ilingness to move more boldly in Indochina, accepting the risk of a sharp reaction by Peking. The entry of hitherto neutral Indonesia into Cambodia would also suggest to Hanoi.. and Peking that major changes) detrimental to de, were occurring in the shape of the struggle in Indochina. Communist response to the political and psychological implications of development would be intense They{ would try by every credit the Asian character of the moves into Cambodia and to label the countries involved as puppets and dupes of the United States. Possibly Communist Reactions 6. Token third-country forces which served primarily to provide garrison security to Phnom key lines of communication from Sihanouk-Ville or the Thai border would not, in Hanoi' s greatly complicate the Communist position in Cambodia, which depends mainly on the territory east of the Mekong. But effective combat forces operating in the, eastern Cambodian countryside against Communist troop concentrations, base areas, and supply routes would be an entirely different matter. Hanoi would not, at least in the first instance, look to Peking for direct assistance, but would attempt to cope with its problems, as before, by reinforcing VC/NVA units in Cambodia, strengthening defensive positions in key strategic areas, and, perhaps, by diversionary attacks in South Vietnam. ,B-C-R-B-T EXT Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01500020012-3 Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904*001500020012-3 S-R-C-R-N-T both South Korean forces were introduced, Hanoi would call upon the orth Korea to re-open their 1967-1968 campaign of armed harass ent of South Korea in hope of deterring further ROK troop movements into uld probably oblige, by some measures calculated to heighten tensions in the Korean peninsula, though it would want to avoid provoki counteraction. 8. As for Indonesia, the Communists probably would not anticipate that the entry of its forces would significantly affect the military situ- any case, Indonesia is beyond the reach of their playsical retribution. The Conunistt powers would, however, use such assets as exist in Indonesia and the still potent leftwing in that country #o fan anti-war and anti-regime sentiment. 9. nose Nationalist troops were to be sent to Cambodia, Hanoi in cooperation with Peking would invoke the threat of some kind of Chinese r" response. Hanoi would probably not, however, press for any large of Chinese into Indochina lest this threaten Hanoi e s own predominance in the area and produce the escalation of Allied effort Hanoi would hope to avoid. 10. In Peking, a Nationalist deployment into Cambodia would raise concern regarding the possibility of a subsequent move by Taipei into 8IIT Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01500020012-3 Approved For ReFease 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AP01500020012-3 neighboring Laos and thus close to Chintz's Own border. More broadly, Poking would consider it a most provocative move simply because of Tai; aoet ty tow to respond with more than propaganda, but in such a way as to minimize the of direct confrontation with the United States. Peking's actions might Taiwan; GRC air and sea units in the Taiwan strait area; and shelling of the Offshore islands. In addition, the Chinese Ca;miunists would nforce their forces along the Laos border and might add to their forces . The primary Soviet concern in tle event of a Chinat deployment into Cambodia would be that the situation was evolving into one in which Moscow could exercise little or no influence. The Soviets would also perceive the likelihood of further losses in their competition -with Peking luence in Hanoi, particularly in view of their continuing diplomatic presence in Phnor. Penh. They would view the enhanced possibility of a Sine- United: States ccnfront&tion with mixed feelings. Wile delighted at the vanishing chances of a S no-United!. States rapprochement, the USSR would be .pprehensive concerning the general repercussions of any direct hostilities between China and the United: States. S -C-R_E-T S ITIV troop and aircraft deployments to coastal areas opposite Approved For Release 2005/07/13 : CIA-RDP79R00904AO01500020012-3