ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM (FISCAL YEAR ENDING 30 JUNE 1959)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00961A000400090005-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2001
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: August 26, 1959
• Content Type: REPORT

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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1959)
Submitted by
United States Intelligence Board
August 1959
NSC Declassification/Release Instructions on File
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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1959)
I. Organization, Integration and Coordination
From the standpoint of the intelligence community the most
significant organizational development during the past year was the
creation of the new United States Intelligence Board. This Board,
established by National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1,
of 15 September 1958, integrates under a single body the responsi-
bilities previously assigned to the former Intelligence Advisory
Committee (TAG) and United States Communications Intelligence Board
(USCIB). Initially the new Board retained substantially the IAC sub-
committee structure, established COMINT and ELINT Committees
to support the Board in these important areas, * and created an
Intelligence Board Secretariat to assist the Board in carrying out its
responsibilities. Subsequently, the Board undertook and substantially
completed a systematic consolidation and revision of the Director of
* The activities in these fields are discussed in a Special Annex to
this report.
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Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs), and made some further
adjustments in the Board's subcommittee structure.
During the fiscal year the Board created a Committee on Space
Surveillance Intelligence Support and a Satellite Requirements Com-
mittee to coordinate community efforts relating to intelligence on outer
space activities, a Cost Estimates Committee charged with providing
annually a fully coordinated cost data report covering the intelligence
community as a whole, and a Security Committee. Ad hoc. groups were
set up to study special problems
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and to report weekly on the Berlin situation on a
community-wide basis. A comprehensive review of emergency planning
within the intelligence community was initiated. The Board also es-
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services of common concern. We expanded the scope of our.. program
for procuring and exploiting- foreign publications. Intensive and long-
range efforts were underway in many parts of the community to
employ modern electronic equipment in intelligence information
processing. We also moved to improve coordination in the collection
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particularly in those areas
deemed most deficient. Other specific measures were taken to
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improve coordination and integration, with special emphasis on high
priority intelligence targets. Within several USIB departments, notably
State and Defense, basic reorganizations were made in order to meet
departmental and community needs more effectively. For example, all
intelligence research and analysis on Communist areas and international
aspects of the Communist movement are now concentrated in a single
office within the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department
of State, thus permitting an integrated approach to world Communism
within that Bureau.
Intelligence liaison and exchanges with friendly governments
continued on both the overt and covert level; we developed further our
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A number of conferences, including
one for the highly important field of guided missiles, were held with
to discuss problems of mutual interest.
As a result of NSCID No. 1 and implementing actions such as'
those above, the Director of Central Intelligence and USIB have made
material advances in the consolidation of policy-making and establish-
ment of effective managerial control over the national U. S. intelligence
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effort. A principal effect of these developments is to provide increased
assurance that the total resources of the U. S. intelligence community
are available to those responsible for producing and coordinating our
intelligence at the national level (e. g., National Intelligence Estimates,
National Intelligence Surveys, Central Intelligence Bulletin).
II. Early Warning Capabilities
In spite of certain improvements, the problem of providing
strategic early warning of a Sino-Soviet attack on the U. S. and U. S.
forces has become increasingly difficult with Soviet advances in complex
weapons systems, particularly in the field of guided missiles. To the
extent that guided missiles may be in place in operational sites within
the Sino-Soviet Bloc--and particularly if maximum surprise were
desired--only a high-level decision and brief preparation at the missile
sites would be absolutely necessary to launch an attack.
Meeting
all these requirements in time to provide specific early warning would
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be unlikely or at best extremely difficult. If, however, conventional
forces were used--alone or in conjunction with missiles--to launch a
strategic attack, there would be a considerably better chance for detection.
In situations initially involving more localized conflicts, intelligence is
also in a better position to obtain evidence of the buildup of conventional
forces in the area if this occurs. Such detection is especially likely if
attention is focused by a general atmosphere of crisis. However, there
remains the difficult analytical problem of distinguishing between the
increase in Bloc capabilities for the purpose of bluff, probe or general
readiness on the one hand, and the intention (or decision) to launch an
attack with these increased capabilities on the other.
During the year a revision of the general list of indications of
hostile intentions was undertaken, and the survey of the means and like-
lihood of acquiring these types of information was continued.
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25X1 C Improved procedures were developed for the purpose of
alerting the highest authorities, and further steps were taken to imple-
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Research and development proceeded on several projects which bear
on the early warning problem.
III. Intelligence Capabilities by Area
A. The Sino-Soviet Bloc
1. USSR
With respect to political intelligence, increased contacts at
both unofficial and official levels, particularly with Mr. Khrushchev
himself, combined with a more liberal Soviet policy on the release of
information have provided a broader background on which to base in-
ferences regarding Soviet society, its leaders and their general outlook.
However, we still lack the types of hard information to permit reasonably
confident anticipation of short-range specific prospects in the policy
field, the rise and fall of key Soviet officials, or the tactical shifts in
Soviet foreign policy focus among the various non-Bloc target areas.
In addition, there is a dearth of direct evidence on the precise nature
of the relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China.
We are able to assess with considerable confidence the broad
strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet economy. Economic intelligence
on the USSR improved during the year as our continuing analysis of
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uncertainties. In addition, economic intelligence collection was
strengthened by new and comprehensive programs of community-
shifting Soviet economic policy reduced or eliminated many former
coordinated guidance and by major improvements in
tion remain, particularly on the size, composition, and cost of
Soviet military programs.
Rigorous security measures continue in effect in the USSR,
yet our requirements call for increasingly detailed analysis of the
complex new Soviet weapons systems. We are able to assess with
confidence the broad military capabilities of the Soviet Union, but we
are unable to measure with the degree of precision which would be
desirable, the military force levels, and the deployment and detailed
characteristics of many weapons systems including those of guided
missiles. Nevertheless, we have made some advances in the past
However, important gaps in our informa-
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Despite intensified
collection efforts, certain gaps still exist in a number of critical areas
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During the year intelligence coverage of the Soviet nuclear
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test program continued to be of high quality,
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Although our understanding of the Soviet missile and space
program has increased somewhat during the past year, critical gaps
still exist in most areas despite extensive and costly collection and
analysis efforts.
During the past year our knowledge continued to improve
with respect to most areas of Soviet science but particularly in the
fields of fundamental sciences, organization and control of science,
education in the sciences, conventional weapons systems, electronics,
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and communications. Primarily through open sources,
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acquired a satisfactory understanding of the general level of
development of Soviet science and technology and have reduced
somewhat the possibility of a surprise scientific breakthrough.
However, critical gaps in scientific intelligence continue to exist.
2. Communist China
Intelligence on Communist China remains highly inadequate.
Our limited sources (primarily coverage of the regime's press and
radio) provide some general understanding of the principal events.
However, in spite of certain marginal improvements, our sources
do not provide a firm basis for predicting important shifts in
dorra.gstic or foreign policy. Although military information on Communist
China is adequate for over-all assessments, serious gaps exist in
almost all areas when attempts are made to go beyond broad generali-
zation. In particular, we generally lack the capability to collect infor-
mation on Chinese Communist efforts to develop or acquire advanced
we have now
weapons.:
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Economic coverage has
been greatly complicated by the regime's release of highly suspect pro-
duction statistics, which accompanied its adoption of the Commune and
"Leap Forward" programs.
3. Other Bloc Areas
There is considerable variation in the quality and quantity of intel-
ligence on other Bloc areas. Coverage of Albania, Mongolia, North Viet-
nam and North Korea is particularly weak. In most Bloc countries our
capacity to obtain more comprehensive and useful intelligence continues to
be limited, either because of lack of diplomatic relations or restrictions in
our movements and contacts with Bloc officials and peoples. These difficulties
are less pronounced in Poland and East Germany
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sources, including a heavy reliance on the local press and radio,
provide a background for understanding the general developments within
these countries. These sources, however, do not furnish a reliable basis
for anticipating uprisings or redirection of policy. In addition, our capa-
bility to acquire intelligence on the North Korean and Viet ::Minh ground
forces remains- highly inadequate.
In all Bloc countries available
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Communist movements (e. g., the Pathet Lao).
Despite a general improvement during the year, intelligence
on Africa is rather sketchy. The problem at present is complicated
by the fluidity arising from the pace of African nationalism, the
lack of published data in many areas, our often understaffed and
thinly spread consular and attache posts in Africa, and various cultural
factors which hinder collection programs. Moreover, our intelligence
requirements almost certainly will grow in the light of emerging longer-
term problems and mounting East-West competition for influence in
the area. In particular, a larger staff of trained experts on Africa
must be developed.
Intelligence on Latin .America continued to improve during
the past year, but deficiencies were still apparent in some areas. In
particular, the increase in extremist agitation and exile activities
in the Caribbean area in the wake of the Cuban revolution and the
rise of ultra-nationalism"and anti-U. S. sentiment in South America
have expanded our intelligence needs and changed our focus somewhat.
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We expect our over-all intelligence on both Bloc and non- 25X1 B
Bloc areas to benefit from the increased experience of our analysts,
more efficient processing and utilization of available information, and
new collection techniques.
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With respect to, the Bloc, we cannot predict with confidence
a significant reduction in many of our more important intelligence
deficiencies at an early date. The highly effective Bloc security
apparatus continues to hamper our collection in most areas1
and Soviet advances into complex weapons systems require correspond-
ing improvements in our collection capabilities and more sophisticated
analytical techniques. An adequate early warning system requires, in
addition, the augmentation and modernization of our critical communica-
tions facilities. We have some prospects for improving our understand-
ing of Soviet military--capabilities and intentions through possible
developments such as freer East-West exchanges, broadened service
attache programs, various scientific collection devices (including re-
connaissance satellites or space vehicles specially adapted to intelligence
needs), or even some type of international arms inspection agreement.
Nevertheless, we shall continue to have difficulty in keeping pace with
the growing complexity of the military intelligence problem.
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