ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00961A000400090007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 18, 1959
• Content Type: MF

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: Annual Report to the National Security Council on the
Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
REFERENCE: USIB-D-3.2/1, 16 July 1959
1. Attached for Board review is a draft report in response to
a memorandum from the Executive Secretary of the National Security
Council, dated 6 July 1959. This memorandum requested that the
Central Intelligence Agency, in consultation with other departments
and agencies, submit not later than 1 September 1959 a report on the
status of the foreign intelligence program as of June 30, 1959.
Particular reference was made to NSC 5801 / 1, the relevant paragraph
of which deals with establishing and maintaining an intelligence system
capable of providing early warning, assessing the capabilities of foreign
governments and anticipating important developments abroad.
2. This draft report has been prepared in the Intelligence Board
Secretariat on the basis of contributions from the member agencies
and the various subcommittees. It was reviewed and coordinated at
a meeting to which all interested agencies and subcommittees were
invited to send representatives.
4. In order to meet the deadline set forth by the NSC, this
report will appear on the Board agenda
for the meeting of August.
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Executive Secretary
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ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(Fiscal Year Ending 30 June '1959)
1. Organization, Integration and Coordination
From the standpoint of the intelligence community the most significant
organizational development during the past year was the creation of the new
United States Intelligence Board. This Board, established by National
Security Council Directive No. 1, of 15 September 1958, integrates under a
single body the responsibilities previously assigned to the former Intelligence
Advisory Committee (IAC) and United States Communication Intelligence
Board (USCIB). Initially the new Board retained substantially the IAC sub-
committee structure, established COMINT and ELINT Committees to
support the Board in these important areas,' and created an Intelligence
Board Secretariat to assist the Board in carrying out..its responsibilities.
Subsequently, the Board undertook and substantially completed a systematic
consolidation and revision of the Director of Central Intelligence Directives
(DCIDs), and made . some further readjustments in the Board's subcommittee
structure.
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a Cost Estimates Committee charged with providing annually a fully
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coordinated cost data report covering the intelligence community as a whole,
and a Security Committee. Ad hoc groups were set up to study special
problems
and to
report weekly on the Berlin situation on a community-wide basis. A compre-
hensive review of emergency planning within the intelligence community was
initiated. The Board also established
o provide services of common concern.
processing. We also moved to improve coordination ix1
particularly in those areas deemed most
deficient. Other specific measures were taken to improve coordination and
integration, with special emphasis on high priority intelligence targets.
Within several USIB departments, notably State and Defense, basic reor-
ganizations were made in order to meet departmental and.community needs
more effectively. For example, all intelligence research and analysis on
Communist areas and international aspects of the Communist movement are
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now concentrated in a single office within the Department of State, thus per-
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mitting an integrated approach to world Communism within that department.
As a result of NSCID No. 1 and implementing actions such as those above,
the Director of Central Intelligence and USIB have made material advances in
the consolidation of policy-making and establishment of effective managerial
control over the national U.S. intelligence effort. A principal effect of these
developments is to provide increased assurance that the total resources of the
U. S. intelligence.community are available to those responsible for producing
and coordinating our intelligence at the national level (e. g., National Intel-
ligence Estimates, National Intelligence Surveys, Central Intelligence Bulletin).
II. Early Warning Capabilities
In spite of certain improvements, the problem of providing strategic
early earning of a Sino-Soviet attack on the U. S. and U. S. forces has
become increasingly difficult with Soviet advances in complex weapons
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systems, particularly in the field of guided missiles. To the extent that
guided missiles are now in place in operational sites within the Sino-Soviet
Bloc--and particularly if maximum surprise were desired--only a high-
level decision and brief preparation at the missile sites would be absolutely
necessary to launch an attack.
Meeting all these requirements in time to provide specific early
warning would be unlikely or at best extremely difficult. If, however, con-
ventional forces were used to launch a strategic attack, there would be a
considerably better chance for detection. In situations initially involving
more localized conflicts, intelligence is also in a better position to obtain
evidence of the buildup of conventional forces in the area if this occurs.
Such detection is especially likely if attention is focused by a general at-
mosphere of crisis. However, there remains the difficult analytical
problem of distinguishing between the increase in Bloc capabilities for the
purpose of bluff, probe or general readiness on the one hand, and the
intention (or decision) to launch aniattack with these increased capabili-
ties on the other,
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During the year a revision of the general list of indications of hostile
intentions was undertaken, and the survey of the means and likelihood of
acquiring these types of information was continued. Improved procedures
in the CRITIC system resulted in faster transmission of urgent indications,
III. Intelligence Capabilities by Area
A. The Sino-Soviet Bloc
1. USSR
With respect to political intelligence, increased contacts at both
unofficial and- official levels, particularly with Mr. Khrushchev himself,
combined with a more liberal Soviet policy on the release of information
have provided a broader background on which to base inferences regarding
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Soviet society, its leaders and their general outlook. However, we still
lack the types of hard information to permit reasonably confident anticipation
of short-range specific prospects in the policy field, the rise and fall of
key Soviet officials, or the tactical shifts in Soviet foreign policy focus
among the various non-Bloc target areas. In addition, there is a dearth of
direct evidence on the precise nature of the relationship between the Soviet
Union and Communist China.
We are able to assess with considerable confidence the broad strengths
and weaknesses of the Soviet economy. Economic intelligence on the USSR
improved during the year as our continuing analysis of shifting Soviet economic
policy reduced or eliminated many former uncertainties. In addition,
economic intelligence collection was strengthened by new and comprehensive
programs of community-coordinated guidance
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mation remain, particularly on the size, composition, and cost of Soviet
military programs.
Rigorous security measures continue in effect in the USSR, yet our
requirements call for increasingly detailed analysis of the complex new
Soviet weapons systems. We are able to assess with confidence the
broad military capabilities of the Soviet Union, but we are unable to
However, important gaps in our infor-
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measure with the degree of precision which would be desirable, the military
force levels, the deployment and detailed characteristics of many weapons
systems including those of guided missiles. Nevertheless, we have made
some advances in the past year
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have reduced somewhat the possibility of a surprise scientific breakthrough.
However, critical gaps in scientific intelligence continue to exist: for
example, we are still, in general, at least a year behind in our knowledge
of current Soviet Bloc. military research and development.
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