GREECE, EUROPE, AND THE US

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000200010002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 23, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Greece, Europe, and the US
Secret
23 April 1970
C~vqy
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
23 apri'L 1970
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT.- Greece, Europe, and the USA
An authoritarian, anti=Communist military regime is
likely to rule Greece for the next several years, though
there are some fairly remote contingencies which could
bring about its downfall, Athens' relations with some NATO
countries, notably Holland, Denmark, and Norway, wi:1.1.
remain strained and the US will incur some onus in h~ ,.se and
other West European countries for any support it gives the
Greek regime. But the alliance itself is not lik:eLy.to be
ruptured because of the Greek issue a The Greek regirrre will
continue to value good relations with the US and vi' _L!
to it for military supplies, but will be willing to turn
.for the latter to France and West Germany. Relation: , w . t~ a
the USSR will probably remain correct but distant.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of
the Office of Current Intelligence, Office of Economic
Research, and the Clandestine Services, who are in.
general agreement with its judgment.-
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.1.. In the 140 years since Greece was freed from impee'rial.
Ottoman rule, it has never achieved a stable democratic
governmental system. Rather, it has seen considerable domestic
disruption, and periodically, a polarization of left and
right wing forces with the growth of hatreds and political
extremism on both sides and with moderate and centrist groups
put on the defensive.
2. The military coup of April. 21, 1.967 came at a time.
when the Greek political system was in serious disarray.
Intrigues and disputes between the King and party leaders
had embittered the political atmosphere, weakened the already
dwindling prestige of the monarchy, and brought disc:reedit to
parliamentary rule. Most governments were short-lived, i'nm
decisive, and corrupt; much of the press was venal. and
irresponsible.
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The New Regime
3. A coup did indeed occur,
I is leaders, a
group of colonels who had drawn up the coup plans as directed
by their superiors, are now the rulers of Greece. They share
many of the views of the King and the old ruling establish-
ment; in particular, they are militantly anti-Communist and
highly conservative in many respects. But they differ sig-
nificantly in a number of ways. Unlike their predecessors,
the colonels are almost all from the rural, :lower middle
class. They are relatively unimaginative, sternly moralistic,
strongly committed to traditional Greek religious and ethical
norms; they resent the political favoritism, the corruption,
the weakness, and the toleration of Leftists which charac-
terized the regime they overthrew. Their rule can be described
as a kind of authoritarian, populism; ice., a reluctance to
share political power, combined with advocacy of old-fashioned
morality and patriotism, and measures -- such as the cancella-
tion of all farmers' debts and the provision of free -textbooks
to school children ?- which benefit the group from which the
colonels came.
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4. The principal figure in the present government is
Prime Minister Papadopoulos, a leading conspirator from the
start.
Papadopoulos appeared to be but one of a triumvirate of
leaders of the Revolutionary Council, sharing supreme power
with Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Pattakos
and Coordination Minister. Makarezos. The latter two remain
important figures, as is the new Commander in. Chief of the
armed forces, General Angelis.
5. But Papdopoulos has steadily exploited his position
as coup leader, as Prime Minister, and as chief of the civil
government to increase his influence and aa-thority. He is
far from an absolute ruler, however, and is unable to force
his military colleagues to accept policies which they strongly
oppose, such as any extensive liberalization of the regime or
early restoration of democratic institutions. Most of the
younger officers oppose such a step strongly -- both because
they fear retribution for their military takeover and because
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they really believe that, they have a mission to bring revolu-
tionary reform to their country.
6. The regime has not ruled without challenges; the
most serious of these was an unsuccessful attempt at a counter-
coup in December 1.967 by King Constantine and r group of
senior army officers. Its failure led to the Kings exile
and to a major purge of the military. The new regime has
received little support from the politicians of former govern-
ments, but nearly all those who have attempted to cooperate
with it have been rebuffed. The present government appears
to have its chief backing in the countryside rather than in
the major cities. It is widely hated in intellectual and
most politically conscious circles. Indeed, hostility to the
regime represents about the only common ground of most of
the old line Greek politicians. They do unite on that issue
though there is little they can do about it,
7e Rigorous repression and the police have effectively
stifled public dissent. The government has jailed the
country's leading leftists and has to a considerable degree
muzzled the press. It issues a considerable, number of state-
ments declaring that its objectives are revolutionary, but in
practice it has not done much to change the e.xi:ting social
order. Some reforms in the church and the educational s.vs?t;em
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have been pushed through, but for the most part the large
gap between the regime's rhetoric and its political accom-
plishments remains.
8. It has adopted certain definite economic policies,
which have thus :far had positive effects on the internal
scene. It has strictly enforced tax laws formerly ignored
by many Greeks, and has greatly increased public revenues
for expenditure on a variety of investment and public welfare
projects. Under the direction of Coordination Minister
Makarezos, the government has sought to promote private,
enterprise and private investment; its relations with
private enterpreurs have become excellent. The 1967 coup
occurred in the midst of a mild recession, which has now
ended thanks to new government fiscal policies, a good
harvest in 1969, and a sharp upsurge in the tourism; thus
in 1969 there was a growth of some eight percent in GNP*
with no major pressure on prices. In addition, after laborious
negotiations Makarezos finally reached agreement with the
Onassis and Niarchos interests which have., undertaken to invest
800 million in a number of new projects in Greece over
A figure claimed by the Greek Government and accepted
by the US Embassy and the World Bank. Hostile critics,
such as the Economist Quarterly, put the figure at
4-5 percent.
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9. But the regime's economic performance has come under
heavy fire from its critics, who question. the long range
effects of present policies. Under -tnz. present government,
the balance of payments situation has became even worse than
it was in pre-coup days. Export earnings, though growing,
are relatively small, especially when. compared to expenditures
for imports which are also growing; in absolute terms, the
gap is increasing. Much of the trade gap is closed by recei,ts
from shipping, tourism, and remittances from Greek workers in
Western Europe. Ever, so, a sizable ira'iance of pa,;y^re aTs de-
ficit remains, and heavy imports of raw material, and capital
goods ?- intended to make Greece more nearly ;e: '?euf'ficiert ??
will be necessary for some years to core. Foreign. exchange
availability, 'therefore, will pose some very ceriou probleme?
to the government in Athens.*
According to the World :Bark, the 1969 Creek balance of
payments situation was as follows (:r.i.! _ion U.S. dollars
Exports
$ 525)
Imports
Net Service,
and
'i., 414
Income Transfer 55
Current Account
Balance ..331,
The Bank's experts further believe that -,,u._-rcnt
deficit will, in the absence of policy charges, increase
to a level of $400_4A0 million. annually in t ,e next few
years.
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1.0. It has so far met the challenge by medium;. and short
term borrowing at high commercial rates. Since Greece has to
date had a relatively light foreign debt service burden, the
regime can probably continue doing this for several more
years, though it will be saddling the country with increasingly
onerous debt service obligations. To date, government leaders
have shown relatively little concern about the problem, and
their 'tangible attempts to do something about it have been
limited in scope.
The Domestic Outlook
11. The Greek government leaders insist that theirs is
merely a transitional rule, and that they seek to purge the
body politic of corruption and 'then turn power over to
democratically elected officials. As an earnest of -their
intent (and as a result of foreign pressure, principally
American) a new constitution has been drawn up, submitted to
the electorate, which overwhelmingly approved it in aa, refer-
endum characterized by heavy-handed official coercioz-a. Some
sections of the constitution. m? such as those forbidding
arrests without a warrant and guaranteeing the right of
habeas corpus ?o have been put into force. Others m_ suc'
as free elections m? remain suspended, and the military
rulers continue to govern autocratically.
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12. There are some contingencies which could lead to
their downfall. Probably the gravest threat would be a,
serious split among the principal military figures in the
government, or the development of a strong opposition within
the army itself. There are no signs of such major disputes
now, nor do they appear likely. But we can speculate on
how they might come about. There might, for example, be
serious disagreement on instituting even a limited program
of political liberalization, with some officers favoring a
facade of a parliamentary government and others, bitterly
opposed, trying forcibly to prevent such a move. Another
potentially divisive issue is the return of the exiled King.
Greece remains officially a monarchy and some government
leaders say they favor the King?s eventual. return; others
in the Revolutionary Council are strongly opposed. Finelly,
a disintegrating situation on Cyprus, if it developed into ashooting confrontation with Turkey, could lead to military
disaster which would bring about the regice's demise.
It should be noted that the appropriations for the Greek.
military and security services have increased by some
75 percent since 1966, raising its share of the gross
national product from 4.3?f to about 5.8%.
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13. On balance, we believe that the Papadopoulos gov,rern-
menu or another military-dominated regime will probably rule
Greece for some years to come. There is no evidence to indicate
that it is about to relinquish power. Further steps towards
political liberalization and putting the constitution into
effect are likely, but the military rulers are not likely
voluntarily to surrender their ultimate control of the country.
Any political change -- say the sudden departure of Papadopoulos
is likely to entail a further swing to the right, with more
conservative and younger officers taking charge.
i1. A public uprising does not appear to be in the cards.
The government has shown itself determined and efficient in
repression of dissent; organized opposition is almost non-
existent; most if not all of the leaders of the old regime
are discredited or exiled. The power and influence of tradi-
tional political forces in Greece is now very small, and they
:pose little threat to the colonels. Liberal and left wing
groups are similarly weak. Sporadic bombings have occurred
in Athens, and opposition manifestoes get underground circula-
tion. However, these have posed no real challenge to the
ruling authorities, and their instigators usually seem to be
quickly caught. Most of the people will probably continue to
remain silent, fearing the police and remembering the uncer-
tainties of the immediate pre-coup period as w.-e11 a, the
agonies of the 19+5?l949 civil. war.
- to
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Greece and Europe
15. There have been widespread and well publicized
allegations of brutality and torture by the Greek security
mervices. Regardless of the truth of these charges, they
are widely believed by important elements of Wit European
opinion, and since the April 1967 coup there have been very
adverse reactions in e, number of Western European countries.
These have entailed public demonstrations, active support
for Greek exiles by prominent politicians, and demands in.
NATO and other European organizations that punitive measures
be taken against the Greek Government until it retires in
favor of a new freely elected one. These protests are
loudest and strongest in Scandinavia and Holland. At least
initially, this brought the loss of some tourist revenues,
and perhaps some decline in European investment in Greece.
To date, hostile European opinion has led to Greece?s
resignation from the Council of Europe -- to avoid its almost
certain suspension. Most recently, fifteen council members
have charged in a resolution that the Greek Goverment engaged
in torture and other ill treatment of its olitical prisoners.
The US will incur some onus in West Europe for any support it
gives the Greek regime.
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18. Papadopoulos (perhaps more than his associates)
sincerely wishes Greece to remain in NATO. But if expulsion
or suspension seemed imminent, he would probably order with-
drawal :from. the organization so long as he felt sure of
close bilateral relations were secured with the 'US, parti-
cularly in the military supply field. A. key factor of
current Greek foreign policy is the continued. receipt of
arms and other materiel which the armed forces, the back-
bone of the regime, desire or deem necessary.
19. Greece's correct but cool. relations with the USSR
and Eastern Europe are not likely to change to any significant
extent. The strong anti-leftist posture of the present
Greek leaders, dating at least from their service i-.,i -the
civil war, will militate against close ties with the Communist
countries, though for a number of reasons there has 'been very
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little open hostility displayed by either side towards the
other. Indeed the Soviets and 'their allies have been careful
to seek good bilateral relations with the present Greek
regime and have restrained party members within Greece from
attacking it. At the same time Communist propagandists
have sought -to weaken NATO by exploiting the widespread West
European distaste for the Papadopoulos government, and Greek
Communists exiled in Eastern Europe have bitterly attacked
the regime in black radio broadcasts. When the Greeks deem
it to their advantage, they will from time 'to time reach
agreements, principally economic in nature, with -the Soviets
and East Europeans. If they feel the US is not fort's c oming
in arms supplies, they will suggest that they may seek
Soviet military equipment and closer political ties. But
even if there were a virtually complete rupture between
Athens and Washington, Greece would more likely to continue
to purchase military supplies from France and West Germany.
The Cyrus Question
20. The Papadopoulos regime has been far more restrained
and less xenophobic than its predecessors on the Cyprus issue,
that perennial irritant in Greek-Turkish relations. It permits
no .public advocacy of enossis (union of the island with Greece),
though the cause retrains a popular one; it has banned iT y.flam?
matory anti-Turkish propaganda; in 1967, it qua qtly acceded
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to a Turkish ultimatum to withdraw Greek troops from Cyprus;
and it is giving active encouragement to current negotiations
between leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities on the
island. At the same time, since the Papadopoulos government
does not have to concern itself overmuch with Greek public
opinion, it is in a position to make a deal with the Turks
on Cyprus,*
21. But given the ever present possibility of a civil
war there, and the evident willingness of the Turkish govern-
meat to intervene militarily if it feels the Turkish Cypriots
are receiving intolerable treatment, a confrontation cannot
be ruled, out. And if violence broke out between the Greek
and Turkish communities on the island ?_ an ever present
possibility _- relations between Greece and Turkey could
deteriorate very fast.
Greece and The US
22, Ever since they came to power Papadopoulos and his
colleagues place a high priority on maintaining good relations
with the US, this is a very sensitive problem with them..
Such as "double enosis" or partition of the island 'between
Greece and Turkey. There are rumors that secret negotiations
to this effect have taken place recently, but these are
unconfirmed by any substantive evidences
1,7 -
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In part, this is due to its heavy dependence on the US for
arms supplies. In part, it is due to a desire to convince
the Greek people that the colonels' regime has the backing
of the US Government.
23. Greek-US relations have of course, had their ups
and downs. The coup leaders were disappointed and probably
not a little surprised at the distaste with which their
seizure of power was regarded in many segments of American
society. They were particularly chagrined at the US cut-off
of new major military supplies planes, tanks and the like
which followed the April 1967 coup. Greece's steps towards
political liberalization probably have been taken chiefly as
a result of US urgings.
24. But there are limits beyond which US p:res:s7;reo
cease to be effective. In particular, though the ruling
colones are willing to allow some relaxation of official
restraints ?- such as de jure abolition of press censorship --
they will not surrender their control over Greek political
,life. Indeed, they probably calculate that the US itself
sees a very real value in preserving the relationship. They
are aware of the many factors which make the US consider that
access to Greek soil and facilities is importa:(.t, the rising
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Soviet naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, the loss
of Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, the rising current of
anti-American sentiment in Turkey manifested in. riots against
Sixth Fleet visits and US installations, and the diminishing
number of Mediterranean ports in which the Sixth Fleet and
other military forces can be freely based, much less visit.
25. In 'these circumstances, the leaders of the Greek
regime will at times seek to placate the US by taking steps
towards i:niplementing the Greek constitution, combined with
offers to the US of naval, air and other privileges of a
military type in Greece. But they will also suggest the
possible denial. of these privileges if, in 'their opinion,
US policy towards them is punitive and unreasonable. Nor
will they accede to US requests if they fear that these would
run counter to 'their own interests, as by embroiling them
with the Arabs over support for Israel. On the whole, how-
ever, they will seek to remain on good terms with the US,
and failing that, with such major European powers as France
and West Germany, while retaining a fairly consistent anti-
Communist posture. In consequence, the US will face a
familiar dilemma- that of being able to receive tangible
strategic advantages at the price of supporting a government
widely regarded as hostile to democracy and civil freedoms.
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
I`'
lj
The attached Memorandum was requested by
DIA, in lieu of an NIE.
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
Attachment:
ONE Memorandum, dated 23 April 70
"Greece, Europe, and the US"
24 April 1970
(DATE)
FORM NO. lol REPLACES FORM 10-101
I AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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