SOVIET POLITICS AND POLICY: THE NEXT PHASE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000200010006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 3, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: April 21, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Secret
MEMORANDUM
Soviet Politics and Policy: The Next Phase
Secret
21 April 1970
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'SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
21 April 1970
SUBJECT: Soviet Politics and Policy: The Next Phase*
By year's end the Soviet collective leadership will
have been in power more than six years. There have been,
of course, moments of tension and conflict within the
Politburo, and these have been, from time to time, visible
from the outside. Sources of stress are present now. This
paper takes a look at some of the elements in the present
pattern of politics and policies in an attempt to discover
whether the time for change is edging closer. It con-
cludes that it is. Age and infirmity seem certain to take
their toll. But the state of the economy could also pro-
vide the catalyst for more important changes. Problems in
international politics or domestic disaffection might not
in themselves be determining factors in changing the
composition of the leadership, but they might have con-
tributed to tensions within it.
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was
prepared by the Office of National Estimates and
coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence
and the Office of Economic Research.
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1. There will be, during the remainder of this year,
three major state occasions in Moscow: the celebration on
April 22 of the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth (and
some time soon, probably, a plenary meeting of the party
Central Committee); quadrennial elections to the Supreme
Soviet in June; and in the fall the 24th Party Congress.
Each will produce great volumes of rhetoric and will be
valued by the regime for its morale-building function, but
they could also be the vehicles through which changes in
leadership or policy could first manifest themselves.
2. There has been no formal announcement that the
Party Congress is to take place or when. The announcement
could come at the Central Committee meeting, which may in
addition be given a preview of the new Five Year Plan
(1971-75). The Committee meeting thus will be the opening
act of a political ritual culminating at the Congress.
There, the Five Year Plan will be approved and a new Central
Committee will be chosen, which will in turn formally recon-
stitute the Politburo and the party Secretariat.
3. Barring a major upheaval in its ranks, the Polit-
buro will not in any true sense be submitting itself to
election by the Central Committee which will be named at
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the Party Congress, nor will the wishes of the Congress
determine who will be appointed to the Central Committee
and who will not. Nevertheless, for reasons having to do
with the patronage system and because higher authority
needs the active support of the less powerful bodies in
securing the execution of its policies, it matters to mem-
bers of the Politburo who the delegates to the Congress are
and who is appointed to the new Central Committee. It
matters to the Politburo also that the policies it exposes
to them should obtain, to the greatest extent possible,
their willing approval. Between now and the opening of the
Congress, the effort to produce a suitable outcome in both
regards will get considerable attention from the Politburo
and may sharpen political rivalries.
Problems in Search of Solutions
4. In the last couple of years much discussion among
Western students of the USSR has centered on whether the
Soviet political structure, highly bureaucratized and based
on an ideology which is a waning motive force, will be able
to cope with the problems it is likely.to come up against
in the next decade or two. The chief problem, broadly put,
is the problem of adaptation to technological change, of
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economic and social modernization. Will the system, more or
less in its present form, manage to stagger along? Will it,
instead, have to reform itself drastically? Or will it --
failing that -- face stagnation, degeneration or convulsion?
5. There are some who think that muddling through is
possible. But there is no one who thinks that the present
leaders are capable of undertaking radical renovation. This,
if it comes, will have to be undertaken by a new generation
of leaders. Still, the present leaders have given evidence
by their actions, and even more by their expressions of
concern, that they perceive the general problem, if not the
solutions to it. The issues posed by the avowed and worri-
some lag in the rate of introduction of new technology into
the Soviet economy, by stultifying managerial practices,
and by various manifestations of sagging public discipline
are real and present ones. And they are bound to figure to
some degree in the proceedings at the upcoming Congress and
to bear on decisions affecting economic allocations and
perhaps also on appointments to key positions ratified there.
6. In these circumstances a number of questions suggest
themselves. Has the unity of the Politburo already come
under stress, as some published rumors would have it? If
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so, are significant changes in the leading policy-making bodies
likely to be revealed either before or at the Party Congress?
Changed or unchanged, what can the Politburo claim as its
record in domestic and foreign policy? Is it likely to propose
innovations in either of those areas?
Prospects for Change in Top Bodies
7. Useful hard intelligence on the state of play of
Kremlin politics, is, as it has always been, rare;
"Kremlinology" cannot be counted upon as a reliable guide.
It should be possible, even so, to describe some of the
reasons why some turnover in the Politburo and the other
leading organs might be expected, though surmises about
who might be involved are more hazardous. Some of the
issues of policy which might contribute to tensions can be
identified, but we have no good basis for conjecture about
how individual issues, particularly those on the foreign
policy side, affect particular political relationships. It is
more difficult still to assess how this or that change in the
face of the leadership might affect policy, domestic or
foreign.
8. The durability of collective leadership as such
and the continuity of the collective's membership are by
now often-remarked, but still remarkable facts. A few
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statistics to remind: among the 11 full members of the
Politburo formed immediately after Khrushchev's overthrow
there have been only two subtractions, Mikoyan and Shvernik,
both of whom, it seems, were permitted to go into honorable
retirement; and two additions, one of the latter having been
moved up from candidate status. Of the candidate members
of the Politburo, only one has been demoted within the same
span. There has been a good deal more turnover within the
Secretariat, the third top group, but four of the present
ten secretaries have been in place all the way.
9. By any reckoning this is a high degree of stability.
It could not possibly have been accomplished except on the
basis of some kind of conscious, if tacit, moratorium on
normal turnover and normal political competition among the
25-30 men involved. It is conceivable that an oligarchic
arrangement can be maintained for some time. But it is not
conceivable that the individual forebearance, unenforced
and unenforceable, which has produced this much continuity,
can endlessly rise above the political antagonisms and policy
conflicts which must inevitably occur. It is improbable,
also, that the collective leadership (full Politburo only),
having now an average age of 61 plus, can go on defying the
actuarial laws.
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10. There are other ways in which time may have worked
to fray the fabric of collective stability, If four years
ago, at the last party Congress, the leadership could claim
success merely for having cleaned up the mess left behind by
Khrushchev, the record of accomplishments and failures on
which it now stands is its own and nobody else"s? The prac-
tice of collective decision-making, though it has provided
the political safety which comes from the diffusion of
responsibility, must have seemed often a poor mechanism for
incisive action. And consensus-making seems certain to have
been frequently abrasive, despite the generally well-maintained
appearance of unity.
11. The collective process must have been especially
painful in the months leading up to the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia and again during the long period when Moscow was
trying to decide whether and how to approach SALT. The first
issue may have lost some of its sharp edge but the second no
doubt remains a focal point of debate and tension. Policy
toward China, in the Middle East, and vis-a-vis Germany pre-
sumably also give rise to difficult deliberations. But it
is probably as true now as in the past that domestic issues
provide the readiest weapons when the political contest
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reaches a peak, even though many other issues may have helped
to bring it to that point. The big domestic issues at this
stage are the state of the economy and the temper of public
morale.
The State of the Economy
12. It is evident that such increases in output as were
to be had from the modifications in industrial and agricul-
tural policy introduced by the collective leadership during
its first two years have already been extracted. Published
figures on economic results for 1969 suggest, in fact, that
a point of diminishing returns in key growth rates may have
been reached. These figures record that the rate of growth
of industrial production last year was the lowest since the
end of World War II. Targets for output in several key
categories, such as steel production, were not met, and
housing construction continues to fall behind plan.. Agri-
cultural output actually declined; even Moscow is currently
experiencing a meat shortage, suggesting that more parlous
conditions prevail in the rest of the country, Another
cause for concern is the unsatisfactory rate of growth of
labor productivity amidst conditions of a shortage of
industrial labor.
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13. The regime may be able to ameliorate some of these
immediate problems. Official figures for the first quarter
of 1970 point to some recovery in growth rates, It is also
true that especially bad weather had something to do with
last year's poor showing in agriculture. Beyond these prob-
lems, in any case, lies the larger question of whether the
regime can find ways to increase the effectiveness of in-
vestment, which has tended to decline in recent years, It
is acknowledged also that Soviet industry, if it is going to
serve the needs of the state, must henceforth concentrate on
increasing the quality of its product, not just the volume.
The more rapid introduction of advanced technology, new modes
of industrial management, and the infusion of greater dili-
gence into the labor force are seen as essential to the
achievement of this aim, Yet, the present leadership has
given no sign that it has any answer other than continuation
of the 1965 mini-reform, more exhortation, and tighter dis-
cipline. At the Collective Farm Congress last year the
regime passed up an opportunity to sanction a modest innova-
tion in the organization of agricultural labor.. On the
industrial front, it has shown some favor for the so-called
Shchekino experiment (which gives plant managers authority
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to reduce their labor force and to use the savings to in-
crease the wages of the remaining force), but has, so far,
come up with no other new ideas. The devolution of mana-
gerial authority and the fuller use of profit incentives
remain anathema for both bureaucratic and ideological reasons.
Dissent, Protest, and Alienation
14. When exhortation is the order of the day, faults
which are endemic but ignored at other times tend to be
exaggerated. That may be happening now. Lack of drive,
absenteeism, drunkenness, and inertia within the labor
force are not new phenomena in the USSR; the regime has
considered it necessary at regular intervals to organize
public campaigns to combat them. Now, with the economy
faltering, this kind of effort seems less likely than before
to produce the desired results; pointing up the declining
susceptibility of the Soviet population to the stimulus
of propaganda slogans. While the conspicuous alienation of
youth comparable to that apparent in Western countries has
not yet appeared, many Soviet youths have clearly demon-
strated a tendency toward disengagement from, or disenchant-
ment with, the state's objectives.
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15. The dissident currents running through the Soviet
intelligentsia give the problem a further dimension. Though
manifested in various ways -- protest demonstrations, care-
fully formulated letters to the authorities from celebrated
citizens, underground literature -- the dissent from the pre-
vailing practices of the Soviet state rests on a demand for
fuller civil rights and broader intellectual freedom. The
most trenchant and carefully articulated statements of dis-
sent have come in two essays -- one addressed to the leader-
ship, but no doubt widely circulated in intellectual circles
as well -- by the distinguished physicist, Andrei Sakharov.
16. It is difficult to gauge in practical terms what
impact dissent is having or is likely to have and how far
it will go. In dealing with it the regime is not going to
be much influenced by foreign opprobrium, though this may
result in some reduction in the severity of repression.
Present methods of dealing with the problem -- imprisonment,
exile, lunacy proceedings, administrative penalties, and
social ostracism -- may continue to work. They may not.
The leadership must be especially disquieted by the know-
ledge that unhealthy ideas are abroad in the scientific
community where they cannot be written off as the ravings
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of cranks or rag-tag intellectuals, and where their spread
could obviously greatly harm the interests of the state.
17. It would be surprising if the present leadership
were much moved by Sakharov's warning that it would be
suicidal to allow the gap between the regime and the
intelligentsia to grow. There is some reason to suppose
that the exponents of moderate liberalism in cultural policy
have enjoyed some support at the highest level, but this
support obviously has not been vigorously asserted. There
may be, in addition, a little sympathy in high places for
the notion that the quest for technological progress will
require some real reform of economic structures. But even
if some in the leadership might sense that the present
course will merely store up problems for the future there
must be nearly unanimous agreement that the kind of pro-
gressive views expressed by Sakharov cannot be countenanced.
It is difficult to imagine, for instance, there being more
than one view in the Kremlin about the acceptability of
Sakharov's appeal for the lifting of censorship, his charge
that the USSR is being dragged down by corruptions of the
Communist system, and his call for an end to arbitrariness,
by which he clearly means the regime's right to,ignore even
its own laws.
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The USSR's International Position -- Favorable
Factors
18. Of the delegates to the party Congress in the fall,
the great majority will be preoccupied with domestic issues:
the provincial party secretary interested in inner party
politics, the marshal concerned about arms policy, the plant
director who wants to know what the Five Year Plan will en-
tail for his operations, the KGB official who worries about
"alien" influences, the chairman of a city soviet who wonders
if there will be new funds for housing construction, and so
on. But this varied constituency will also need to be told
what is being done to protect the USSR's security interests
and in general how well it goes for the USSR abroad. On
this, the leadership can express a guarded optimism. It can
claim that it has steadily strengthened the Soviet inter-
national position in important ways, while, at the same
time, it has, by and large, stayed out of serious scrapes by
looking before it leaped. It can say this without perjuring
itself and, indeed, measured by its own conservative
standards, the present position must seem to the leadership
on the whole not acutely uncomfortable.
19. While the Chinese problem remains one of the most
difficult the Soviet leadership has to grapple with, the
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leadership can claim that the USSR is better off than it was
a year ago after the Ussuri incidents. By administering the
Chinese a sharp rebuff on Damansky Island and by the applica-
tion of other pressures, they have managed to bring the Chinese
into a discussion of substantive issues at a respectably high
level for the first time since early in 1964. They have to
some degree also shored up their diplomatic position on other
fronts by stemming what was becoming a growing belief that
they were virtually handcuffed by the China problem. In many
parts of the world they will receive credit for having com-
bined statesmanship with firmness in dealing with the
Chinese, while, at home, they have the use of a well-nigh
universally popular nationalist cause.
20. From the Soviet point of view, the trend of events
in Vietnam has been generally favorable. Developments can
be seen as moving in a direction which will vindicate the
assistance and advice Moscow has given Hanoi and obviate
the possibility of a deeper Soviet military involvement,
while bringing no particular advantage to the Chinese. At
the same time, the prospect of a change in the role of the
US in Asia has set Moscow to pondering the shape of its
own future in that area. With Brezhnev's statement last
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summer about the desirability of organizing a system of
collective security for Asia, Moscow has implied more active
involvement but has as yet put only a very timid toe in the
water.
21. To the west, the Soviets have succeeded in reducing
Czechoslovakia to something like its former subservience.
They have good reason to suppose that, because of their dis-
play of,power, they are not likely soon again to face in
Eastern Europe the kind of challenge to their authority and
security they perceived in the Czechoslovak reform movement.
The outbreak of polycentric turbulence among Communist
parties, particularly those of Western Europe, which the
invasion of Czechoslovakia provoked, has since largely sub-
sided. These parties are, in any case, of diminishing
importance to Moscow as instruments of foreign policy. The
World Communist Conference in Moscow last June, though no
pilgrims' chorus, signified that Moscow remains the nominal
capital of international Communism, whatever that means and
whatever it is worth.
22. They have discovered, moreover, that their invasion
of Czechoslovakia only momentarily quelled the craving in
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Western Europe for detente. Their proposal for a European
security conference is meant, in the first place, to exploit
this craving in a way which would contribute further to
tranquilizing their western marches by securing acknow-
ledgement of their right to domination in Eastern Europe.
They hope also, via the detente route, to obtain some of the
benefits for the East European states and for themselves of
Western Europe's economic and technical attainments and to
foster any tendencies in Western Europe toward greater inde-
pendence of the US. Moscow's probing of the possibilities
to be found in West Germany's Ostpolitik is governed by
the same motives but has the more particular goal of moving
West Germany toward acknowledgement of the Oder-Neisse line
and recognition of East Germany.
23. A judgment that the US is moving toward a contrac-
tion of its foreign commitments in Europe, as elsewhere, has
also no doubt had something to do with the reactivation of
the USSR's European diplomacy. It may be that, on some sort
of rough calculation, Moscow reckons that the Chinese cancer
and the debility of its economy are to some extent offset by
domestic social and economic problems on the US side. The
leadership has, in the meantime, brought the USSR to approxi-
mate parity in nuclear strength with the US. This
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accomplishment has enabled the USSR to negotiate from a
position of equality in SALT which might, in its turn, help
to ease the burden of arms competition for the USSR. SALT
signifies, in addition, that relations with the US are
being kept within the framework of "peaceful coexistence."
On that basis, the political contest with the US is being
carried on in many areas. Nowhere is the increase in the
USSR's influence more apparent than in the Middle East.
International Position: Complications
24. Nowhere, at the same time, does the USSR run
greater risk of overextension and possible dangerous embroil-
ment than in the Middle East. The Soviets are uneasy at the
prospect that events there could bring it toward a serious
collision with the US. They are no doubt made uncomfortable
by the realization that the prolongation of the Arab-Israeli
conflict in its present form could lead them into deeper and
deeper military involvement and by their inability to arrange
an agreement which would not jeopardize their position with
their Arab friends.
25. Obviously there are many clouds on the horizon else-
where as well. As Soviet leaders often express it in public
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speeches, "the international situation is complicated,"
Moscow has no basis for hope of a real accommodation with
China. The contest promises to be protracted. It already
requires a substantial Soviet military effort and could
easily become more dangerous as China's nuclear capacity
grows. Moscow is, moreover, nagged by fear of an eventual
rapprochement between the US and China. In Eastern Europe
it has become apparent once again that Soviet domination
rests ultimately on military power. The construction of
a "socialist commonwealth" resting on the willing accept-
ance of Soviet political and economic forms is no nearer
realization. The economic troubles which helped to pro-
voke the Czechoslovak rebellion persist and a disaffected
population cannot be expected to contribute much to recovery.
Hungary's program of economic reform, modest as it is,
causes disquiet in Moscow, or at least uncertainty.
Romania, though careful to avoid bear-baiting, is as deter-
mined as ever to set its own course in many areas of policy.
Moscow hopes by careful management of its own and its allies'
response to West German Ostpolitik to ease some of these
problems but senses that by granting West Germany fuller
access to Eastern Europe it may, in the end, only magnify
them.
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26. As has been said, the widening gap between the
Soviet and US economies, in terms of both size and sophisti-
cation, causes concern in Moscow. It may foresee some re-
trenchment in US international commitments but it does not
regard the US as a paper tiger. It is less than fully
convinced that it can obtain an acceptable agreement in arms
control through SALT and, indeed, fearful that it will be out-
maneuvered by the US.
What Kind of Change and How Much?
27. Does the balance sheet on the Soviet international
position affect the play of politics within the Politburo?
This position has suffered no serious deterioration and
in some respects has been improved, though some members of
the leadership may realize that in certain key areas progress
has been marginal, ephemeral, or even illusory. And the
problems the leaders presently face are such that, even when
they agree about broad objectives, there is probably room
for disagreement over tactics. Given the condition of the
Soviet economy, the question of priorities is bound to affect
foreign policy decisions and it is reasonable to suppose that
there is some tension within the leadership between the urge
to enlarge the USSR's international power and prestige and an
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appreciation of the limits of Soviet means. And, finally,
simple temperamental differences between the conservative
instincts of cne leader and the more activist inclinations
of another must also exist.
28. Nevertheless, however much the problems of inter-
national politics may trouble relations among the Soviet
leaders, they are not likely to rise or fall according to
their positions on these issues. We are indeed likely to
see some changes in the leadership of the USSR soon, but
they are most likely to appear -- on the surface at least
-- to arise from other factors. The most obvious are aqe
and infirmity. Problems in the economy, which are serious
enough in themselves and make some of the USSR's inter-
national problems seem even more complicated, could pro-
vide the stimulus for further change. There is little,
however, in the pattern of politics and policies to point
to convulsive change in the leadership or radical departures
in policy. Various possible combinations of political and
policy changes might qo something like this:
A. All but certain: A limited renewal of the
Politburo. This would involve, as a minimum the
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retirement of its oldest member, viz. Pelshe (71).
The retirement of better known and more important
figures, e.g., Kosygin (66) or Suslov (67) -- also
on the grounds of age or health -- is likewise possible.
Limited to one or two men who were politically impor-
tant, such changes would not necessarily demonstrate
that there had been conflict or imply major modifica-
tions of policy. The outlook would be for some modest
tinkering with the economy and continuity of policy in
other respects.
B. Quite conceivable: A more extensive shakeup,
involving several important figures, e.g., adding
Shelepin (51) to the others mentioned above (Shelepin's
removal on grounds of age or health would not be
credible). This would probably be seen as the conse-
quence of political conflict. Assuming Brezhnev (63)
was not among those removed, this would signify a
strengthening of his position and a weakening of
collegiality. It might even mean -- especially if his
hand were evident in the choice of the man replacing
those removed -- that he was moving to establish
clear-cut dominance of the Politburo. This would
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not, however, need to imply a sharp shift in policy, but
might be expected to reinforce the present conservative
tendency in both domestic and foreign policy. 'There
would be some chance that the Soviets would show less
flexibility in SALT.
C. At the outer fringe of the possible: The dis-
placement of most or all of the leading members of the
Politburo (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Suslov, Podgorny). If the
result were to bring the younger members of the Politburo
-- Shelepin, Polyansky (52), Mazurov (56) into the
center of power, the outlook would be for greater
dynamism in Soviet policy, especially on the economic
front. These men might prove to be less hidebound in
their attitude toward the US, though certainly there is
no guarantee that they would be any friendlier.
D. Improbable: A palace coup putting an end to
collective leadership and setting up a new supreme leader.
Shelepin comes most readily to mind as organizer of such
a move. Though this appears as the least likely change,
it would also be the leasl;, visible in advance. What such
a move would entail for policy is unpredictable. Much
would depend upon who was behind it and on other variables
such as whether it relied heavily on military support.
Approved For Release 2007/03/087: UA--RDP79R00967A000200010006-6
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000200010006-6
Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000200010006-6