MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. ABBOT SMITH FROM RICHARD HELMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000200030002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2006
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 24, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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2L September 1970
1. Please date this paper 25 September and send it
out tomorrow to whatever distribution list you feel appropriate.
As you know, the President, Rogers, Laird, Moorer, and Kis-
singer will all be taking off for Europe at various times from
Friday on. Nevertheless, I find it desirable to get this memo-
randum distributed.
2. I have one comment: Under "Other Implications", i.e.
paragraphs 13 and 1, I do not feel that you underline suf-
ficiently the possible reaction in the Arab World to Israeli
intervention. Put another way., it strikes me that there is a
little bit too much shorthand in these two paragraphs. In
any event, I have the feeling that Arab passions have been so
aroused by the spectacle of Arabs killing Arabs that almost any
intervention from an "outsider" would serve as a lightning rod
and one would, therefore, get an intensity of reaction which at
other times might have been more moderate. In short, I think
that American individuals, installations, businesses, etc.,
would come in for a real pasting. If you and your associates
disagree with me, I will accept your view, but I am concerned
that policy-makers in Washington have been inclined to under-
play the fury of Arab reaction against Israel, i.e., Israeli-
United States, intervention.
Richard Helms
Director
Attachments - 2
"Likely Soviet Reactions to Possible US or Israeli
Actions Concerning Jordan"
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23 September 1970
SUBJECT: Likely Soviet Reactions to Possible US or Israeli
Actions Concerning Jordan
SOVIET CONSIDERATIONS
1. The turn of events in the Middle East, particularly in Jordan,
is not at all to Moscow's liking. The Soviets lent themselves to the US
peace initiative, among other reasons, because it offered a means of
imposing increased control over military developments on the Suez
Front. The Soviets must have believed that the Syrians and the
Palestinian guerrillas could be prevailed on to go along, or, could at
least be prevented from disrupting Soviet-UAR tactics. If so, the
Soviets were wrong. As a result, the prospects for talks, from which
they hoped to extract concessions from the US and Israel, have been
hurt, perhaps fatally. (This result was, of course, helped by the Soviets'
own failure to hold back, the Egyptians from forward moves in the Canal
zone.) The chances of the Russians being able to impose some discipline
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to their own liking on the current pattern of political and military events
and of being able to keep their various Arab clients in line in the future
is diminished. And the tactical play becomes complicated for the
Russians because of the unpredictability of the other players, not only
the Arabs, but the US and Israelis as well.
2. For these reasons, the Russians can probably be believed when
they say that they have spent some effort to prevent the events in Jordan
from happening. At this stage, they would have preferred a simpler
Middle East contest involving Nasser and themselves against the US and
Israel. They would no doubt like to see these players put back in their
previous positions and will try, if they can, to bring this about. It must
now be evident to them that it will be virtually impossible to resume the
game in this manner, even if there is no US or Israeli intervention in Jordan.
3. The warnings which the Russians were bound to sound at any
hint of US or Israeli intervention are partly reflex action. It is also
a case of nothing ventured, nothing gained, for, if it turns out that there
is no such intervention, the Russians can and will say that they were the
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deterrent. But they must also think that intervention is a real and
increasing possibility and this must arouse mixed feelings. It would
support the Soviet line that the US and Israeli policies toward Arab
nationalism are collusive and equally malign. Some political benefits
would fall automatically to the Soviets. But intervention would, at the
same time, put pressure on the Russians to demonstrate the practical
value of their advocacy of the Arab cause.
4. We would expect the USSR to exercise care to see that the
issue did not turn into a momentous political test between it and the US
and to minimize the likelihood of direct engagement between its military
forces and those of either the US or Israel. But the Russians would also
feel the need to show that, because of their expanded role in the area,
the balance of forces was no longer what it was when US forces' landed
in Lebanon in 1958 or when the 1967 war broke out, and they might be
inclined to accept certain risks on that account.
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SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES
5. With these considerations in mind, we examine below possible
Soviet responses.in three contingencies: (1) an Israeli attack on Syrian
and fedayeen forces in northern Jordan; (2) a broader Israeli military
operation into Syria proper; and (3) a US rescue operation centered on
the Amman area. We treat the three as more or less distinct operations,
although it is recognized that they might not in practice remain such,
since, for instance, (1) might grow into (2) or (3) might overlap with (1).
AN ISRAELI ATTACK INTO JORDAN
6. As has already been suggested, the recent actions of the
Palestinian guerrillas and the Syrians do not fit the Soviet book and the
Russians would not be entirely unhappy to see them taught a lesson. There
is substantial evidence of Soviet distaste for the Syrians and apprehension
over the fedayeen as an uncontrollable element in the whole confrontation.
Moscow might hope that such a setback would make them more amenable
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to Soviet advice in the future, and the Russians would see in the defeat
of the Arab forces by the Israelis an occasion for renewing their
strictures against premature and uncoordinated military actions.
7. All this aside, the Israeli operation would, of course, be
represented by Moscow as having been carried out with US approval
and encouragement and would provide Moscow with propaganda ammuni-
tion against the US throughout the Arab world. The Soviets would make
urgent and conspicuous diplomatic representations at the UN and in
Western capitals which would be intended to keep the Israeli action
within limited bounds and win some credit for the USSR if it should so
remain.
8. The Russians would almost certainly attempt to reinforce this
point by taking certain military actions of a largely demonstrative kind.
This might entail the dispatch of some additional units to the Soviet
Mediterranean squadron and the movements of some elements of the
squadron toward the Syrian coast. The Russians would raise warnings
against Israeli encroachment on Syrian territory and would probably seek
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ways -- by sending a high-level military delegation to Syria, or even
by sending token air or ground units -- to give the impression that
Moscow was prepared to give the Syrians significant assistance in
the defense of their territory.
9. Israeli intervention in northern Jordan would probably
quickly result in the routing of Palestinian and Syrian forces there
(and the Iraqis as well, if they happen to become engaged). The
Israelis would presumably not linger on Jordanian territory, but even if
they did, there would be little the Russians could or would do to dislodge
them. For these reasons, the Soviets would in responding to Israeli
intervention probably attempt to strike in both their diplomatic and
military actions a stern but statesmanlike attitude. They would probably
see no advantage in inflaming the situation at the risk of being caught
bluffing and of encouraging the Syrians and Palestinians to believe that
they would have Soviet support for future ventures. Better that they
should be able, without having appeared altogether craven, to say
old you so" to the Arabs while winning some credit in other quarters,
including the US, for having behaved with some degree of responsibility.
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10. In the event that Israeli operations against the Syrian and
fedayeen forces now in north Jordan spilled over into Syria itself,
the Soviet reactions would probably not be greatly different from those
discussed in the preceding paragraphs. A more ambitious effort,
involving a major Israeli assault on Syria, is not likely. The Israelis
would foresee a much heightened risk of direct Soviet involvement,
as would we. But, should the Israelis, nonetheless, embark on such
a course, the Russians would be unwilling to accept the prospect of
the overthrow of the Syrian regime and they would probably conclude
that the protection of their position in the Middle East required a
vigorous military reaction. They would accept the risk that this might
lead in some way to US military countermeasure.
ll. The nature of Soviet military countermoves would, of course,
depend on how far and how fast the Israelis moved into Syria. In any
event, however, we would expect the Soviets to reinforce their
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Mediterranean squadron and to move a substantial part of it into Syrian
waters. They might signal the seriousness of their intent by putting
the combat contingent embarked with the squadron ashore in, say,
Latakia. The Soviet MIG pilots now on training duty in Syria might be
given combat missions against the Israelis. Additional pilots would
probably be dispatched from the USSR. Assuming that Damascus was
still in Syrian hands while the Russians had time to act, they would
make its defense a first priority and would probably establish an
airlift to bring in both equipment and ground force units for this
purpose. We would expect that, if the fighting was protracted, the
Soviets would steadily augment their fighting forces in Syria to the point
where they had established a substantial presence. At some point,
they might, in conjunction with the Egyptians, seek to create a
diversion on the Suez front, nullifying the ceasefire there.
12. Even if the aim of such action was to protect the lives of
US citizens there, the Russians would suspect the US of having additional
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motives or, at any rate, would foresee that the intervention, once
begun, might become prolonged and enlarged, thereby expanding the
US military presence in the area. On the other hand, the Russians
could make easy propaganda and political play on the US' interventionist
role. The US action, assuming it remained limited in duration and
scope, would not, at the same time, represent any real challenge to
the USSR's military prestige. We would expect Moscow's reaction to
be mostly diplomatic and propagandistic rather than military.
13. No matter what form US or Israeli intervention took, the
Soviets would score from the impact it could be- expected to have on
Arab opinion. Arab popular response would be harsh. Anti-American,
demonstrations, some likely to be violent, would take place in a
number of cities; there would be intense pressures on Arab govern- .
ments to retaliate against the US government and against American
citizens and commercial interests. In particular, demands would be
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made for the breaking of relations with the US and for sharp measures
against US oil interests. The extent and severity of adverse reactions
would depend on how long the intervention lasted, how many Arab
lives were lost in the process, and the apparent degree of US-Israeli
collusion.
14. Of all the present Arab governments, Libya, Syria, and
Iraq would be the most likely to take punitive anti-American measures.
The Libyans are, of course, in the best position to do so. But even
regimes such as those in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Kuwait might
feel obliged to take at least some steps, both to placate public opinion,
and to demonstrate their solidarity with the Palestinians. This would
be particularly the case if there were obvious US-Israeli collaboration
in an intervention. The Soviets, of course, could be counted on to
encourage a broad range of anti-US manifestations in the area.
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