PROSPECTS FOR EGYPT WITHOUT NASSER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000300010008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 16, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
Prospects For Egypt Without Nasser
SECRET
16 November 1970
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
16 November 1970
SUBJECT: Prospects for Egypt Without Nasser*
The six weeks which have passed since Nasser's death
have seen his associates and subordinates maneuvering for
power and attempting to carry on the business of governing
Egypt. This memorandum assesses what they have done and
offers some judgments on probable future trends. It is
written in full awareness that there is much we do not know
about what has gone on behind the scenes and relationships
among the various Egyptian leaders.
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National
Estimates. It was discussed with representatives of
the Office of Current Intelligence and the Clandestine
Services, who are in general agreement with its judgments.
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1. Although the official mourning period for Gamal
Abdel Nasser has ended, the consequences of his death for
Egypt, the Arabs, and the world are far from clear. Infor-
mation on events behind the scenes in Egypt is scanty indeed,
and judgments about the future are highly speculative. The
leaders chosen in more than a month of maneuvering are drab
and unprepossessing, but they hold the instruments of power.
They will not inspire the Egyptian people, but they may be
able to control them. In the months ahead, they are likely
to stick as close as possible to the course prescribed by
their late hero -- in any event, they will claim to be doing
so. Nevertheless, Nasser's death portends change. His heirs
have individual ambitions, prejudices, and fears. They inev-
itably will be faced with decisions for which there is no
specific precedent. Variant interpretations of Nasser's words
and thoughts are likely to thrive as the Middle East in general
and Cairo in particular learn to get along without the man who
was the area's outstanding figure for more than 15 years.
2. Egypt has become accustomed to the leadership of one
powerful and decisive man. It now faces rule by a group of
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men without personal power or great popularity -- men who
are likely to find decisions difficult to make. The indi-
viduals who were in charge of the government and political
machinery at the time of Nasser's death appear to have agreed
quite rapidly on one essential -- they, rather than any other
Egyptians, should retain and share the power among themselves.
The "outs" -- notably Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
members Zakariya Muhyi al-Din, Abd al-Latif Baghdadi, and
Kamal al-Din Husayn -- made an ineffectual attempt to secure
some role for themselves in the new regime. The "ins" united
long enough to block them. The power of decision remained
nominally with the eight-man Executive Committee of the Arab
Socialist Union (ASU). Essentially, decisions were made by
three members of that body (Anwar Sadat, Husayn Shafi, and
Ali Sabri), together with three men affiliated with the police
and intelligence services, and General Fawzi, the head of the
armed forces. Nasser's erstwhile spokesman, Hasanayn Haykal,
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had some voice in the early proceedings but developed polit-
ical laryngitis somewhere along the way.
3. When Sadat was chosen as President, a triumvirate
of three more or less coequal rulers appeared to be in the
making. Rumor tagged Sabri and Sharawi Jumma, the Interior
Minister, for Nasser's two remaining job titles -- Prime
Minister and head of the ASU. Instead, after considerable
delay, a veteran diplomat, Mahmud Fawzi,became Prime Minister
and the Executive Secretary of the ASU was made Secretary
General of the organization. Neither has previously had much
political importance. After further hesitation, Sabri and
Shafi were named Vice Presidents, without clearly delineated
responsibilities or stated order of precedence. Subsequently,
Sadat was made Chairman of the ASU; since the party has not
previously had both a Secretary General and a Chairman simul-
taneously, the division of power is uncertain. The appoint-
ment of four Deputy Prime Ministers from the Cabinet is said to
be pending.
4. Sadat, long thought to be an ineffective man, is
emerging in a surprisingly strong position. He was, of course,
the designated successor, but his initial acceptability as
President apparently stemmed as much from his weaknesses as
from his strengths. He had no particular power base, no
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known coterie of admirers, no identification with the major
powers. He was, therefore, non-controversial. Now, however,
he is the only member of the original RCC remaining in a
powerful official position. We doubt that Sadat could have
managed to exclude both Sabri and Shafi from key positions
without considerable help. Sabri, at least, is almost certainly
dissatisfied, and he can be expected to try to improve his
status. We know next to nothing about the inner workings of
Egyptian politics, but our best guess is that Sadat's most
influential allies were Jumma, who retains the powerful Interior
post, and Sami Sharaf, who continues as intelligence advisor
and assistant to the President. We cannot now judge whether
Jumma and Sharaf are acting from motives of self-preservation,
personal ambition, loyalty to the late master, or some combi-
nation of the three. Neither has evidenced great ambition or
incipient charisma in the past. They bear watching, however,
as two of the dozen or so individuals who will be running
Egypt during what promises to be a period of considerable --
though probably circumspect -- struggle for power and position.
5. The leadership and the public are likely to be hyper-
suspicious of one another in the months ahead; the result
could be a period of severe repression. Within Egypt, one of
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Nasser's greatest strengths was the unflagging popular con-
viction that he cared about his people. Cairenes and others
griped at his policies and grumbled at his mistakes, but they
faulted him for not succeeding -- never for not trying. To
the day of his death, the vast majority of the 33 million
Egyptians trusted him. For his part, he resorted to repres-
sion infrequently and for brief periods; generally, his touch
was light.
6. Sadat and company have had years to learn the obvious
lesson, but they probably have not. They began their reign
by trying to buy popularity; lowering prices of basic com-
modities, declaring an early distribution of industrial profits,
and promoting a lot of civil servants. We believe, however,
that they are likely to move rapidly and massively against
people who show signs of dissent. The existence of several
separate security networks, each with a leader who has ambitions
for political survival if not greater political power, provides
ample opportunity for fitful arrests, investigations, hunts,
and purges. The opposite phenomenon -- development of an
atmosphere in which alternative policies can be discussed
and slightly unorthodox ideas vented -- would indicate that
Egypt's new leaders have more political savvy and self-confidence
than we currently credit them with.
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7. The leadership can expect to run into trouble with
Egypt's student population. There are upwards of 240,000
enrolled in Egyptian universities; roughly 150,000 of them
are in or near Cairo. They have numerous, basically insol-
uble grievances -- notably the lack of job opportunities
after graduation. They have organizations that are supposed
to be apolitical. They have chafed for years under restrictions
on political activity, and such gripes have recently been rein-
forced by their vulnerability for military service. Student
outbursts are nothing new for Egypt; Nasser himself took part
in them as a teenager. Students got out of hand twice in 1968,
and the nominal reforms that followed those demonstrations have
not assuaged discontent. A great deal of pent up frustration
is present; some incident may spark it. Student demonstrations
might be incited or exacerbated by such elements as the Muslim
Brotherhood -- a right-wing, politico-religious society -- or
the adherents of one or more of the several small Communist
factions. The result could be a serious breakdown of law and
order in the cities.
8. The armed forces remain the regime's ultimate defense
against student unrest or any other form of domestic political
turmoil. Nasser never had to use major military force to control
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the civilian population; if the new regime were forced to call
out the troops, we do not know what the response would be. The
current armed forces chief, General Fawzi, is closely identified
with the present leaders and probably would give the "correct"
orders -- out of instincts of self-preservation, if not out of
personal commitment. In the event of simple riot and disorder
on the part of street mobs, the military probably would obey
and intervene to impose calm. However, if trouble were to come
in the form of a challenge to the personal power and prestige
of Sadat, the military might stand aside. Sadat is not partic-
ularly popular with any known group of Egyptians, and he seems
to be actively disliked by some considerable number of Egyptian
military officers. In these circumstances, the regime will be
very reluctant to trust the military in an internal security
role, much preferring to rely on the substantial police establish-
ment.
9. If there is a "new Nasser" -- or several -- in the
Egyptian Armed Forces, he is well hidden from us. It seems
logical to assume that there are majors, lieutenant colonels,
and colonels who believe that they could do a better job of
running Egypt than Sadat and his associates. Such men may be
organized into clandestine groups and may be planning a coup.
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All in all, we doubt that a successful move along these lines
is imminent. However, it will become more likely with the
passage of time, if power in Cairo remains fragmented and
various civilians and perhaps military leaders compete for
position and popularity. A resumption of active hostilities
in the Canal area would initially tend to damp down any coup-
making tendencies. If the Israelis again got the best of it,
as they likely would, the prospects for military mutiny might
rise.
10. There is a notable paucity of promising alternatives
to the present collective leadership. In the days immediately
following Nasser's death only one name was fairly frequently
mentioned with approval -- that of Zakariya Muhyi al-Din. Among
some sizable segment of the Egyptian middle classes, and among
the military officers who make up an influential part of that
group, he apparently enjoys approbation, though he does not
arouse bounding enthusiasm. As an original member of the RCC,
a competent high official, and the man Nasser designated as
successor in the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 war, he
looked like a serious contender for at least a share of power
in 1970. Whether or not he tried strenuously to push his claim
we cannot say, but he failed in whatever efforts he made. There
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are reports that he intends to remain politically inactive,
giving Sadat and company time to blunder, in the hope that he
will be called in to rectify their mistakes. However, he has
no official position and no organized mass support; he has thus
far shown little facility for political maneuvering. A military
coup -- carried off in his name but perhaps without his know-
ledge -- seems more likely than a deliberate power grab actively
led by Muhyi al-Din.
11. It is possible, though it does not seem likely,
that Nasser's death could invigorate the political institutions
that he created but kept impotent. Since his death, his old
comrades have scrupulously followed the letter of the Constitution.
Decisions have been promulgated in the name of the Executive
Committee of the ASU, ratified by the National Assembly, and --
in the case of the presidency -- approved by the entire member-
ship of the ASU. The new leadership has announced regular,
periodic meetings of the Executive Committee, the Central Com-
mittee, the Cabinet, etc. Without Nasser to quote as the authority,
they have quoted the names of the institutions. If internal
power struggles are indecisive, with various factions cancelling
one another out behind closed doors for months or even years, the
repeated invocation and use of the various legal entities could
in time give them some real authority.
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12. The stress on institutions, rather than individuals,
has been reflected in Soviet press commentary on Egypt and in
what we have heard of private Soviet advice to the new leaders.
The USSR probably hopes to avoid too close identification with
one or another faction that might develop. The new Egyptian
leadership, unsure of itself, may be inclined to accept Soviet
advice somewhat more readily than Nasser was; at the same time,
it may be less able than Nasser to carry out whatever promises
it might make -- to Moscow or to anyone else.
13. The same major factors that contributed to steadily
increasing Soviet influence over the past regime will continue
to be operative. Soviet friendship and assistance is vital to
the Egyptians in their confrontation with Israel; for Cairo,
there is no alternative. Immediately after Nasser`s death,
Moscow hastened to assure the Egyptians, both privately and
publicly, that Soviet support would continue unabated. In
the future as in the past, overt Soviet pressure is likely to
be limited to specific questions of great concern to the USSR.
Barring a major change in the Egyptian regime, or a substantial
amelioration of the confrontation with Israel, we see no reason
to expect Soviet influence on the Egyptian leaders to diminish.
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II. VACILLATION ABROAD
Don't Shoot, Don't Talk, Don't Move
11k. In Egypt, continuation of the ceasefire along the
Suez Canal clearly is desired and intended. There is con-
siderable evidence that the Egyptian military leadership is
especially anxious to avoid subjecting its forces again to
the punishment they underwent in daily Israeli air raids
earlier this year, At the same time, leaders in Cairo can-
not agree to accept indefinite continuation of the ceasefire,
since to do so would imply acknowledgment that Israeli oc-
cupation of Sinai was, for all practical purposes, permanent.
However, we do not believe that Egypt will deliberately resume
large-scale fighting along the Canal in the near term.
15. For Egypt's collective leadership, any kind of major
decision will be difficult -- a decision to make significant
concessions in an attempt to get to a settlement may be vir-
tually impossible. On the other hand, the new leaders must
devote more attention than Nasser to consolidating their position
domestically, and they are likely to be inclined to put Egyptian
interests ahead of Arab interests; they may be willing to make
some concessions on that account. They have been somewhat less
isolated than Nasser from dissenting opinion and may be less
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convinced than he was about the dedication of the Egyptian
people to the anti-Israeli cause. If they find themselves
in a position where they must act quickly and decisively, it
is conceivable that they might seize an opportunity to move
toward settlement. But Sadat and company are not likely to
accept terms Nasser had publicly rejected.
16. Constrained as they are by Nasser's policies, and
uncertain about the political reliability of the armed forces,
the new leaders are highly unlikely to take any steps that
would antagonize the Egyptian military or materially weaken
the Egyptian position along the Canal. The Egyptian military
suffered very heavy casualties in the months before defenses
along the Canal were strengthened. Egyptian military personnel
know that Israel's inventory of Phantom aircraft, which have
been invested with a mystique even more powerful than their
impressive military potential, has increased since the cease-
fire went into effect. The Israelis have announced that their
own position has markedly improved. In these circumstances --
and barring extraordinary Israeli concessions -- the Egyptian
leaders are highly unlikely to agree to any redisposition of
Egyptian men, missiles, or other materiel that would materially
weaken Egyptian defense in the area between the Canal and Cairo.
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Arab Affairs
17. Nasser's special position cannot be fully duplicated.
It was, in part, the product of circumstances. He was one of
the most prominent revolutionary leaders in the underdeveloped
world. He had available a remnant of Western colonialism --
the British Army -- and expelled it. He pulled off the first
major nationalization in the Middle East. He caught on early
to the game of non-alignment and played it.while it was still
lucrative in both money and prestige. Opportunities to make
a similar mark in the world at large are not likely to be avail-
able to any Egyptian -- or other Arab -- any time soon.
18. Nasser managed his roles as Egyptian leader and as
Arab leader more or less in tandem. His victories on the
Arab stage consolidated his position at home; his losses never
seriously endangered his primacy in Egypt. His successors,
beginning without mass popularity in Egypt and without great
prestige on the Arab scene, will have to be much more cir-
cumspect about risks to their position. It is difficult to
envisage Anwar Sadat -- or any of the others now in charge --
calling and presiding over an acrimonious meeting of King Hussein
and Fatah chief Arafat and bringing a Tunisian into play as
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mediator. Nevertheless, Sadat has moved one step closer to
some form of association with Libya and the Sudan. Any effective
"federation", however, appears distant in time and difficult
of accomplishment.
19. Inter-Arab relations are due to change somewhat.
Nasser in his last several years was a conservative in Arab
politics. Preoccupied with Israel, having certain common
interests with Hussein in the aftermath of the 1967 war, dependent
on the Khartoum subsidies, and himself alarmed at the fedayeen
as a potential threat to existing governments, he generally
worked to avoid unsettling challenges to prevailing authority
in the Arab world. His death, therefore, removes a force for
stability. Moreover, with Nasser gone, traditional antipathies
between Egyptians and other Arabs are likely to become somewhat
more obvious.
20. We doubt, however, that an increase in deliberate
Egyptian troublemaking is in the cards. Rather, Sadat and
company probably will go on hosting Arab meetings, organizing
Arab diplomats at the United Nations, and financing pro-Egyptian
political groups wherever they exist. But, their efforts and
concerns will be concentrated principally on domestic matters,
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on assuring a large and continuing flow of military aid from
the USSR, and on the Egyptian-Israeli military/diplomatic
calculus.
21. Yet, they will not be ignored outside the Nile
Valley. For 15 years, Cairo's voice has counted more than
any other in Arab decisions; the habit of listening to Cairo
will not easily be unlearned. The Egyptians are the most
numerous and best organized body of Arabs. Cairo has long
been one of the cultural centers of the Arab world. Cairo
controls by far the strongest propaganda network in the area.
Its military forces and equipment make it of central importance
to the Arabs in their confrontation with Israel. The other
Arab countries are accustomed to considering, if not always
following, Egypt's policy on all international issues and many
domestic ones. In losing Nasser, Egypt has been weakened --
but not eliminated -- as the single most potent political entity
in the Arab world and as a force on the Middle Eastern and
Mediterranean scene.
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Additional Distribution Outside CIA of ONE Memorandun:
DCI, Attention
Prospects For Egypt Without Nasser
(16 Nov 1970)
1 copy each sent to the following;
Mr. James H. Noyes, OSD/ISA
Mr. Robert Allen, OSD/ISA/NESA
Mr. Dayton S. Mak, INR/RNA
Mr. Herbert J. Liebesny, INR/RNA
Mr. Philip Stoddard, INR/RNA/NE
Mr. Rodger Davies, Dep. Asst Sec., NE, State
Mr. H. H. Stackhouse, NEA/IAI, State
Mr. Michael Sterner, NEA/UAR, State
Mr. Stanley D. Schiff, NEA/RA, State
Mr. Arthur Houghton, INR/RNA
Mr. Harold Saunders, White House
Mr. Kent Crane, Office of the Vice President
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