NORTH KOREAN POLICY TOWARD THE NON-COMMUNIST WORLD: OBJECTIVES, RESULTS, AND PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000400020004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2006
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 16, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
MEMORANDUM
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
North Korean Policy Toward the Non-Communist World:
Objectives, Results, and Prospects.
Secret
Copy No.
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c 1
C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: North Korean Policy Toward the Non-Communist
World: Objectives, Results, and Prospects
Over the past five or six years, North Korea has
made advances in its relations with non-communist countries.
It has achieved modest success in developing trade with
Western Europe and Japan, and has gained additional diplo-
matic support in the Third World. Nonetheless, by their
continuing support of ultra-radical causes and for other
reasons -- the North Koreans have remained an unpopular
alternative to the South Koreans in most Free World circles.
They may be in process of readjusting their strategy, as
the Asian political landscape alters.
This memorandum was prepared by the office of
National Estimates and coordinated within CIA
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Obviously, Pyongyang's overseas policies do not bulk large
in a global context, but the subject, has not received much
attention in the intelligence literature over the years, and
this memorandum provides an assessment of it. The principal
conclusions appear in Section III, "Prospects," pages 22-27.
1. Twenty-six years have elapsed since Kim 11-song
returned to Korea with Soviet occupation forces and assumed
leadership of the northern half of the country. The length
of his tenure, the cultish acclaim surrounding him, the
tight internal controls he has imposed, and the repetitive
din of his propaganda have often made his regime appear
rigid and immutable. Yet, substantial changes have occurred
in North Korean foreign policy, espei.cally since the middle
1960s.
2. For a long time, North Korea focused on breaking
out of the isolation imposed on it during the Korean War;
it sought to win at least a measure of international
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acceptability in its competition with the regime in South
Korea. In the mid-1960s, objectives came to include re-
duction of Pyongyang's economic dependence on the USSR and
China, primarily by emphasizing trade relations with the
developed countries; and establishment of a distinctive
political position as well, in this case by spreading Kim's
revolutionary gospel among the less developed nations. Over
the past two or three years, the North Koreans have added
another objective: to adjust to the shifting power rela-
tionships and the new mood of detente in East Asia, particu-
larly in their relations with South Korea.*
II. RESULTS
A. The Developed Countries
Economic Results
3. Soviet economic and military assistance to North
Korea, quite substantial. in the post-Korean War years,
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virtually ceased in the early 1960s.* And although Soviet
economic and military assistance was resumed in 1965, Kim
Il-song felt compelled by 1967 to seek alternative sources
of supply and to develop new trading partners in Western
Europe and Japan. For the most part, Kim's efforts in
these areas were squarely in the economic realm and con-
ducted by qualified professionals and technicians. North
Korean needs were genuine and substantial. The Seven-Year
Plan (1961-67) had sagged badly, particularly with regard
to the installation of new industrial capacity.
4. Results were prompt and impressive. Trade with
the Free World rose sharply even though North Korea's trade
with its communist partners remained around 80 percent of
the total. In particular, imports of machinery and equip-
ment from Western Europe and Japan jumped -- to $67 million
in 1969, over ten times the 1967 level and exceeding in
value comparable imports from the USSR. Total Free World
* Chinese aid, never nearly as great as Soviet assistance,
was cut off during much of the Cultural Revolution.
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imports in 1969 reached nearly $94 million.* (In 1970, while
imports from Japan held steady, those from Western Europe de-
clined and total Free World imports dropped to about $57
million.)
The most striking import increase since 1967 has been in
the category of metalworking machine tools -- from less
than $1 million in 1967 to $35 million in 1969. Other
major purchases have included refrigerated fishing ships
(The Netherlands), marine diesel engines (France), and a
textile plant (Japan). Imports of electronics equipment
from Japan have also been relatively heavy. Overall, im-
ports from Japan increased from $7 million in 1967 to
$25 million in 1969, and leveled off in 1970 (when two-
way trade amounted to $57 million).
Characterizing North Korea's post-1967 trade with the
Free World has been the diversity of suppliers. West
Germany supplied 90 percent of the machine tools imported
in 1969; Bonn has also supplied a high-quality steel
induction furnace, mobile TV vans, and electric power
plant equipment. France has sold television equipment
and a tannery. Austrian, Belgian, French and British
firms are presently putting the finishing touches on the
sale of a petrochemical complex. The Austrians have
supplied a power plant, chemicals, generators and tur-
bines. The Netherlands has sold ships, compressors and
a urea fertilizer factory. The UK has supplied small
quantities of machine tools. And Japan, in addition to
machine tools, has sold industrial sewing machines, com-
munications equipment, and data processing gear.
North Korean trade with the Free World was roughly in
balance until .1969 when it rolled up a deficit of over
$40 million. Pyongyang's chief exports are ferrous and
non-ferrous ores, semi-manufactured goods, and food
products.
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5. The current picture is far different than before
1967 when Pyongyang was a novice in European trading circles,
virtually without any credit standing. Then, only the Dutch
were a significant trading partner, willing to meet North
Korea's chronic payments problems with guaranteed contracts
and long-term credits. Now, West Germany, France, Belgium
and Austria (as well as The Netherlands) have either extended
liberal deferred payment schemes and guarantees to the North
Koreans or are planning to do so. As a by-product of its
efforts in Europe to date, Pyongyang has been able to set up
unofficial trade missions in Paris, Vienna, and Helsinki and
has been given authority to establish such an office in Zurich.
6. Imports from Japan and Western Europe in the late
1960s assisted North Korea in creating substantial new in-
dustrial capacity. Machine tool imports boosted Pyongyang's
metal-working technology, improving its capabilities to manu-
facture military and industrial equipment. Partly as a result,
the North Korean machine-building industry has been able to
expand productive capacity over the past few years and
apparently managed to exceed some of the stated goals of the
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Seven-Year Plan. Pyongyang's importation of plants and
technology for the production of integrated circuits and
transistors has materially improved its small electronics
industry.
7. Despite the post-1967 infusion of Free World
machinery and equipment, the North remains well below the
ROK in terms of industrial growth. The North Korean annual
growth rate of gross industrial production averaged about 14
percent from 1967 through 1970 but ROK industrial production
achieved an average growth rate of 24 percent a year from
1965 on. In terms of overall trade with the Free World, of
course, there is little competition; ROK trade amounts to
some $2.5 billion a year, while North Korean-Free World ex-
changes have never reached as much as $100 million annually.
(North Korean total trade in 1970 was estimated to be about
$680 million.)
Political Results
8. Notwithstanding the clearcut emphasis on trade
in their dealings with Western Europe, the North Koreans
have also tried to make some political points, in some cases
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using trade as both bait and entree. This political approach
has been most apparent in Scandinavia where trade is minimal
but where Pyongyang has apparently sought opportunities to
establish secure bases for political activities elsewhere in
Western Europe.
9. Thus, Pyongyang succeeded in 1970 in opening an
information office in Sweden (receiving considerable help
from the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm); and a few North
Korean "documentaries" have been presented on Swedish tele-
vision. Beginning in the late sixties, the North Korean
ambassador in Moscow made several visits to Scandinavia
seeking diplomatic recognition and trade. And North Korean
officials have lavishly entertained various Scandinavian
officials and business executives. Pyongyang has sought,
without success, to set up an information office in Denmark,
and has funded the "Finnish Defenders for Peace" to dissemi-
nate North Korean propaganda. Pyongyang may have believed
that neutralist tendencies in Scandinavia could be turned to
political advantage, and that recognition might be extracted
from one or more countries. But the North Koreans have
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probably been disappointed; in the face of almost universal
official coolness, they have had to limit their contacts
largely to local communist parties and front groups.
10. In a number of other European countries the North
Koreans have been able to establish "friendship societies,"*
but efforts to gain official recognition -- e.g., from France,
Austria, and Switzerland -- or to surround unofficial trade
missions with diplomatic trappings have had little success.
Countries like France and Austria, which have permitted
unofficial North Korean trade missions to be established,
continue to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with the
ROK. A total of 16 noncommunist European countries presently
recognize South Korea; none recognizes North Korea.
Friendship societies or cultural associations (or insti-
tutes as they are sometimes called) are a favorite North
Korean device for gaining access to foreign areas, and
have been established in some 30 to 40 countries, many
of which have no official relations with North Korea.
They may be used as a wedge for establishment of trade,
commercial, or diplomatic relations at some Later date.
They also serve as covers for propaganda activity and,
in certain instances, for guerrilla training
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11. The reasons for Pyongyang's political failure in
Western Europe are varied. The North Korean effort in Europe
has not been able to overcome the entrenched acceptance of
South Korea's legitimacy, based on UN decisions at the time
of the Korean War. Indeed, there are few compelling reasons
for European UN members to break their pledges in this regard.
For one thing, South Korean trade is likely to remain far more
important to them than that of the North for the foreseeable
future. Additionally, many have been reluctant to move toward
recognition of North Korea lest it set some kind of precedent
on the issue of recognition of East Germany. There is also
awareness of and distaste for Pyongyang's proclivities toward
espionage and subversion. North Korea's attempts to derive
vicarious advantage from the sympathy which its ally North
Vietnam has won in some European capitals have generally
failed. States which have established official contacts with
Hanoi have emphasized that these are not to be viewed as a
precedent for dealing with Pyongyang.
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The Special Case of Japan
12. Despite North Korea's increased trade with Japan,
political relations have remained cool until very recently.
This partial thaw is a product of the uncertainty of both
sides about political trends in East Asia.
13. In policy toward Japan, North Korea has clearly
decided to follow China's lead: to work to undercut the
US-Japanese security relationship and to discredit pro-US
leaders in Japan. By these tactics, Pyongyang hopes to
speed removal of the US military presence from Japan and
Okinawa and, ultimately, to secure the complete withdrawal
of US forces from South Korea. In economic terms, Pyongyang
wants favorable Japanese consideration of North Korea's
industrial requirements for its current Six-Year Plan. Japan
is obviously in the best position to.supply such help; ship-
ping costs are low compared to Western European sources, and
Japan is familiar with North Korea's economic structure,
needs, and practices.
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14. In the realm of propaganda, Kim I1-song has recently
taken the same route as the Chinese in toning down charges of
resurgent Japanese "militarism" in favor of more subtle appeals
to Japanese self-interest. Kim has suggested that non-
governmental exchanges and increased trade with Japan could
begin immediately if Tokyo is willing. The Japanese seem
receptive. Although North Korea is hardly a market with major
potential, Japanese traders would like to capitalize on
Pyongyang's desire to import entire manufacturing plants.
There is also interest in relatively cheap supplies of North
Korea's ferrous and non-ferrous ores.
15. More importantly, Tokyo is pleased that Pyongyang
and Seoul are showing less hostility toward each other, at
least for international audiences, and in particular, that
the North and South Red Cross Societies are talking. These
developments have lessened Japanese concerns over the possi-
bility of renewed warfare in the peninsula and are leading
Tokyo to contemplate some political initiatives of its own
vis-a-vis North Korea: easing passport and travel restrictions,
assigning journalists to Pyongyang on a long-term basis, per-
mitting North Korean technicians to visit Japan, and possibly
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lifting the Japanese Export-Import Bank ban on loans to
Pyongyang. Given this new mood, Japanese-North Korean
political and economic contacts are likely to multiply in
the near future, though Japan will move cautiously to avoid
alienating South Korea.
16. Pyongyang hopes that the development of relations
with Tokyo may in time serve to restrain further heavy
Japanese investment in South Korea. Pyongyang is also
seeking to impress on the Japanese the advantages in not
becoming politically over-committed to the ROK. There is
obvious concern in Pyongyang, as US military forces withdraw
from the South, that the ROK linkage with Japan will become
stronger and that Tokyo will become a major force in per-
petuating the division of the peninsula.
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B. The Less Developed Countries*
Goals and Tactics
17. With little hope of registering political gains in
the advanced countries, North Korea has focused mainly on the
less sophisticated Third World to try winning friends and
influence. The near-term aims are twofold: to win acceptance
from the Third World at the annual UN General Assembly sessions,
thus blurring the UN's stamp of legitimacy on South Korea; and,
by propagating the revolutionary cult of Kim Il-song, to gain
a leading voice among radical elements in the less developed
countries disenchanted for one reason or another with the in-
creasingly moderate policies of both the USSR and China.**
The ultimate goals, of course, have long been to discredit
the US and to generate pressures for its military withdrawal
from the ROK; and to make unlikely any repetition of the 1950
UN intervention in Korean affairs.
See footnote on following page.
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18. North Korea has used a variety of tactics in its
cultivation of the less developed countries. It has criss-
crossed the Third World with high-pressure propaganda dele-
gations, set up numerous "friendship societies," subsidized
newspapers, worked with local communist parties and front
groups, extended aid in the form of small factories, irri-
gation projects, and agricultural schemes, and talked trade,
even where prospects for trade were dim, as a foot-in-the-
door technique. By and large, however, the North Koreans
have not spent large sums on overseas operations. In Tan-
zania, for example, 45 educational advisors assigned to the
By 1966, partly as a result of their conduct in the
Vietnam War, Kim had become convinced that neither
Moscow nor Peking would support his more venturesome
policies in the South, and that the Sino-Soviet conflict
had weakened the communist effort worldwide. He moved,
therefore, to stake out a more independent position in
line with the North Korean doctrine of chuch'e, which
rationalizes North Korea's right to pursue its own
course between the USSR and China. In its domestic and
foreign policy variants, chueh'e seeks to make North
Korea a model worthy of emulation: a small state fight-
ing great power "imperialism" of whatever hue, and which
by economic self-reliance and planned industrialization,
successfully bridges the gap between colonial dependency
and industrial self-sufficiency.
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secondary school system and the ruling party's parents'
association have established a position in Tanzanian edu-
cational planning "in the spirit of a true socialist culture."
19. North Korea has sometimes found it profitable to
ride Chinese and Soviet coattails. In Pakistan, the USSR
was instrumental in getting the North Korean mission es-
tablished and assisting Pyongyang's representatives to make
their initial contacts. Before the present fighting, North
Korea used its access to Soviet military equipment to send
in advisory teams to train the Pakistanis in the repair and
manufacture of Soviet hardware. The Chinese also were helpful
in placing North Korean technical teams in touch with the
Pakistani military. Following China's lead, Pyongyang has
furnished political support and training facilities to certain
guerrilla organizations in the Middle East, and to various
anti-South African, anti-Rhodesian, and anti-Portuguese groups
in southern Africa. North Korea has in fact, both copied and
competed with China in the training of guerrilla movements.
Although no comparative figures of Chinese and North Korean
assistance to these groups are available, Pyongyang has
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apparently found that the training of guerrillas is a rela-
tively cheap and easy undertaking in which a small country
can compete on fairly even terms for influence among radical
groups.
20. Some of Pyongyang's opportunistic approaches have
been better calculated than others. By siding strongly with
the Arabs in the aftermath of the 1967 war with Israel, North
Korea won access to the moderate Middle Eastern states of
Lebanon and Kuwait, where Pyongyang now has trade missions.
The North Koreans took advantage of the advent of the Allende
regime to set up a commercial mission in Chile, although
Santiago still recognizes South Korea. In Senegal, the
North Koreans are about to capitalize on its president's
desire to establish formal relations with another divided
state (i.e. East Germany) to win recognition for themselves.
21. But diplomacy based on sheer opportunism can some-
times boomerang. As a result of Pyongyang's involvement with
the Ceylonese "new left," which played a prominent role in
the March-April 1971 insurrection, the North Koreans were
ejected from that country. The fall of Nkrumah left Pyongyang,
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as it did Moscow, without fall-back assets in Ghana.
The recent coup in Bolivia wiped out whatever achieve-
ments had been made by visiting North Korean "cultural"
delegations; the new government publicly condemned Pyong-
yang's training of Latin American insurgents. Mexico
reacted strongly last spring to disclosures that North
Korea was training and funding student guerrillas --
whose requests for aid had previously been rejected by
the Soviets, the Chinese, the North Vietnamese and
the Cubans.
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22. When North Korea embarked on its rather extensive
cultivation of the less developed countries, it had diplo-
matic relations with only 14. It now has diplomatic
relations with 25 non-communist Third World states. The
North Koreans have generally won acceptability from the
most radical or the most poverty-stricken: Syria, Iraq,
South Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic in the Arab World;
The fourteen were Cambodia, Syria, Yemen, Algeria,
Maviiania," Guinea, Mali, Congo (Brazzaville),
Tanzania, Ghana, Indonesia, the UAR, Kenya, and Uganda.
The upsurge beginning in 1967 brought North Korea
recognition from Burundi, the Central African Repub-
lic (CAR), Ceylon, Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Somalia,
South Yemen, Sudan, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Chad, and
the Maldives Republic. Relations with Cambodia were
severed in 1970 with Sihanouk's downfall and with
Ghana in 1966, although Ghanian recognition of North
Korea was not withdrawn. Ceylon, as noted earlier,
ejected North Korean diplomats after the 1971 in-
surrection and Pyongyang closed its embassy in the
CAR to avoid the onus of a diplomatic break last
spring. North Korea has trade or consular missions
in 9'additional Third World countries: Burma,
India, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Chile, Kuwait,
Lebanon, and Mauritius.
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Ceylon (before the 1971 insurrection) and Pakistan in
South Asia; and Sudan, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia
in Africa. The radicals tend to be instinctively sympa-
thetic to Pyongyang's strident anti-Western rhetoric.
They see in North Korea a fellow victim of the colonial
period, somehow managing to avoid Soviet or Chinese
domination and loudly critical of the US. Pyongyang has
learned to manipulate the symbols of anti-imperialism,
small-country nationalism and economic self-reliance to
exploit these natural sympathies. And, in the case of
such poverty-stricken friends as South Yemen and Somalia,
to supplememt advice with a certain amount of aid.
23. But North Korea's pursuit of seemingly contra-
dictory policies -- cultivating governments on a state-
to-state basis while at the same time supporting and
encouraging revolutionary fringe groups -- has led to
political setbacks. These have not been confined to
Ceylon or Ghana or Bolivia or Mexico. In the wake of
the Ceylonese and Mexican episodes, for example, Indonesia
and Malaysia cracked down hard on North Korean propaganda
activities. Indeed, throughout East Asia, North Korea
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has been able to make little headway, in part because of
its unsavory reputation as a meddler in the internal affairs
of other countries. The disappearance of such congenial
leaders as Sukarno and Sihanouk, was also the cause of
setbacks, of course. (Meanwhile', ROK prestige in East
Asia has grown tremendously in recent years.) In Latin
America, too, North Korea has failed to extend its influence
to any significant degree, though it has trained a few
guerrilla leaders.
24. For much of the Third World, North Korea remains
a poor and remote country, with a parochial view of the
world, and only rhetoric to offer in abundance to its
would-be friends. To all but the most radical states,
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South Korea is a more attractive alternative, willing to
match or exceed the North in providing economic and tech-
nical assistance. Seoul has also gained prestige in some
quarters as a result of the effectiveness of its military
activities in South Vietnam. More importantly, South
Korea has impressed others by its vigorous and constructive
role in promoting regional cooperation in East Asia;
the Pak government took the initiative in forming the Asian
and Pacific Council. (ASPAC) in 1966, and, unlike North
Korea, it participates in ECAFE, the Asian Development
Bank, and numerous other regional organizations and
conferences.
III. PROSPECTS
25. North Korea is no longer a pariah in the inter-
national community. Although it is still badly upstaged
by Seoul in terms of diplomatic recognition (82 vs. 40),
it has established a presence around the world much beyond
that which it had in the mid-1960s. Its vigorous efforts
in the Free World in recent years have at least established
access to such important trade sources as Japan, West
Germany, France, The Netherlands, Italy and Austria.
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Further modest trade increases in North Korea's trade with
the developed countries, most especially Japan, seem
likely. Pyongyang is interested in buying some 30 complete
plants and will probably purchase additional machine tools,
electronics equipment, industrial: machinery,manufactured
goods, and petroleum to meet the ambitious goals of its
current Six-Year Plan (which emphasizes expansion of power,
metallurgical, chemical, and machine-building capacities).
26. North Korea, however, may not find it easy to
expand trade with the developed countries as rapidly or
as substantially as in the past few years. Pyongyang has
rolled up sizable debts in trading with the West; and nego-
tiations have generally been lengthy and tough. Success
of future trade negotiations will depend on the ability
of North Korean export industries to generate foreign
exchange earnings and, more importantly, on the continued
willingness of certain Western European countries and Japan
to extend long-term deferred repayment schemes and guaran-
teed contracts. In this connection, a straw in the wind
may be Sweden's decision to grant North Korea (and North
Vietnam and Cuba) preferential trade treatment at the
beginning of next year; Sweden is the first OECD country
to do so.
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27. North Korea will probably also make some addi-
tional political gains in the less developed countries.
Particularly with regard to UN affairs, Pyongyang probably
feels that its chances of receiving an "unconditional"
invitation to any 1972 General Assembly deliberations on
Korean issues have improved as a result of China's presence
on the scene. Pyongyang may find a good deal of support
for such an invitation among middle-of-the-road UN members
-- i.e., those non-radicals of the Third World who none-
theless voted for Peking's admission. Moderates of the
Middle East and West Africa, for example, for whom the
Korean War is a distant and irrelevant memory and who
draw no fine distinctions between the two Koreas, would
be the most likely supporters of a revised UN approach
to the Korean issue..-,
28. North Korean prospects at the UN would be clearly
enhanced if the General Assembly were to wash its hands
of the UN Command in South Korea or to abolish the UN
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea
(UNCURK), in short, for the UN to take steps to erase
the vestiges of its 1950-1951 decisions. Thus, if North
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Korea is invited to any 1972 General Assembly discussion
of the Korean issue, Pyongyang may be expected to lobby
intensively., among both its communist allies and its Third
World friends, for the abolition of these Korean War
institutions and for adoption of a more evenhanded approach
to the two Koreas. A parallel strategy outside the UN
context, at least in the near term, would be for North
Korea to support Chinese efforts to reach a modus vivendi
with the US, and for continuation of the present Red
Cross negotiations with the South Koreans. All these
approaches would help to move Pyongyang toward its most
compelling objective: the withdrawal of all remaining
US troops from the ROK.
29. Any real diplomatic breakthrough for North
Korea, however, is likely to depend mainly on the attitu-
des and actions of other countries. Ultimately, for
example, Japan's policies toward Pyongyang will be shaped
by the more important requirements of Tokyo's evolving
posture toward China. Chou En-lai has stated to Japanese
businessmen his desire for improved Japanese relations
with North Korea. Elsewhere, North Korea's overseas
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fortunes will be shaped by such diverse factors as the
progress of Sino-American talks and reconciliation of the
two Germanys. Of major interest to North Korea in this
latter connection is a possible shift in the UN position
on the issue of divided states; changes here could lead
to simultaneous admission for both Koreas, a position
always acceptable to Pyongyang and increasingly accepta-
ble to Seoul.
30. As the world moves to liquidate Cold War legacies,
one might expect North Korea to follow the Chinese lead
in yet another way -- to tone down its advocacy of violent
revolution and bring its hostile and provocative propa-
ganda more into line with its flexible diplomacy. But so
far there has been little evidence of any such shift in
North Korean actions, except in relations with Japan and
South Korea. North Korean officials abroad continue to
promote with excessive zeal Kim's pretensions to world
revolutionary leadership. As late as 15 October, for
example, Pyongyang Radio re-emphasized North Korea's
dedication to all shades of revolutionary activity and
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underscored Kim's continuing belief in the necessity
for supporting "the revolutionary struggles of peoples
of all countries."
31. Yet it stands to reason that the North Koreans
should limit their involvement with revolutionary move-
ments, at least in those countries they are attempting
to cultivate, if their efforts to appear more responsible
internationally are to bear fruit. In this connection,
the Korean Workers Party has recently undertaken "a compre-
hensive analysis of general questions raised by the inter-
national situation." If these sessions are fruitful,
and if Pyongyang continues to see merit in Peking's
new foreign policy pragmatism, there may soon be some
reduction in North Korean revolutionary activity in the
Third World.
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