IMPLICATIONS OF AN INDIAN VICTORY OVER PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000400020005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 9, 1971
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Implications of an Indian Victory over Pakistan
A. Liberation of Bangla Desh
B. The incorporation into India of the southern area
of Azad (Pakistani-held) Kashmir
C. The destruction of Pakistani armored and air force
strength so that Pakistan can never again threaten
India.
In the following we assume that these objectives have been
achieved, and discuss their implications in the subcontinent
and for other powers.
The General Postwar Situation in the Subcontinent
2. India would, of course, be the dominant power in South
Asia. But its formidable economic problems would have been
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GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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aggravated by the war and its need for outside economic
assistance increased. Further, though the military power
of Pakistan would be destroyed, both the former east and
west wings of that country would emerge gravely troubled
from the war and their difficulties are likely to spill
over, sooner or later, into India itself.
3. Bangla Desh would probably emerge under a kind of
Indian tutelage. India will be in a position to exert
paramount influence, but it does not desire and could not
maintain outright control. Already impoverished and over-
crowded, Bangla Desh's economy and social structure have been
badly damaged by civil war and by Indo-Pakistani hostilities.
The Bengali propensity for extremism, radicalism, and violence,
already apparent in the Hindu Indian state of West Bengal, is
likely to manifest itself in Muslim Bangla Desh in fairly short
order. And the troubles in that new country and in West Bengal
are likely to reinforce and stimulate one another. We do not,
however, believe that a new Bengali nationalism (working for
the secession of West Bengal from India and its incorporation
into Bangla Desh) is likely to be an effective force for the
foreseeable future; Hindu-Muslim antagonisms remain too intense,
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and Indian military power too great to permit such a contingency.
But the two Bengals will create considerable trouble and consume
much of New Delhi's efforts and resources.
4. What is now termed West Pakistan will also face an
uncertain future. Though the Indian military would have with-
drawn after its victory, the area would also probably have suffered
considerable damage during the fighting. Much would depend on the
extent of damage to such important and expensive Indus valley
hydroelectric and irrigation projects as the Tarbela and Mangla
dams and on the industrial plant, centered mostly in Karachi.
5. Beyond this, West Pakistan might fall apart politically.
The area suffers from regional antagonisms and hostilities; a
major defeat could permit the emergence of centrifugal forces
which could shatter West Pakistan into as many as three or four
separate countries, successors to the four states which now make
up most of that nation.* Of the four the Punjab has traditionally
The four are the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the pre-
dominantly Pushtu speaking Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).
Of West Pakistan's roughly 55 million people, some 66 percent
are Punjabis, .13 percent are Sindis, 10 percent Pushtuns, and
3 percent Baluchis. The remainder are principally Urdu-
speaking refugees from India.
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dominated the army and the government of Pakistan, so far
without major challenge. But if this army is not just
defeated, but disintegrates, at least some of its often
disaffected fellow nationals might seek to break away --
each in its own individual fashion. These possibilities
are discussed in more detail in an annex.
6. It should be noted that the possible breakup of
Pakistan is based on the assumption that the Pakistani army is
not simply defeated but virtually ceases to exist in the West
as well as in the East.
it is doubtful that India will (or that it can) impose such a
total defeat on Pakistan. In other words, the Pakistani army
in the West will still probably be in being when the cease-fire
sounds and, as such, more likely than not able to contain or
deter any breakaway tendencies in the West. Yahya and his
associates would probably be so discredited by the defeat that
someone else would head the government, but except in the very
worst case, the army could probably be counted on to hold West
Pakistan together. Nonetheless, such a government would be
under heavy pressure from radical political forces, long at odds.
with the military establishment, seeking access to power.
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7. Moscow has apparently been convinced for some time
that a close association with India is central to its long-
term interests in South Asia. The USSR supported diplomatically
and materially New Delhi's "policy of pressure" on Pakistan
prior to the outbreak of hostilities and has backed it vigorously
in the UN. The USSR stands to emerge, therefore, as even more
influential in South Asia after the fighting stops than it has
been. It will, as a consequence, continue to have large and
growing demands in terms of economic and military aid to India
and also to Bangla Desh. Even if it were able and willing to
meet such demands, the USSR could not be sure of getting all it
wants in the area as a result of its prestigious position. India,
no longer faced by a strong qnd hostile Pakistani military machine,
would feel less beholden to the Soviets than today, less amenable
to Soviet requests which offend its sense of dignity or sover-
eignity. Indian gratitude is not a very enduring matter.
8. Whether Soviet-Indian relations are characterized by
intimacy and (on the Indian side) dependence in future will be
determined largely by how China and the US define their attitudes
toward Delhi. If Indian-American relations are not repaired and
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economic aid is cut back, India will place greater reliance on the
USSR. If China's current hostility to India is sustained, the
same would be true. In this case, Moscow would have greater
leverage in Delhi and could drive hard bargains, for example,
for naval facilities. But if China eventually accepts the new
situation in South Asia and moves to normalize its relations
with Delhi, the latter would probably welcome the chance to
diminish its dependence on the USSR.
9. India's achievement of its objectives would be a matter
of serious concern to China. Peking would fear some loss of
face internationally simply because it had failed to take effective.
action to support a friend of long standing. More serious from
Peking's point of view would be the implications of this event
for its contest with the USSR.
10. In its statements at the UN and on Radio Peking, China
has stressed two major propositions: that the USSR is shielding
and supporting India's "armed aggression" against Pakistan and
attempting thereby to control the subcontinent and the Indian
Ocean; and that there is no guarantee for the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of various countries if India, with Soviet
support, is permitted to use the "pretext" of self-defense to
commit "armed aggression" against Pakistan.
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11. Both of these propositions are designed to embarrass
the USSR and to gain credit for China as a "principled" defender
of Third World interests against the machinations of the Great
Powers. But they almost certainly reflect a genuine and deep-
seated concern that the USSR will make an important advance in
position and influence in the subcontinent, adding to the "en-
circlement" of China, and providing in the longer run a military
and political base for further expansion of Soviet influence in
the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.
12. If China accepts the Indian fait accompli, its concern
will still remain and it will have to devise longer range and
more sophisticated means for limiting or undermining Soviet/Indian
collaboration. Basically, its alternatives would be to try gradually
to strengthen West Pakistan and to weaken India via subversion or
in time compete for influence in New Delhi with the Soviets. This
latter course may eventually appear attractive; Delhi may not
relish too close an embrace with the USSR and thus might be disposed
to welcome Chinese overtures.
13. But the Chinese may be in no hurry to shift the focus
of their efforts in the subcontinent. They will not wish to
appear as "fair-weather" friends, they have gone on the record
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with very strong condemnations of India, and they don't Zike
Indians particularly. India is potentially a big power rival
and the Chinese may have serious doubts that any Sino-Indian
rapprochement would serve any purpose other than permitting
India to gain more aid from all sides and hasten the growth of
its economic and military power. For these reasons, we believe
that Sino-Indian relations will remain tense for some time.
14. Of the regional powers, Iran much more than Afghanistan
has involved itself in Pakistan's struggle with India. The Shah
would probably provide a defeated West Pakistan with oil, some
money, and some military equipment. He might even see Iran's
interests served by moving to exert deeper influence in Pakistan's
affairs, but, at least initially, we doubt that he would devote
much of his real resources to such a project. More generally,
however, the defeat and dismemberment of Pakistan would clearly
enhance Iran's importance in the Persian Gulf-Indian Ocean area.
As a result, other governments may eventually come to take Iran
at something closer to the Shah's valuation of his country as
one of the world's major regional powers. Pakistan's defeat would
also reinforce the Shah's view that he must rely on himself as far
as possible to gain his foreign policy objectives.
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Wider Implications
15. As indicated, the successful achievement of India's
political-military objectives would alter power relations in
the subcontinent in a highly visible way. Because the USSR
would have helped to bring about this result by overt diplomatic,
propaganda, and material support to India, an impression would
be left in many quarters that Soviet power and policy were effective
and had served the USSR's ally well. Since US policy would have
suffered a reverse and since US power and influence tend to be
measured relative to that of the USSR, some in other states
might think that they should take into account in their own
calculations some revised judgment of the US-USSR power equation.
16. Such impressions and calculations are often transitory
in effect, though in this case a widely held impression that Soviet
weight in the world is growing would no doubt be reinforced in
some degree. It is another thing, however, for states involved
in confrontation situations in other areas, say the Middle East
or Southeast Asia, to draw concrete inferences and to act in
different ways than they are now acting. It is unlikely that
Egypt would conclude that the USSR would be willing to take greater
risks on its behalf; if it did so, Moscow would be quick to disabuse
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Cairo of the notion. The states in Southeast Asia which are
concerned about US disengagement from that area would find new
reason for concern and perhaps would lend a readier ear to Soviet
efforts to build influence there, but they would be most unlikely
to undertake any sharp turn of policy.
17. The key factor determining wider effects of the current
events in South Asia would be what the Soviets think these events
mean. In a general sense Moscow would be encouraged to think
that its power and influence were growing and that it could
entertain the idea of playing a stronger hand in some other
contexts. But the Soviets are unlikely to abandon the careful
calculation of risks they customarily bring to particular situations.
Moreover, they would not wish to compromise the general line of
their current foreign policy which, vis-a-vis the West, operates
under slogans of detente, negotiations, etc. This would be
especially the case if the current developments in South Asia,
as seems likely, deepened their quarrel with China.
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ANNEX
Possible Breakaway Elements in West Pakistan
1. The eight million Sindhis, residents of the southern
part of West Pakistan and centered around the cities of the
Hyderbad and Karachi, often hostile to the Punjabis, could
declare their independence. Indeed, West Pakistan's principal
civilian political figure, Z. A. Bhutto is a Sindhi, and though
the recipient of a heavy electoral mandate in December 1970,
has never been permitted to take office by the Punjabi military.
Undoubtedly resentful, he could in extreme circumstances seize
the initiative and secede, preferring the leadership of a small,
weak, comparatively unimportant country to remaining out of power.
2. The predominantly tribal residents of the NWFP have
long been objects of international contention. They have close
ties with Pushtu speakers in eastern Afghanistan. Kabul has
long believed that the Pushtuns belong together, and that the
present Afghan-Pakistan frontier is a line arbitrarily and unfairly
drawn by the British raj. Their claims on this area have led them
in the past to quite serious confrontations with the Pakistanis.
Indeed, were Pakistan to begin to fall apart, the Afghans would
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probably help the process along by moving to detach the
NWFP and bringing it under their protection.
3. Baluchistan, primitive, frequently lawless, and
isolated, is not likely to be able to assume the status of
an independent state. It could thus remain attached to the
Punjab, though it is conceivable that it would be absorbed by
either Afghanistan (giving that landlocked country an outlet
to the sea) or by Iran. Both these countries already have
Baluchi speaking residents.
4. The Muslim Punjab, with its capital in Lahore, would
remain a not inconsiderable country of over 30 million people.
Provided it had not been too badly damaged, it would probably
recover economically fairly rapidly. It would remain the focus
of bitterly intractable anti-Hindu, anti-Indian sentiments. But
if Mrs. Gandhi's objectives above are met, the Punjab -- either
as the dominant figure in a still united West Pakistan or as a
separate country -- would no longer pose a threat to India. Nor
would it have the international stature previously enjoyed by a
united Pakistan. Rather it would probably be viewed by most
powers as a state on the order of Afghanistan: remote and of no
great consequence.
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