IRAN: ROYAL REVOLUTION REVISITED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020011-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 31, 2006
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: July 27, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Iran: Royal Revolution Revisited
MORI
review(s)
completed.
Secret
27 July 1972
Copy No.
.. 1
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
27 July 1972
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Iran: Royal Revolution Revisited*
The Shah's emergence as the dominant force in the Persian
Gulf area and his central role in world oil negotiations make
the question of his survival and the continuation of his policies
of particular importance at this time. The present memorandum
surveys his prospects and the outlook for stability in Iran in
terms of the domestic challenges to his position.
1. In recent years the Shah of Iran has scored an impressive
chain of successes. At home he has cut down or isolated potential
rivals, staked out his claim to be a royal revolutionary, and in
the process has established his supremacy beyond question. He has
presided over remarkably rapid economic development, due in no small
* This memorandum was prepared by the Office of National Estimates
and discussed with other components of the CIA, who are in
general agreement with its judgments.
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part to his ability to squeeze enormous additional funds from
Western oil companies. On the foreign front as well, the Shah
has built an image of independence. He deals with the Great
Powers with assurance, and insists that his American ally should
give great weight to his appreciation of regional problems. In
short, the Shah has become a supremely self-confident figure with
much to be proud of.
2. The Shah's achievements have to a large extent been
Iran's as well. During his reign the country has grown greatly
in economic terms.* There has even been some measure of re-
distribution of wealth. The so-called White Revolution has taken
land from the larger owners and put it into the hands of former
sharecroppers and small holders. Booming industrial development
has also provided jobs to reduce the unemployment and under-
employment that has long characterized the Iranian economy. Access
to education for the poor has also broadened with a mushroom growth
of schools and of literacy training promoted by the Shah. All in
* In Iran Gross National Product has risen over 10 percent annually
for the last five years and now stands at $11.5 billion (1970
dollars). This striking achievement is due largely to sharp
increases in oil revenues, which totalled about $2 billion in the
past fiscal year. Income from oil is slated to continue to mount
according to the terms of agreements between Iran and the inter-
national oil companies.
T~rr
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all, the lot of the common man in Iran has improved significantly,
especially in recent years.
3. The Shah has managed to improve the conditions of the
masses without seriously alienating his erstwhile support from
the "thousand families". Most of the important wealth in Iran
had already been shifted from land to industry before the White
Revolution and thus the rich have grown richer. Nor is their
position in the power structure greatly diminished. The Shah's
court and government still cater to scions of these prominent
families. While they are not necessarily in the forefront of
the drive for social change in Iran, these elements seem rea-
sonably satisfied with the course of the regime.
4. There has also been overall improvement in the position
of the emerging educated urban classes. To be sure they are
caught in an inflationary squeeze and some of those who had purchased
land as a way to status in the years before the White Revolution
were hurt by the reform program. Yet the reform movement brought
middle class technocrats to positions of command in the bureau-
cracy so that many find themselves substantially better off than
they were. The ranks of the losers have been comparatively small
and confined to segments of the population which had little power
either in the traditional system or in the emerging more modern one.
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5. The Shah has achieved his results by hard work, growing
political skill, and a share of luck. He personally commands the
White Revolution, leaves little to others, and continues to hold
the reins of power firmly in his own hands. Over the years, the
Shah has developed the ability to make the most of good fortune.
For example, in negotiations with international (mostly American)
oil companies last year he exploited to the utmost Western fears
of Arab instability in the face of a mounting energy crisis --
fears which were compounded by company miscalculations of oil
demand, disruption in normal oil supply routes, and tanker short-
ages. While the Shah has obtained a huge infusion of new financial
resources, he has managed to continue to impress the oil companies
as a man with whom they can do business.
6. Also basic to his position is the creation of modern and
efficient military forces. Not only does he see a strong military
establishment as a bulwark at home, but he is spurred by desire to
be the dominant force in the Persian Gulf littoral. He has proved
persuasive in arguing for the purchase of large amounts of weaponry,
including F-4 aircraft. This has made the Iranian military far
overshadow the forces of most of his neighbors. While his armed
forces thus provide him a strong base of power within Iran, posses-
sion of this force also raises the possibility that he might misuse
his power and embark on foreign adventures.
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7. In addition to his undeniable achievements, there is a
considerable measure of ballyhoo about the Shah. He is not
quite as radical a reformer as he claims. His has not yet
been -- and will not soon be -- a thoroughgoing social revolution.
But his public effort to convey the impression that he is leading
a total transformation of society is an essential part of his
style, and contributes to the success of the regime. And there
are few in Iran who publicly question the Shah's claims.
8. The regime, however, does have some important weak-
nesses. First the Shah's program -- his "revolution" -- depends
to an inordinate degree on him personally. At the center of a
complex web of balanced forces -- the army, the palace, the
"thousand families", the bureaucracy, the religious institution,
etc. -- the Shah alone supplies direction and coherence to the
system. Through his extensive network of formal and informal
channels, he personally keeps his finger on developments within
university dissidence. Rather than use this great fund of know-
ledge to take effective action, however, he often prefers to act
to prevent changes in the system that might diffuse his authority,
let alone upset his position. An example of this is the way in
which he has consistently removed all second echelon figures of
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independent standing, thereby depriving Iran of experienced
alternative leadership.
9. Beyond this lack of institutionalization, the regime
faces other problems. The educated urban dwellers remain
potentially disruptive. Some of these elements have economic
grievances against the Shah. Even the technocrats who have been
incorporated into the regime may not be entirely converted from
their ancient skepticism of the throne. The Shah has been care-
ful to limit their authority and these limitations are a source
of frustration. Gossip about the continuing corruption in high
places is growing in these circles, and they may be becoming more
restive.
10. The young have long been a particular thorn in the side
of the Shah. Those thousands he sends abroad for education have
often become estranged; some have embarked on radical causes and
have often promoted violence against him. Even university students
inside Iran have demonstrated against the archaic, though gradually
modernizing, educational system. Further, students seem to be the
backbone of the small groups of anarchists that have gained prom-
inence in recent years. These radicals -- branded Maoists by the
Teheran government -- have begun terrorist activity apparently
dedicated to bringing down the Shah's regime.
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11. We do not know how widespread organized opposition is
in Iran. Stringent security measures and forceful dealing with
the university students have undoubtedly retarded the growth of
anarchist groups. The Shah's tough and efficient security service,
has arrested
a number of alleged terrorists. Recently, in fact, some 100 were
put on trial and sentenced to prison terms of varying length. But
others undoubtedly remain at large and have some potential to cause
trouble. They are not, however, a serious danger to the regime at
this time.
12. We think it likely that the challenges to the Shah will
mount over the longer run. And given the reservoir of disaffected
youth, particularly those educated abroad and encouraged by Iran's
foreign enemies, the regime stands little chance to prevent all
terrorist opposition. Clearly arrests have not broken the back of
this radical protest movement -- there were more than a dozen
explosive devices set off to protest President Nixon's recent visit.
13. Political terrorism of this sort cannot by itself shake
the regime, unless it should accomplish the assassination of the
Shah. Our best guess is that the Shah will continue to ride out
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this challenge without serious overreaction. He has managed to
combine firmness and moderation with great skill in the past.
Should he continue to act with his usual dexterity, there appears
to be no reason why his regime would not survive for many years
to come, even though all opposition is unlikely to disappear.
14. There is, however, some chance that continuing terrorist
violence will provoke the Shah into responses which could have a
broader impact on Iranian society. Already the Shah is deeply
frustrated at the apparent ingratitude of the young who, thanks
to his economic successes, enjoy far greater opportunities for
education and advancement than in the past. At some point, par-
ticularly in view of the gradual estrangement of the middle class,
this frustration could lead the Shah to clamp severe new restrictions
on students -- or perhaps on wider segments of the population.
15. If the Shah should move in this direction, it would
probably add impetus to the forces against him. Such restrictions
could alienate groups now satisfied with the regime and tarnish
the Shah's image as a progressive modernizer. Under these circum-
stances, over the longer run, the military establishment might
not prove entirely reliable in imposing increasing repression.
Despite his best efforts, an anti-Shah cabal could develop in the
army; and a few well placed officers might undertake a coup. This
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is a potential, rather than a present danger; we do not have
any evidence that significant military dissidence exists.
Moreover, the Shah has such a good track record in dealing
with challenges that plotters are likely to be deterred,
knowing that an attempt to unseat him would by no means be
certain of success.
16. In any event,should the Shah soon leave the scene,
either by assassination (and he is often careless of his personal
safety) or by accident, there is reasonable doubt that the
succession mechanism would work to assure his 12-year old son,
Reza Cyrus Ali, the throne. Regency is untried in modern Iranian
experience and in this case would entail rule by the Queen --
an expedient only recently sanctioned by law after long being
specifically forbidden by Iranian custom and canon. Queen Fara
Dibba is popular and reputed for her common sense. She has
political interests, family connections and her own coterie of
advisers and hangers-on; initially at least she would have to
depend on a junta drawn from the establishment for support. This
alignment would probably stand for a time, but without the Shah's
strong hand, political intrigue would be likely to burgeon, and
the position of the throne would be jeopardized. In short, the
Shah's departure would create conditions in which a new alignment
of forces would be likely to arise.
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