SOVIET TREATY-MAKING IN THE THIRD WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00967A000500020014-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: July 7, 1972
• Content Type: MEMO

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Secret
OFFICE OF
NATIONAL ESTIMATES
MEMORANDUM
Soviet Treaty-Making in the Third World
Secret
7 July 1972
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
7 July 1972
SUBJECT: Soviet Treaty-Making in the Third World*
Since May 1971 the Soviet Union has signed treaties of
friendship and cooperation with Egypt, India, and Iraq. This
memorandum seeks to set forth the relevant facts, to consider
these new formal agreements in perspective, and to address three
interrelated questions: (a) What are the implications for
Soviet relations with those countries and with their neighbors?
(b) Does this activity represent a consistent pattern or a new
development in Soviet foreign policy? (c) Are other such treaties
in prospect?
This Memorandum was produced in the Office of National Estimates
and coordinated within CIA.
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Soviet Treaty-Making in Context
1. These three treaties fall into a special category, but
a rather restricted one-., The Soviet Union has treaties
of "friendship and good-neighbor relations" with Iran, Afghanistan,
and Turkey which date back to the early 11920s` it also has a
"friendship" treaty with Yemen (San'a) signed in 1964.* In addition,
there is a treaty of "friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance"
the term also used for the bilateral treaties among the Soviet bloc
countries -- with Finland, signed in 1948 and extended in July 1970
for 20 years more. Thus the treaties with Egypt, India, and Iraq
are, along with the Yemen treaty, the USSR's only ones with
noncontiguous, noncommunist countries.
origins of the Three Treaties
2. Particular circumstances obtained in the formation of
each of these three treaties, and on this account they do not
entirely fit a single pattern. Our best information regarding the
Soviet-Indian agreement (Annex B) is that it stemmed from an offer
A 1,925 USSR-Turkish "friendship and non-aggression" treaty was
denounced by the USSR in 1945. The Soviet government had signed
a treaty of "friendship and trade" in 1928 with the then
Mutawakkalite Kingdom of Yemen -- an agreement which the 1964
treaty presumably supplanted.
SECRET
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made by Soviet Defense Minister Grechko, with Politburo approval,
in March 1969. The Soviets at that time apparently were in some
consternation regarding the Sino-Soviet border clashes and were
particularly eager to obtain India's diplomatic support against China.
For their part, the Indians were receptive to the idea because they
thought it might lead to the reduction or cessation of Soviet aid
to Pakistan, But for various reasons, including Mrs. Gandhi's desire
to select the most suitable time for springing this surprise on the
Indian public, and (possibly) a few second thoughts in Moscow about
the treaty, nothing was done until August 1971. By that time Mrs.
Gandhi had won her election, the crisis with Pakistan was nearing a
flashpoint, the Indians apprehended an unfriendly US stance toward
them, and both the Indians and Soviets were nervous about Sino-US
detente. Result: the treaty.
3. Our information on the Soviet-Egyptian treaty (Annex A)
indicates that, as with India, the Soviets were the instigators.
Some of the gossip in Cairo after the treaty was signed in May 1971
had it that in 1970 the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to gain Nasser's
approval of the idea. The Soviets may indeed have made such an
attempt. In any case it is clear that after Nasser's death the
Soviets detected several signs that Sadat was drifting to the "right"
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in domestic policies and away from the "anti-imperialist direction"
in foreign policy; more specifically, that he was negotiating. with
the US on his own in the interests of an acceptable Egyptian-Israeli
settlement. Accordingly, Moscow pressed for the treaty as a useful
way of counteracting these threats to Soviet influence. For his part,
Sadat probably believed that his acceptance of the treaty would help
to ensure continuing Soviet economic, military, and diplomatic support.
4. In contrast to the other two signatories, Iraq, early
this year, asked.'for its treaty (Annex C). Baghdad apparently
reckoned that it would enhance the regime's domestic prestige and
its reputation in the Arab world -- at least among the radical Arabs.
Moreover, Baghdad supposed that it might lead to an increase in
Soviet military and economic aid, especially aid to Iraq's production
and marketing of oil. Not least of all, the Iraqis believed, it
could transform the USSR's benevolent neutrality in the simmering
Iraq-Iran dispute into something much more benevolent and less
neutral. The Soviets, for their part, apparently pressed Iraq hard
on three matters:
-- to include Communist Party members in the Iraqi regime
and to involve the Party in the major political
organization;
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-- to provide some form of access to Iraqi support facilities
for Soviet naval forces;
-- and to consult with the USSR prior to initiating hostilities
with another country (read: Iran).
The Iraqi regime has in fact taken on Communist'Party members in
certain positions; whether or not commitments were made on the other
two issues is not yet clear.
Textual Differences
5. While the treaties are similar in language, they are
not identical. Publicly (and predictably) the Soviets have stressed
the common features. For example, on 13 June, during the Supreme
Soviet's pro forma debate over the treaty with Iraq, Chairman
Podgorny commented that the three treaties together "represent a
new, practical embodiment of the strengthening link and expanding
interaction of world socialism with the forces of national libera-
tion'.'. Privately, the Soviets have acknowledged that there are
important differences, at least in tone. They apparently regard
their treaty commitments to Iraq, and India's commitments to them,
as least binding, and the mutual ties between Moscow and Cairo as the
strongest. This interpretation is borne out by certain distinctive
formulations in the published texts, e.g.:
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-- The Egyptian treaty spells out the question of Soviet
military assistance; the Iraqi text refers only in
general terms to cooperation in the strengthening of
"their" defense capabilities; the Indian treaty con-
tains no equivalent language.
-- Both the Egyptian and Iraqi treaties refer to the
coordination, or concerting, of foreign policies,
whereas the Indian text urges only "mutual coopera-
tion"; moreover, the Iraqis are given less leeway than
the Egyptians to decide whether and when consultation
with the Soviets is required.
-- India's "nonalignment" and "independence" are
recognized by the Soviets; in contrast, both Egypt
and Iraq in effect allow for the preservation of
Soviet influence in their countries by agreeing to
cooperate with the USSR in preserving their "socio-
economic gains".
-- The desirability of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation.in the
development of Iraqi oil resources is specifically
mentioned, though the language does not bind the
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Soviets to render any specific aid to the Iraqis in
this area (the,,UAR treaty mentions only "natural
resources", whereas the Indian treaty limits itself
to a general statement, common to all three treaties,
regarding "economic, scientific and technological
cooperation").
Implications for Bilateral Relations: India
6. The effects of the treaties on Moscow's relations with
the signatories, and with their neighbors, have been mixed. In
India, the more articulate critics of the treaty picked a bad time
to state their objections -- i.e., after Parliament had ratified
the treaty but before the outbreak of the war. Critics chose this
moment to lace otherwise cogent arguments with some very bad predic-
tions: the treaty would not lead to any increase in Soviet military
aid and diplomatic support for India; and the USSR might use the
treaty as a means of preventing India from taking appropriate
military measures against Pakistan. Subsequent events have muted
virtually all criticisms of the new arrangement with the USSR.
7. Indian goodwill and gratitude toward the USSR could
be dissipated under certain circumstances. India now regards
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itself, with reason, as the dominant voice on-the subcontinent, and
yet the USSR also desires to extend its influence in the area. Indian
and Soviet policies toward Bangladesh are broadly parallel at present,
but the Indians are quite wary of Moscow's long-term objectives; there
could be, at the least, serious misunderstandings if the Soviets
were seen by the Indians to be establishing some sort of military
arrangement or to be meddling in Dacca's internal politics. The
expected growth of the Soviet naval presence in the.Indian Ocean, even
if it does not lead to the establishment of Soviet bases as such near
India's shores, may jar Indian sensitivities about outside intrusions.
Beyond this, India may conclude that its security from external
threat has improved to such a degree that India no longer requires
the kind of close association with another country implied in the
treaty.
8. Avoiding these potential sources of friction in its
relationship with Delhi entirely will require Moscow to show a
sense of pace and subtlety -- the latter quality not always
characteristic of Soviet diplomacy. If they are wise, the Soviets
should, for example, bring themselves to go through the ritual of
consulting the Indians in advance of any new moves in Bangladesh.
They should forego asking for one or two naval facilities in the
Indian Ocean until the West is seen by the Indians to have
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established three or four. They should offer the Indians more
action on the world scene; in other words, Moscow is likely to find
the Indians better disposed to the spread of its influence in South
Asia if, at the same time, the Soviets encourage a larger Indian
voice in Asian affairs. (There are signs that they have begun to
urge the Indians to be more active diplomatically in Southeast Asia.)
Iraq
9. In addition to whatever advantages the Soviets may have
derived from the negotiations which led up to the Iraqi treaty,
the treaty itself serves longer-term Soviet goals in the region.
For example, the Soviets have referred to the Iraqi treaty as a
factor which, in conjunction with the Egyptian treaty, promotes
the "consolidation" and "development" of Soviet-Arab relations as
a whole. (General Secretary Brezhnev himself made this point in
his speech to the Soviet trade union congress in April, just after
the Soviet-Iraqi treaty was signed, and Party Secretary Ponomarev
repeated it in June, as the treaty was brought before the Supreme
Soviet for formal ratification.) The Soviets, in other words,
probably expect that the achievement of a second treaty with an
Arab state will help to persuade the Arab states generally that
close association with the USSR is the wave of their future.
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10. This Soviet expectation may or may not prove realistic
in the case of Syria. The Soviets have apparently been seeking a
friendship treaty with Syria for some time, and no doubt hope that
the Iraqi treaty will encourage Damascus to favor a similar agree-
ment. And, indeed, some Syrians acknowledge that pro-treaty forces
in Damascus may have been strengthened somewhat by the signing of
the Iraqi treaty. But Syrian opponents of close association with
the USSR have also become more active of late, and Damascus Radio
announced on 16 April that Syria was not at the moment contemplating
the signing of a treaty with the USSR.
11. Other important radical Arab states seem less than
pleased about the Iraqi treaty. Libya not only criticized it
publicly, but withdrew its ambassador from Baghdad for a short
period. Moreover the Libyans evidently asked for and received
Algeria's prior approval before expressing their displeasure.
Indeed, Algerian foreign ministry officials have since maintained
that only the "delicacy" of their government's relations with the
USSR prevented it from joining in the public denunciation of Iraq.
And despite a recent improvement in the overall climate of Iraqi-
Egyptian relations (which may owe something to Soviet prodding of
the Iraqis), some Egyptian officials have professed annoyance at
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what they regard as Iraq's effort to challenge Egypt's primacy of
place among the USSR's Arab allies.
12. Among non-Arab states in the area, Iran is naturally
the most concerned. Evidently the Soviets have tried in various
ways to reassure Teheran that the treaty is not aimed at Iranian
interests, but these reassurances would sound hollow indeed if.the
Iranians began to observe qualitative improvements in Iraqi
weaponry and particularly if they witnessed the establishment of
a Soviet naval facility at the head of the Persian Gulf. At a
minimum, the Iranians are apprehensive that the Soviets may intend
to enter into serious competition with them for influence in the
Persian Gulf.
Egypt
13. The Soviet-Egyptian treaty must present a very mixed
picture to the Soviets at this point. Since the treaty Sadat has
in fact moved to curb some officials critical of Egypt's pro-Soviet
alignment. He has also made efforts to mediate between the USSR and
the rather anti-Soviet regimes in Libya and the Sudan. In these
respects Sadat has acted in a manner consistent with the treaty,
if not necessarily as a consequence of it. Of course the main
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argument in favor of the treaty, from Moscow's point of view, may
be a negative one: the tensions that exist in Soviet-Egyptian
relations might have become considerably worse if there had not
been some formal check on Sadat's behavior. But this may not be a
very persuasive argument nowadays. Occasional' scenes between Soviet
and Egyptian officers, and the persistent, often public, criticism
of Soviet behavior expressed by Egyptian officials and journalists
may suggest to some Soviets that the bilateral relationship has
actually deteriorated since the treaty.
14. Indeed, the day may come when the Soviets see the
treaty itself as an irritant in the relationship. The treaty
may have raised Egyptian expectations that the Soviets will
somehow be able to break the deadlock with Israel. As it becomes
clearer that they will not or cannot do so, Egyptian resentment
will surely intensify. Moreover, the treaty may encourage Sadat
to go out of his way to prove in various ways that he is not
simply a Soviet puppet.
A Pattern for the Future?
15. Whatever the Soviets' misgivings about these three ,
treaties, they have apparently decided that formal undertakings of
this sort can be a useful adjunct to overall Soviet foreign policy
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aims. They have, according to reports from a variety of sources,
expressed an interest in signing additional treaties. The Soviets
can be expected to keep trying in various ways -- e.g., add offers
to persuade the Syrians to sign a treaty; President Asad can expect
Soviet pressure to sign a treaty on his trip to Moscow in.July.
Moscow may, moreover, have suggested the idea of a friendship treaty
to the People's'Democratic Republic of Yemen, and to officials in
Bangladesh as well.
16. The Soviets have also invited Yugoslavia to sign a
"general friendship" treaty. That they would do so, knowing full
well that there was virtually no chance that Tito would accept,
implies that Moscow sees some virtue in the mere proposal. It
presumably hopes that in time the recipients (in this instance
Tito's successors) can be persuaded to sign up, and that in the
interim they will view such offers as signs of Soviet goodwill.
It is clear, then, that in certain circumstances the Soviets see
both the proposals and the treaties themselves as useful diplomatic
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instruments and as yet another way to help expand the international
influence of the USSR.*
17. But presumably there is a limit to the list of
candidates in the Third World. The Soviets must be aware that
signing too many friendship treaties would tend at best to cheapen
the value of existing treaties, and at worst to embroil the Soviets
in local conflicts where they stand to lose more than they gain,
Accordingly, we do not expect the Soviets to try to sign treaties
with the smaller, strategically less important states in the Middle
East and South Asia, nor with states at great distance from the
USSR; i.e., in Latin America or Black Africa. Israel and Pakistan,
as hostile neighbors of treaty states, are not likely to be
suitable candidates.
18. As Moscow weighs the general question of legal ties
to the Third World, several considerations no doubt enter the
calculation, First of all, the Soviet government probably views
the treaties as a means of preserving the significant political
progress it-has made in this arena. Beyond this, Moscow presumably
A quite different order of Soviet considerations, but nevertheless
an indication of the current set of Soviet mind is reflected
in Moscow's interest in establishing legal relationships of
one sort or another with eveiz those states in opposing alliance
systems; e.g., the non-aggression treaty with Bonn, the p pposed
friendship treaty with Turkey, and the expressed desire to-improve
the "juridical" relationships with France, Canada, and the US,
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sees them as one more way of maintaining momentum -- or at least an
impression of momentum -- for its whole array of efforts to project
influence there. All the states which have signed treaties to date
are "progressive", if not "socialist", and on many international
issues Moscow has received more support from these capitals than
from many Communist Parties. The Soviets may believe that the treaties
will help to perpetuate this happy circumstance, Moreover, they may
hope that if any of these regimes are overthrown or otherwise replaced,
the successors may feel more bound to the Soviets, because of the
treaty, than otherwise would have been the case. The other parties
to the treaties, of course, may not share this view.
19. A second consideration is that the Soviets may believe
that the treaties serve to underwrite the extensive economic and
military aid commitments they have made with these countries. A
treaty will not force a client to pay its debts if it has exhausted
its treasury. But perhaps the Soviets believe that the spirit of
the treaty may reduce friction in the day-to-day administration of
these aid agreements. Moreover, the Soviets may reckon that the
treaties will discourage recipient states from accepting aid from
competing sources, particularly Chinese aid, which nowadays usually
can be had on far more generous terms. In any case, it is a fact
that Egypt, India,-add Iraq stand 1-2-3 on the list of active
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recipients of Soviet military aid among the Less Developed Countries,
that Egypt and India are 1 and 2 on the economic list, with Iraq
not far behind, and that certain potential treaty signatories,
especially Syria and Algeria, are also high on both lists.
20. Finally, this tendency to deal formally with Third
World states may be particularly congenial to the collective
leadership. Khrushchev?s habit was to arrange matters personally
with the Sukarnos, Nkrumahs, etc. If the bilateral relationship
sooner or later proved disadvantageous to the USSR, it was held
against him as another of his "harebrained schemes". The members
of the Politburo may prefer to have the USSR's general obligations
embodied in a formal state document at least partly in order to
protect themselves personally. Not to spin the thread too fine,
it may be worth noting that the Soviets arranged procedures so
that each of the three treaties under discussion was signed by a
different Soviet officials Perhaps no one in the Kremlin wishes to
risk his prestige on the success of all of them.
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USSR-UAR TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP
AND COOPERATION, 27 MAY 1971
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United
Arab Republic,
Being firmly convinced that the further development
of friendship and all-around cooperation between the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic
meets the interests of the peoples of both states and helps
strengthen world peace,
Being inspired by the ideals of struggle against im-
perialism and colonialism, and for the freedom, independence
and social progress of the peoples,
Being determined to wage persistently the struggle for
stronger international peace and security in accordancewith
the invariable course of their peaceable foreign policy,
Reaffirming their allegiance to the aims and principles
of the United Nations Charter,
Being driven by a desire to consolidate and strengthen
the traditional relations of sincere frJi4ndship between
the two states and peoples through concluding a treaty of
friendship and cooperation and thus creating a basis for
their further development,
Agreed on the following:
Article 1
The high contracting parties solemnly declare that un-
breakable friendship will always exist between the two
countries and their peoples. They will continue to develop
and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-
around cooperation between them in the political, economic,
scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the
basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, noninterference in the internal affairs
of each other, equality and mutual benefit.
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The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a socialist
state and the United Arab Republic, which has set itself the
aim of reconstructing society along socialist lines, will
cooperate closely and in all fields in ensuring conditions
for preserving and further developing the social and economic
gains of their peoples.
Being guided by a desire to contribute in every way
toward maintaining international peace and the security of
the peoples, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and
the United Arab Republic will continue with all determination
to make efforts toward achieving and ensuring a lasting and
fair peace in the Middle East in accordance with the aims and
principles of the United Nations Charter.
In pursuing a peace-loving foreign policy, the high
contracting parties will come out for peace, relaxation of
international tension, achievement of general and complete
disarmament and prohibition of nuclear and other types of
weapons of mass destruction,
Article 4
Being guided by the ideals of freedom and equality of
all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn im-
perialism and colonialism in all their forms and manifesta-
tions. They will continue to come out against imperialism,
for the full and final elimination of colonialism in pursu-
ance of the U.N. declaration on the granting of independence
to all colonial countries and peoples, and wage unswervingly
the struggle against racialism and apartheid.
The high contracting parties will continue to expand
and deepen all-around cooperation and exchange of experience
in the economic and scientific-technological fields -- in-
dustry, agriculture, water conservancy, irrigation, develop-
ment of natural resources, development of power engineering,
the training of national personnel and other fields of economy.
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The two sides will expand trade and sea shipping between
the two states on the basis of the principles of mutual benefit
and most-favored nation treatment.
Article 6
The high contracting parties will further promote
cooperation between them in the fields of science, arts,
literature, education, health. services, the press, radio,
televisi.on,.cinema, tourism, physical culture and other
fields.
The two sides will promote wider cooperation-and direct
connections between political and public organizations of
working people, enterprises,. cultural and scientific institu-
tions for the purpose of a deeper mutual acquaintance with
the life, work and achievements of the peoples of the two
countries.
Being deeply interested in ensuring peace and the security
of the peoples, and attaching great. importance to concertedness
of their actions in the international area in the struggle for
peace, the high contracting parties will, for this purpose,
regularly consult each other at different levels on all important
questions affecting the interests of both states.
In the event of development of situations creating, in the..
opinion of both sides, a danger to peace or violation of peace,
they will contact each other without delay in order to concert
their positions with a view to removing the threat that has
arisen or reestablishing peace.
Article 8
In the interests of strengthening the defense capacity of.
the United Arab Republic, the high contracting parties will
continue to develop cooperation in the military field on the
basis of appropriate agreements between them. Such cooperation
will provide specifically for assistance in the training of the
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ANNEX A
U.A.R. military personnel, iq:mastering the armaments and
equipment supplied to the United Arab Republic with a view
to strengthening its capacity to eliminate the consequences
of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up
to aggression in general.
Article 9
Proceeding from the aims and principles of this treaty.
Each of the high contracting parties states that it will
not enter into alliances and will not take part in any groupings
of states, in actions or measures directed against the other
high contracting party,
Article 10
Each of the high contracting parties declares that its
commitments under the existing international treaties are
not in contradiction with the provisions of this treaty and
it undertakes not to enter into any international agreements
incompatible with it.
Article 11
The present treaty will be operative within 15 years
since the day it enters into force.
If neither of the high contracting parties declares
a year before the expiry of this term its desire to term-
inate the treaty, it will remain in force for the next five
years and so henceforth until one of the high contracting
parties makes a year before the expiry.of the current five-
year period a written warning on its intention to terminate
it.
Article 12
The present treaty is subject to ratification and shall
come into force on the day of exchange of ratification in-
struments, which will take place in Moscow in the nearest future.
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ANNEX A
The present treaty is done in two copies, each in Russian
and Arabic, with both texts being equally authentic.
Done in the city of Cairo on May 27, 1971,wwhich CQrres-
ponds to 3 Rabia as Sani, 1391, Hejira.
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
N. PODGORNY.
For the United Arab Republic.
ANWAR SADATO
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ANNEX B
INDO-SOVIET TREATY OF PEACE, FRIENDSHIP,
AND COOPERATION, 9 AUGUST 1971
Desirous of expanding and consolidating the existing
relations of sincere friendship between them,
Believing that the further development of friendship
and cooperation meets the basic national interests of both
the States as well as the interests of lasting peace in
Asia and the world,
Determined to promote the consolidation. of universal
peace and security and to make steadfast efforts for the
relaxation of international tensions and the final elim-
ination of the remnants of colonialism,
Upholding their firm faith in the principles of peace-
ful co-existence and co-operation between States with
different political and social systems,
Convinced that in the world today international prob-
lems can only be solved by co-operation and not by conflict,
Reaffirming their determination to abide by the purposes
and principles of the United Nations Charter,
The Republic of India on the one side and the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the other side, have
decided to conclude the present treaty, for which purposes
the following plenipotentiaries have been appointed;
On behalf of the Republic of India: Sardar Swaran
Singh, Minister of External Affairs.
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Mr. A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs who, having
each presented their credentials, which are found to be in
proper form and due order, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
The high contracting parties solemnly declare that enduring
peace and friendship shall prevail between the two countries
and their peoples. Each party shall respect the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other party and
refrain from interfering in the other's internal affairs. The
high contracting parties shall continue to develop and
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consolidate the relations of sincere friendship, good
neighbourliness and comprehensive co-operation existing
between them on the basis of the aforesaid principles,
as well as those of equality and mutual benefit.
Guided by the desire to contribute in every possible
way to ensure enduring peace andsecurity'of their people,
the high contracting parties declare their determination to
continue their efforts to preserve and to strengthen peace
in Asia and throughout the world, to halt the arms race and
to achieve general and complete disarmament, including both
nuclear and conventional, under effective international control.
Article 3
Guided by their loyalty to the lofty ideal of equality
of.all peoples and nations, irrespective of race or creed,
the high contracting parties condemn colonialism and racial-
ism in all forms and manifestations, and reaffirm their
determination to strive for their final and complete
elimination.
The high contracting parties shall co-operate with other
States to achieve these aims and to support the just as-
pirations of the peoples in their struggle against colonial-
ism and racial domination.
Article 4
The Republic of India respects the peace-loving policy
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed at
strengthening friendship and co-operation with all.nationso
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respects India's
policy of non-alignment and reaffirms that this. policy
constitutes an important factor in the maintenance of
universal peace and international security and in the les-
sening of tensions in the world.
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Article 5
Deeply interested in ensuring universal peace and
security, attaching great importance to their mutual
co-operation in the international field for achieving
these aims, the high contracting parties will maintain
regular contacts with each other on major international
problems affecting the interests of both the States by
means of meetings and exchanges of views between their
leading statesmen, visits by official delegations and
special envoys of the two Governments, and through
diplomatic channels.
Article 6
Attaching great importance to economic, scientific and
technological co-operation between them the high contracting
parties will continue to consolidate and expand mutually
advantageous and comprehensive co-operation in these fields
as well as expand trade, transport and communications between
them on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual benefit
and most-favoured-nation treatment, subject to the existing
agreements and the special arrangements with contiguous countries
as specified in the Indo-Soviet trade agreement of Dec. 28, 1970.
Article 7
The high contracting parties shall promote further
development of ties and contacts between them in the fields
of science, art, literature, education, public health,
press, radio, television, cinema, tourism and sports.
In accordance with the traditional friendship established
between the two countries each of the high contracting parties
solemnly declares that it shall not enter into or participate
in any military alliance directed against the other party.
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Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from
any:aggression against the other party and to prevent the use
of its territory for the commission of any act.which might
inflict military damage on the other high contracting party.
Article 9
Each high contracting party undertakes to abstain from
providing any assistance to any third party-that engages in
armed conflict with the other,party. In the event of either
party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the
high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual
consultations in order to remove such threat and to take
appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security
of their countries.
Article 10
Each high contracting party solemnly declares that it shall
not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or
more States, which is incompatible with this treaty. Each high
contracting party further declares that no obligation exists,
nor shall any obligation be entered into, between itself and
any other State or States, which might cause military damage
to the other party.
Article 11
This treaty is concluded for the duration of 20 years
and will be automatically extended for each successive period-
of-five years unless either high contracting party declares
its desire to terminate it by giving notice to the other high
contracting party,12 months prior to the expiration of the
treaty. The treaty will be subject to ratification and will
come into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of
ratification which will take place in.Moscow within one month
of the signing of this treaty.
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Article 12
Any difference of interpretation of any article or
articles of this treaty which may arise between the high
contracting parties will be settled bilaterally by peace-
ful means in a spirit of mutual respect and understanding..
The said plenipotentiaries have signed the present
treaty in Hindu, Russian and English, all texts being
equally authentic and have affixed thereto their seals.
Done in.New Delhi on the ninth day of August in the
year one thousand nine hundred and seventy one.
On behalf of the Republic of India.
SWARAN SINGH
Minister of External Affairs
On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
A.A. GROMYKO
Minister of Foreign Affairs
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USSR-IRAQ TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION, 9 April 1972
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Iraqi
Republic!
Firmly convinced that the further devel opment...af 'friend-
ship and all-round cooperation between them accords with the
national interests of both states, serves the cause of peace
in the whole world and in the area of Arab countries, the
interests of the freedom of the peoples, their security and
respect of sovereignty.
Believing that the strengthening of the cohesion of-all
forces of peace and progress, including the consolidation of
the unity of Arab states, on an anti-imperialist basis is an
impo?tant means of struggle for lasting peace and international
security.
Inspired by ideals of struggle against imperialism,
colonialism, zionism and reaction, for the freedom, independence
and social progress of the peoples.
Convinced that the present-day world international problems
should be solved by way of cooperation and the search for
mutually acceptable solutions.
Confirming their peace-loving foreign policy and loyalty
to the aims and principles of the Charter of?the'United Nations
organizations.
Wishing to develop and strengthen the existing relations
of friendship, cooperation and mutual trust, striving to
raise these relations to a new, even higher level, have decided
to conclude the present treaty and agreed on the following:
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ANNEX C
Article 1
The high contracting parties declare that inviolable
friendship will exist between the two'countries and their
peoples and all-round cooperation will develop in.the polttical,
economic, trade, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields
on the basis of respect for state sovereignty, territorial
integrity and non-interference in each others internal affairs.
Article 2
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics'and the Iraqi
Republic declare that they will closely and. comprehensively
cooperate in ensuring conditions for preserving and further
developing the socio-economic gains of their peoples and
respect for the sovereignty of each of them over all their
natural resources.
Article 3
The high contracting parties, consistently pursuing the
policy of the peaceful coexistence of states with different
social systems, in accordance with their.peace-loving foreign
policy will further come out for peace in the whole world,
for-easing of international tensions, for the attainment of
general and complete disarmament, encompassing both nuclear and
conventional arms under effective international control.
Article 4
Proceeding from the ideals of freedom and the.equality
of all the peoples, the high contracting parties condemn
imperialism and colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.
They will further conduct an undeviating struggle against
imperialism and Zionism, fora full final and unconditional
liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism, racism and
apartheid, come out for the speediest full implementation of
the United Nations declaration on the granting of independence
to colonial countries and peoples.
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The sides will cooperate with each other and with other
peace-loving states in supporting the just struggle of the
peoples for their sovereignty, freedom, independence and
social progress.
Article 5
Attaching much importance to economic, technical and
scientific cooperation between them, the high contracting
parties will further expand and deepen this cooperation and
exchange of experience in industry, agriculture, irrigation
and water conservancy, in the working of oil and other natural
resources, in the field of communications and in other branches
of the economy as well as in the training of national cadres.
The sides will expand trade and shipping between the two states
on the basis of the principles of equality, mutual advantage
and most ? avnurdd nation` treatment,
Article 6
The high contracting parties will facilitate a further
development of ties and contacts between them in the field
of science, art, literature, education, public health, press,
radio, cinematography, television, tourism, sport and in other
fields.
With the aim of securing a fuller mutual acquaintance
with the life, labour and achievements of the peoples of
both countries in various fields the sides will facilitate
an expansion of cooperation and direct ties between state
bodies and public organizations, enterprises, cultural and
scientific institutions of both states.
Article 7
Attaching much importance to concerted actions on the
international scene in the interests of ensuring peace and
security and also to the development of political cooperation
between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the high contracting parties
will regularly consult each other at various levels on all
important international. questions concerning the interests of
both states, as well as on questions of further developing
bilateral relations.
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In the event of the origination of situations threatening
the peace of any of the sides or ?creating a threat to peace or
violating peace, the high contracting parties will immediately
contact each other with the aim of coordinating their positions
in the interests of removing the threat or restoring peace.
Arti cl e 9
In the interests of the security of both countries the
high contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation
in the strengthening of their defense capabilities.
Article 10
Each of the high contracting parties declares that it
will not enter alliances or take part in any groupings of
states, as well as.in actions or undertakings directed
against the other high contracting party.
Each of the high contracting parties undertakes not.to
permit the use of its territory for any act capable of inflicting
military damage to the other side.
The two high contracting parties declare that their
commitments under existing international treaties are not
in contradiction with the provisions of the present treaty
and undertake not to conclude any international agreements
incompatible with it.
The present treaty is concluded for a period of 15
years and will be automatically prolonged for each subsequent
five-year period if any of the high contracting parties
does not express its desire to terminate twelve months before
the expiration of the treaty.
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ANNEX C
Article 13
Any differences that may arise between the high
contracting parties concerning the interpretation of some
provision of the present treaty will be resolved bilaterally
in a spirit of friendship, mutual respect and understanding.
Article 14
The present treaty is subject to ratification and will
enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of
ratification, which will be effected in Moscow in the shortest
possible period of time.
The present treaty is done in two copies, each in
Russian and Arabic, both texts being of equal'authenticity.
Done in Baghdad on April 9, 1972, this according with
the 25th Safar, the 1392 year of the hegira.
For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
A. KOSYGIN
For the Iraqi Republic
A. H. AL-BAKR
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